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ABSTRACT 
Kenya adopted a new Constitution in 2010, with devolution of political power, 
responsibilities and resources to newly created counties as its centrepiece and most 
transformative aspect. Devolution was intended to address the many governance, economic 
and development problems of the country, which arose from the long history of a highly 
centralised, undemocratic and inequitable system. The main problem, however, is how to 
give effect to the stated intent of the Kenyan people and make devolution as envisaged, a 
reality. This is compounded by the fact that devolution‟s constitutional design has its 
provisions spread across and permeating the entire Constitution. Thus, the main aim of this 
thesis was to give a coherent and purposeful interpretation of the constitutional provisions on 
devolution in order to realise the objectives and intent of the Kenyan people. This study has 
advanced the argument that the central nature of devolution and its intended objectives can be 
realised through a purposive interpretation. This entails the practical realisation and 
application of the constitutional provisions by identifying the objects and purposes of 
devolution and giving effect to them. Such interpretation draws on textual, structural, 
contextual and historical elements.  The Constitution is interpreted as a whole, taking into 
account both intra-textual and extra-textual context, including the social, economic, political 
and cultural context of the country in its historical and contemporary dimensions. 
Comparative law, especially the South African jurisprudence and scholarly commentaries, 
provided instructive lessons, given the significant textual similarities between the Kenyan and 
South African constitutional provisions on devolution.  
A coherent and purposive interpretation has demonstrated that devolution was adopted to 
promote and advance democracy and accountability; development and service delivery; 
equity and inclusiveness; and limitation of centralised power. This is reflected in the values, 
objects and principles of devolution, which are not only aids for the interpretation of other 
provisions of the Constitution but also themselves operative provisions demarcating the limits 
of powers of the two levels of government. The interpretation demonstrates that the 
Constitution creates two distinct governments that must conduct their intergovernmental 
relations in a cooperative manner. The county governments are relatively autonomous; are 
represented in selected decision-making at the national level, through the Senate; and have 
both exclusive and concurrent powers. Although they have limited revenue-raising powers 
comprising property rates and entertainment taxes, they are entitled to a share of the revenue 
raised nationally as equitable shares and conditional or unconditional additional grants. The 
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national government, however, has some limited and circumscribed supervision powers. 
These conclusions have been arrived at by interpreting the devolution- and county-
empowering provisions liberally, broadly and generously in favour of the counties and 
devolution, and the national government intervention and devolution limiting provisions 
narrowly and strictly against the national government. In this process, the South African case 
law has been very useful in giving content to the purposive interpretation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1 Problem statement 
Kenya has a long history of centralised political and economic power, dating from colonial 
days. This history of centralisation engendered many governance and economic problems. 
Key among them were an illiberal and undemocratic governance system centred around an 
„imperial‟ presidency, which controlled both political and economic power, and an economic 
and development system exhibiting regional, ethnic, gender and individual inequalities. The 
centralised system hindered democratic participation of the people and communities in their 
own governance and development as well as management of their own affairs. It also 
encouraged inequitable development, distribution of resources, opportunities, and access to 
services. These problems gave rise to a long struggle and search for a good governance 
system through constitutional review,
1
 which culminated in the Constitution of 2010. The 
Constitution was approved in a referendum on 4 August 2010 and brought into operation 
through promulgation by the President on 27 August 2010. 
These events have been described as revolutionary steps in the history of the country.
2
 Many 
have observed that if properly implemented, the new Constitution should lead to 
revolutionary transformation of the country.
3
 Devolution of political power, responsibilities 
and resources is perceived as the centre piece and the most transformative aspect of the new 
                                                 
1 Agitation for change started in the mid-1980s but a formal process of constitutional review started in 2000 
when Parliament established a statutory Constitution of Kenya Review Commission. See The Final Report of 
the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission of 2005 
2
 See Kirira N „Public finance under Kenya‟s new constitution‟ (2011) Society for International Development 
(SID) Constitution Working Paper No. 5 discussing transformation in the public finance area; Nyanjom O 
„Devolution in Kenya‟s new constitution‟ (2011) Society for International Development (SID) Constitution 
Working Paper No. 4 identifying some of the areas in which transformation is expected; Sihanya B „The 
presidency and public authority in Kenya‟s new Constitutional Order‟ (2011) Society for International 
Development (SID) Constitution Working Paper No. 2 discussing transformation in the executive and 
presidency; and World Bank Devolution without Disruption: Pathways to a Successful New Kenya (2012) v. 
3
 Task Force on Devolved Government, Final Report on Devolved Government in Kenya: Developmental 
Devolved Government for Effective and Sustainable Counties (2011) 14-15. See also Ojwang JB Ascendant 
Judiciary in East Africa: Reconfiguring the Balance of Power in a Democratizing Constitutional Order (2013) 
35. 
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Constitution
4
 having been identified as the main solution of the problems of centralisation 
long before the formal process of constitutional review started.
5
 While there are 
improvements in various other aspects of the Constitution such as recognition of the 
supremacy of the Constitution, separation of powers, the Bill of Rights and a more 
independent judiciary, these existed even in the repealed Constitution. However, devolution 
did not exist there and is viewed as the major change the new Constitution introduces that 
will have far-reaching implications for many aspects of government.
6
 If the Constitution in 
general, and devolution in particular, are properly understood and implemented, Kenyan 
society should be fundamentally transformed, leading to positive change in the lives of the 
people.
7
 
The main problem, however, is that devolution is the most complex and least understood 
aspect of the Constitution.
8
 Contrary to popular belief, devolution permeates the entire 
Constitution. For instance, because Chapter Eleven of the Constitution is titled „devolved 
government‟ many wrongly understand this chapter, which establishes counties, to be the 
only one that deals with devolution of power. This is far from the truth – reference to 
devolution and devolved government or governance is reference to a system comprising both 
the national and county levels of government,
9
 and not just one level. As such, the system of 
                                                 
4
 See World Bank (2012) v, which notes that „[d]evolution is at the heart of the new Constitution and a key 
vehicle for addressing spatial inequities‟.  
5
 See s 3 Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2000. 
6
 See Zutt J and Tooth G „Forward‟ in World Bank (2012) iii, where they observe that „Kenya‟s new 
Constitution envisages far-reaching changes to the way that government operates and relates to its citizens, with 
a view of making it more fair, efficient, transparent, and accountable. Devolution is a core dimension of this 
ambition, and one that will profoundly affect the daily lives of Kenyans from all walks of life.‟ 
7
 World Bank (2012) 1. 
8
 World Bank (2012) 1, where it is stated: „The centerpiece of the changes is the devolution of powers to a new 
tier of constitutionally entrenched county governments. In terms of achieving the promise of greater equity and 
participation, devolution lies at the heart of the new system of government. Devolution will be one of the most 
complex aspects of the new constitutional arrangement to implement, but it holds the promise of having the 
greatest impact on the lives of ordinary Kenyans, particularly those living in traditionally marginalized and 
peripheral regions of the country.‟ 
9
 Ghai YP & Ghai JC, Kenya’s Constitution: An Instrument for Change (2011) 118. 
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devolved government informs the whole Constitution.
10
 In terms of design, the rules 
governing devolution of power appear in almost all the chapters of the Constitution, which 
are intertwined. The chapters on public finance,
11
 the legislature,
12
 land and environment,
13
 
the bill of rights,
14
 public service,
15
 leadership and integrity,
16
 and the judiciary, among 
others, all deal with matters of devolution. To understand and give effect to devolution in 
Kenya one must look beyond Chapter Eleven to the other chapters, bearing in mind their 
interconnections.
17 
Devolution, however, remains a contested subject in Kenya given its controversial history, 
central role in the constitutional design, and the impact it has on vested centralised interests. 
Moreover, national government may not fully accept the consequences of devolution as 
provided for in the Constitution. In addition, it is a novel concept in the Kenyan system, 
which many are yet to understand. Devolution is therefore potentially going to be a highly 
litigated area in the Kenyan system. Ojwang observes that 
[d]evolution under the new Constitution will, in all probability, result in a 
major shift in the power configuration: as the various counties have urgent 
                                                 
10
 Article 1(4) of the Constitution, which provides that „the sovereign power of the people is exercised at – (a) 
the national level; and (b) the county level,‟ begins the Constitutional organization of governance in a devolved 
manner.  
11
 Among other matters, the chapter deals with the sharing of taxation functions and powers between the 
national and county levels of government (art 209); the empowering of both the national and county 
governments to borrow money (arts 211, 212, 213 and 214); the equitable sharing of revenue raised nationally 
among the national and county levels of government (arts 201, 202, 203 and 204); and the budgetary processes 
of both the national and county levels of government (arts 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223 and 224). 
12
 The chapter establishes a bicameral parliament with the Senate representing the counties and serving to 
protect the interests of counties and their governments (arts 93 and 96). 
13
 Arts 62 and 67.  
14
 The obligations imposed upon the state by the Bill of Rights bind both the national and county governments.  
15
 The chapter envisages the establishment of a public service for each of the two levels of government, and 
Article 232 provides for values and principles of public service which apply to public service at both levels of 
government. 
16
 The chapter provides for leadership and integrity standards which bind leadership at both levels of 
government.  
17
 See Speaker of the Senate and another v Attorney General and others [2013] eKLR (Speaker of the Senate) 
para 183. 
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developmental priorities, and with their elected leadership committed to local 
issues, they are unlikely to render themselves amenable to undue control by 
the central government. The county set-ups are destined to generate 
contentious matters for judicial determination, in view of the competing 
interests therein, and also in relation to possible conflicts with the national 
authorities.
18
 
As any constitution providing for a framework for the distribution and limitation of state 
power must be interpreted, and because the language of constitutions is often open to more 
than one interpretation, the controversy and contention will be about the meaning of the 
devolution provisions in the Constitution. Disputes will abound about: the meaning, form and 
extent of the devolution adopted; the functional and responsibility distribution among the 
different levels of government; the resource sharing and entitlement by the different levels of 
government; the institutional arrangements and their roles; the intergovernmental 
relationships; and the balance of power among the levels of government. Indeed, if the central 
role of devolution and its intended objectives are to be realised, a comprehensive, coherent 
and consistent way of resolving some of these disputes is imperative. 
Since Kenya has adopted devolution through a supreme Constitution,
19
 constitutionalised and 
entrenched the system, the resolution of these issues will depend on interpretation of the 
relevant provisions. Yet there is no history of Kenyan constitutional jurisprudence on 
devolution. Furthermore, Kenya‟s jurisprudence on interpretation of a supreme constitution 
under the replaced Constitution was not consistent as it kept fluctuating between recognition 
of constitutional supremacy and occasional reversion to parliamentary sovereignty. 
2 Research question 
Because of the problems raised above, the main question this study raises and seeks to answer 
is how to interpret the devolution provisions in order to give full effect to the objectives of 
devolution as the centrepiece of the new Constitution. The study seeks to examine how a 
purposive interpretation, which the Constitution provides for,
20
 can be used to provide a 
comprehensive, coherent and consistent interpretation of the constitutional provisions on 
                                                 
18
 Ojwang (2013) 54. 
19
 Art 2.  
20
 Arts 159(2)(e) and 259(1)(a). 
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devolution. It does so by asking the following sub-questions: given the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the prospect of constitutional review, how should the devolution provisions 
of the Constitution be interpreted? How can effect be given to devolution‟s transformative 
intent? Given the novelty of devolution, can foreign jurisprudence provide assistance in the 
interpretation of these provisions? In particular, given the scale of borrowing from the South 
African Constitution and the striking textual similarities in a number of provisions, can South 
African jurisprudence be useful? Since the adoption of the Constitution the Kenyan Courts 
have turned to and used South African case law especially in respect of the interpretation of 
the Bill of Rights, which has textual similarities to the South African Bill of Rights. Can 
South African jurisprudence also be used in the interpretation of the devolution provisions 
although the structures of government have some differences? 
3 Argument 
This study makes the argument that the Kenyan people adopted devolution as the central and 
most transformative aspect of the Constitution not as an end in itself, but as a tool of 
achieving specific objectives.
21
 First, by constitutionalising and entrenching devolution in the 
Constitution, they aimed to achieve real non-centralism and not mere decentralisation or 
delegation by national government. Secondly, devolution was intended to address the 
numerous problems of centralisation that were rooted in the previously highly centralised 
system. Devolution must ensure equitable development, and distribution of resources, 
opportunities and services,
22
 in order to reduce the regional disparities that engender 
perceptions and feelings of ethnic discrimination and hatred.
23
 It must give the Kenyan 
people and communities the benefits of democratic and accountable exercise of power,
24
 
enabling them to participate in and manage their own affairs of governance, and economic 
and social development.
25
 It aims to provide proximate and easily accessible services.
26
 It 
                                                 
21
 Art 174.  
22
 Arts 174(f) and (g), and 201(a) and (b). 
23
 Arts 10(2)(b), 203(1) and 204(2). 
24
 Art 174(a). 
25
 Arts 174(c) and (d). 
26
 Art 174(f). 
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must ensure affirmative action for and protection and promotion of the interests and rights of 
minorities and marginalized communities.
27
 
Given these objectives, the thrust of the argument presented in this study is that the 
constitutional framework on devolution must be interpreted in a manner that seeks to give full 
effect to these objectives and purposes. A purposive approach to the interpretation of the 
devolution provisions, which the Constitution incorporates,
28
 is pursued because 
constitutional interpretation is purposive in nature and draws on textual, structural, 
contextual, historical and comparative elements.
29
 It is argued that the economic, social, 
political and cultural context of Kenyan society and the constitutional drafting history should 
play a role in the purposive interpretation of the devolution provisions.
30
 
It is further argued that since there are significant textual similarities between the Kenyan and 
South African constitutional provisions on devolution, comparative South African 
jurisprudence and scholarly commentaries provide instructive lessons. In addition, 
jurisprudence from other countries such as Germany, Canada, United States of America and 
Nigeria, which have non-centralised systems, also provides lessons in some respects. It is 
concluded that, interpreted in this manner, a comprehensive and consistent constitutional 
framework on devolution which gives full effect to the objective and intent of the Kenyan 
people can be realised. 
4 Literature survey and significance of the study 
Much has been written with regard to interpretation,
31
 particularly on the importance of the 
interpretation of works in the field of law and constitutional law.
32
 According to JR de Ville, 
                                                 
27
 Art 174(e). 
28
 Arts 159(2)(e) and 259(1)(a). 
29
 Davis D, Chaskalson M & De Waal J „Democracy and constitutionalism: The role of constitutional 
interpretation‟ in Van Wyk D et al (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order 
(1994) 1-130; Stevens J The Interpretation of Fundamental Rights Provisions: International and Regional 
Standards in African and other Common Law Jurisdictions (1998) 5-8; and Hogg PW „Interpreting the Charter 
of Rights: Generosity and justification‟ (1990) 28 (4) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 818.  
30
 Watts RL „Federalism in fragmented and segmented societies‟ in Kramer J & Schneider (eds) Federalism and 
Civil Society (1999) 145-63. 
31
 Du Plessis L & Corder H Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 61. 
32
 De Ville JR Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) 2-3. 
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although similarities exist between interpretation in law and in other literary works, there is at 
least one important difference. Interpretation in law has concrete consequences in the real 
world and lives of human beings as legal words normally have profound effects on the 
concrete domain. It should therefore not be seen as an activity whose outcome does not 
matter or as simply a playing with words. This is even more important in the field of 
constitutional law.
33
 Robert M Cover observes thus: 
Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death. This is true in 
several senses. Legal interpretative acts signal and occasion the imposition of 
violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as 
a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life. 
Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for violence which has 
already occurred or which is about to occur. When interpreters have finished 
their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn 
apart by those organized, social practices of violence. Neither legal 
interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly understood apart 
from one another.
34
 
These effects of pain and death have more impact and severe implications in the field of 
constitutional interpretation and much more in the field of devolution. Because of this the 
literature draws a distinction between, firstly, interpretation of a constitution and that of an 
ordinary statute; and secondly, interpretation in a constitutional system founded upon 
parliamentary sovereignty
35
 and in that of constitutional supremacy.
36
 The two systems are 
seen as different and having different implications in many fields, including that of 
interpretation. This literature establishes certain rules applicable to the interpretation of a 
supreme constitution and the Bill of Rights. In doing this the literature draws from 
                                                 
33
 De Ville JR (2000) 1. 
34
 Cover RM „Violence and the world‟ (1986) Yale Law Journal 1601, 1601. 
35
 Phillips H & Jackson P Constitutional and Administrative Law (1987) 25; Loveland I Constitutional Law: A 
Critical Introduction (1996) 26; Wade HWR and Forsyth Administrative Law (1994) 30; see also Sir William 
Wade, The Hamlyn Lectures: Thirty Second Series – Constitutional Fundamentals (1989) 27; and Brazier R 
Constitutional Reform: Re-shaping the British Political System (1991) 10-11.  
36
 Rautenbach IM General Provisions of the South African Bill of Rights (1995) 56. See also Ge Devenish A 
Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 585; and Steytler N Constitutional Criminal Procedure: 
A Commentary on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1998) 7-10. 
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jurisprudence established by courts in various countries. It teases out a number of rules of 
constitutional interpretation including the recognition of the fact that a constitution is a 
document sui generis, requiring special rules of interpretation.
37
 
This study focuses on devolution in the Kenyan Constitution and its purposive interpretation. 
Since the coming into force of the new Constitution, there has not been any literature written 
on this subject. Ghai and Ghai‟s commentary38 provides a brief overview of the entire 
Constitution as an instrument for change. It has a brief section on devolution which does not 
address the question of a purposive interpretation of the devolution provisions. The World 
Bank‟s „devolution without disruption,‟39 although providing a detailed analysis on the 
practical aspects and challenges of implementation of devolution, does not focus on the legal 
and constitutional purposive interpretation dimensions. Lumumba and Frenceschi‟s 
introductory commentary also remains at this introductory level.
40
 It briefly touches on the 
devolution provisions but does not move to the level of interpretation. Ojwang‟s book on the 
ascendant judiciary focuses on the judiciary and its elevated role under the new Constitution. 
It correctly sees the judiciary as destined to play a critical role in giving effect to devolution 
and settling the likely disputes on devolution matters especially among the levels of 
government.
41
 Bosire‟s doctoral thesis on devolution for development, conflict resolution, 
and limiting central power, provides a detailed analysis of devolution in the Kenyan 
Constitution.
42
 It concentrates on the design aspects and how these can be traded off in order 
to achieve the objectives of development, conflict resolution and centre-constraining. It seeks 
to evaluate the design to see whether or not it is appropriate for achieving these objectives. It 
does not, however, address the purposive interpretation dimensions of the devolution 
                                                 
37
 Stevens J The Interpretation of Fundamental Rights Provisions: International & Regional Standards in 
African and other Common Law Jurisdictions (1998) International Centre Against Censorship, Report on article 
19, 1-2; Steytler N (1998) 7; Minister of Home Affairs and another v Fisher and another (1980) AC 319, 329; 
Thornhill v A-G of Trinidad and Tobago (1981) AC 61 (PC) 69; Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana 
(1994) (1) BCLR 92 (B)118; and Dow v Attorney General (1992) LRC (const) 623, 632-3. 
38
 Ghai & Ghai (2011). 
39
 World Bank (2012). 
40
 Lumumba PLO & Franceschi L The Constitution of Kenya, 2010: An Introductory Commentary (2014). 
41
 Ojwang (2013) 53-4. 
42
 Bosire CM Devolution for development, conflict resolution, and limiting central power: An analysis of the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010 (unpublished Phd thesis, University of Western Cape, 2013). 
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provisions. A few commissioned research papers
43
 have also been published on the new 
Constitution but they are fairly general and do not address the interpretation aspects of the 
devolution provisions. It is thus clear that there is a dearth of literature on the issue of 
purposive interpretation of the devolution provisions, which this study seeks to provide. 
A large body of literature by scholars of the South African system provides some insights that 
may be instructive in developing a purposive approach to the Kenyan devolution 
provisions.
44
 Though this literature may provide useful insights for this study, it does not 
canvass specifically and comprehensively interpretation of constitutional provisions on 
devolution and is not focused on Kenyan devolution. 
Drawing from this comparative literature and jurisprudence, this study provides a 
comprehensive interpretation of the Kenyan constitutional provisions on devolution. This is a 
significant contribution to be used by various arms of government such as the judiciary, 
legislative institutions at both levels of government, speakers of these legislative institutions, 
executive institutions at both levels, and commissions and independent offices, which have a 
constitutional interpretation mandate.
45
 Even private individuals in the course of their 
interaction with each other and with the governments will find this work significant as they 
deal with interpretation questions.
46
 The judiciary as the determinative interpreter of the law 
and forum before which the litigation will be undertaken may find this study particularly 
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 Kirira N (2011); Nyanjom O (2011) and Sihanya B.  
44
 See for example Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government of South Africa (2011); Bishop M „Remedies‟ in 
Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2
 ed (2011) ch 9; Du Plessis L „Interpretation‟ in 
Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2
 ed (2011) ch 32; Steytler N & Fessha YT „Defining 
local government powers and functions‟ (2007) 124 South African Law Journal 320-38; Michelman FI „The 
rule of law, legality and the supremacy of the Constitution‟ in Woolman S et al Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2
 ed ch 11 (2011); Bronstein V „Legislative competence‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2
 ed (2011) ch 15; Malherbe R „The constitutional distribution of powers‟ in De Villiers B (ed) 
Review of provinces and local governments in South Africa: Constitutional foundation and practice (2008) 19; 
and Madlingozi T and Woolman S „Provincial legislative authority‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional 
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ed (2011) ch 19. 
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useful as it will be called upon to render determinative meaning of the constitutional 
devolution provisions.
47
 
Given the central role of devolution and its design, which spans most of the chapters of the 
Constitution, a comprehensive coverage of the issues raised in this study necessitated a 
lengthy document. 
5 Research Methodology 
This research is based on a critical analysis and review of both primary and secondary 
literature relevant to the subject area. Most important among the primary sources has been the 
Constitution of Kenya. Besides this, at the comparative level, an analysis and review of 
constitutional provisions of other countries‟ constitutions relevant to devolution has been 
undertaken. Given the lengthy constitution-making process in Kenya, reliance has also been 
placed on reports of government commissions, committees and task forces which have been 
and continue to be involved in processes of constitution-making and implementation. 
Instances of Kenyan case law are examined to draw both positive and negative lessons. 
In addition to primary sources, a critical analysis and review of secondary sources such as 
scholarly works in the form of textbooks and journal articles on the subject of devolution 
have been undertaken. The analysis of these scholarly works and comparative approaches and 
experiences of other countries have provided useful lessons in understanding the theoretical 
and conceptual foundations of some of the issues in the theory, architecture and design of 
devolution. 
Since the framers of the Kenyan Constitution borrowed heavily from the South African 
Constitution, particularly in as far as the system of devolved government is concerned, the 
study has used South African jurisprudence in interpreting the Kenyan Constitution. Besides 
the South African experience, other appropriate comparative jurisdictions such as Germany, 
Canada and India, among other sources, have been used. The overall aim of this study is to 
provide a coherent, purposive interpretation of key devolution provisions of the Kenyan 
Constitution, using the usual techniques of constitutional interpretation, in a manner that 
gives effect to the envisaged centrality of devolution and its objectives and purposes. 
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6 Chapter outline 
This study is organised and presented in a number of chapters. Chapter Two deals with the 
approach to interpretation to be followed in the interpretation of the devolution provisions. 
Chapter Three discusses the Kenyan political, economic, social and cultural history which led 
to the adoption of the devolved system of government, since it has been identified as one of 
the extra-textual sources of purposive interpretation. It aims at establishing the problems and 
challenges which led to the adoption of devolution. Chapter Four examines the provisions on 
the values, objects and principles of devolution, which form part of the basic structure of the 
Constitution. It examines the nature of the objects and principles within the constitutional 
framework and the status of these provisions and whether they are enforceable as law. 
Chapter Five interprets the provisions establishing the levels of governance and demarcation 
of county boundaries, and institutions and structures of governance at the county level. The 
focus of Chapter Six is the examination and interpretation of the constitutional provisions on 
the functions and powers of the two levels of government. In Chapter Seven the provisions 
dealing with financial resources for both levels of government are considered. Chapter Eight 
focuses attention on the provisions covering supervision and intervention by national 
government into the affairs of county governments. Chapter Nine undertakes an examination 
of the provisions on co-operative government and intergovernmental relations. In Chapter 
Ten the constitutional provisions on the Senate as an institution of shared rule are critically 
considered and examined. Consideration of the constitutional provisions dealing with the 
process of transition to devolved government is undertaken in Chapter Eleven. Chapter 
Twelve concludes the study by addressing the major questions that arose in previous 
chapters. 
7 Defining devolution and related concepts 
Given that this study is about the interpretation of the devolution provisions in the 
Constitution, devolution and other related concepts call for working definitions. This is 
necessary in order to make it clear from the outset what the term „devolution‟ or „devolved 
government‟ and other related terms and forms of organising governance such as federalism, 
decentralisation, delegation and deconcentration will mean when used in this study. 
7.1 Devolution 
There is no fixed definition of the term devolution, although it is a form of organising 
governance which is often used to mean different things in different circumstances. Countries 
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have used the term to describe systems that differ markedly from each other. For example, 
the United Kingdom‟s „devolution‟ is completely different from the Ugandan „devolution‟ 
and what Kenya has adopted as „devolution‟. Likewise, the devolution adopted by Zimbabwe 
in 2013 differs markedly from these others. Each country‟s devolution must thus be evaluated 
within its own constitutional or statutory context to determine its meaning, form and content, 
in order to distinguish or locate it within the conceptual framework of the other systems of 
organising governance such as federalism, decentalisation, delegation and deconcentration. 
For the purposes of this study the legal meaning of Kenyan devolution must be drawn from 
what the Constitution presents it to be. It is presented as a system of multilevel government 
under which the Constitution creates two distinct and interdependent levels of government – 
the national and county – that are required to conduct their mutual relations in a consultative 
and cooperative manner. The Constitution assigns them powers and functions which include 
revenue raising and sharing powers, and grants the counties participation rights and 
representation in the national legislature through the Senate. Because of the distinct and 
interdependent nature of the levels of government and the manner of their functional 
assignment, the Constitution also provides for a system of intergovernmental relations, 
including dispute resolution among the governments it creates. Thus, the system creates 
counties that are fundamentally different from the local government that hitherto existed 
under the replaced constitutional dispensation. Their distinct nature renders them relatively 
autonomous and coordinate rather than subordinate to the national government. However, 
national government is granted limited powers of supervision and intervention in county 
affairs which are constitutionally circumscribed and constrained, and must be exercised 
within the framework of cooperative government. 
7.2 Federalism 
Federalism is one of the systems of organising governance which combines self-governance 
at the local level with shared governance at the national level.
48
 As such, power is organised 
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and administered vertically by two or more distinct levels of government.
49
 Crucial to the 
normative definition of a non-centralised or federal system is the division of the country into 
mutually exclusive geographic territorial units.
50
 The system then „grants partial autonomy to 
the geographically defined subdivisions of the polity‟, making the system lie somewhere 
between a fully unitary state and an alliance of separate states working in a kind of 
confederation.
51
 Elazar excludes hierarchy in his conception of a classical federal or non-
centralised system; instead he conceives of co-ordinate tiers of government,
52
 which he 
associates with the social contract theory of government and calls it contractual non-
centralisation: 
Contractual non-centralisation – the structured dispersion of power among 
many centers whose legitimate authority is constitutionally guaranteed – is 
the key to the widespread and entrenched diffusion of power that remains the 
principle characteristic of and argument for federal democracy.53 
According to Watts, „federalism provides a technique of constitutional organization that 
permits action by a shared government for certain common purposes in a larger political unit, 
combined with autonomous action by smaller constituent units of government, directly and 
democratically responsible to their own electorates‟.54 Hogg identifies the most essential 
characteristic of a federal Constitution as the distribution of governmental power between 
coordinate central and regional authorities. He emphasises that this requires a constitution 
which defines the powers vested in the central and regional authorities, and which must be in 
writing because such a vital matter could not be left to unwritten understandings. The 
constitution must be supreme, binding on, and unalterable by each of the central and regional 
authorities. He observes that if either of the governments could unilaterally change the 
                                                 
49
 Kommers DP & Thompson WJ „Fundamentals in the liberal constitutional tradition‟ in Joachim Jens Hesse & 
Nevil Johnson (eds) Constitutional Policy and Change in Europe (1995) 34. 
50
 Watts (1999) 150. 
51
 Feeley MM & Rubin E Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise (2008) 22. 
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 Elazar (1971) 91-106.  
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distribution of powers, then the authorities would not be coordinate since supreme power 
would lie with the authority having the power to change the Constitution.
55
 
There are two types of federal systems: the dualist competitive system and the integrative 
cooperative system. Because of this, different countries adopt different forms depending on 
their particular circumstances. Some scholars even say that there are no two similar 
systems.
56
 Watts points out that some are hybrids drawing from both centralised and non-
centralised systems.
57
 
7.3 Decentralisation 
A federal system must be distinguished from a decentralised system, considered by some 
scholars as being essentially a centralised system which delegates some of its powers and 
functions to lower level units.
58
 A decentralised system involves the transfer of powers by a 
central government to sub-national units which exercise those received powers under the 
control and supervision of the central government that is transferring the powers to them. The 
central defining feature here is that the lower units, their nature and form, are creatures of the 
central government, the powers and functions they exercise and perform, and the resources 
they use are assigned and allocated to them by the central government. The lower units are 
subordinate and not coordinate to the central government since they are not created and 
protected by the constitution and they can easily be abolished or their powers and functions 
recentralised or re-adjusted by the central government. According to Elazar: 
Decentralization implies the existence of a central authority, a central 
government. The government that can decentralize can recentralize if it so 
desires. Hence, in decentralized systems the diffusion of power is actually a 
matter of grace, not right, and, as history reveals, in the long run it is usually 
treated as such.
59
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Stauffer and Topperwien, on the other hand, define decentralisation from the perspective of 
the combination of self-rule and shared-rule,
60
 as a system under which the sub-entities are 
granted a certain measure of self-rule but without shared-rule.
61
 
This study adopts Elazar‟s definition as the working definition for decentralisation whenever 
this terminology is used. From this perspective, decentralisation can be used in both unitary 
and federal systems. For example, under the Kenyan Constitution the county governments 
have both original constitutional functions and powers, and decentralised functions and 
powers delegated by the national government. In addition, the counties are required to 
decentralise their functions and provision of services to lower units. 
7.4 Delegation 
Delegation, a form of decentralisation, involves the transfer of responsibilities for specifically 
defined functions to structures that exist outside of central government, which retains indirect 
control of them. The central government has discretion in deciding whether or not the power 
or function should be delegated.
62
 It is also generally empowered to withdraw the delegation 
of powers and functions. The units to which the power is delegated are mere agents since 
they have their own employees, in contrast to a deconcentrated system. It is for this reason, 
among others, that delegation is said to be to bodies outside the central government.
63
 
According to De Visser, delegation takes place when a power that originally belonged to the 
central government is transferred to a sub-national government. Although the central 
government has discretion in deciding whether or not to delegate the power or function, and 
can circumscribe the delegated power and subsequently withdraw it, it is prevented from 
exercising the power once it is delegated.
64
 The central government does not have direct 
control over the delegates but it has the discretion to determine whether or not to delegate, 
what to delegate and to whom. It also has discretion regarding when to end the delegation and 
withdraw the responsibility. Delegation focuses more on executive powers. 
                                                 
60
 Stauffer T & Topperwien N „Balancing self-rule and shared rule‟ in Fleiner LRB & Feiner T (eds) Federalism 
and Multiethnic States: The case of Switzerland, 2
nd
 Revised Edition (2000) 41-74. 
61
 Stauffer & Topperwien (2000) 43. 
62
 De Visser (2005) 14.  
63
 Ahmad J, Bird R & Litvack J Rethinking Decentralisation in Developing Countries (1998) World Bank 4-6.  
64
 De Visser (2011) 14. 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
National government can assign some of its legislative and executive powers and functions to 
county governments. First, the assignment by national government of some of its powers and 
functions to county governments as envisaged by Article 186(3) is a typical example of 
decentralisation through delegation.
65
 Where such assignment or delegation is of legislative 
powers, the county governments are given the discretion to determine the policy and 
legislation and to implement this legislation. They are not accountable to national 
government on what to put in the legislation and how to implement it, as long as they act 
within the parameters of their assigned powers. The powers can however be repealed by 
national government. Secondly, it is delegation of powers and functions when national 
government, in terms of Article 183(1)(b), requires a county executive committee to 
implement national legislation or aspects of it within the county.
66
 In this case, the county 
government is accountable to national government regarding what it implements and the 
manner in which it implements the legislation. Thirdly, delegation of powers and functions 
arises when in terms of Article 187(1) the national government by agreement transfers some 
of its functions to county government. The county government is accountable to national 
government when exercising such transferred powers as it is bound by the agreement of 
transfer.
67
 Fourthly, the decentralisation by county governments envisaged by Article 176(2) 
contemplates the delegation variant.
68
 
7.5 Deconcentration 
According to De Visser, deconcentration involves „the distribution of powers and 
responsibilities among different units or levels within a central government‟ in a manner that 
ensures that the units or levels are agents that are, ultimately, accountable to the central 
government. The main defining feature is the fact that the allocation of responsibilities occurs 
within the hierarchy of central government in the sense that the central authority is superior 
and can direct, instruct and supervise the local units, which are subordinate.
69
 The local units 
are directly controlled and ultimately accountable to the central authority and not to the 
people. Deconcentration is administrative in nature in that it involves entities that are part of 
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the central authority on whose behalf they act. It involves the central authority opening its 
own departmental and ministerial administrative field offices in the sub-units. Effectively, 
deconcentration is not decentralisation as it does not involve any transfer of functions and 
powers, which are retained by the central authority as the employer of the field officers who 
implement its decisions. According to Stauffer and Topperwien, deconcentration is a system 
where the sub-entities are merely administrative units which have neither a right to self-rule 
nor shared-rule, and can be changed by the central authority since they have no autonomy.
70
 
The defining feature is the lack of both self-rule and shared-rule. In the course of the 
discharge of their functions, both the national and county governments may employ the 
deconcentration strategy, and may combine it with decentralisation. 
The decentralisation by state organs from the capital of Kenya envisaged by Article 174(h) 
and the reasonable access to services envisaged by Article 6(3) take the form of 
deconcentration.
71
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Although devolution in the Kenyan context need not be labelled a federation, what is clear is 
that it is not mere decentralisation. The system has quite a number of federal features which 
are entrenched in the Constitution and cannot be changed on a whim of the national 
government. These features are, however, complemented by some aspects of decentralisation 
as discussed above. The system closely resembles the South African one and may correctly 
be described as quasi-federal. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
An approach to the interpretation of the devolution provisions in 
the Constitution 
1 Interpreting devolution provisions as part of a supreme constitution 
The new Constitution is founded upon two major principles: the sovereignty of the people
1
 
and the supremacy of the Constitution.
2
 The High Court of Kenya in two cases challenging 
the constitution-making process drew a distinction between the constituent power of the 
people as the sovereign and the supremacy of the Constitution as the will of the people.
3
 As 
the supreme law of the land the Constitution binds and controls all persons and state organs at 
both levels of government.
4
 
Based on the fact that constitutional supremacy
5
 is different from a system founded upon 
parliamentary sovereignty,
6
 courts and scholars across the world have developed an approach 
to the interpretation of a supreme constitution
7
 that is different from the one used in a system 
                                                 
1
 Article 1 and the preamble to the Constitution which declares that it is „[w]e the people of Kenya‟ who, when 
„exercising our sovereign and inalienable right to determine the form of governance of our country‟ have 
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the Implementation of the Constitution v Parliament of Kenya and another [2013] eKLR para 71, where the 
court observed that „[t]h golden thread running through the Constitution is one of sovereignty of the people of 
Kenya‟.  
2
 Art 2. 
3
 Timothy Njoya and others v Attorney General, and others (2004) AHRLR 157 (KeHC 2004) (Njoya 1); and 
Patrick Ouma Onyango and others v Attorney General and others [2005] eKLR (Onyango). 
4
 Art 2(1). 
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 Gardbaum S „The new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism‟ (2001) 49 American Journal of 
Comparative law 707-60. 
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 Marbury v Madison 5 US 137, 2 Led. 60 (1803), in which Justice John Marshall established the principle of 
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based on parliamentary sovereignty.
8
 From this, specific principles and rules for the 
interpretation of the Constitution have emerged. In addition, other principles and rules for the 
interpretation of bills of rights, which are entrenched in a supreme constitution, have also 
been developed.
9
 This approach is generally referred to as a purposive interpretation.
10
 In 
keeping with comparative jurisprudence and literature in this area, these principles and rules 
of constitutional interpretation have been incorporated into the Kenyan Constitution. Both 
Article 159, which provides for principles guiding the exercise of judicial authority,
11
 and 
Article 259, which, provides for rules for construing the Constitution, prescribe a purposive 
and value-based approach to interpretation.
12
 Article 20, when addressing the application of 
the Bill of Rights, also prescribes a value-based and purposive interpretation of rights.
13
 Since 
devolution has been entrenched in the Constitution, the constitutional provisions on 
devolution must also be interpreted following this purposive approach. 
1.1 The meaning of a supreme Constitution 
Article 2 of the Constitution of Kenya establishes the doctrine of constitutional supremacy in 
the following terms: 
1) This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and binds all 
persons and all State organs at both levels of government. 
2) No person may claim or exercise State authority except as authorised 
under this Constitution. 
                                                 
8
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th
) 321, 395-6. See also S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) para 14, in 
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Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher: „A supreme constitution requires a generous interpretation 
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              3).... 
4) Any law, including customary law, that is inconsistent with this 
Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or 
omission in contravention of this Constitution is invalid. 
The explicit message is that the Constitution is the highest law as compared with all other 
laws and binds all state organs and persons. The High Court in Martin Nyagah Wambora and 
others v The Speaker of the Senate and others commented on the meaning of this supremacy 
clause thus: 
This means that no person or state organ is above the law and above the 
Constitution. All organs created by the Constitution are subordinate to it. 
Further, Article 10(1) binds all state organs, state officers and public officers 
and all persons while applying and interpreting the Constitution. Therefore, 
when any of these organs steps outside its area of operation, this Court will 
not hesitate to intervene.14 
This supremacy is best understood by distinguishing it from its polar opposite system of 
parliamentary sovereignty. While the system of parliamentary sovereignty rests upon the 
principle that parliament is a sovereign law-maker with unfettered power,
15
 that of 
constitutional supremacy rests upon the principle that the people are sovereign and when they 
express their will through the Constitution, the Constitution becomes the supreme law which 
limits all governmental authority, including the power of parliament to legislate and perform 
all its other functions.
16
 The supremacy of the Constitution therefore derives from the 
sovereignty of the people. Justice Kasango in the Njoya case observed that „[t]he Constitution 
of Kenya which is the supreme law of this country is the will of the people or the mandate 
they give to indicate the manner in which they ought to be governed‟.17 The High Court in 
Onyango clarified the hierarchical relationship between the sovereign people and the supreme 
constitution thus: 
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The reason for this is that constituent power cannot be fettered by an existing 
Constitution in that in the hierarchy of power, the people come first and it is 
the people who gave rise to a Constitution. They are the supreme law givers. 
The Constitution though supreme is subordinate to the people.18 
According to Justice Ringera, „the Constitution is not supreme because it says so: its 
supremacy is a attribute to its having been made by a higher power, a power higher than the 
Constitution itself or any of its creatures. The Constitution is supreme because it is made by 
they in whom the sovereign power is reposed, the people themselves‟.19 
Inherent in the supremacy of the Constitution (or the concept of constitutionalism) is the 
notion of limited governmental power. As Justice Ringera put it, „The concept of 
constitutionalism betokens limited government under the rule of law. Every organ of 
government has limited powers, none is inferior or superior to the other, none is supreme: the 
Constitution is supreme and they all bow to it.‟20 Accordingly, the legislature‟s power to alter 
the Constitution is subjected to procedural and substantive limitations requiring completely 
different and difficult procedures compared with those for alteration of ordinary legislation. 
Similarly, its powers of law enactment and limitation of the rights of the citizens are 
themselves limited by the Constitution, both in substance and procedure.
21
 This is contrasted 
with a constitution based on parliamentary sovereignty, such as the orthodox Westminster 
model, which is regarded as just another statute. Under such a system, all laws including 
statutes of a constitutional nature were equal, which meant that they could be made and 
unmade by Parliament at its own will and following the same procedures.
22
 Because of this, 
there were no constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights.
23
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1.2 The role of the courts 
One consequence of constitutional supremacy is that the judiciary has the power of 
constitutional interpretation and judicial review which it must use to strike down legislation 
or any other action if found to be inconsistent with the supreme Constitution. Constitutional 
interpretation is a process that employs generally applicable principles, procedures and 
strategies to read and apply the Constitution, starting with and centred on the written 
constitutional document.
24
 It is a process of seeking to discover the content of the norms and 
apply them.
25
 More importantly, it is a process of the practical realisation of the constitutional 
provisions by giving them content, shape and direction.
26
 While Article 2(4) makes it clear 
that any law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is void to the extent of the 
inconsistency, in terms of Article 165(3)(d)(i), the High Court has jurisdiction to interpret the 
Constitution and determine „whether any law is inconsistent with or in contravention of [the] 
Constitution‟ and make the necessary declaration. This draws on what Justice John Marshall 
of the US Supreme Court found many years ago.
27
 He pointed out that it is the role of the 
judiciary to weigh Acts of the legislature and acts of any other body against the Constitution 
for constitutional consistency and, where there is inconsistency, declare them unconstitutional 
and invalid.
28
 The Kenyan High Court in Trusted Society of Human Rights and others v 
Attorney-General and others has already acknowledged this authority of the courts under the 
new Constitution, noting that „the Courts have an interpretative role – including the last word 
in determining the constitutionality of all governmental action‟.29 This power, the Court 
added, includes the responsibility to determine whether the other constitutional organs have 
interpreted their mandates under the Constitution correctly.
30
 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court in Speaker of the Senate and another v Attorney General and others asserted that a 
time comes when the prosecution of mandates by other organs of state raises conflicts 
touching on the integrity of the Constitution itself, calling for the court as the ultimate judge 
                                                 
24
 Du Plessis (2011) 19. 
25
 Komers DP The Constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (1989) 50. 
26
 Du Plessis (2011) 19. 
27
 Marbury v Madison 5 US 137, 2 Led 60 (1803) (Marbury).  
28
 Marbury  
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 [2012] eKLR (Trusted Society ) para 64. 
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 Trusted Society para 69. See also Federation of Women Lawyers and others v Attorney-General and others, 
where the High Court notes that the court has power to supervise the exercise of constitutional mandates.  
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of right or wrong.
31
 Ojwang notes that the „new Constitution cannot propel itself‟,32 and as 
such, the judiciary is assigned a central and special role as „the primary and ultimate arbiter, 
when the operations of the several public bodies run into conflict‟.33 It is the dominant 
interpreter of the totality of the Constitution, and has the power to „pronounce upon legality 
with a final voice‟.34 
Contrary to what happens under parliamentary sovereignty, courts do not avoid and abstain 
from legal issues that have political and policy implications.
35
 In Speaker of the Senate, 
Rawal DCJ adopted the view of the South African Constitutional Court in Doctors for Life 
where it was asserted that the court bears the „responsibility of being the ultimate guardian of 
the Constitution and its values‟, has jurisdiction in „crucial political areas‟ and bears the duty 
„to adjudicate finally in respect of issues which would inevitably have important political 
consequences‟.36 In both Judicial Service Commission v Speaker of the National Assembly 
and another,
37
 and International Legal Consultancy Group v The Senate and Another,
38
 the 
High Court went further and made various policy recommendations regarding what should be 
legislated. Constitutional supremacy gives the courts a special and wide responsibility for the 
enforcement of rights under the Constitution.
39
 Ojwang explains that the elaboration of this 
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 Ojwang JB Ascendant Judiciary in East Africa: Reconfiguring the Balance of Power in a Democratizing 
Constitutional Order (2013) 39. 
33
 Ojwang (2013) 26. 
34
 Ojwang (2013) 26. 
35
 Du Plessis LM & Corder H Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 69, where they 
point out: „In the heyday of apartheid, judges most often preferred to understand (what were called) “policy 
issues” or “policy considerations” rather extensively, and they professed abstention from them lest the courts 
and the legal system became entangled in and “tainted” by politics. This point of view prevailed as regards 
interpretation of legislation in particular. In some cases where “policy considerations” were given weight the 
judicial frame of mind was one of either covert support for or acquiescence in policies of the government of the 
day.‟ 
36
 Speaker of the Senate para 201. See also Du Plessis (2011) 47, where the Court observes that „generally 
speaking, constitutional interpretation in South Africa since 1994 seems to have been accompanied by an 
awareness of the judiciary‟s unavoidable political involvement in the broad sense of the word‟. 
37
 [2014] eKLR (Judicial Service Commission) para 268. 
38
 [2014] eKLR International legal consultancy group (judgment) para 63.  
39
 Jasbir Singh Rai v Tarlochan Singh Rai and others [2013] eKLR (Jasbir Singh Rai). para 96. See also 
Ojwang (2013) 37. 
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mandate to protect human rights, „necessarily extends the judicial mode of work beyond 
technical legalism, to perceptions in the social and political context‟.40 A German judge, 
Dieter Grimm, once observed that „constitutional courts inevitably cross the line between law 
and politics‟ because „the constitution does not offer an unambiguous and complete standard 
for [reviewing the validity of legislation]‟.41 This is contrasted with the system of 
parliamentary sovereignty under which the judiciary plays a very limited role and is made 
subservient to both the legislature and the executive,
42
 with its role reduced to enforcing and 
not questioning what the legislature has said or done.
43
 
Although the courts have a more important role, and interpretation requires more than just a 
literal reading of the text, they do not have unfettered discretion as they, like other organs of 
state, are subject to constitutionalism. Dominique Rousseau considers the judge the master of 
the Constitution, who, however, is not free to produce whatever interpretation of the 
Constitution he or she chooses. Objectivity through the control of interpretation rules is called 
for, making the constitutional judge the „unfree master‟ of the constitution.44 For Motala, 
limiting and disciplining rules are necessary to avoid abuse of unfettered discretion of the 
judges.
45
 Breyer calls for limitation of the courts‟ judicial power through constitutional 
interpretation rules and judicial restraint.
46
 Ringera J points out that to affirm that a 
Constitution must be interpreted differently: 
                                                 
40
 Ojwang (2013) 27. 
41
 See Komers (1989) 51. 
42
 Wade HWR & Forsyth (1994) 29, where in a chapter titled „Constitutional Foundations of the Powers of the 
Court‟ they observe that: „The sovereignty of parliament is a peculiar feature of the British constitution which 
extents a constant and powerful influence. In particular, it is an ever-present threat to the position of the courts; 
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effectively under the executive‟s control.‟ See also City of London v Wood 12 Mod. 669, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 
(1702) in which Chief Justice Lord Holt opined that: „An Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do 
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 Rousseau D „The constitutional judge: master or slave of the constitution‟ in Rosenfeld M (ed) 
Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives (1994) 263. 
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is not to deny that words even in a Constitutional text have certain ordinary 
and natural meanings in the English or other language employed in the 
Constitution and that it is the duty of the court to give effect to such 
meaning. It is to hold that the court should not be obsessed with the ordinary 
and natural meaning of words if to do so would either lead to an absurdity or 
plainly dilute, transgress or vitiate constitutional values and principles.
47
 
Similarly, Mutunga CJ in a dissenting advisory opinion in In the Matter of the Principle of 
Gender Representation in the National Assembly and the Senate correctly observed that „[t]he 
approach is to be purposive, promoting the dreams and aspirations of the Kenyan people, and 
yet not in such a manner as to stray from the letter of the Constitution‟.48 In Federation of 
Women Lawyers (FIDA-K) and others v Attorney General and others, the High Court 
endorsed the view that the courts‟ express constitutional duty to interpret the Constitution is 
not an unlimited power.
49
 
This study avers that the purposive interpretation and its rules and principles have been 
developed and incorporated in the Kenya Constitution to provide guidance and restraint in 
this regard, with the constitutional text being the starting point. 
1.3 Rationale for interpreting a supreme Constitution differently 
Kenya‟s adoption of constitutional supremacy entails a clear jurisprudential choice of a 
different approach to interpretation.
50
 As was observed by the Botswana Court of Appeal, „it 
was once thought that there should be no difference in approach to constitutional construction 
than any other statutory interpretation‟.51 Not so anymore, as it is now established that a 
supreme constitution is interpreted differently for a number of reasons. First, the Constitution 
is a statute sui generis, different from ordinary statutes as it is the expression of the will of the 
people, establishing a framework of government which grants and constrains governmental 
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49
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power.
52
 Justice Ringera asserted that „a supreme Constitution is not an Act of Parliament and 
is not interpreted as one‟.53 Secondly, it establishes a society‟s core values and principles 
which identify the ideals and aspirations of the nation. The spirit and the tenor of the 
Constitution must therefore preside and permeate the processes of judicial interpretation and 
judicial review,
54
 which is not a search for the intention of the legislature but an enforcement 
of constitutional values.
55
 Thirdly, it is drafted in broad language with room for growth and 
development to serve present and future generations.
56
 In Muhozya v The Attorney General, 
the Tanzanian High Court declared: „A Constitution is a living instrument which must be 
construed in the light of present day conditions.‟57 As such, the judiciary is entrusted with the 
task of its development through its purposive and generous interpretation.
58
 
1.4 Pre-2010 Constitutional interpretation 
The idea of a different approach was already evident even before the 2010 Constitution came 
into operation since the replaced Constitution was also founded upon constitutional 
supremacy.
59
 However, the courts initially fluctuated between recognition of constitutional 
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supremacy and occasional reversion to parliamentary sovereignty.
60
 On the parliamentry 
sovereignty side, the following statement by Chief Justice Kitili Mwendwa was often quoted: 
We do not deny that in certain context a liberal interpretation may be called 
for; but in one cardinal respect, we are satisfied that a constitution is to be 
construed in the same way as any other legislative enactment, and that is 
where words are precise and unambiguous, they are to be construed in their 
ordinary and natural sense. It is only where there is some imprecision or 
ambiguity in the language that any question arises whether a liberal or 
restricted interpretation should be put upon the words.
61
 
This was as a result of the fact that until 1969, according to Ghai and McAuslan, the Kenyan 
Constitution was formally a „British‟ document whose interpretation was governed by the 
English Interpretation Act, 1889, as it applied for the purpose of interpretation and in relation 
to the Acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
62
 Indeed, it was enacted as a British 
subsidiary legislation.
63
 The Statute was based on parliamentary sovereignty under which the 
English common law had evolved an approach to the interpretation of statutes which required 
the courts to simply look for the intention of the legislature and enforce it, however absurd 
the results or consequences may be.
64
 It was only when the statute was ambiguous that the 
courts could look at other sources to give meaning to the statute.
65
 Often this approach took a 
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literal view without paying any attention to context, whether historical or contemporary.
66
 
The approach was informed by the golden rule of statutory interpretation, which required that 
the literal meaning of the words be adhered to, leading to its being appropriately described as 
the literalist-cum-intentionalist approach. 
However, in Cripus Karanja Njogu v Attorney General,
67
 in which it had been sought to rely 
on Mwendwa‟s words, the Court rejected this approach and stated that a supreme constitution 
must be interpreted in a manner different from how ordinary statutes are interpreted. It 
emphasised that when an Act of Parliament is in any way inconsistent with the constitution, 
such an Act is void to the extent of that inconsistency and must give way to the constitution. 
Since the Constitution embodies the values and aspirations of the people, it must be 
interpreted broadly and liberally and not in a pedantic way.
68
 This decision informed the 
reasoning of the court in Njoya 1
69
 which similarly rejected the El Man approach. Justice 
Ringera outlined some of the reasons for a different approach: 
[i]t is a living instrument with a soul and consciousness; it embodies certain 
fundamental values and principles and must be construed broadly, liberally 
and purposely or teleologically to give effect to those values and principles; 
and that whenever the consistency of any provision(s) of an Act of 
Parliament with the Constitution is called into question, the court must seek 
to find whether those provisions meet the values and principles embodied in 
the Constitution.
70
 
Despite this fluctuation, it is clear that by the time of the adoption of the new Constitution, 
the Kenyan Courts had solidly embarked on a different approach to interpretation. 
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2 Purposive interpretation under the Constitution of 2010 
Constitutional provisions for a purposive approach, its meaning and application are examined 
in the next sections. 
2.1 Constitutional incorporation of purposive interpretation 
The purposive approach to the interpretation of the Constitution has been explicitly 
incorporated in the Constitution itself. Mutunga CJ in the Gender Representation case 
underscored this fact when he noted that it was not necessary for the court to come up with 
other prescriptions on interpretation „other than those that are within the Constitution itself‟.71 
Article 259(1) provides that: 
(1) This Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that –  
(a) promotes its purposes, values and principles; 
(b) advances the rule of law, and the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights; 
(c) permits the development of the law; and 
(d) contributes to good governance. 
The use of the term „promotes‟ in sub-article (1)(a) requires that the Constitution be 
interpreted in a manner that helps, encourages or furthers its purposes, values and principles. 
It must be interpreted in a manner that enables these purposes, values and principles to 
flourish. Likewise, the use of the term „advances‟ in sub-article (1)(b) requires the 
Constitution to be interpreted in a manner that furthers or improves the rule of law, and the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights. „Permits‟ requires it to be 
interpreted in a manner that allows or affords opportunity for the law to develop; the courts 
must through interpretation develop the law. In addition, it must be interpreted in a manner 
that assists and supports good governance. 
Article 159(2)(e) explicitly requires the courts to exercise judicial authority in a purposive 
manner that protects and promotes the purpose and principles of the Constitution. The 
essence of this is that the Constitution must be interpreted in a manner that defends, 
encourages, asists and helps the flourishing of the purposes, values and principles of the 
Constitution. It is to do so in a manner that furthers or encourages the progress or existence of 
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those purposes, values and principles. In addition, Article 20(4), which provides for the 
application of the Bill of Rights, prescribes a purposive approach to interpretation thus: 
(4) In interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or other authority 
shall promote –  
(a) the values that underlie an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality, equity and freedom; and 
(b) the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Read together, these three provisions indicate that the Constitution and all the powers it 
confers on various state organs and state officers are not ends in themselves, but a means to 
an end. Thus, the Constitution must be interpreted and the powers must be exercised so as to 
achieve these ends. Consequently, the provisions limit the exercise of all the powers it 
confers by requiring that they be exercised to protect and promote the identified ends. 
After examining these provisions as well as Article 10 dealing with the values and principles 
of governance, Mutunga CJ concluded that they set out a purposive approach to interpretation 
which must be followed by the Supreme Court and the other courts.
72
 In Jasbir Singh Rai 
Mutunga CJ, in a concurring ruling, reiterated this purposive approach.
73
 Although the 
Constitution prescribes a purposive approach to interpretation, the meaning of such an 
approach and a clear methodology and guiding rules must be detailed. 
2.2 The meaning of a purposive interpretation 
A purposive approach is geared towards identifying the purposes, the core values and 
principles which the Constitution seeks to achieve and give effect to them or protect and 
promote them.
74
 The process is aimed at discovering the purpose of the provision and not 
merely the meaning of the words used to communicate the purpose.
75
 It is the process of 
attributing meaning to a provision in a manner that is mindful of its intended objectives, and 
the fulfilment of its aspirational values.
76
 The approach makes reference to „grammatical, 
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systematic, teleological, and historical methods of analysis‟77 of the constitutional text as a 
main focus. The grammatical method, which is often the starting point, „relies on a verbal 
analysis of words and phrases in a constitutional provision‟.78 The systematic method 
interprets particular provisions of the Constitution as part of a constitutional totality.
79
 The 
teleological method is a form of structural reasoning which looks for the purposes, goals, and 
aspirations behind the language of the Constitution.
80
 Finally, the historical method elucidates 
the text with reference to the original intent of the framers, or the values they 
constitutionalised.
81
 
A purpose-conscious interpretation is necessary in order to honour the aspirational intent of 
the Constitution, and begins with the assumption that the provision and the Constitution in 
general have a purpose that must emerge in the course of interpretation and eventually be 
realised.
82
 The High Court in the Trusted Society case emphasised the importance of 
discovering the purpose of the Constitution and effectuating it.
83
 Similarly, Mutunga CJ in 
two Supreme Court cases emphasised that a purposive interpretation of the Constitution must 
seek to promote „the dreams and aspirations of the Kenyan people‟.84 In Dorothy N 
Muchungu v Speaker of the County Government of Embu and others, the High Court 
observed that the duty of the courts „is to interpret the Constitution in a manner that does not 
defeat its evident purpose, values and principles‟.85 
The aim of interpreting a constitution is to further its objectives and purposes. If a court is 
interpreting a rights provision in the Bill of Rights, it should seek to identify the purpose of 
the right and give effect to it as far as possible.
86
 On the other hand, where a devolution 
provision is in question, the objectives and purposes of devolution in general and the 
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devolution provision in particular should be ascertained and given effect. Where there are two 
possible meanings and the interpreter has to make a choice, a purposive interpretation would 
settle for that meaning which, more than the other, furthers the objectives and purposes of the 
provision being interpreted.
87
 
Sometimes this may involve a very delicate balancing of and choosing between two 
competing constitutional values.
88
 The interpreter reads the text as the revelation of the great 
objectives and purposes which the Constitution intended to achieve.
89
 The value judgment 
must not, however, be made in a subjective manner based on the interpreter‟s personal 
values. Instead, it should be objectively informed by the broad values of the wider society. 
Justice Mohamed in the Namibian case of Ex parte Attorney General, Namibia: In re 
Corporal Punishment by the Organs of State, stated that: „[I]t is … a value judgment which 
requires objectively to be articulated and identified, regard being had to the contemporary 
norms, aspirations, expectations and sensitivities‟ of the people.90 In Trusted Society, the 
Court recognised the need to balance the competing value of an individual‟s protection 
arising out of the presumption of innocence against that of leadership and integrity provided 
for in Chapter Six of the Constitution, and concluded that values of leadership and integrity 
serve more important objectives and purposes of the Constitution. The Court concluded that 
for purposes of the integrity test, the Constitution does not require that the behaviour, 
attribute or conduct complained about must rise to the threshold of criminality. The 
consequence is that the fact that a person has not been convicted of a criminal offence is not 
dispositive of the inquiry about lack of integrity.
91
 
Although purposive interpretation aims at giving effect to the purposes and values of the 
Constitution and the aspirations of the people, sometimes those purposes, values and 
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aspirations may not be very clear and may contradict each other. In Speaker of the Senate the 
Supreme Court held that the courts have a responsibility to clarify them and resolve the 
contradictions. The Supreme Court urges the courts to resolve „constitution-making 
contradictions; clarify draftsmanship-gaps; and settle constitutional disputes‟ that may have 
arisen from constitution-making compromises that often attend the constitution-making 
process.
92
 The Court emphasised that „constitution-making does not end with its 
promulgation; it continues with its interpretation‟ and the courts must „illuminate legal 
penumbras that constitutions borne out of long drawn compromises‟ tend to create.93 In doing 
this, the Court noted that, where the „constitutional text and letter may not properly mine the 
aspirations of the people‟, such „limitations of mind and hand should not defeat the 
aspirations of the people‟. Instead, it is in such a „context that the spirit of the Constitution 
has to be invoked by the Court as the searchlight for the illumination and elimination of these 
legal penumbras‟.94 In Dorothy N Muchungu the Court noted that the spirit of the 
Constitution „embodies the ideals, aspirations and values of the people of Kenya‟95 and that 
the values „illustrate the spirit of the Constitution‟.96 However, it warned that the spirit of the 
Constitution must be gathered from the language of the various provisions of the Constitution 
which must be read together as an integrated whole.
97
 
The process of interpretation begins at the textual level with the language and structure of the 
text; though this may not be the conclusive determinant of the meaning and purpose of the 
provision.
98
 The object and purpose of the provision may in many cases only be discovered 
from reading the provision within its context, such as the other provisions of the Constitution, 
the values and principles of the Constitution, the preparatory drafting material, the historical 
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background of the provision, the economic, social and cultural context, and comparative 
foreign jurisprudence and scholarly literature.
99
 But the language of the text must constantly 
play the limiting and disciplining role.
100
 Accordingly, the interpretation process first seeks to 
determine what the words of the provision say and whether they reveal the purpose of the 
provision; it then also asks what the internal constitutional context says and whether it yields 
the meaning and purpose; and finally, the extra-constitutional context is considered to 
determine the purpose. Context is thus critical and dichotomised into two distinct typologies: 
the intra-textual and the extra-textual.
101
 Both types of context have past or historical, present 
or contemporary, and future aspirational dimensions. They both focus on the language of the 
text. Intra-textual interpretation looks at the provision in the context of other provisions of the 
Constitution as a whole, while extra-textual interpretation goes beyond the Constitution and 
takes into account other sources. In essence, constitutional interpretation is not confined to 
legal sources – it also relies on non-legal sources and phenomena.102 
3 Intra-textual context 
When a court uses the intra-textual context of the constitution, it restricts itself to getting 
meaning from the words of the Constitution itself by reading the relevant provision together 
with other provisions of the Constitution. This leads to what is often referred to as 
interpreting a constitution as „a structural whole‟. The interpreter looks beyond the relevant 
provisions into other provisions of the Constitution but does not go beyond the Constitution 
itself. 
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others v The Centre for Human Rights and Democracy and others (Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board) 
Supreme Court Petitions No.s 13A, 14 and 15 of 2013 para 209. 
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3.1 The literal words of the provision 
The establishment of the meaning of a constitutional provision begins with the literal words 
of the provision. This approach holds that the meaning of the constitutional provision can and 
must be deduced from the very words in which the provision is couched.
103
 The provision 
must be taken to mean what the ordinary meaning of the words used discloses and which is 
assumed to be clear. Such ordinary meaning would be the standard grammatical dictionary 
meaning of the words. Grammatical interpretation focuses on the natural language and 
meaning of the words used in the constitutional provision in the hope of avoiding the 
proliferation of meanings that could be attached to the provision.
104
 
The problem, however, is that the ordinary or natural meaning of words is often not clear. 
Constitutions are often expansive and indefinite since rights and values which they provide 
for can hardly be expressed categorically or conclusively. Moreover, the Constitution is 
meant to be a long-lasting document and its expansively and open-textured formulated 
provisions must be able to accommodate a number of unpredictable situations.
105
 This 
naturally puts in question the assumption that the constitutional provisions are presented in 
clear and unambiguous language. Thus, getting even the literal and ordinary meaning of the 
words used requires that they be read within the context of other provisions of the 
Constitution. The South African Constitutional Court correctly warned that in interpreting 
constitutional provisions it is not sufficient to focus only on the ordinary or textual meaning 
of the provisions.
106
 The Kenyan Court of Appeal in Rotich Samuel Kimutai v Ezekiel 
Lenyongopeta and 2 others
107
 had equally long before the adoption of the new Constitution 
rejected the exclusivity of the literal interpretation noting thus: 
                                                 
103
 Du Plessis (2011) ch 32, 29. 
104
 Du Plessis (2011) ch 32, 160.  
105
 Du Plessis (2011) ch 32, 161. 
106
 In Matatiele Municipality and others v President of the Republic of South Africa & others 2007 (1) BCLR 47 
(CC) (Matatiele) para 37, Ngcobo J stated that: „The process of constitutional interpretation must therefore be 
context-sensitive. In construing the provisions of the Constitution it is not sufficient to focus only on the 
ordinary or textual meaning of the phrase. The proper approach to constitutional interpretation involves a 
combination of textual approach and structural approach. Any construction of a provision in a constitution must 
be consistent with the structure or scheme of the Constitution. This provides the context within which a 
provision in the Constitution must be construed.‟ 
107
 Rotich Samuel Kimutai v Ezekiel Lenyongopeta and 2 others [2005] eKLR. 
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The gramatical meaning of the words alone, however is a strict construction 
which no longer finds favour with true construction of statutes. The literal 
method is now completely out of date and has been replaced by the approach 
described as the „purposive approach‟. In all cases now in the interpretation 
of Statutes such a construction as will „promote the general legislative 
purpose‟ underlying the provision to be adopted. It is no longer necessary for 
the judges to wring their hands and say, „There is nothing I can do about it‟. 
Whenever the strict interpretation of a Statute give rise to an absurd and 
unjust situation, the judges can and should use their good sense to remedy it 
– by reading words in, if necessary – so as to do what Parliament would have 
done, had they had the situation in mind.
108
 
The process is not always a linear one which looks at other sources only when the text of the 
provision cannot yield a meaning. There is no order of priority among these methods of 
interpretive analysis.
109
 The text of the provision may be grammatically clear, yet read alone, 
not yield a purposive meaning. A search for the purpose, objects and values the provision was 
meant to serve may disclose that the provision cannot be read in isolation. Where a provision 
has various subsections the interpreter begins with the relevant subsection, but may only get 
the full purposive meaning by looking at the other subsections and provisions of the 
Constitution. 
 3.2 Interpreting the Constitution as a whole 
The essence of intra-textual interpretation requires that the Constitution must be interpreted 
as a whole, including the preamble, the national values and principles and the schedules to 
the Constitution.
110
 It must be interpreted holistically in order for the individual provisions to 
reveal their purposive meaning.
111
 The Supreme Court has defined a holistic interpretation of 
the Constitution as interpreting it in context: 
                                                 
108
 Rotich Samuel Kimutai page 6. These words of the Court of Appeal have been adopted as the law by the 
High Court in both Republic v Transitional Authority and another Ex parte Medical Practitioners, Pharmacists 
and Dentists Union (KMPDU) and 2 other [2013] eKLR para 65, and Okiya Omtatah Okoiti and another v 
Attorney General and 6 others [2014] eKLR para 78. 
109
 Komers (1989) 50. 
110
 Du Plessis (2011) ch 32, 163. 
111
 Du Plessis (2011) ch 32, 165. 
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It is the contextual analysis of a constitutional provision, reading it alongside 
and against other provisions, so as to maintain a rational explication of what 
the Constitution must be taken to mean in light of its history, of the issues in 
dispute, and of the prevailing circumstances. Such scheme of interpretation 
does not mean an unbridled extrapolation of discrete constitutional 
provisions into each other, so as to arrive at a desired result.
112
 
In order to achieve full benefits of a purposive interpretation, the South African 
Constitutional Court warned against an interpretation which is founded upon „technical 
rigidity‟113 and urged for a holistic114 interpretation which avoids interpreting specific 
provisions in isolation from each other and leads to a conflict among the different 
provisions.
115
 
Conflicting provisions of the Constitution must be interpreted in such a manner as to 
harmonise them. The essence and foundation of this rule is the fact that the Constitution is 
perceived as a logical whole, with each provision forming an integral part of the whole, and 
none destroying the other but each sustaining the other.
 116
 When emphasising this approach, 
the Supreme Court of Kenya correctly asserted that „a Constitution does not subvert itself‟.117 
As the Court of Appeal in Center for Rights Education and Awarenes and another v John 
Harun Mwau and others noted, „all the provisions should be regarded as cogs of the same 
wheel‟.118 As such, it is imperative that one part be construed in the light of the provisions of 
the other parts.
119
 In FIDA-K the High Court emphasised that „it is important that the 
                                                 
112
 In the Matter of the Kenya National Human Rights Commission [2014] eKLR paras 136, 137 and 138.  
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 First Certification (1996) para 36. 
114
 First Certification (1996) para 37. 
115
 First Certification (1996) para 38. 
116
 See the judgment of Manyindo DCJ in the Ugandan case of Major General David Tinyefuza v Attorney 
General (SC) Const Appeal No. 1 of 1997. See also Majanja J in U.S.I.U v Attorney-General & Another (2012) 
eKLR in which he adopted the statements in the Uganda case of Olum v The Attorney-General of Uganda 
(2012) E.A. 508.  
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 Speaker of the Senate para 185. 
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 Center for Rights Education and Awareness and another v John Harun Mwau and others [2012] eKLR para 
43. 
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 See the words of Kania CJ of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Gopalan v State of Madras (1950) 
SCR 88, 109 cited in Stevens J The Interpretation of Fundamental Rights Provisions: International and 
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Constitution be treated as a whole and all provisions having a bearing on the subject matter 
be considered together as an integral whole‟.120 This is because sometimes the true meaning 
and purpose of the words may not be easily ascertained unless read and considered within the 
context of the whole document.
121
 
In the interpretation of the devolution provisions of the Kenyan Constitution this rule is 
important because devolution as a system runs through the entire Constitution in an 
interlocking manner. This design was underscored by the Supreme Court in Speaker of the 
Senate when it stated: 
Thus, a ‘Chapter 11-Only’ approach would wrongly obscure the interlocking 
nature of devolution with other aspects and institutions of the Constitution, 
an element which is critical to its success. These other elements include 
Treasury, which plays a significant role in public finance matters; 
Parliament, which requires a functional Senate to provide sufficient 
protection to the devolved governments, and ensure that there is no gridlock 
in the budgetary or legislative processes; Judiciary, particularly the Supreme 
Court, whose mandate under Article 163(6) is to give „advisory opinion … 
on any matter concerning county government‟, and which is an arena for 
arbitrating conflicts between the National Government and County 
Government; Independent Commissions and Offices, such as Controller of 
Budget and Auditor General, which are crucial in ensuring probity and 
accountability.
122
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Regional Standards in African and other Common Law Jurisdictions (International Centre Against Censorship) 
Report on Article 19, 8. 
120
 FIDA-K 21. 
121
 See the Nigerian case of Archbishop Okogie v Attorney General of Lagos State [1981] 2 NCLR 337, 348 
where Mamman Nasir PCA explained that: „The true meaning of the words used and the intention of the 
legislature in any statute and particularly in a written Constitution, can best be properly understood if the statute 
is considered as a whole. It is a single document and every part of it must be considered as far as relevant in 
order to get the true meaning and intent of any particular portion of the enactment.‟ 
122
 Speaker of the Senate para 183 (emphasis in the original). See also Matatiele, para 36 where Ngcobo J 
explained the need and significance for such systematic or contextual constitutional interpretation thus: „Our 
Constitution embodies the basic and fundamental objectives of our constitutional democracy. Like the German 
Constitution, it „has an inner unity, and the meaning of any one part is linked to that of other provisions. Taken 
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A fuller and purposive understanding of the constitutional provisions on devolution must thus 
be informed by a contextual interpretation that considers the many other aspects of the 
Constitution which touch on devolution. Provisions of the Constitution must not be 
interpreted in isolation but in unity with each other. 
3.2.1 The Preamble 
The preamble often states how and why the Constitution was made, the source of authority 
for it, and the values on which it is based.
123
 Although it does not form part of the operative 
provisions of the Constitution, it is relevant to the interpretation of the rest of the 
Constitution.
124
 It must play a recognisable role in the interpretation of the individual 
provisions because a systematic reading of the individual provisions, in the context of the 
Constitution, requires the broadest possible spectrum of textual elements to be taken into 
account.
125
 But more important is the fact that the Preamble and text, like the long title, are 
also statements of the purpose of the Constitution.
126
 In Rose Wangui Mambo v Limuru 
Country Club, the High Court regarded the „purpose and principles of the Constitution‟ 
                                                                                                                                                        
as a unit [our] Constitution reflects certain overarching principles and fundamental decisions to which individual 
provisions are subordinate.‟ Individual provisions of the Constitution cannot therefore be considered and 
construed in isolation. They must be construed in a manner that is compatible with those basic and fundamental 
principles of our democracy. Constitutional provisions must be construed purposively and in the light of the 
Constitution as a whole.‟  
123
 Saunders C „The Constitutional Preamble‟ FCRC Research Papers – vol. 2, 261 at 264. 
124
 Saunders 260. See also Stevens, Report on Article 19 at p 10; Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] 
SCR 1 Suppl. at 712; Monju v Minister of Economy and Finance, Suit No. HCB/37/95 of 1995 (unreported) in 
which Justice Moma of the High Court of Cameron held that taxes previously exempted under earlier legislation 
were not to be retrospectively imposed as this would be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution as reflected in 
the preamble which prohibited retrospective laws; Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth, cited in 
Saunders C at 261 where the principle of popular sovereignty derived from the preamble was used to support the 
conclusion that an implied right to freedom of political communication was protected by the Constitution as an 
attribute of representative government. See also Roux T „Democracy‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (2011) ch 10, 22. 
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 Du Plessis (2011) ch 32, 164. 
126
 Du Plessis (2011) ch 32, 164. 
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mentioned by Article 159(1)(a), which must inform interpretation, as including „those values 
recognised by the Preamble to the Constitution‟.127 
The Constitution of Kenya has a Preamble which is central to the establishment of the core 
values of governance. Relevant to devolution is, first, the recognition of the fact that it is the 
Kenyan people who, in exercise of „our sovereign and inalienable right to determine the form 
of governance of our country‟ have settled on the devolved system as the form of 
governance.
128
 Secondly, is the recognition of unity in diversity and the determination to live 
in peace as one indivisible sovereign nation balancing the two concepts of unity in 
diversity.
129
 Thirdly, is the commitment to nurture and protect „the well-being of the 
individual, the family, communities and the nation‟.130 Fourthly, the Preamble recognises the 
essential values of governance which include social justice that forms the core of devolution 
solidarity, equity and financial equalisation.
131
 All these provisions lay a basis for a number 
of the objectives of devolution set out in Article 174. 
Although the conventional approach has been to turn to preambles as tools of interpretation 
only where the substantive provisions are ambiguous and uncertain, in constitutional law the 
approach must be different.
132
 As statements of the purpose of the Constitution, the preamble 
should not be employed as an interpretive tool only when the individual operative provisions 
of the Constitution are ambiguous or uncertain due to deficient formulation. The meaning of 
the substantive provisions should always be arrived at after the provisions have been read 
together with the preamble as part of the integrated whole. In the South African case of S v 
Mhlungu and others, Sachs J eloquently explained the value of the Preamble and why it must 
be taken seriously in constitutional interpretation: 
The Preamble in particular should not be dismissed as a mere aspirational 
and throat clearing exercise of little interpretative value. It connects up, 
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 Rose Wangui Mambo v Limuru Country Club Nairobi High Court Constitutional Petition No 160 of 2013 
para 56.  
128
 Para 7, preamble. 
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 Para 3, preamble. 
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 Para 5, Preamble. 
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 Para 6, Preamble. 
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reinforces and underlies all of the text that follows. It helps to establish the 
basic design of the Constitution and indicate its fundamental purposes.
133
 
Although it was not an issue whether or not the preamble could be referred to in the 
interpretation of the Constitution, the High Court in FIDA-K referred to the preamble noting 
that „[i]n its preamble the Constitution starts off with recognition of inherent dignity of all 
members of the human family and expresses the desire to promote amongst all the dignity of 
individuals‟.134 In Jasbir Singh Rai Mutunga CJ held that „in interpreting the Constitution, the 
aspirations captured in [the] preambular paragraphs are relevant‟.135 The preamble must 
therefore be a constant point of reference whenever the constitutional provisions on 
devolution are interpreted. 
3.2.2 National values and principles 
Article 10 provides for national values and principles of governance which bind all state 
organs, state officers, public officers and all persons. The provision requires all the listed 
persons and institutions to take the values into account whenever any of them „applies or 
interprets [the] Constitution;
136
 enacts, applies or interprets any law;
137
 or makes or 
implements public policy decisions‟.138 In addition, both Articles 159 and 259 expressly 
provide that the Constitution must be interpreted in a manner that promotes and protects the 
values, purposes and principles embodied in the Constitution.
139
 
Values are defined as states of social affairs which a community is committed to and seeks to 
achieve. A Constitution may combine value- and principle-setting provisions and specific 
normative prescriptions which produce rule-setting provisions. Since the Kenyan Constitution 
has settled for this combination, it can correctly be described as a value-laden Constitution as 
it embodies an objective, normative value system. Its design has foundational provisions 
                                                 
133
 S v Mhlungu and others 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC) para 112.  
134
 FIDA-K p 12. 
135
 Jasbir Singh Rai para 94. 
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which set out the values, objects and principles of the Constitution,
140
 and other provisions 
which provide for concrete and specific matters. Most chapters begin with a principle-setting 
article, followed by articles providing for specific matters. The chapter on devolved 
government has both Articles 174 and 175, which set out the objects and principles of 
devolution. Being value-laden, the Constitution has been described by the Supreme Court as 
transformative in nature because it is aimed at engineering society in a particular desired 
direction. In Speaker of the Senate, the Court observed that „[u]nlike the conventional 
“liberal” Constitutions of the earlier decades which essentially sought the control and 
legitimization of public power, the avowed goal of today‟s Constitution is to institute social 
change and reform, through values such as social justice, equality, devolution, human rights, 
rule of law, freedom and democracy.‟141 Through this transformative approach, the values are 
intended to achieve „desirable goals of governance consistent with dominant perceptions of 
legitimacy‟.142 The Court observed that although these values are set out in the Preamble to 
the Constitution which describes them as essential, they are fleshed out in Article 10, Chapter 
Four on the Bill of rights, and Chapter Eleven on devolved government.
143
 Quoting Klare, the 
Court viewed the values as part of transformative constitutionalism, which is defined as: 
[A] long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and 
enforcement committed … to transforming a country‟s political and social 
institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connotes an 
enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through non-violent political 
processes grounded in law.
144
 
In Speaker of the Senate the Supreme Court thus concluded that in interpreting the 
Constitution, the court „must take into account the context, design and purpose of the 
                                                 
140
 For instance, the Preamble to the Constitution provides for the essential values of governance which the 
Kenyan people aspired to: Article 1 for the value of the sovereignty of the people; Article 2 for that of the 
supremacy of the Constitution; and Article 10 for the values and principles of governance, including sharing and 
devolution of power.  
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 Speaker of the Senate para 51.  
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 Speaker of the Senate para 52. 
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Constitution; the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution; [and] the vision and 
ideals reflected in the Constitution‟.145 In Communications Commission of Kenya the 
Supreme Court regarded the Kenyan Constitution as one of the „[t]ransformative 
constitutions [which] are new social contracts that are committed to fundamental 
transformations in societies‟.146 Such a constitution provides „a legal framework required for 
the fundamental transformation required that expects a solid commitment from the society‟s 
ruling classes‟.147 Under such a Constitution the „judiciary becomes pivotal in midwifing 
transformative constitutionalism and the new rule of law‟.148 A transformative „constitution 
cannot be interpreted as a legal-centric letter and text‟; rather, its interpretation must consider 
other sources that are „not solely reflective of jural phenomena’.149 
3.2.3 Schedules to the Constitution 
Schedules form part of the Constitution and must be read together with the parent provision 
as part of interpreting the constitution as a whole.
150
 The Constitution creates territorial 
county units,
151
 assigns functions,
152
 and provides for transition by reference to schedules to 
the Constitution.
153
 In Dennis Mogambi Monga’re v Attorney General, the High Court 
asserted that „[t]he transitional provisions are as much a part of the Constitution and as much 
an expression of the sovereign will of the people as the main body of the Constitution‟.154 In a 
similar manner, the Court of Appeal in Center for Rights Education emphasised this 
wholeness by stating that „the sixth schedule is an integral part of the current Constitution and 
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 Speaker of the Senate para 49. See also Community Advocacy and Awareness Trust and others v Attorney 
General and others Petition 243 of 2011(unreported) para 78, where the High Court stated that the values 
„provide a foundation upon which Kenyans have determined that our democratic state shall be build; they are 
the intestinal fluid which nourishes the bill of rights and the Constitution‟. 
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 Communications Commission of Kenya para 377. 
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 Gatirau Peter Munya para 232 (emphasis in original). 
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 See Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (10) 
BCLR 1289 (CC) (Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature) paras 33 and 34.  
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has the same status as the provisions of the other Articles although it is of a limited 
duration‟.155 Schedules that are linked to the permanent provisions of the Constitution are 
permanent parts of the Constitution, while those that are linked to the transition provisions 
last for the transition period only. 
3.2.4 Harmonising conflicting provisions 
Interpreting the constitution as a whole may create the misleading impression that the 
constitution is one coherent and harmonious document that can easily be interpreted in this 
manner. Since constitutions embody a multiplicity of values and issues, two or more 
provisions may conflict with each other or at least appear to conflict. The rule is that the 
Court should seek to harmonise the conflicting provisions and to construe them in a manner 
that can reasonably reconcile them and give full effect to each of them.
156
 If this fails, then 
the Court must prefer the interpretation that gives effect to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms as well as constitutional values to any other interpretation.
157
 In cases of conflict 
between a general and a specific provision, the South African Constitutional Court held that 
the general provisions must ordinarily yield to the specific provision – general provisions 
would not normally prevail over the specific and unambiguous provisions.
158
 
Drawing from comparative experience and jurisprudence, the Kenyan Constitution requires 
the conflict to be resolved in favour of fundamental rights and freedoms as well as the values 
and purposes embodied in the Constitution. In this regard, Article 20 provides that when 
applying a provision of the Bill of Rights, a court must „adopt the interpretation that most 
                                                 
155
 Center for Rights Education para 32. 
156
 Du Plessis (2011) ch 32, 167. See also Doctors for Life v Speaker of the National Assembly and others 2006 
(12) BCLR 1399 (CC) para 48. 
157
 Art 20(3) (b). 
158
 Ex Parte Speaker of KwaZulu Natal Provincial Legislature: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Province of KwaZulu Natal, 1996 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) para 28. See also Doctors for Life para 49 where 
the Constitutional Court stated thus: „The specific provision must be construed as limiting the scope of the 
application of the more general provision. Therefore, if a general provision is capable of more than one 
interpretation and one of the interpretations results in that provision applying to a special field which is dealt 
with by a special provision, in the absence of clear language to the contrary, the special provision must prevail 
should there be a conflict.‟ 
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favours the enforcement of a right or fundamental freedom‟.159 Furthermore, Article 259 
requires the Constitution to be interpreted in a manner that „promotes its purposes, values and 
principles;
160
 advances the rule of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
Bill of Rights;
161
 permits the development of the law;
162
 and contributes to good 
governance‟.163 In addition, Article 20 provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
court, tribunal or other authority must promote „the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, equity and freedom;
164
 and the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights‟.165 It follows that if the interpreter clearly 
understands the values, principles and purposes of the Constitution, it should be possible to 
resolve conflicts among the provisions by interpreting the provisions in favour of such values 
and purposes. 
But when the conflict is between the values or the purposes of the Constitution the interpreter 
will be required to make very difficult value choices and judgments, and must decide in 
favour of the core values and purposes. As will be argued in Chapter Four, the Constitution 
provides for a hierarchy of values with some – such as sharing and devolution of power, 
democracy and rule of law articulated in Article 10, the sovereignty of the people in Article 1, 
and the supremacy of the Constitution in Article 2 – being more important than others. In a 
value-laden Constitution, neutrality for the interpreter is a fiction, since he or she must take 
sides with the core values and purposes which the people intended to give effect to and for 
which they enacted the Constitution.
166
 In Speaker of the Senate the Supreme Court quoted 
with approval
167
 the words of Archibald Cox when he stated that „[t]he Court can seldom be 
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 Article 20(3)(b). See also the Tanzanian case of Mtikila v The Attorney General Civil Case No 5 of 1993 
(Unreported) in which the court chose an interpretation that favoured the realisation of rights as opposed to their 
restriction. 
160
 Art 259(1) (a). 
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 Art 259(1)(b). 
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 See Komers (1989) 39, where he states that „the Constitutional Court itself rejects the notion of a value-
neutral state‟ and „instead ... speaks of a constitutional polity deeply committed to an “objective order of 
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wholly neutral upon the social, political, or philosophical questions underlying constitutional 
litigation. Its opinions shape as well as express our national ideals.‟168 It is for this reason that 
the Supreme Court in the concurring opinion of Mutunga CJ went into a detailed exposition 
of the Kenyan historical background of regional disparities that informed the very protected 
system of devolution, especially as regards revenue-sharing under which the Senate must 
protect the interests of the counties.
169
 
 4 Extra-textual context 
When the interpreter uses extra-textual context he or she uses other sources such as the 
preparatory drafting material, international law instruments, constitutions of other countries, 
foreign court precedents, and even academic and scholarly works.
170
 Modern constitution-
making has been reduced to what Juliane Kokott
171
 calls constitutional reception and 
transplantation as well as convergence of constitutional models, with borrowing from 
international law instruments and the constitutions of other countries, which necessitates 
consideration of other sources during interpretation. Thus, in extra-textual constitutional 
interpretation, the political and constitutional order, society and its legally recognised 
interests and the international legal order are all consciously taken into account.
172
 
                                                 
168
 Archibald Cox Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform (1968) 118.  
169
 In the Trusted Society para 102, the High Court dealt with an apparent conflict between the constitutional 
value of the presumption of innocence and Chapter Six establishing leadership and integrity. The court settled 
the conflict between the two values in favour of leadership and integrity, emphasizing that the „Kenyans were 
very aware in their intentions when they entrenched Chapter Six and Article 73 in the Constitution. They were 
singularly aware that the Constitution has other values such as the presumption of innocence until one is proved 
guilty. Yet, Kenyans were singularly desirous of cleaning up our politics and governance structures by insisting 
on high standards of integrity among those seeking to govern us or hold public office.‟ Implicitly, the court 
viewed the values of leadership and integrity as more important. 
170
 Du Plessis & Corder (1994) 94, where they say the following: „Context determines the meaning from 
“within‟‟ the text as a structural whole (intra-textually) and by reference to its “environment” (extra-textually). 
From this it follows that the interpretation of text requires both its intra- and extra-textual contextualization.‟ 
171
 Kokott J „From reception and transplantation to convergence of constitutional models in the age of 
globalization – with special reference to the German Basic Law‟ in Starck C (ed) Constitutionalism, 
Universalism and Democracy – a Comparative Analysis: The German Contributions to the Fifth World 
Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law (1999) 71-134. 
172
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4.1 Preparatory drafting material 
One of the most important extra-textual sources is the historical drafting materials generated 
in the course of the constitution-making process. A clear distinction must, however, be drawn 
between the materials and records compiled during the constitution-making process, which 
have value and can be referred to during interpretation; and the statements made by 
individual players, which are of no value in interpretation. Currie and De Waal observe that 
„statements by politicians made during the negotiations and drafting process, sometimes 
called the “ipse dixit” of the political players, are of little value in the interpretation of the 
constitution‟.173 They draw a distinction between the ipse dixit of the negotiators and the 
background material compiled during the drafting or constitution-making process. They note 
that in international law, similar material is referred to as the „trauvaux preparatoires‟ or 
„preparatory work‟ of a treaty and can be used in the interpretation of the treaty.174 
In S v Makwanyane the South African Constitutional Court made significant use of drafting 
preparatory materials when interpreting the South African Constitution. However, drawing 
from the wisdom of the Canadian Supreme Court, the Court counselled caution when using 
such material in order to maintain the distinction between statements of the individual 
participants and the background drafting material. It quoted the Canadian Supreme Court 
where it said that: 
[T]he Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] is not the product of a few 
individual public servants, however distinguished, but of a multiplicity of 
individuals who played major roles in the negotiating, drafting and adoption 
of the Charter. How can one say with confidence that within this enormous 
multiplicity of actors … the comments of a few federal civil servants can in 
any way be determinative?
175
 
As such, preparatory drafting material must be used with care and circumspection. 
The Kenyan constitution-making process was quite consultative and lasted for over ten years, 
with Kenyans voting in a referendum twice. It left behind numerous draft constitutions and 
other documents that form part of the constitution-making history of the country. These 
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preparatory materials form part of the extra-textual sources. Read together with the historical 
context of the country, they provide useful background material that defines where the 
Kenyans were coming from and where they wanted to go through devolution. Indeed, in the 
Center for Rights Education the Kenyan Court of Appeal recognised this kind of extra-textual 
source when it relied on the Final Report of the Committee of Experts in its interpretation of 
the constitutional provisions.
176
 And in Speaker of the Senate the Supreme Court extensively 
quoted with approval from the Final Report of the Constitution of the Kenya Review 
Commission.
177
 
4.2 International law and ratified treaties 
There are two major reasons why purposive constitutional interpretation must take into 
account international law as one of the extra-textual context. First, adherence to international 
law forms part of a country‟s international law obligations, arising out of either the general 
principles of public international law or the treaties which a country has signed, thereby 
agreeing to be bound by them. Secondly, it has already been noted that modern constitution-
making draws heavily from international law instruments which must thus, be considered in 
the interpretation of the constitutional provisions. Such inclusion of provisions from 
international law instruments into a country‟s constitution has been said to be the most direct 
and powerful way of incorporating international law into the country‟s municipal law.178 As 
such, the provisions of the Constitution must be interpreted in harmony with the country‟s 
international law obligations and in a manner that does not conflict with principles of 
international law. 
4.3 Foreign law and decisions 
Foreign law and decisions also play some role as extra-textual sources in the effort to 
establish the purpose of a constitutional provision. These are relevant because most modern 
constitutions cannot be described as unique pieces of work since they have borrowed, 
adopted and adapted provisions from constitutions of other countries.
179
 Kriegler J observed 
that „where a provision in our Constitution is manifestly modelled on a particular provision in 
another country‟s constitution, it would be folly not to ascertain how the jurists of that 
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country have interpreted their precedential provision.‟180 The Kenyan Constitution, like many 
others written in the past few decades, extensively borrowed from the experiences of other 
countries. Thus its interpretation will benefit from comparative foreign decisions on related 
matters or on in pari materia provisions, „particularly where Courts in exemplary 
jurisdictions have grappled with universal issues confronting us‟.181 In Jasbir Singh Rai, 
Mutunga CJ underscored the pivotal role that Commonwealth and international jurisprudence 
will continue to play in the development of Kenyan jurisprudence.
182
 
However, such foreign decisions must be used with circumspection, aimed at „finding 
principles rather than extracting rigid formulae,‟ seeking „rationales rather than rules.‟183 Use 
of such comparative methods requires knowledge not only of foreign law, but also of its 
social and above all its political context, as it can become an abuse if it is legalistic and 
ignores context.
184
 When one is borrowing and transplanting, care must be taken so as to 
anchor comparative borrowing, both within the context of the texts from which the authority 
emanates and the context of the nature and purpose of the text of the borrowing country. To 
uncritically borrow from foreign sources without considering the appropriate context is a 
dangerous exercise. It would appear that it was with this kind of counsel in mind that the 
Chief Justice in Jasbir Singh Rai warned against „mechanistic approaches to precedent‟ that 
rely on foreign decisions without an inquiry into their respective contexts. He concluded that 
„[w]hile our jurisprudence should benefit from the strengths of foreign jurisprudence, it must 
at the same time obviate the weaknesses of such jurisprudence, so that ours is suitably 
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enriched‟.185 Likewise, in Communications Commission of Kenya, the Supreme Court warned 
of the danger of „unthinking deference to canons of interpreting rules of common law, 
statutes and foreign cases [which] can subvert the theory of interpreting the Constitution‟.186 
The interpreter must always bear in mind that it is the Kenyan Constitution being interpreted 
and not a constitution of the other country being used as a comparative source. As 
Chaskalson in the South African case of S v Makwanyane cautioned, „[i]n dealing with 
comparative law we must bear in mind that we are required to construe the South African 
Constitution, and not an international instrument or the constitution of some foreign country, 
and that this has to be done with due regard to our legal system, our history and 
circumstances, and the structure and language of our own Constitution‟.187 Having adopted 
devolution, blindly borrowing from decisions of countries that do not have devolved systems 
may be misleading and dangerous.
188
 Furthermore, the Kenyan devolution as defined in 
Chapter One
189
 appears to have burst the boundaries of mere decentralisation and decisions 
from countries whose devolution is mere decentralisation must be relied upon with caution. 
As noted in Chapter One, this study pays specific attention to South African jurisprudence, 
because the drafters of the Kenyan Constitution used many provisions from the South African 
Constitution, particularly in the area of devolution. Bearing in mind the caution articulated 
above about the differences in the contexts, there are also similar contexts between the two 
countries.
190
 Although there are differences in the structure of devolution in the sense that 
South Africa has three spheres of government, while Kenya has only two, the general context 
in which both adopted devolution has similarities. Whereas South Africa was coming from an 
autocratic apartheid system with a skewed approach to the development of the country and 
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distribution of resources, services and opportunities, Kenya was coming from an autocratic 
system of an „imperial‟ presidency with a skewed approach to the development of the country 
and distribution of resources, services and opportunities. 
The Kenyan approach in this respect is consistent with comparative jurisprudence which is in 
favour of consideration of foreign decisions on in pari materia provisions. In S v Juvenile the 
Zimbabwean Supreme Court was of the view that where provisions are couched in similar 
terms to the provisions of international or regional bills and bills of rights in other countries, 
consideration must be given to the interpretation placed upon these provisions by courts in 
those other countries. In the South African case of K v Minister of Safety and Security, 
O‟Regan J was emphatic that „[t]here can be no doubt that it will often be helpful for our 
courts to consider the approach of other jurisdictions to problems that may be similar to our 
own‟.191 The Court explained the justification for reliance on foreign jurisprudence as an 
effort to avoid a parochial view of the problems facing the modern world. 
It would seem unduly parochial to consider that no guidance, whether 
positive or negative, could be drawn from other legal systems‟ grappling 
with issues similar to those with which we are confronted. Consideration of 
the responses of other legal systems may enlighten us in analysing our own 
law, and assist us in developing it further.
192
 
Justice Ginsburg
193
 holds the view that in this age of supreme constitutions along the lines of 
the American one having been adopted in many countries, even the American system stands 
to benefit from decisions of courts of other countries when interpreting provisions in their 
constitutions which are similar to those in the US Constitution. 
4.4 Political, economic, social and cultural context 
Constitutions are enacted and expected to operate and serve the interests of a people within a 
political, economic, social and cultural context. Contextual interpretation therefore seeks to 
look at the political, social, economic and cultural context that informs the circumstances 
under which the Constitution was adopted and operates as an extra-textual source. This kind 
                                                 
191
 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC) (Minister of Safety and Security) para 34.  
192
 Minister of Safety and Security para 35. 
193
 Ginsburg RB „A decent respect to the opinions of [human]kind: The value of a comparative perspective in 
constitutional adjudication‟ (2005) Cambridge Law Journal 575. 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
Chapter 2: An approach to the interpretation of the devolution provisions in the Constitution 
of context has three dimensions – the historical, contemporary and future dimensions. The 
Supreme Court has asserted that „historical, economic, social, cultural, and political content is 
fundamentally critical in discerning the various provisions of the Constitution that pronounce 
on its theory and interpretation‟.194 
4.4.1 Historical dimension of context 
The historical dimension investigates the political, social, economic and cultural conditions 
which impelled the framers to make the constitution in the manner they did and which they 
were responding to. A look into the history enables the interpreter to determine the mischief 
which the provision was intended to remedy – it enables him or her to identify the purpose 
the provision was meant to serve.
195
 The provision to be interpreted is regarded as a response 
to a mischief that existed as a historical fact. That historical fact or situation, as well as the 
law as it stood at the time, must be understood in order to fully appreciate the effects of the 
provision as a measure of redressing the mischief.
196
 The Kenyan Constitution of 2010 was 
meant to address and redress a legacy of a multiplicity of governance problems revolving 
around centralised power, which had been abused and used to marginalise the majority of the 
people, as individuals, communities and regions. This legacy goes back to the colonial days 
and devolution should be understood as having been intended as a remedy to this 
marginalisation. In Jasbir Singh Rai, Mutunga CJ appreciated the role of history in 
constitutional interpretation from this perspective in the following terms: 
There is no doubt that the Constitution is a radical document, that looks to a 
future that is very different from our past, in its values and practices. It seeks 
to make a fundamental change from the 68 years of colonialism, and 50 
years of independence. In their wisdom, the Kenyan people decreed that past 
to reflect a status quo that was unacceptable, through: provisions on the 
democratization and decentralization of the executive; devolution; the 
strengthening of institutions; the creation of institutions that provide checks 
and balances; decreeing values in the public service; giving ultimate 
authority to the people of Kenya which they delegate to institutions that must 
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serve them, and not enslave them; prioritizing integrity in public leadership; 
a modern Bill of Rights that provides for economic, social and cultural rights 
to reinforce the political and civil rights, giving the whole gamut of human 
rights the power to radically mitigate the status quo and signal the creation of 
a human-rights State in Kenya; mitigating the status quo in land that has 
been the country‟s Achilles heel in its economic and democratic 
development. These instances, among others, reflect the will and deep 
commitment of Kenyans, reflected in fundamental and radical changes, 
through the implementation of the Constitution.
197
 
A major aspect of this historical legacy was the highly centralised system in which the 
allocation of resources, opportunities and development of the country was skewed. The 
system fused political and economic power into one centre, personified by the imperial 
presidency, leading to the „country‟s developmental imbalances‟, which necessitated the 
adoption of the devolved system of government.
198
 
Historical context must inform contemporary decisions in order to move the country into the 
desired future. Reference to the past ensures that mistakes of the past are not continued
199
 or 
repeated and that the past unacceptable ways of doing things are abandoned. According to the 
High Court in Dennis Mogambi Monga’re, „[w]hen the people of Kenya voted in favour of 
the Constitution, they made a decision to make a break with the past and bring in a new 
constitutional dispensation on the basis of the values and principles set out in the 
Constitution‟.200 This position is consistent with the view of Mohamed J in the South African 
case of S v Mhlungu, that the main desire of the South African people in adopting the new 
Constitution was that there was going to be „a ringing and decisive break with the past‟.201 
From these premises, a purposive and contextual interpretation focuses on the negative 
history aiming at fulfilling the desire that it must be departed from, redressed and never 
repeated. The South African Constitutional Court similarly declared that „the Constitution is 
not simply some codification of an acceptable or legitimate past. It retains from the past only 
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what is defensible and represents a radical and decisive break from that part of the past which 
is unacceptable.‟202 In a similar manner, the determination of the purpose and objective of 
devolution in Kenya must benefit from a clear appreciation of the political, economic, social 
and cultural context of the country in its historical dimension, so as to inform the present 
application of the constitutional provisions and shape the future. In the context of interpreting 
the right to equality and equal protection of the law, the High Court in FIDA-K noted that the 
interpreter must look at not only the language chosen to articulate specific rights and 
freedoms, but also „the historical origins of the concept enshrined‟.203 It emphasised that 
„[t]he equal protection and non-discrimination principles are not abstract propositions. They 
are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties and historical injustices to be 
addressed so that specific goals and remedies are achieved.‟204 The Supreme Court has 
asserted that the Supreme Court Act grants it „a near-limitless, and substantially elastic 
interpretative power‟ [that] „allows the court to explore interpretative space in the country‟s 
history and memory that … goes beyond the minds of the framers whose product, and 
appreciation of the history and circumstances of the people of Kenya, may have been 
constrained by the politics of the moment‟.205 
In respect of devolution, Mutunga CJ in Speaker of the Senate went into a detailed 
examination of Kenya‟s colonial and post-independence history of skewed economic 
development and regional disparities to illustrate why the Constitution has sought to 
zealously protect devolution and the system of revenue-sharing from unilateral discretion of 
the national government.
206
 The Court examined past attempts to decentralise power and 
came to the conclusion that the design of the current devolution is meant to be a 
transformative device for Kenyan society. It is meant to redress past problems of 
marginalisation and exclusion. „Devolution is the core promise of the new Constitution. It 
reverses the system of control and authority established by the colonial powers and continued 
by successive Presidents. The large panoply of institutions that play a role in devolution-
matters, evidences the central place of devolution in the deconstruction-reconstruction of the 
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Kenyan state.‟207 Thus contextual interpretation of devolution informed by Kenyan history 
must induce large-scale social change through non-violent political processes grounded in 
law.
208
 
4.4.2 Contemporary dimension of context 
The contemporary dimension investigates the current and prevailing political, economic, 
social and cultural circumstances within which the Constitution is operating. Interpretation is 
therefore a contemporary function of the application of the constitutional provisions to the 
present problems of society. Contextual interpretation draws from the historical facts to 
inform the formulation of solutions to contemporary problems. Breyer argues for an 
interpretation that serves the concerns of the people at their specific times of existence in the 
different time dimensions and thereby sees the people as including future generations. A 
judge must interpret the Constitution in a manner that „reconstructs the past solution 
imaginatively in its setting and project the purposes which inspired it upon the concrete 
occasions which arise for decisions‟.209 The court in FIDA-K underscored the need for the 
judges to strive to capture within their decisions the purpose of each individual right, but 
hastened to clarify that „by purpose we do not mean what some framers may have intended to 
mean in the past, rather we mean the best modern theory that can be devised to justify the 
existence of the right in question and how it addresses a particular injustice‟.210 
4.4.3 Future dimension of context 
The future dimension looks at the aspirational aspects and seeks to interpret the Constitution 
in a living manner to respond to the dynamism of society in order to serve not only the 
promised future, but also new challenges that may not have been envisioned or properly 
captured by the framers. In this sense, purposive interpretation is said to be „forward-looking 
interpretation based on what can be learnt from past experience‟.211 Thus, the Constitution 
must be construed in a manner that is heedful of the continuing time-frame within which it 
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obtains and operates.
212
 Purposive contextual interpretation must link the past to the promised 
future by constantly reflecting on the reality of the past in order to create new ideas and 
values for the present and the future.
213
 Against this background, the Preamble to the 
Constitution makes it clear that the Constitution is adopted for not only the current generation 
of „we the people of Kenya‟ but also for our future generations. Consequently, Article 259(3) 
instructs that the Constitution be contextually interpreted in a dynamic manner as a living 
instrument, a law that „is always speaking‟. The High Court in FIDA-K referred to „what is 
known as always speaking approach‟.214 
 5 Additional principles relating to interpretation of Bills of Rights 
The Bill of Rights forms part of the Constitution and as such, all the rules of interpretation 
discussed apply to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. However, because of the special 
significance of rights, additional rules have been developed for their interpretation, which 
may be relevant to the interpretation of devolution provisions. While the content of a right 
has to be interpreted broadly, liberally and generously, restrictions to a right must be 
construed narrowly and restrictively. The rationale for this is the fact that a limitation in 
respect of a right is to be regarded as an exception to the general rule, which must therefore 
be construed narrowly.
215
 This is because in the relationship between the state and the 
individual, the individual is in a weaker position and requires protection against the state 
whose power to limit the rights must be subjected to interpretative restraints. 
5.1 Interpretation of rights and limitations 
Rights must be interpreted generously in order to allow the full benefit of the rights, while 
avoiding a strict and legalistic approach that may impede the realisation of the objectives of 
the rights‟ provisions.216 In FIDA-K the High Court adopted this approach, stating the rule 
thus: 
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Provisions relating to fundamental rights and freedoms must be given 
purposive and generous interpretation in such a way as to secure maximum 
enjoyment by all of the rights and freedoms guaranteed. In our view when a 
State organ seeks to do an act which derogates on the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under Chapter 4 of our 
Constitution, the burden is on that person or authority seeking the derogation 
to show that the act or omission is acceptable within the derogation 
permitted under the Constitution.
217
 
Currie and De Waal define it as an interpretation which is in favour of rights and against their 
restriction: „It entails drawing the boundaries of rights as widely as the language in which 
they have been drafted and the context in which they are used makes possible.‟218 In 
relational terms the court stands between the state and the individual to ensure that the state, 
as the stronger party in the relationship, is restrained in order to give the individual adequate 
space to exercise his rights. 
In contrast, limitations to rights must be interpreted narrowly because although it has been 
recognised that rights are not absolute but subject to limitations, the power of the state to 
limit rights is itself limited.
219
 Limitations to rights must be interpreted strictly against the 
state or person limiting the right to justify the limitation. 
 5.2 Application to interpretation of devolution provisions 
Drawing from these rules, devolution provisions which seek to empower the county 
governments must be interpreted generously. This is more so in the key areas of political, 
functional, administrative and financial autonomy. For instance, in the functional area,
220
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taking into account the subsidiarity principle, the devolution provisions should be interpreted 
generously in favour of the counties to ensure that where certain functions are most 
efficiently and effectively performed by county governments, they are left to those authorities 
to decide.
221
 Similarly, in the administrative area, a generous interpretation in favour of the 
counties should ensure that the administrative functionaries of the county government are 
truly answerable to the county government. 
Given the history of exclusion, regional inequalities and a deficit of development as well as 
marginalisation, the financial provisions on devolution must be interpreted generously in 
favour of county governments, and financial equalisation for marginalised regions, areas and 
communities.
222
 In Speaker of the Senate the Supreme Court laid ground for this approach by 
noting that „[t]he “constitutional commitment to protect”, and its signal of the search for a 
more perfect devolution, implies that, in interpreting the devolution provisions, where 
contestations regarding power and resources arise, the Supreme Court should take a generous 
approach‟.223 It added that „[t]he Supreme Court will not hesitate to pronounce itself with 
final authority, by laying down the proper juridical structures consolidating the devolution-
concept where they are required, and stabilizing our Constitution, as is expected‟.224 
Similarly, provisions on intergovernmental processes for the management and sharing of 
finances must be interpreted generously in favour of the participation in the processes by the 
county governments and the Senate as their representative and protector.
225
 In the historical 
context of Kenya set out in Chapter Three, the Court as the determinative interpreter and 
guardian of the Constitution must view its role as standing between national government and 
county governments to ensure that national government ensures that county governments are 
enabled to have adequate capacity and space within which to operate. Indeed, the Court must 
interpret the cooperative government provisions generously in favour of the counties to 
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ensure participation on the basis of mutual respect.
226
 The Supreme Court in Speaker of the 
Senate has in this regard asserted the following: 
Article 96 of the Constitution represents the raison d’etre of the Senate as 
“to protect” devolution. Therefore, when there is even a scintilla of a threat 
to devolution, and the Senate approaches the Court to exercise its advisory 
jurisdiction under Article 163(6) of the Constitution, the Court has a duty to 
ward off the threat. The Court‟s inclination would not be any different if 
some other State organ approached it. Thus if the process of devolution is 
threatened, whether by Parliamentary or other institutional acts, a basis 
emerges for remedial action by the Courts in general, and by the Supreme 
Court in particular.
227
 
On the other hand, given the historical context in which Kenya adopted devolution, there will 
be temptation on the part of the national government, especially during the transition period, 
to want to use the intervention provisions to claw back power and recentralise. For this 
reason, it is argued that while interpreting the county-empowering provisions generously in 
favour of the counties, the national government supervision- and devolution-limiting 
provisions ought to be interpreted narrowly and restrictively against the national government. 
The provisions on monitoring and evaluation, intervention both in functional
228
 and financial 
matters,
229
 the suspension of county government,
230
 and the residual functions of the national 
government must all be interpreted restrictively.
231
 They must be interpreted narrowly in 
order to maintain a delicate balance between the distinctness and autonomy of the county 
governments, and the supervisory powers of national government.
232
 
6 Remedies for violation of constitutional devolution provisions 
In most cases a court would be approached to interpret constitutional devolution provisions in 
the context of a challenge to legislation or conduct of any of the governments or their 
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officials, raising the question of what remedies the court can grant. Both mandatory and 
discretionary remedies are implied by a number of constitutional provisions. When a court 
finds a law or conduct inconsistent with devolution provisions of the Constitution, it must 
declare it invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.
233
 Appropriate discretionary reliefs are 
also envisaged in a number of provisions.
234
 Four basic remedies related to a declaration of 
invalidity, arranged in hierarchical order, are possible. First, the law may be „read down‟ to 
avoid the inconsistency.
235
 Secondly, if that is not possible, the law must be declared 
invalid.
236
 Thirdly, instead of declaring the whole law invalid, the substantive impact of the 
declaration should, where possible, be limited and controlled by altering the offending law 
through severance, reading-in or notional severance to cure the constitutional defect.
237
 
Fourthly, it might be necessary to limit the temporal impact of the order of invalidity by 
suspending the order of invalidity or limiting the retrospective effect of the order.
238
 In 
addition, with or without a declaration of invalidity, other appropriate reliefs could be 
fashioned to meet the exigencies of the situation. 
6.1 Reading down of the law 
Given that a declaration of invalidity may lead to very severe and disruptive consequences, 
the constitutional remediation provisions must be read as envisaging powers of the courts to 
make orders that mitigate some of the consequences. The first step is to try and avoid a 
declaration of invalidity through reading down. Reading down is an approach to 
interpretation of a statute in situations where two interpretations are possible: one leading to 
inconsistency and another to consistency.
239
 The court must choose the approach that avoids 
inconsistency and thereby avoid invalidity, which should be declared only where it cannot be 
                                                 
233
 Art 2(4) on constitutional supremacy envisages such a declaration.  
234
 See Article 3(1) which requires every person to respect, uphold and defend the Constitution, Article 23(1) 
which empowers the High Court to provide redress in cases of violation of rights, Article 23(3) which identifies 
a number of appropriate reliefs, and Article 165(7) which empowers the High Court to „make any order or give 
any direction it considers appropriate to ensure the fair administration of justice‟.  
235
 See Bishop M „Remedies‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2011) Chap 9, 
86. 
236
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 86. 
237
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 86. 
238
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 87. 
239
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 87. 
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avoided. The South African Constitutional Court rendered this rule thus: „judicial officers 
must prefer interpretations of legislation that fall within constitutional bounds over those that 
do not, provided that such an interpretation can be reasonably ascribed to the action.‟240 
When such a choice is made, reading down becomes a remedy. 
In respect of devolution, the Constitution envisages reading down as a mechanism of 
avoiding conflict of national and county legislations.
241
 Likewise, by requiring existing laws 
to be construed with alterations, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions necessary to bring 
them into conformity with the Constitution, reading down is envisaged and will play a critical 
role in bringing devolution into operation.
242
 This will be more critical during the transition 
period. 
6.2 Declaration of invalidity of legislation or conduct 
Where it is not possible to read down the legislation, a declaration of invalidity must follow. 
This is an important mandatory remedy implied in the supremacy clause, but is restricted to 
the extent of inconsistency, once a court concludes that a law or conduct is inconsistent with 
a constitutional provision.
243
 The remedy of invalidity follows automatically the moment 
inconsistency is found.
244
 In respect of fundamental rights, the Constitution includes among 
the listed „appropriate reliefs‟ a declaration of invalidity of any law that violates rights.245 
6.3 Reading in and severance 
A court can limit the substantive impact and mitigate the consequences of a declaration of 
invalidity by invalidating only part of a law through reading in, severance, and notional 
severance.
246
 By providing that any other law that is inconsistent with the constitution „is 
                                                 
240
 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd 
and others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit No and others 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC) para 
23.  
241
 See Art 191(5) discussed in Chap 6 section 8.2. 
242
 See section 7(1) and Chap 11 section 3.4. 
243
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 96. 
244
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 19 and 20 where he talks of „automatic remedialism‟ and emphasises that „in 
constitutional law a finding that law or conduct is unconstitutional results automatically in a declaration of 
invalidity‟.  
245
 Art 23(3)(d). 
246
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 97. 
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void to the extent of the inconsistency‟, the Constitution incorporates these limiting elements 
as mechanisms for avoidance and control of the consequences of a declaration of 
invalidity.
247
 This terminology „reflects a narrow striking down‟ of legislation as opposed to 
striking down the whole statute.
248
 
By „reading in‟ a court adds words to the statute to cure the defect in it and make it consistent 
with the Constitution.
249
 It effectively changes the text to save a law from being declared 
invalid in whole or in part. Although „reading-in‟ and severance have been criticised as forms 
of „writing‟ and „editing‟ legislation that usurp legislative power,250 there is judicial support 
for reading-in as a good remedy in cases of under-inclusion of protected persons.
251
 South 
African Courts have supported this remedy, arguing for the „equality of the vineyard [and 
not] the graveyard‟.252 The essence of this is that in a statute that is unfairly discriminatory 
because it provides benefits to some groups and not others, reading-in is the correct remedy 
as it would benefit everybody. In contrast, a declaration of invalidity would benefit 
nobody.
253
 From this perspective, reading-in comes closer to the „including‟ principle that 
features prominently in the county- and devolution-empowering provisions. In Rotich Samuel 
Kimutai v Ezekiel Lenyongopeta and 2 others, the Court of Appeal had long before the 
adoption of the new Constitution recognised reading-in as a remedy to absurdity: „Whenever 
the strict interpretation of a statute gives rise to an absurd and unjust situation, the judges can 
and should use their good sense to remedy it – by reading words in, if necessary – so as to do 
what Parliament would have done, had they had the situation in mind.‟254 
                                                 
247
 Art2(4). 
248
 See Ackermann J in the South African case of Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) para 131. 
249
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 104. 
250
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 105. 
251
See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 109. 
252
 See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) 
(NCGLE v Minister of Home Affairs) para 75. See also Minister of Home Affairs and another v Fourie and 
another 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) para 149. 
253
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 106. 
254
 [2005] eKLR (Rotich Samuel Kimutai) page 6. 
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Severance involves reading a statute that is partly unconstitutional in such a manner that the 
unconstitutional part is severed from the rest, leaving the constitutional part intact.
255
 
Through severance the court is able to control and limit the consequences of its order of 
invalidity to only those offending provisions of the statute. Kriegler J of the South African 
Constitutional Court rendered the test for severability as involving determining whether the 
good can be separated from the bad: „If the good is not dependent on the bad and can be 
separated from it, one gives effect to the good that remains after the separation if it still gives 
effect to the main objective of the statute.‟256 One must first ask whether it is possible to 
severe the invalid provisions and, secondly, whether what remains gives effect to the purpose 
of the legislative scheme. Notional severance involves a court leaving the words of a statute 
unaltered, but subjects its application to a condition.
257
 
Sometimes severance and reading-in are combined so that the interpretation excises certain 
words from the provision and reads in others. This interpretative approach as a remedy will 
be useful not only for the interpretation of old order laws to bring them into conformity with 
the devolved system under the new Constitution but also new order laws to facilitate 
devolution. The South African Constitutional Court referred to both „severance‟ and „reading 
in‟ as an interpretive solution to both old and new order legislation.258 The South African 
Supreme Court of Appeal has also viewed this kind of interpretation as envisaging „some 
form of pruning exercise‟ which „involves discarding the offensive portions‟ of the old order 
law and „giving meaning and effect to the non-offensive ones‟.259 
In John Harun Mwau, the High Court of Kenya appears to have by implication adopted this 
technique of severance and reading-in for interpreting these old order laws. The Court 
understood „all laws‟ in force as including the former Constitution and the National Accord 
and Reconciliation Act of 2008 (NARA). It then held that section 9(2) of the Sixth Schedule 
amended or modified the provisions of the NARA to the extent that elections could be held 
                                                 
255
 Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Matiso and others v Commanding Officer Port 
Elizabeth Prison and others 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC) (Coetzee and Matiso). 
256
 Coetzee & Matiso para 16.  
257
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 97. 
258
 Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and others 2006 (8) BCLR (New Clicks) 
para 14, both severance and reading-in were used to make the South African Medicines Act and Regulations 
make sense within the meaning of the new Constitution. 
259
 Majomatic 115 (Pty) Ltd v Kouga Municipality and others [2010] 3 All SA 415 (SCA) para 6. 
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before 2012, if the coalition government established under the NARA was dissolved. It also 
held that by section 12 of the Sixth Schedule saving the positions of the President and the 
Prime Minister until the first elections, section 6 of the NARA must be read as having been 
amended or modified to exclude the possibility by one coalition partner withdrawing from the 
coalition and early elections being necessitated without the agreement of the other.
260
 
6.4 Suspension of a declaration of invalidity 
The inconsistency of a law or conduct with the Constitution is a matter to be determined 
objectively, and once established, must lead to an automatic declaration of invalidity. This is 
because, it is not the court that invalidates the law, which is invalid from inception; the court 
only declares what it already is. Ackerman J of South African Constitutional Court observed 
that „[t]he Court‟s order does not invalidate the law; it merely declares it to be invalid‟.261 
Likewise, Kriegler J notes that a declaration of invalidity „is descriptive of a pre-existing state 
of affairs‟.262 Article 2(4) of the Constitution does not read that „the law will be declared void 
and the conduct invalid‟. Instead, it reads, the law „is void‟ and the conduct „is invalid‟. The 
essence of this is that a declaration of invalidity has retrospective effects and affects all 
actions taken in the past on the basis of the invalidated statute. The necessary implication is 
that the declaration can have very drastic consequences, some of which the courts must seek 
to avoid or mitigate.
263
 Courts can therefore regulate the effect of their orders of invalidity on 
both the future and the past.
264
 
In contrast to South Africa, which explicitly empowers the courts to suspend a declaration of 
invalidity, to allow Parliament an opportunity to rectify the law,
265
 the Kenyan Constitution 
makes no such explicit provision. It is, however, submitted that the implied powers of the 
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 John Harun Mwau paras 157 and 158. See also Republic v Transitional Authority and another Ex parte 
Medical Practitioners, Pharmacists and Dentists Union (KMPDU) and 2 other [2013] eKLR (para 67) in which 
the High Court severed the phrase „this section‟ in section 34 of the Intergovernmental Relations Act as being 
misplaced and replaced it with „this Act‟. 
261
 Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) para 27. 
262
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) para 94. 
263
 See Steytler (1998) 30 writing in the context of South Africa. 
264
 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 111. 
265
 See ss 98(5) and (6) of the South African Interim Constitution and 172(1)(b) of the Constitution of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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Kenyan courts to fashion and grant appropriate reliefs envisage suspension as one such relief. 
The South African Constitutional Court has observed that: 
The need for the Courts to have such a power has been recognised in other 
countries. In Canada for instance where no provision is made specifically in 
the Constitution for such powers, the Courts have achieved this result by 
suspending an order invalidating a statute for sufficient time to allow 
Parliament to take remedial action.
266
 
Where the result of invalidating everything done under an unconstitutional law would be 
disproportional to the harm which would result from giving the law temporary validity, 
suspension of a declaration of invalidity as an appropriate relief would be justified. For 
example, a declaration of invalidity may create a lacuna in the law that may cause 
uncertainty, administrative confusion or potential hardship.
267
 Thus, the aim and effect of a 
suspension, as Chaskalson P noted, is to permit: 
[T]his Court to put Parliament on terms to correct the defect in an invalid law 
within a prescribed time. If exercised, this power has the effect of making the 
declaration of invalidity subject to a resolutive condition. If the matter is 
rectified, the declaration falls away and what was done in terms of the law is 
given validity. If not, the declaration of invalidity takes place at the expiry of 
the prescribed period, and the normal consequences attaching to such a 
declaration ensue.
268
 
But suspension may in certain circumstances be inadequate in mitigating the consequences. 
The Court may thus limit the application of the declaration of invalidity by delineating who 
may benefit from the relief granted and under what circumstances. Transactions that may 
have been finalised under the invalidated law before the declaration is made could be 
excluded from the application of the order.
269
 However, individual litigants must not be 
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 Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (10) 
BCLR 1289 (Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature) para 107. 
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 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 116. 
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singled out for benefit of the order. Instead, all people who are in the same situation as the 
litigants should benefit from the order. 
6.4 Other appropriate relief 
In respect of the Bill of Rights, Article 23(3) empowers the courts to grant „appropriate 
relief‟, including a declaration of rights, an injunction, a conservatory order, a declaration of 
invalidity of any law that denies, violates, infringes, or threatens a right or fundamental 
freedom in the Bill of Rights, an order for compensation, and an order for judicial review. 
These appropriate reliefs are implied in the other constitutional provisions, including those on 
devolution, that grant the court jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution. They are also 
inherent in the common law powers of the courts to grant such orders as will meet the ends of 
justice. For example, the High Court‟s unlimited jurisdiction includes power to fashion 
appropriate reliefs.
270
 The power to declare a law invalid includes the power to fashion 
appropriate reliefs to avoid and control the consequences of the declaration. The Supreme 
Court‟s jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution and even the exercise of appellate 
jurisdiction imply powers to grant appropriate reliefs, whether temporary or final. This 
includes the power to alter the lower court‟s appropriate relief with a relief the appellate 
Court deems fit.
271
 The Supreme Court has held that the appropriate reliefs envisaged by 
Article 23(3) imply a power for the courts to grant relief for infringement of other provisions 
of the Constitution other than the Bill of Rights. 
Article 165(3)(d) makes it clear that that power extends well beyond the Bill 
of Rights when it provides that the High Court has jurisdiction to hear any 
matter relating to any question with respect to interpretation of the 
Constitution „including the determination of (i) the question whether any law 
is inconsistent with or in contravention of this Constitution; (ii) the question 
whether anything said to be done under the authority of this Constitution or 
of any law is inconsistent with, or in contravention, of this Constitution; (iii) 
any matter relating … to the constitutional relationship between the levels of 
government.‟ These provisions make it clear that the Kenyan Courts have a 
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far-reaching constitutional mandate to ensure the rule of law in the 
governance of the country.
272
 
Such appropriate relief will depend on the circumstances of each case and the constitutional 
provision under interpretation. In Fose Ackermann J commented on what is appropriate: 
Appropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect and 
enforce the Constitution. Depending on the circumstances of each particular 
case the relief may be a declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or 
such other relief as may be required to ensure that the rights enshrined in the 
Constitution are protected and enforced. If it is necessary to do so, the courts 
may even have to fashion new remedies to secure the protection and 
enforcement of these important rights.
273
 
It is submitted that the need to fashion new remedies to ensure that devolution is protected 
and enforced is apparent and imperative. Just as remedies for rights are informed and shaped 
by the purposes of the right,
274
 devolution remedies must be shaped and informed purposively 
by the values and purposes of devolution. From this perspective the devolution remedies must 
correct past problems of centralisation
275
 and regulate the behaviour of the two levels of 
government.
276
 Appropriate reliefs must not only be focused on the case before the court but 
also guide and direct future conduct by the two levels of government and state organs to 
avoid future repetition of the violations.
277
 They must shape the development and operation 
of the devolved system of government. The remedies must also be effective,
278
 serving the 
interests of not only the individual litigants but society as a whole
279
 so as to entrench the 
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 Communications Commission of Kenya para 360 (emphasis in original). 
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 Fose para 19. See also Bishop (2011) ch 9, 56. 
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 Fose para 19. 
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 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 67-8. 
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 See Bishop (2011) ch 9, 65. See also Fose para 17. 
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 See Hoffmann v South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC) para 45.  
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new form of governance and transform society. The appropriate reliefs may include common 
law and statutory remedies where they are suitable to the devolution demands. Where they 
are not, the courts must creatively fashion other constitutional remedies that may effectively 
deal with the special demands of the constitutional litigation.
280
 The courts have wide 
discretion in this respect.
281
 
 7 Conclusion 
Over the years special principles and rules for the interpretation of a supreme Constitution 
and a Bill of Rights have been developed. Significant among these principles and rules is the 
requirement that a supreme Constitution must be interpreted purposively, a principle adopted 
and incorporated in the Constitution. Purposive interpretation will require the determination 
and identification of the purposes of devolution and giving full effect to them. In determining 
these purposes the interpreter must start but not end with the text of the provision – he or she 
must interpret it contextually, drawing on both intra-textual and extra-textual contexts. While 
intra-textual context draws from the other provisions and aspects of the Constitution, extra-
textual context draws from sources outside the Constitution, including historical conditions of 
the country and comparative studies from other countries and international law. In these 
comparative studies, South Africa is a crucial source for Kenyan interpretation of devolution 
provisions given that Kenya‟s devolution borrowed significantly from the South African 
Constitution. 
While county-empowering provisions must be interpreted liberally, broadly and generously 
in favour of the counties in order to give full effect to the objectives and purposes of 
devolution, devolution intervention and limitation provisions must be interpreted narrowly 
and restrictively in order to restrain national government and create space for the county 
governments and the system of devolution to take root. In doing this, courts as the 
authoritative and determinative interpreters of the constitution will be seeking to stand 
between the national and county governments as „the veritable guardian-angels‟282 of 
devolution to enable the counties to take root. In this manner the promise of devolution as a 
transformative agent in Kenyan society will be achieved. To do this the courts must realise 
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that interpretation is not a neutral concept but rather a utilitarian and egalitarian concept 
which connotes social good and places a heavy responsibility on the judiciary as the decisive 
interpreter of the Constitution and the social good.
283
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 Klare KE „Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism‟ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Constitutional history of devolution 
1 Introduction 
Chapter Two has identified history as one of the key extra-textual sources to consult in a 
purposive interpretation, in order to establish the purpose of the devolution provisions in the 
Constitution. This chapter examines Kenyan political, economic, social and cultural history to 
the extent that it is relevant to interpretation and determination of the purposes for which 
devolution was adopted. To establish the problems and challenges which led to the adoption 
of devolution, the chapter traces the establishment of a political and economic system from 
the colonial and post-independence periods to the adoption of the new Constitution. 
2 Colonisation and its economic objectives 
As a political and economic entity, Kenya is a creature of Western countries‟ colonial policy 
and adventure in Africa.
1
 In the scramble for and division of Africa into spheres of influence, 
Kenya came under control of the British: first as a territory managed on behalf of the British 
government by the British East Africa Association, which later became the Imperial British 
East Africa Company (IBEACO); then as a protectorate; and finally as a colony.
2
 The 
scramble was aimed at expansion of commercial opportunities and informed by imperial 
policies based on conquest and subjugation of the natives.
3
 Mackinnon formed the British 
East Africa Association in 1887 solely „to open up the British portion of East Africa to 
commerce and civilization‟.4 The General Act of the Berlin Conference set out the rules of 
international law to govern the acquisition and establishment of authority over territory in 
Africa. Article 35 disclosed the agenda of the conference as including establishment of 
                                                 
1
 Ojwang JB Constitutional Development in Kenya: Institutional Adaptation and Social Change (1990) 19. 
2
 Ghai YP & McAuslan JPWB Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: A Study of the Legal Framework of 
Government from Colonial Times to the Present (1970) 3.  
3
 Juma L „Ethnic politics and the constitutional review process in Kenya‟ (2002) 9 Tulsa Journal Comparative 
& International Law 471- 532, 476-7 where he observes that „[t]hrough conquest, deliberate annexation of 
territory and lopsided treaties, the British coalesced the ethnic groups and the minority settler population into a 
Nation State‟. 
4
 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 3, 6. 
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sufficient authority in the occupied regions „to protect existing rights and as the case may be, 
freedom of trade and transit‟.5 
2.1 The exclusive economy and development, and the legacy of marginalisation 
The stated colonial objective necessitated economic and development policies not meant to 
promote the welfare of African natives but to serve the narrow interests of the British settlers 
and businessmen.
6
 According to Oyugi, having divided the colony into „native‟ and settler 
areas, the colonial government implemented a doctrine of separate development with separate 
policies for the two areas. This led to separate institutions, including local government 
catering exclusively for the interests of the different areas.
7
 Ghai and McAuslan call it a „dual 
economy‟ meant to exclusively serve the white settlers.8 
As an instrument for implementation of this policy, government was designed to be 
controlled and used by one group to the exclusion and disadvantage of the rest. A system was 
implemented to provide security of land tenure for the white settlers, publicly supported 
credit facilities for their agricultural activities, controlled involvement by Africans in 
agriculture and marketing of certain cash crops to ensure monopoly by the white settlers, and 
coercion to ensure cheap African labour. Laws were enacted to reduce land in the African 
reserves and access rights of the Africans to such land so as to force them to go and provide 
labour on the white settler farms.
9
 The demands of the markets back home informed the 
choice of the sectors to benefit from government investment policies, leading to neglect of 
other sectors that were not in high demand.
10
 Since most sectors of interest were based on 
agriculture, land which could support them was zoned as high or medium potential, allocated 
to whites, and received investment in infrastructure, while the low potential areas were 
                                                 
5
 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 4. 
6
 Mutakha JK „Regional inequalities in Kenya in the context of decentralization and devolution: Dynamics and 
policy options‟ in Report of the National Conference on Equity and Growth: Towards a Policy Agenda for 
Kenya (2006) 125. http://www.sidint.net/docs/inequalities%20Conference%202006.pdf (accessed: 1 November 
2013). 
7
 Oyugi WO „Local government in Kenya: a case of institutional decline‟ in Mawhood P (ed) Local Government 
in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa (1983) 1-2. 
8
 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 258.  
9
 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 96-7. 
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 Mutakha (2006) 125.  
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reserved for Africans and neglected,
11
 thereby starting the creation of regional disparities and 
development deficits.
12
 The 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance was enacted to allocate to settlers 
land belonging to African communities.
13
 Karuti Kanyinga, in his discussion of the relation 
between land, politics and election violence, estimates that a lot of high potential land was 
allocated to white settlers.
14
 The low potential lands became native reserves and were 
allocated to Africans on an ethnic basis, with solid socio-political boundaries enforced to 
avoid inter-ethnic political interactions among the Africans.
15
 This laid a foundation for the 
ethnicisation of Kenyan society.
16
 
In agriculture, laws were enacted to aid white settlers and disempower the natives.
17
 In 1914, 
agricultural legislation ostensibly aimed at the prohibition of the import of certain coffee 
plants to prevent coffee leaf disease was enacted under which Africans and Asians were 
administratively denied certificates of registration to engage in coffee-growing.
18
 The African 
reserves were only useful for sourcing cheap labour, which once prepared would be relocated 
to the high potential areas. Migration of people from African reserves to the white highlands 
in search of employment created the problem of squatters on settler farms, and later of rural 
to urban migration for non-existent opportunities. The migration of educated people to high 
and medium potential areas robbed the low potential zones of their high and medium 
potential human resources, which they badly needed for the development of these areas, 
thereby worsening the regional disparities.
19
 Furthermore, since most of the schools were 
                                                 
11
 Karuti K „The legacy of the white highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-2007 election violence in 
Kenya‟, (2009) 27 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 328, where he adds: „Population pressure resulted 
in congestion and declining productivity in the “native areas”. The administration shifted attention towards 
settler farming and neglected the reserves.‟ 
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 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 25. See also Mutakha (2006) 125.  
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 Karuti (2009) 328. 
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 Karuti (2009) 328. 
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established by Christian missionaries who found predominantly Islamic regions more 
resistant to Christianity, missionary schools were hardly established in these areas. This 
resulted in their marginalisation in an economy that was to later offer more opportunities for 
people with formal education.
20
 
These developments encouraged the growth of major urban areas within and around these 
high and medium potential areas. In particular, after construction of the Mombasa-Uganda 
railway line, Nairobi emerged as the government administrative headquarters, attracting 
industrial and commercial activities. The introduction of local manufacturing revolved 
around Nairobi and the other urban centres in the high and medium potential areas and along 
the railway line.
21
 Low potential areas ended up producing raw materials to be processed in 
Nairobi and the other major urban areas.
22
 
2.2 The centralised political system 
To achieve the objective of an exclusive economy, a political system based on the British 
unitary system of a highly centralised government with the concentration of power in the 
hands of the white minorities was developed. It was founded upon command and control of 
African activities. Initially, the territory was administered on behalf of the British government 
by the IBEACO, which was chartered as an instrument of both acquisition of territory and 
administration.
23
 This system was essentially centralised, as the company administered the 
territory on behalf of the British Government in London. From 15 June 1895, however, the 
British government assumed direct administration when the country was declared a 
protectorate and a commissioner appointed to administer it. The first legal instrument 
establishing an administrative system was the East Africa Order in Council of 1897. The 
Commissioner was appointed by Her Majesty as the chief executive officer of the territory 
with extensive powers, including the responsibility of establishing an administration for the 
territory. He had powers to legislate through the Queen‟s Regulations, establish a court for 
the protectorate, to sit in Mombasa with appeals going to the High Court in Zanzibar and 
other courts, regulate the native courts which were to have exclusive criminal jurisdiction 
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 Mutakha (2006) 126. 
21
 Mutakha (2006) 126. 
22
 A good example is the case of the semi-arid areas producing livestock to be slaughtered and processed in the 
slaughter houses and meat commissions in Nairobi and the other urban areas.  
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over Africans, and establish a constabulary or other force to be employed in the maintenance 
of law and order, and to deport persons.
24
 Since the details of the system were not provided, 
the first Commissioner developed a system of provincial administration, with the 
Commissioner having unfettered powers internally but being accountable to the Secretary of 
State, who had authority to approve any regulations he made. 
A 1902 Order in Council replaced the 1897 one with two significant changes: the freeing of 
the Commissioner from constant restrictions from London; and the granting of discretion to 
divide the country into provinces and districts for administration purposes. Although the 
freeing of the Commissioner was regarded as administrative devolution, he remained under 
the control of the colonial office and the provinces and districts he established were mere 
administrative outposts under his control, leaving the system essentially centralised.
25
 The 
first line of attack against this centralised system of government was agitation by white 
settlers and Indian businessmen who sought to be involved in law-making. They sought 
horizontal separation of power as well as participation at the local level. 
2.3 Emergence and development of local government 
Local government emerged and was developed along dualist lines, with one stream for the 
white settled areas and another for African reserves.
26
 The involvement of Africans in the 
administration of the protectorate started with the creation of the African native courts under 
the 1897 East African Order in Council; the appointment of African village headmen under 
the 1902 Order in Council and Village Headmen Ordinance; and the 1902 Order in Council 
under which the Commissioner created provinces and districts and appointed provincial and 
district commissioners. The provincial commissioners were empowered to appoint chiefs as 
agents of the central government, and any native or natives to be official headmen or 
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collective headmen of any village or villages.
27
 The functions of the village headmen 
included the maintenance of law and order, collection of taxes, maintenance of roads in their 
areas and the settlement of minor disputes between and among Africans.
28
 On the other hand, 
the townships of Mombasa and Nairobi were established in 1903 and administered by 
committees.
29
 
Notwithstanding these efforts, the first local government structures were recognised and 
formalised in 1919 when the town councils of Nairobi and Mombasa were established and 
District Advisory Committees for county areas recognised.
30
 In rural African non-scheduled 
areas, the District Advisory Committees were, according to the 1924 Native Councils 
Ordinance, replaced by Local Native Councils, which comprised the district commissioner, 
the assistant district commissioner, headmen and other Africans appointed at the discretion of 
the provincial commissioner.
31
 According to the Omamo Report all resolutions passed by the 
local native councils were subject to the approval of the provincial commissioner and the 
governor of the colony. This made it difficult for them to earn respect and recognition among 
Africans who perceived them as instruments of indirect colonial rule. This resistance resulted 
in the governor‟s appointment in 1926 of a Commission of Inquiry headed by R. H. Feetham 
to inquire and report on the system of government in the country with emphasis on what was 
most suitable for the white settled areas.
32
 
The Feetham Commission recommended that a policy of separate development for the 
Africans and the settlers be pursued; that district councils comprising elected non-officials 
with full executive authority be established in Nairobi, Naivasha, Nakuru, Laikipia, Uasin 
Gishu, Trans-Nzoia, Kisumu and Londian; and that townships be excluded from the district 
councils and be administered by the district commissioners.
33
 The 1929 Local District 
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Councils Ordinance gave effect to this separated system of local government,
34
 creating local 
district councils comprising members elected by whites to replace the 1919 district advisory 
committees in the white settled areas. Some Asian members were allowed to vote or be 
elected to these councils – but no Africans, even if they lived in these areas. Following 
pressure from Africans, the 1937 Native Authority Ordinance was enacted, permitting the 
election of Africans by Africans to the Local Native Councils even though the district 
commissioner retained the power to remove any elected member perceived to be 
„inappropriate‟. Further pressure led to the Local Government (African District Councils) 
Ordinance of 1950, which created African District Councils, which were corporate bodies 
with increased powers including the authority to appoint their own administrative staff and to 
set up committees to deal with specific matters and functions, replacing local native 
councils.
35
 More changes in the white settled areas led to the 1962 Local Government 
(County Councils) Ordinance that drew a distinction between rural and urban local 
government. As a consequence, between 1952 and 1963 the country developed three parallel 
systems of local government: municipalities, white settler areas, and African areas. 
Financing of these separate local governments directed more money into white local 
authorities than those in the African reserves.
36
 Even when in 1953 the Local Government 
Loans Authority was established to provide loans to local governments, the facility was 
skewed in favour of local authorities in white areas.
37
 Government became an exclusive 
property used for the benefit of whites against the natives, creating a notion that control of 
government by an individual entitles him or her to use it exclusively for the benefit of a few 
associated with him or her by race, ethnicity, friendship or even political affiliation. 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
The colonial period ensured that by the time Kenya attained independence in 1963, it had a 
history of a highly centralised system of government; a highly ethnicised people who 
participated in political activity from the vantage point of ethnicity; and a country with 
serious regional disparities. These factors conspired to ensure that the regional distribution of 
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employment opportunities, infrastructure, and access to professional services such as health 
care was uneven. The rural areas produced professionals such as doctors and lawyers but did 
not benefit from their services since most of them moved to the high and medium potential 
areas where their services were well remunerated. Such centralisation unevenly distributed 
the purchasing power and markets which were also centralised around Nairobi.
38
 Even the tax 
base became unevenly distributed with the most lucrative tax bases such as income tax and 
VAT concentrated in urbanised areas that had more employment opportunities. More money 
circulated in Nairobi and its environs making it easy and more profitable to do business in 
there than in other places.
39
 The result was that by the time of independence, regional 
disparities and inequalities that required correcting had been entrenched.
40
 
The colonial system of divide and rule coupled with the party politics of the last years before 
independence had also created negative ethnicity.
41
 Land having been the central platform on 
which the colonial system was founded had itself created a multiplicity of problems calling 
for resolution. Poverty and unemployment among Africans were major problems to be 
tackled. Yet Africans had been socialised in a highly centralised and oppressive system of 
government which may not have been appropriate for addressing these problems. Would they 
adopt this discredited colonial system, and how would they redistribute land? At 
independence the people‟s expectation was the deconstruction of the colonial political and 
economic system and the construction of a system aimed at serving the welfare of all the 
inhabitants of Kenya. It was genuinely hoped that independence would introduce different 
approaches to governance, economic investment and development that would fundamentally 
redress these problems. 
                                                 
38
 Mutakha (2006) 126. 
39
 A good example the high property values in Nairobi, which make it more profitable to invest in rental 
housing.  
40
 Mutakha (2006) 126. 
41
 Maxon (2011) generally discloses how ethnicity was used by the colonial government during the 
constitutional negotiations of the 1950s and 1960s. The book also makes it clear that Africans were not allowed 
to form nation-wide political movements that could allow them to mobilise their supporters across ethnic 
groups. 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
Chapter 3: Constitutional history of devolution 
3 The post-independence phase 
The hopes of the people were never realised as the government inherited the centralised 
system with its political and economic structures intact.
42
 Although the country attained 
independence with a federal Constitution, referred to as the Majimbo Constitution, delicately 
negotiated at Lancaster House and in Nairobi,
43
 within a few years it was frequently amended 
to abandon the non-centralised system and revert to the colonial centralised system of control, 
command and patronage. 
3.1 The federal independence system 
The process of making the independence Constitution divided the country into two camps 
which disagreed not on „whether independence would be achieved but rather the form it 
should take‟.44 The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) pushed for a federal system 
while the Kenya African National Union (KANU) strongly opposed this and wanted to retain 
the centralised system. The debate among the two parties was informed by the negative 
ethnicity which the colonial system had helped to cultivate in the country, with KANU being 
perceived as representing the two major and more populous communities in the country, 
while KADU was perceived as representing the minority communities which were worried 
about the possibility of losing to larger communities what they saw as their ancestral land.
45
 
As a result, the debate was couched in terms of KANU wanting nation-building and a united 
country while KADU was portrayed as wanting to divide the country along tribal lines. In the 
end KANU won by changing strategy, which involved accepting the proposed federal 
Constitution for the sake of hastening independence but once elected into government, 
planning to immediately amend it to recentralise power and create a unitary system.
46
 
The irony of the Kenyan situation is, therefore, one of a country which attained independence 
with a leadership that had no intention of implementing the independence Constitution and 
deconstructing the colonial centralised control and command system to construct a new 
constitutional dispensation. Macharia Munene has pointed out that the KANU leadership 
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went to elections with clear intentions not to implement the new Constitution, which they 
perceived as an imposition by the outgoing colonial government. He even argues that they 
understood their victory in the 1963 elections as giving them a mandate to amend the 
Constitution.
47
 
The Independence Constitution created a federal system with three levels of government: the 
national and regional, with local government as a competency of the regional government. 
Seven regions were created, with each regional assembly having power to legislate in various 
functional areas and elect a president and vice president.
48
 They had both legislative and 
executive authority over certain matters.
49
 The executive authority of the regions was, 
however, subject to that of the national government and the national legislature.
50
 The 
national legislature was bicameral with a senate meant to protect the interests of the regions. 
3.2 Recentralisation under the Kenyatta regime 
Consistent with the stated intention, the Kenyatta regime repeatedly amended the 
Constitution until it completely lost its identity and any pretensions to a non-centralised 
system.
51
 It was amended to do away with regional governments and to centralise power in 
the office of one “imperial” presidency. Both parliament and the judiciary were reduced to 
institutions subservient to the executive, personified by the “imperial” presidency, as they 
ceased to play any meaningful role of checks and balances. Susanne D. Mueller observes that 
„it appears that many of the tools of repression which were articulated under colonialism, and 
                                                 
47
 Munene (1994) 58. Also see Maxon (2011) chaps 8 and 9, in which he clarifies that in fact it is KANU which 
was assisted by the departing colonial powers and not KADU, as was previously believed. See also Okoth-
Ogendo HWO „The politics of constitutional change in Kenya since independence, 1963-69‟ (1972) African 
Affairs 18, where he observes that „KANU therefore treated the May elections of 1963 as a referendum on 
regionalism‟. 
48
 Oyugi (1983) 118 and Maxon Kenya’s Independence Constitution (2011) chapters 5 and 6.  
49
 Oyugi (1983) 118. 
50
 Section 105(2) of the Independence Constitution provided that: „The executive authority of a region shall be 
exercised as – (a) not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive authority of the Government of 
Kenya; (b) to ensure compliance with any provision made by or under an Act of Parliament applying to that 
region.‟ In respect of the legislative powers, section 66(4) of the Independence Constitution further provided 
that: „If any law made by a regional assembly is inconsistent with any law validly made by Parliament, the law 
made by Parliament shall prevail and the law made by the regional assembly shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be void.‟  
51
 Mutakha (2006) 130. 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
Chapter 3: Constitutional history of devolution 
then refined by a new ruling class following independence, are still being used to consolidate 
the state against its detractors‟.52 The process of recentraliation involved the abandonment of 
regionalism; the weakening of local government; the retention of the colonial economic and 
investment policy; and the mismanagement of the transfer of land from white settlers to 
Africans. 
3.2.1 The abandonment of regionalism 
The first steps towards recentralising power were administrative and aimed at denying 
regional governments administrative autonomy. The Ministry of Home Affairs, which was 
headed by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, directed in 1963 that all civil servants down to the 
district assistants would continue as officers of the national government and only be seconded 
to the regional governments.
53
 The Civil Secretaries who previously were Provincial 
Commissioners and had been designated by the Constitution to become heads of the civil 
service in the regions and be responsible to the regional assemblies, were directed to maintain 
close liaison with the central government.
54
 This effectively turned the public servants of the 
regional governments into a restored colonial provincial administration answerable to central 
government, which used them to frustrate the implementation of the federal arrangements.
55
 
Furthermore, since the salaries of these officers were still coming from the central 
government, their primary loyalty was to the central government rather than the regions. In 
addition, the regional assemblies were directed to refer draft legislations to central 
government for advice before their introduction in the regional assemblies.
56
 The central 
government also refused to release funds to the regional governments as they had undertaken 
to do. This was followed by the crossing of the floor by the KADU members of Parliament to 
join the ruling party, KANU. 
This, then, set the stage for the first constitutional amendment in 1964 which declared Kenya 
a republic and abolished the offices of Prime Minister and Governor-General, and combined 
their powers into the newly created office of the President. The amendment also deleted 
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Schedule Two which provided for some of the functions of the regional governments.
57
 In 
addition, the provisions for financial arrangements between central and regional governments 
and the independent revenue of the regions were repealed, making them entirely dependent 
on grants from the central government.
58
 The control of police was centralised to the central 
government and any role by the regions eliminated. Through these amendments the system of 
regional government was by 1965 reduced to something nominal. Two more amendments in 
1964
59
 and 1965 almost completed the process of doing away with regionalism.
60
 The 
exclusive legislative competence of the regional assemblies was scrapped by redesignating it 
as a concurrent function, while the exclusive executive competence was also abolished. The 
1965 amendment emphasised the inferior status of the regions and the regional assemblies by 
renaming them provinces and provincial councils, reducing the regional system to a glorified 
local government which derived its legislative and executive authority from delegation by the 
central government.
61
 By an amendment of 1966, the Senate was abolished by being merged 
with the House of Representatives to become the National Assembly in which constituencies 
were created to absorb the former Senators.
62
 Although in practice by early 1965 the regional 
assemblies or provincial councils had ceased to perform any functions or have any 
significance, it was not until 1968 that they were legislated out of the Constitution.
63
 
3.2.2 The weakening of local government 
As independence came closer, it became necessary to simplify the local government system 
under a uniform set of laws instead of the colonial parallel system. The 1963 Local 
Government Regulations were therefore promulgated providing for two types of local 
government: municipal councils for urban areas, and county councils for the rural areas that 
followed the existing district boundaries. Both the white settled areas county councils and the 
African district councils were dissolved and replaced by the newly created county councils. 
Since the Independence Constitution established a federal system, local authorities became a 
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competency of the newly created regional assemblies, which had power to constitute them, 
assign functions to them, and allocate them financial resources.
64
 The county councils and the 
municipalities were then assigned the functions of primary education and public health. The 
regional assemblies made available to the local authorities substantial grants to enable them 
to discharge their functions. The 1964 Graduated Personal Tax Act made this tax the most 
important source of revenue for local authorities.
65
 
The attitude of the independence government towards regionalism did not, however, spare 
local government, which suffered negative implications from some of the steps taken to 
abolish regionalism.
66
 According to Oyugi, the problems of the local authorities were 
intertwined with those of regionalism. A strong system of local government could not be 
allowed after the frustration of majimbo; they were therefore streamlined to make them 
simply appendages of the central government.
67
 Though not completely abolished the way 
the regions were, local government was slowly but surely weakened in a number of ways. 
First, through political and administrative mechanisms, central government secured 
representation in the local authorities through the District Commissioner, who under 
regionalism was supposed to be the Regional Government Agent became the nominee and 
agent of central government on the county and municipal councils. He was to provide liaison 
between local and central government, interpret central government policies to the local 
authorities and keep the Ministry of Local Government fully informed as to what was 
happening in the councils. In addition, though a commission had in 1963 recommended the 
abolition of the Ministry of Local Government – since local government had become a 
competence of the regions – central government refused to abolish the ministry and transfer 
its powers to the regions.
68
 The local government finance officers who had been posted to the 
regions were required to become the eyes of the Ministry in the regions, ensuring that the 
local authorities complied with central government financial guidelines. 
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Secondly, local government suffered a perpetual lack of adequate funding since there was no 
clear financial policy to ensure adequate finances that matched the functions they performed. 
Their major sources of revenue were school fees, poll rates and central government grants 
which could not raise adequate revenue.
69
 Independence brought increased demand for the 
local government services such as education and health, yet the revenues were not enough. 
School fees collections depended on enrolments, which were very low in some county 
councils. The collection of poll rates was equally poor, which was a result of the fact that 
during the struggle for independence this was one of the oppressions that Africans had 
complained about, even encouraging their people not to pay.
70
 
As a competence of regional governments, local government was entitled to additional 
funding from regional government grants. When regions were denied funding by the central 
government, they became unable to provide this additional funding to the local authorities.
71
 
When the regions were eventually abolished and local government put under the control of 
central government, ideally additional funding was expected to come from central 
government. Yet central government did not seem keen on providing it and, when it did, it 
did not follow any clear policy for funding and providing grants. Even though it was clear 
that the local authorities had different fiscal capacities,
72
 there was no provision for any 
system of financial equalisation.
73
 The initial response by central government was the 
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introduction of the Graduated Personal Tax of 1964 as the main source of revenue for local 
government. In the case of the county councils, this new tax did not make a difference since 
in practice it virtually replaced the poll rates. It also faced collection problems since it was 
collected by the provincial administration which had become unpopular, making them less 
enthusiastic about pursuing people for payment.
74
 In 1964 the central government followed 
this move with the introduction of general grants to replace the specific grants used before 
independence. This, too, did not solve the financial problems of local government. According 
to Oyugi, even the 1968 decision to redistribute fifty per cent of the Graduated Personal Tax 
from Nairobi and Mombasa did not effectively address the financial problem.
75
 
It appears that following the abolition of regionalism, central government, contrary to the 
provisions of the Constitution, was keen on ensuring a weak local government heavily 
dependent on it and which it controlled the same way the colonial government had done.
76
 
The central government took a number of decisions that virtually crippled local government. 
In 1964 the central government entered into an agreement with employers and trade unions 
(both public and private) to increase their establishments by ten per cent by January 1965 and 
employ additional people. Local authorities were forced to employ more staff than they 
needed.
77
 In 1966 central government decided to provide free outpatient healthcare services 
in all medical and health facilities operated by the central government and the local 
authorities. Local authorities were not consulted, yet the decision reduced their revenues from 
fees and charges. In 1967 central government reduced Graduated Personal Tax rates from Sh. 
48.00 per head per annum to Sh. 24.00 per head per annum, which in less than a year was 
abolished altogether without proposing an alternative source of revenue. Many rural local 
authorities, which relied heavily on this source, lost about sixty per cent of their revenue.
78
 
Between 1963 and 1969, the central government increased the salaries of teachers without 
consulting and involving local authorities in the negotiations, yet they were expected to pay 
the new salaries as soon as they were agreed upon by the central government and the 
Teachers Unions.
79
 The consequence of all these decisions was that local authorities were 
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unable to meet their financial obligations, which led to an outcry from the public. The 
response by the central government was to enact the Transfer of Functions Act of 1970, 
which transferred a number of functions such as primary education, roads and health from 
local to central government. While this relieved the local authorities of a heavy financial 
burden, it took from them some of the most important sources of revenue, such as school 
fees, thereby making it impossible for them to discharge their remaining functions and deliver 
services.
80
 This was compounded by the fact that although functions were transferred, 
personnel were not reduced commensurately, forcing the councils to continue paying huge 
salaries to staff they did not require. When the local authorities tried to lay off the workers, 
the Local Government Workers‟ Union intervened and local authorities were directed by 
central government to retain the workers. 
Thirdly, legislation increased central government control over local government activities. 
Under the 1963 Local Government Regulations, local government was a competence of 
regional assemblies which had power to constitute, assign functions, and provide financial 
resources to them. After the abolition of regionalism, the regulations were amended to 
become the Local Government At of 1965,
81
 under which the Minister for Local Government 
acquired absolute control and could virtually do anything in respect of local government. The 
relationship between central and local government became that of a superior and a 
subordinate with the local authorities required to seek approval of the ministry for virtually 
everything they did.
82
 Policies of local government were made by the Minister, the Ministry 
through its audit, budget and legal departments monitored the activities of local government 
closely, and budgets required the approval of the Ministry.
83
 The Minister was empowered to 
elevate an area to municipality status without consulting the local authority under which it 
previously fell.
84
 The Ministry shared power with the local authorities to appoint senior staff 
such as clerks, treasurers, engineers and medical officers whose salaries and dismissal 
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required the approval of the Minister, matters which shifted the officers‟ loyalty away from 
the local authorities to central government.
85
 The Minister could dissolve a council and 
appoint a Commission to take over its functions. In these circumstances, it is apt to conclude 
that the local government existing at the time of the adoption of devolution was merely 
performing delegated functions of the central government. 
Having abolished the regions as well as weakened and side-lined the local authorities, the 
central government was faced with the problem of how to involve the local communities in 
development. In 1966 the central government attempted to put in place a rudimentary system 
of district planning by establishing District Development Committees and District 
Development Advisory Committees which were dominated by central government 
administrators such as the Provincial Administration, but with representation from the local 
authorities and members of Parliament elected from constituencies within the district. This 
initiative only served to bring local government under more central government control, 
especially in matters of planning.
86
 
3.2.3 The adoption of the colonial economic and investment policy 
The independence government did not only adopt the centralised colonial political system, 
but also its economic, development and investment policies. Rather than seek to reduce the 
disparities, the government adopted development and investment policies that increased 
regional disparities. Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application 
to Planning in Kenya,87 which appears mixed up in terms of its vision and design, shows that 
the government either knowingly or unknowingly adopted the colonial economic, 
development and investment policies that had started the entrenchment of regional 
disparities.
88
 While it set out a vision with egalitarian objectives of organising and developing 
the nation‟s resources for the benefit of all who lived in it, it adopted means which did the 
opposite. The sessional paper identified the objectives as political equality, social justice, 
human dignity, including freedom of conscience, freedom from want, disease, and 
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exploitation, equal opportunities and higher per capita incomes.
89
 Yet when dealing with 
„Provincial Balance and Social Inertia‟, it stated: 
One of our problems is to decide how much priority we should give in 
investing in less developed provinces. To make the economy as a whole 
grow as fast as possible, development money should be invested where it 
will yield the largest increase in output. This approach will clearly favour the 
development of areas having abundant natural resources, good land and 
rainfall, transport and power facilities, and people receptive to and active in 
development. A million pounds invested in one area may raise net output by 
₤20,000 while its use in another may yield an increase of ₤100,000. This is a 
clear case in which investment in the second area is the wise decision 
because the country is ₤80,000 per annum better off by so doing and is 
therefore in a position to aid the first area by making grants or subsidized 
loans.
90
 
The independence government did not only adopt colonial development and investment 
policies, but also perfected these policies by extending the concept of zoning beyond land to 
people. High, medium and low potential people were identified in terms of their 
receptiveness to and activeness in development and this played a major role in deciding 
where and where not to invest. Investment money would go where the colonial government 
had already created some infrastructure, which, it will be remembered, was not informed by 
objective criteria and started the creation of regional disparities and imbalances. What is even 
stranger is the suggestion in this paragraph that the government should invest tax payers‟ 
money in a high potential area in priority over a low potential area, but after profits have been 
made in the high potential area, the low potential area should be aided by the high potential 
area by way of loans, whether subsidised or not.
91
 As early as July 1965, Barak Obama 
Senior wrote a critique of this paper and stated about this approach thus: 
                                                 
89
 Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 „African socialism and its application to planning in Kenya‟ para 4. 
90
 Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965 para 133. See also Speaker of the Senate and another v Attorney General and 
others [2013] eKLR at para 169 (Speaker of the Senate) where the Supreme Court decries this sessional paper as 
a validation of the sectarian, partisan and exclusionary nature of the colonial state itself, by the independence 
founding fathers.  
91
 Mutakha (2006) 132. 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
Chapter 3: Constitutional history of devolution 
The government talks of dealing only with areas where the returns out of any 
development programme are ostensible. But surely the returns are low only 
because these areas are and were undeveloped in the beginning. Must we be 
so short-sighted as to look only into intermediate gains when these areas are 
rotting in poverty?
92
 
It is perhaps for reasons such as this that the Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate 
lamented that „the burden of taxation is shared and remains political-choice-neutral, but the 
benefit of public expenditure is skewed, and remains politically partisan‟.93 
Further, the government adopted and perfected the colonial policies that had encouraged the 
migration of human resources from low to high potential areas. It even invented a weird idea 
of developing people without necessarily developing the environment in which they lived. 
The Sessional Paper provided that „the purpose of development is not to develop an area, but 
to develop and make better off the people of the area‟.94 It noted that if an area is deficient in 
resources, development could be achieved by investing in the education and training of the 
people whether in the area or elsewhere, investing in the health of the people, and 
encouraging some of the people to move to areas richer in resources, and of course 
developing those limited resources that are economic.
95
 The paper then emphasised that with 
education and training and some capital, the people of a province could make the best of 
limited resources and if the potential for expansion was small, medical services, education 
and training would qualify such people to find employment elsewhere.
96
 Ghai and McAuslan 
hold the view that the 1970 economic problems in independent Kenya were no different from 
the problems witnessed in the colonial days, adding that many of the institutions of law and 
administration being used to deal with them had likewise been inherited from the colonial 
government.
97
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3.2.4 The mismanaged land transfer question 
As this was happening, the transfer of land from the white settlers was also mismanaged as 
the greater part of land was allocated to political elites on the basis of political patronage. 
And with an imperial presidency which then became tribally owned by the president‟s ethnic 
community, the resettlement of Africans favoured people from the president‟s community. 
Those who considered themselves as the ancestral owners of some of the land before it was 
taken by the colonial settlers were left out and felt aggrieved. Karuti Kanyinga argues that 
this process created a problem which has not yet been resolved. He even links the post-
election violence which the country suffered in 2007/2008 to this land problem.
98
 
3.3 Moi inherits the instruments of centralisation 
When Kenyatta died in 1978 and Moi took over the presidency, he openly promised to follow 
in the footsteps of Kenyatta, thereby eliciting support from the public and particularly the 
Kikuyu community which revered Kenyatta. Nobody stopped to ask whether the foundation 
Kenyatta had laid for the country was worthy being followed. Moi therefore continued to 
consolidate centralisation of power through the imperial presidency and to weaken the local 
government even further.
99
 A key constitutional amendment in the Moi days was in 1982, 
when Kenya was turned into a one-party state, while local government was weakened 
through administrative mechanisms. Drawing from Kenyatta‟s 1966 District Development 
Committees and District Development Advisory Committees, Moi issued a directive in 1982 
that the districts were to become centres for development in the rural areas and required all 
ministries to ensure the implementation of the directive by the following year.
100
 This was 
followed in 1983 by what was called District Focus for Rural Development Strategy, which 
involved the establishment of District Development Committees to serve the purpose of 
involving local people in the identification, design, implementation and management of all 
development projects and programmes in the district. The committees largely comprised 
central government officials in the district, namely, the district commissioner and all the 
departmental heads of the line ministries with local authorities represented by their chairmen 
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and clerks.
101
 Though it appeared that the system sought to involve local authorities in local 
planning, ultimately the authority and autonomy of local government was eroded through 
closer control by central government officials. They could not undertake any development 
project unless it had been approved by the district development committees.
102
 
Local government was further weakened when in 1984 the Public Service Commission took 
over the recruitment but not the payment of clerks of councils. Although this measure had the 
advantage of protecting local government officers from political victimisation, it served to 
reduce the administrative autonomy of local government.
103
 Furthermore, it is under Moi that 
the Minister for Local Government used his powers under the Act extensively, upgrading all 
manner of townships to municipality status, many of which could not deliver the required 
services without the financial support of the central government. This in effect served to 
further erode the autonomy of local government as the services provided by local government 
deteriorated to unacceptable levels.
104
 According to Southall and Wood: 
To be sure, the delivery and extension of such services was severely 
constrained by a tightening national budget, an alarming growth of 
population and massive informal, urban growth. None the less, by the end of 
the 1980s, local authorities, to all intents and purposes, had been rendered 
impotent.
105
 
Coupled with centralisation of power in the presidency in a manner that became highly 
oppressive to the citizens, protests and calls for reform began to surface, leading to demands 
for constitutional review. 
4 Constitutional review and the devolution agenda 
Kenya‟s Constitution of 2010 is a product of a long process that started with agitation for 
constitutional reform in 1990. The first achievement of this struggle was Moi‟s acceding to 
pressure and permitting constitutional amendments focused on reforming the presidential 
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election process and reinstating a multiparty political structure.
106
 By 1994, the agitation was 
more focused on the demand for a new constitution. According to Bannon, „[c]onstitution-
making became the vehicle through which democratization, promotion and protection of 
human rights and social justice were robustly agitated [for]‟.107 
This resulted in further moderate constitutional reforms in 1997 and the enactment of the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 1997,
108
 which after wider consultation was amended in 
1998 to establish a legal framework for the conduct of comprehensive constitutional review. 
The Act provided for three organs of review: the commission, the district forums and the 
national forum, through which the process was to be conducted.
109
 Section 3(2) of this Act 
provided for a Constitution of Kenya Review Commission comprising 27 members 
nominated by various interest groups, including parliamentary political parties, religious 
organisations, women‟s organisations and civil society. The process failed to take off after 
some of the interest groups disagreed over the sharing of the slots allocated to them.
110
 As a 
consequence, a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC), chaired by Raila Odinga, was 
established to hear views from experts and members of the public on how to restart the 
process. At this point a splinter group comprising some opposition political parties, civil 
society and religious organisations started their own process at Ufungamano House and 
established what was referred to as the People‟s Commission.111 The PSC in the meantime 
recommended further amendments to the Act, which were effected in 2000.
112
 The 
amendments provided for a review process to be conducted through five organs of review: 
the Commission, the constituency constitutional forum, the national constitutional 
conference, the referendum to determine any issues on which there was to be disagreement, 
and the National Assembly.
113
 The amendments also reduced the Commission to 17 members 
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to be appointed on merit following applications and interviews by the PSC.
114
 The 
Commission was first appointed and gazetted on 10 November 2000 with Professor Yash Pal 
Ghai as the Chairman.
115
 Ghai declined to take the oath of office, insisting that he must first 
negotiate a merger between the Commission and the Ufungamano group.
116
 A merger 
agreement was reached, which led to further amendments to the Act in May 2001,
117
 which in 
turn reconstituted the Commission by bringing in an additional twelve members.
118
 
4.1 Devolution as a principle and object in the review legislation 
An examination of the review process reveals that Kenyans commenced the formal process 
having already determined that devolution was to be a major solution to the problems 
bedeviling the country.
119
 They were also clear about the reasons they wanted devolution, and 
the nature, form and extent of it. The functions of the constitutional review commission set 
out by the review Act indicate that the agenda of review in terms of the matters to be 
considered and decided had already been determined. Devolution thrust itself on the review 
agenda at this early stage as part of those matters. The Act explicitly required the 
Commission to ensure that the people of Kenya „examine the federal and unitary systems of 
government and recommend an appropriate system for Kenya‟, and „examine and review the 
place of local government in the constitutional organisation of the Republic of Kenya and the 
degree of devolution of powers to local authorities‟.120 Though these provisions seemed to 
commit these matters to the people of Kenya, it appears that in setting out the objects and 
purpose of review the Act had predetermined the content of the new Constitution, and that 
devolution of power would be part of it. Section 3 provided that the objects and purpose of 
the review and eventual alteration of the Constitution was to secure provision in the 
Constitution on the following matters: first, to guarantee peace, national unity and integrity of 
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the country in order to safeguard the well-being of the people; secondly, to establish a free 
and democratic system of government that enshrines good governance, constitutionalism, rule 
of law, human rights, and gender equity; thirdly, to recognise and demarcate separation of 
powers and create checks and balances; fourthly, to promote the people‟s participation in the 
governance of the country through democratic, free and fair elections and devolution and 
exercise of power; fifthly, to respect ethnic and regional diversity and communal rights; and 
finally, ensure provision of the basic needs of the people through establishment of an 
equitable framework for economic growth and equitable access to national resources. 
Although this Act was amended several times and in 2008 even replaced by a new Act,
121
 
these guiding principles remained intact throughout, with devolution of power tagged among 
them as a pact. For instance, section 4 of the 2008 Act has similar provisions requiring that 
the eventual Constitution must provide for devolution of power.
122
 
4.2 Devolution as demanded in the views of the people 
The Kenyan constitution-making process was founded on the participation of the people who 
expressed their views about the form of government they wanted. A scrutiny of the CKRC 
Final Report of 2005 reveals that there was overwhelming support for devolution as one of 
the mechanisms of restructuring the state and addressing the problems of centralisation.
123
 
The report records the people as having complained about the centralised system and its 
marginalising tendencies.
124
 They expressed a feeling of alienation from the central 
government, marginalisation, neglect, deprivation in terms of resources, and victimisation for 
their political or ethnic affiliations – even discrimination in the allocation of resources and 
development opportunities.
125
 They lamented their exclusion and associated their problems 
with government policies over which they had no control or even influence. They complained 
about central government officials at the local level, such as provincial administration that 
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was not answerable to them but to central government in Nairobi and thus alienated them 
from decision-making.
126
 
The people therefore demanded a fundamental restructuring of the state through devolution of 
power to local levels to enable them to have greater control over their affairs. They asked for 
a share of both local and national resources. They rejected the notion of leaders at the local 
level being nominated or appointed by the central government.
127
 For instance, they rejected 
nominated councillors and demanded direct election of mayors and election of chiefs.
128
 They 
also demanded the abolition of provincial administration and its replacement with 
strengthened local governance systems that would be answerable to the people.
129
 Ghai 
asserts that there was almost universal demand for the abolition of provincial administration 
and the transfer of their powers to elected local government.
130
 They recommended that local 
governance structures should have financial independence, with no interference from the 
centre. Furthermore, they asked for involvement of local councils in decision-making at the 
national level through the Senate.
131
 
Broad consensus emerged
132
 and the Commission concluded that there was no doubt that in 
the people‟s views and consistent with the goals of review, „there has to be transfer of very 
substantial powers and functions to local levels‟; to bodies which are democratic and 
participatory since „people will not be content with mere administrative decentralization 
(deconcentration)‟.133 Despite this overwhelming support, the views of the people did not 
give details regarding the form and structure of the devolution, matters which were left to the 
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technical input of the CKRC.
134
 Similarly, the Committee of Experts reports people‟s support 
for the system of devolution.
135
 
The Commission‟s final report of 2005 then recommended that the devolution principles 
must include a design that reflects cost-benefit factors, clearly defined levels, functions and 
powers, efficient and equitable mobilisation, allocation and management of resources, 
enhanced participation and accommodation of diversity, financial arrangements for funding 
of the devolved governments, and intergovernmental relations including mechanisms for co-
ordination „fashioned in a way that ensures autonomy and accountability by the devolved 
units‟.136 Autonomy seems to have been emphasised by recommendations that devolved 
governments should be able „to recruit, retain and dismiss staff‟, that they be suspended only 
in specified circumstances of „emergencies, war, or corruption or gross inefficiency‟ and after 
an independent commission has made recommendations, and finally that „devolution 
structures and levels be entrenched in the Constitution‟.137 Moreover, the devolved 
governments should be „entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally to enable 
them to provide basic services and perform their responsibilities‟.138 On the other hand, 
„national government institutions and departments should be arranged to ensure equitable 
distribution of resources throughout the country‟.139 It was further recommended that 
transitional mechanisms for phasing out the old order and replacing it with the new one, once 
devolution is adopted, ought to be put in place.
140
 
4.3 Devolution as captured in the Draft Constitutions 
The constitution review legislation required the Commission to conduct civic education, 
collect and collate the views of the people, and prepare a report and a draft constitution. The 
Commission released its first report
141
 and draft constitution in September 2002. The draft 
Constitution provided for devolution to five levels of government: the national, provincial, 
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district, location and village. The National Constitutional Review Conference, which was 
required to debate and adopt with or without amendments the Commission‟s draft, and which 
was held at Bomas of Kenya between 2003 and 2004, adopted the principle of devolution. 
However, it directed that the Commission prepare a special report improving on the 
architecture and design of devolution. The Commission presented to the conference plenary a 
special report on devolution which was then committed to the Technical Working Committee 
of the conference to work out the technical design details and improve on the weaknesses 
noticed in the Commission‟s draft.142 After very delicate negotiations, on 15 March 2004 the 
conference plenary adopted a much improved draft which borrowed quite a number of 
features from the South African Constitution. It provided for four levels of government: the 
national, regional, district and location. It also provided for a better designed Senate, 
mechanisms for revenue sharing and intergovernmental relations as well as dispute resolution 
mechanisms. The improved design appears to have been a gradual move towards a stronger 
form of devolution than had been proposed by the Commission. This is what became known 
as the Bomas draft.
143
 
However, sections of the government who were unhappy with the draft walked out of the 
conference in protest and engineered amendments to the Review Act
144
 to empower 
Parliament to amend the Bomas Draft and to provide for a mandatory referendum to pass the 
draft.
145
 This followed the High Court judgment in Timothy Njoya and others v Attorney 
General, and others, which held that a completely new constitution could not be enacted by 
Parliament but must be adopted by the people in a referendum.
146
 Secondly, after these 
amendments, the Parliamentary Select Committee, at the time chaired by Simon Nyachae, 
proceeded to a retreat in Kilifi where changes to the Bomas draft were made, leading to what 
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was called the Wako Draft.
147
 The changes went to the heart of the devolution that had been 
adopted at the Bomas Conference.
148
 Ghai notes that they „considerably weakened the 
devolution chapter‟149 by largely retaining the existing centralised system which had been 
strongly criticised and rejected by the people and the conference participants. When this 
Wako Draft was taken to the referendum in November 2005 it was rejected by the people 
partly because of this weakened devolution system. 
The referendum campaign divided not only the people along ethnic lines, but also the Cabinet 
as some Ministers who opposed the proposed new Constitution were immediately after the 
referendum fired from their Cabinet positions. This set the stage for highly contested 
presidential elections in 2007 which ended with the controversial declaration and swearing of 
the incumbent as the winner, sparking post-election violence in 2007 and 2008. The violence 
was only brought to an end after a negotiated coalition government brokered by the 
international community was put in place, with one of the agendas being the completion of 
the constitution-making process. Three separate processes established to determine what led 
to the violence all concluded that there was need to complete the constitutional review 
process. Firstly, the Waki Commission Report
150
 identified four underlying causes of the 
violence. Among them and touching on the need to adopt a devolved system of government 
were, first, the over-centralisation of both political and economic power, personified by the 
„imperial‟ presidency. Secondly, there was a feeling of exclusion of people who came from 
communities other than that of the President from state resources and other benefits. The 
Commission recommended that these underlying causes could only be addressed through the 
completion of the constitutional review process. Secondly, the Kriegler Commission 
Report
151
 also identified problems which, it recommended, could only be addressed through 
constitutional reforms. Thirdly, the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee 
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chaired by Kofi Anan agreed on four agendas that aimed to solve the root causes of the crisis 
facing the country. Agenda four focused on long-term issues and solutions through 
constitutional and legal reforms. This agenda was framed in a manner that once again points 
to devolution as one of the solutions to the governance problem. It states: 
Poverty, the inequitable distribution of resources and perception of historical 
injustices and exclusion on the part of segments of the Kenyan society 
constitute the underlying causes of the prevailing social tensions, instability 
and cycle of violence. Discussions under this agenda item will be conducted 
to examine and propose solutions for long-standing issues such as, inter alia, 
 undertaking constitutional, legal and institutional reform; 
 tackling poverty and inequity, as well as combating regional 
development imbalances; 
 tackling unemployment, particularly among the youth; 
 consolidating national cohesion and unity; 
 undertaking land reform; 
 addressing transparency, accountability and impunity.152 
On the recommendations of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee, the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 2008 was enacted to replace the old review legislation. 
The Constitution was also amended to entrench and protect the process of review in the 
Constitution. The Act provided for four organs of review: the Committee of Experts; the 
Parliamentary Select Committee; the National Assembly; and the referendum.
153
 The 
Committee of Experts was composed of nine members
154
 and its main functions were to 
study the previous draft constitutions and isolate agreed issues from the contentious ones.
155
 
It was required to seek the views of the people and build consensus on the contentious issues, 
leading to a harmonised draft Constitution to be approved by the PSC.
156
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This legislation maintained devolution as one of the supra-constitutional objects and 
principles of review that must eventually be part of the new Constitution.
157
 The Committee 
of Experts identified devolution as one of the contentious issues that needed to be resolved.
158
 
The Committee presented its Harmonized Draft Constitution to the PSC, as required by the 
law, on the 8 January 2010.
159
 When the PSC made proposals to change several aspects of 
devolution which would have weakened the system, the Experts Committee in its preparation 
of the final draft to go to the referendum rejected a number of them. For instance, they 
rejected a proposal that the Senate be referred to as a „lower house‟,160 a proposal to create a 
hierarchical relationship between national and county levels of government by making 
provision that the „national government takes precedence over county governments‟,161 a 
proposal that „checks and balances and the separation of powers‟ as one of the objects of 
devolution be deleted,
162
 and a proposal that the Commission on Revenue Allocation be 
omitted from the final Constitution.
163
 The draft was passed in a referendum in August 2010. 
Ultimately, it can be said that reasonably strong devolution has survived in the Constitution 
of 2010 and must be interpreted using this history as one of the extra-textual sources. In 
Speaker of the Senate, the first case that directly raised issues of devolution, the Supreme 
Court categorically stated that this history must inform the manner in which the devolution 
provisions are interpreted.
164
 The Court observed that devolution was meant to be „a 
positively emotive capsule‟ for addressing the historical problems set out herein.165 
5 Conclusion 
This history indicates that there are serious regional disparities, with visible development 
deficits that have exacerbated the feeling of negative ethnicity. There has been a highly 
centralised and authoritarian governance system revolving around the office of the imperial 
presidency, which became the ultimate prize, making elections for that office a highly 
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competitive affair. This authoritarian system has been highly exclusive and has been 
allocating opportunities on the basis of political patronage rather than objective criteria 
informed by the needs of the people. The system has a serious deficit of participatory and 
deliberative democratic values. This has created a strong feeling of exclusion among people 
from regions in the country that have been neglected in the government‟s development 
efforts. These, then, are some of the problems the new Constitution and devolution were 
meant to address. As set out in Chapter Four, this historical background informed the values, 
objects and principles of devolution. It must therefore inform the interpretation of the 
devolution provisions in the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Values, objects and principles of devolution 
1 Introduction 
Chapter Two established that a purposive interpretation of the constitutional provisions on 
devolution must be informed by the constitutional values, objects and principles of 
devolution. Besides Articles 174 and 175, which set out the objects and principles of 
devolution, a number of other provisions which form part of the basic structure of the 
Constitution do so as well. This chapter examines these provisions to establish their legal 
significance. It addresses the question of the meaning, content, nature, status and functions of 
these values, objects and principles, and whether these provisions are merely interpretive aids 
or enforceable operative norms in their own right. 
2 Centrality of devolution in the constitutional design 
Three factors demonstrate the centrality of devolution in the Kenyan constitutional design: 
devolution is regarded as part of the exercise of the sovereign power of the people, the 
national values and principles of governance, and the basic structure of the Constitution. 
2.1 Devolution as part of the exercise of the sovereign power of the people 
Article 1 declares that all sovereign power belongs to the people and establishes the principle 
of devolution by delegating the exercise of such sovereign power to government at two 
levels. Article 1(4) provides for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people at the 
national and county levels, while Article 1(3) delegates the legislative sovereign power of the 
people to „Parliament and the legislative assemblies in the county governments‟ and the 
executive power to the „national executive and the executive structures in the county 
governments‟. Thus, the county governments do not exercise decentralised power delegated 
to them by national government. Instead, they share with the national government the 
exercise of the sovereign power of the people assigned to them directly by the people of 
Kenya. This power, even if limited in subject matter, is not derived from the national 
government but the people.
1
 
                                                 
1
 See the German Southwest State Case (1951) 1 BVerFGE 14 para 4, in Kommers DP The Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (1989) 72.  
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By providing for devolution in this manner, the principle of devolution in the Kenyan system 
is elevated to the status of one of the essential organisational features of the governance 
system. From this perspective Article 1 can be raised by the county governments as a defence 
whenever the national government stretches its powers too far as to obliterate those of the 
county governments. Both levels of government are bound by this provision not to usurp the 
authority of the other. If, for example, the national government usurps the legislative or 
executive authority of the county, the county government can raise the issue as one of an 
exercise of sovereignty. Thus Parliament cannot use Article 186(4) as conferring to national 
government concurrency of powers over all matters to the extent of usurping the entire 
legislative power of the county governments. Article 1 therefore necessitates a narrow 
reading and application of Article 186(4). 
The High Court in Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution v Parliament of 
Kenya and another has underscored the centrality of the sovereignty of the people by stating 
that „[t]he golden thread running through the Constitution is the sovereignty of the people of 
Kenya‟.2 By splitting and assigning to two levels of government the sovereignty of the 
people, which is an important founding principle of the Constitution, devolution is made a 
central feature of the Constitution. 
2.2 Devolution as part of the national values and principles of governance 
Article 10(2) establishes the national values and principles of governance by providing that 
they include –  
(a) patriotism, national unity, sharing and devolution of power, the rule of law, 
democracy and participation of the people; 
(b) human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, 
non-discrimination and protection of the marginalized; 
(c) good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability; and 
(d) sustainable development. 
In constitutional terms, values are states of social affairs which a political society is 
committed to and seeks to promote and sustain by governmental and other social means that 
                                                 
2
 [2013] eKLR para 71.  
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themselves are consistent with the Constitution.
3
 A value is therefore an important desired 
condition a society would like to attain; it is a goal, whereas a rule is a means to achieving the 
goal. „Sharing and devolution of power‟ is thus one of the important desired conditions the 
Kenyan people have set for themselves and must work towards fully attaining. As such, 
values identify and set the parameters within which, and the objects in pursuit of which, all 
power conferred under the Constitution must be deployed.
 4
 The two levels of government 
and all other constitutional entities must exercise their authority and discharge their functions 
not as ends in themselves but as a means of attaining these values as the ultimate goals. 
Although Article 10 refers to „values and principles‟, the Supreme Court in In the Matter of 
the Principle of Gender Representation in the National Assembly and the Senate
5
 defined 
values as „declarations of general principles and statements of policy‟ in a manner that does 
not draw a distinction between values and principles:  
Such principles or policy declarations signify a value system, an ethos, a 
culture, or a political environment within which the citizens aspire to conduct 
their affairs and to interact among themselves and with their public 
institutions.
6
  
Accordingly, the terms „values and principles‟ in Article 10 refer to the same thing. 
In constitutional architecture and design, a distinction may be drawn between statements of 
policy and principle which produce value- and principle-setting provisions, and specific 
normative prescriptions which produce rule-setting provisions. While some designs settle for 
a „highly legalistic‟ approach, solely based on rule-setting provisions, others combine both 
value- and principle-setting provisions, and rule-setting provisions. As the Supreme Court has 
observed, Kenya‟s Constitution has settled for such a combination of „specific normative 
prescriptions, and general statements of policy and principle‟.7 Thus, besides Article 10, other 
values are traceable in other chapters of the Constitution, which begin with foundational 
                                                 
3
 Michelman FI „The rule of law, legality and the supremacy of the Constitution‟ in Woolman S et al 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2
 
ed ch 11 (2011) 35-6. 
4
 See Steytler N & Fessha YT „Defining local government powers and functions‟ (2007) 124 South African Law 
Journal 320-38, 332. 
5
 [2012] eKLR (Gender Representation). 
6
 Gender Representation para 54. 
7
 Re The matter of the interim Independent Electoral Commission [2011] eKLR para 69. 
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provisions setting out values, objects and principles, followed by provisions setting out 
concrete and specific rules. 
2.2.1 Sharing and devolution of power 
In terms of Article 10(2)(a), „sharing and devolution of power‟ are expressly included among 
the national values and principles of governance. „Devolution‟ is defined as a system of 
multilevel governance under which the Constitution has created two distinct and 
interdependent levels of government. „Sharing‟ in this provision should be understood in the 
context of a multilevel system of government that combines a measure of autonomy anchored 
in self-rule at the county level and a measure of shared rule at the national level. In the 
context of shared rule the two levels of government share in the exercise of power, decision-
making, and the performance of functions. Shared rule has three dimensions: First, some 
powers are divided and separated, and assigned and exercised exclusively. Second, other 
powers are assigned and exercised concurrently. These dimensions of sharing power are 
concretised by Article 186 which assigns to the two levels of government exclusive and 
concurrent functions and powers. Third, the county governments have participation rights in 
some of the decision-making processes at the national level. This is secured through the 
Senate which protects county interests. If need be, other intergovernmental institutions of this 
kind should be created to enhance shared rule. In addition, the multilevel system provides an 
institutional framework for sharing by the Kenyan people, communities and regions in the 
benefits of governance, such as services, resources and development. Thus „sharing and 
devolution of power‟ as national values of governance underscore the determination to move 
away from a centralised system to a non-centralised one. 
The fact that Article 10(2) lists „sharing and devolution of power‟ among other widely 
recognised core values, such as democracy, rule of law, and human dignity, underscores the 
central nature of devolution in the Kenyan constitutional design. This supports the argument 
that devolution is, like the rule of law and human dignity, an unalterable element of the law.
8
 
2.2.2 Nature, status and functions of values and principles 
In nature and status, the values and principles inspire and set the goals and the agenda of the 
rest of the constitutional provisions. Their main purpose is to serve as aids for the 
                                                 
8
 See s 2.3 of this chapter.  
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interpretation of the other provisions of the Constitution. Reflecting on the role of the 
founding values in the South African Constitution, the Constitutional Court asserted: 
The values enunciated in section 1 of the Constitution are of fundamental 
importance. They inform and give substance to all the provisions of the 
Constitution. They do not, however, give rise to discrete and enforceable 
rights in themselves.
 9
 
This means that unless read with other provisions of the Constitution or other law, the value 
provisions may not themselves be a basis for instituting a claim in court. As stated by the 
South African Constitutional Court in Britannia Beach Estate (Pty) Ltd and other v Saldanha 
Municipality, „although these values underlie our Constitution they do not give rise to 
independent rights outside those set out in the Bill of Rights‟.10 Thus, the values must be used 
together with other specific and concrete provisions of the Constitution or other law. Where 
the other provisions of the Constitution or the other law adequately and constitutionally cover 
the subject matter, the value provisions need not be relied upon. Where, however, the other 
provisions or other laws are inadequate or unconstitutional, the value provisions can be relied 
upon to either complement the other provisions or attack their constitutionality.
11
 
Nonetheless, there are nuanced ways in which these values and principles get enforced. The 
process of realising and giving effect to the specific and concrete provisions of the 
Constitution must be informed by these values. It is for this reason that Articles 259(1)(a) and 
159(2)(e) require that the Constitution be interpreted in a manner that promotes and protects 
these values and principles. In a constitutional design such as the Kenyan one, which 
combines value and principle provisions, and specific and concrete norm- and rule-setting 
provisions, a nuanced interpretation and use of these provisions is called for. Their 
interpretation and use must recognise a dialectical relationship between them, which ensures 
that they reinforce each other. The Supreme Court in Gender Representation stated thus: 
                                                 
9
 Home affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) and 
others 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) (NICRO) para 21.  
10
 2013 (11) BCLR 1217 (CC)( Britannia Beach). 
11
 See Institute for Democracy in South Africa and others v African National Congress and others 2005 (5) SA 
39 (WC) (IDASA) paras 31, 32, 33, and 34; Britannia Beach para16 citing IDASA with approval. 
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Where a Constitution takes such a fused form in its terms, we believe, a 
Court of law ought to keep an open mind while interpreting its provisions. In 
such circumstances, we are inclined in favour of an interpretation that 
contributes to the development of both the prescribed norm and the declared 
principle or policy; and care should be taken not to substitute one for the 
other. In our opinion, a norm of the kind in question herein, should be 
interpreted in such a manner as to contribute to the enhancement and 
delineation of the relevant principle, while a principle should be so 
interpreted as to contribute to the clarification of the content and elements of 
the norm.
12
 
Thus, the values and principles must inform and „inspire the development of concrete norms 
for specific enforcement‟,13 while the specific norms and rules „can support the principle 
maturing into a specific, enforceable right‟.14 From this perspective, Article 10(1) provides 
for various ways in which these values bind and must be used in the realisation of the 
provisions of the Constitution. 
(1) The national values and principles of governance in this Article bind all 
State organs, State officers, public officers and all persons whenever any of 
them –  
a) applies or interprets this Constitution; 
b) enacts, applies or interprets any law; or 
c) makes or implements public policy decisions. 
These provisions do two things: they identify the entities that are bound by and must use 
these values, and identify the circumstances in which these values become relevant and must 
be used.
15
 
2.2.2.1 Who are bound by the values 
Article 10(1) binds three broad categories of entities, both in the public and private domain. 
These are: those that are purely state offices comprising state organs and state officers; those 
                                                 
12
 Gender Representation para 54 (emphasis in original). 
13
 Gender Representation para 69 (emphasis in original). 
14
 Gender Representation para 69 (emphasis in original). 
15
 Communications Commission of Kenya and others v Royal Media Services and others [2014] eKLR 
(Communications Commission of Kenya) para 365. 
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that are purely „public service‟ offices comprising public officers; and private individuals and 
associations.
16
 Article 260 defines „state organ‟ as being „a commission, office, agency or 
other body established under this Constitution‟, and state officers as persons holding state 
offices. Public officers are defined as holders of public offices in the national government, a 
county government or public service, if the remuneration and benefits of the office are 
payable directly from the Consolidated Fund or directly out of money provided by 
Parliament.
17
 They, however, include public servants in state corporations or companies and 
public entities in which the government holds shares.
18
 
2.2.2.2 Applying and interpreting the Constitution 
In the application and interpretation of other provisions of the Constitution, particularly those 
on devolution, the values and principles should be a guiding light. In Speaker of the Senate 
and another v Attorney General and others the Supreme Court observed that „[n]ational 
values and principles are important anchors of interpretive frameworks of the Constitution, 
under Article 259(a)‟.19 Although these values are interpretation aids, the language of Article 
10 is obligatory and not discretionary. It imposes an obligation on those who apply or 
interpret the other provisions of the Constitution not just to take into account but in fact to 
protect and promote the value of sharing and devolution of power. 
The use of the terms „protect and promote‟20 imposes identifiable and enforceable 
obligations. Understood in this manner, the national values including „sharing and devolution 
of power‟ identify the objects in pursuit of which all authority and power conferred by the 
Constitution must be exercised and used. By setting positive standards to be pursued in the 
                                                 
16
 Art 260. 
17
 Art 260. 
18
 See Nairobi Law Monthly Co Ltd v Kenya Electricity Generating Co and others [2013] EKLR paras 44-51, in 
which the respondents against whom it was sought to enforce the right of access to information, argued that 
being a publicly listed company, they did not form part of the „State‟ within the meaning of Articles 35 and 10 
of the Constitution. As such, they were not bound by the obligations created by the two Articles. The High 
Court held that being a state corporation in which the government had 70% shareholding, the respondents were 
part of the state and were bound by the constitutional obligations. 
19
 [2013] eKLR (speaker of the Senate) para 195.  
20
 See Arts 259(1)(a), 159(2)(e) and 20(4)(a).  
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exercise of authority,
21
 the values impose substantive limitations upon all constitutional 
authority and power. As the Supreme Court stated: 
We in this Court, conceive of today‟s constitutional principles as 
incorporating the transformative ideals of the Constitution of 2010: we bear 
the responsibility for casting the devolution concept, and its instruments in 
the shape of county government, in the legitimate course intended by the 
people. It devolves upon this Court to signal directions of compliance by 
State organs, with the principles, values and prescriptions of the 
Constitution; and as regards the functional machinery of governance which 
expresses those values, such as devolution and its scheme of financing, this 
Court bears the legitimate charge of showing the proper course.
22
 
It is noted, however, that the clearer the value is in terms of its content, the more operative it 
is. 
2.2.2.3 Enacting, applying and interpreting other laws 
The values and principles are also relevant and become operative whenever an entity „enacts, 
applies or interprets any law‟.23 When enacting the enabling legislation required to give effect 
to the devolution provisions, Parliament and the county assemblies must ensure that the 
resultant legislation protects and promotes the values of sharing and devolution of power. In 
Jasbir Singh Rai the Supreme Court declared that the Article 10 values bind Parliament in the 
course of enacting legislation. The Court had been asked to depart from its own earlier 
decision declaring section 14 of the Supreme Court Act, which had conferred on the Supreme 
Court additional original jurisdiction, unconstitutional, since Parliament did not have power 
to confer original jurisdiction. Mutunga CJ, in his concurring opinion, declining to depart 
from the earlier decision, identified a violation of Article 10, which sets out non-
discrimination as one of the national values, as another ground on which he would have 
found section 14 unconstitutional. He pointed out that „Article 10 of the Constitution requires 
                                                 
21
 In United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 (11) BCLR 1179 (CC) para 
19, the South African Constitutional Court observed that: „These founding values have an important place in our 
Constitution. They inform the interpretation of the Constitution and other law, and set positive standards with 
which all law must comply in order to be valid.‟ 
22
 Speaker of the Senate para 53. 
23
 Art 10(1)(b). 
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Parliament to be non-discriminatory when it enacts laws‟.24 Once enacted, the application and 
interpretation of the legislation must protect and promote the values of „sharing and 
devolution of power‟. 
2.2.2.4 Making and implementing public policy decisions 
The values and principles bind any one of the identified entities whenever it „makes or 
implements public policy decisions‟.25 The exercise of most of the powers assigned to the 
two levels of government must be through making and implementing policy decisions. 
Indeed, the day-to-day running of government revolves around the making and 
implementation of policy decisions. These decisions and their implementation must be 
informed by the constitutional values of sharing and devolution.
26
 They must not be made 
and implemented in a manner that subverts these values and principles. If founded upon the 
specific concrete and rule provisions of the Constitution, the interpretation of these provisions 
must be informed by the value provisions. Where they are founded on legislation, the 
legislation itself must be constitutional, and be interpreted by taking into account the values. 
2.3 Devolution as part of the basic structure of the Constitution 
The main question to be addressed in this section is whether devolution forms part of the 
basic structure of the Constitution, and if so, whether it can be removed from the 
Constitution. These questions are answered by examining three issues: the meaning and 
rationale of the concept of the basic structure, the comparative jurisprudence, and the 
application of the concept under the Kenyan Constitution. 
2.3.1 Meaning and rationale of the basic structure 
The doctrine of the basic structure of the Constitution is founded and rationalised upon 
recognition of the following factors. First, the fact that every constitution is „not simply a set 
of values, but rather a hierarchy or ordering of values‟ with some being more important than 
others.
27
 Komers, who sees the German Basic Law as an „objective order of values‟, 
                                                 
24
 Jasbir Singh Rai paras 82 and 83.  
25
 Art 10(1)(c). 
26
 Communications Commission of Kenya para 366. 
27
 Roznai Y „Unconstitutional constitutional amendments: The migration and success of a constitutional idea‟ 
(2013) 61 American Journal of Comparative Law 657, 711.  
 
 
 
 
130 
 
Chapter 4: Values, objects and principles of devolution 
describes as significant the fact that „the framers are said to have arranged these values in a 
hierarchical order‟.28 
Secondly, these more important and fundamental constitutional rules or values are supra-
positive law and supra-constitutional law. They are a higher moral order containing norms 
against which the positive law must be assessed,
29
 and are viewed as having preceded and 
transcended the Constitution and thus bind its maker.
30
 Carlo Fusaro and Dawn Oliver thus 
argue: 
[E]very constitutional arrangement is based upon a set of core principles 
which cannot be changed and which can be regarded as intrinsic to its 
specific identity: this explains the tendency in many constitutional 
arrangements to identify a set of supraconstitutional provisions which the 
constitution‟s text itself, or even more frequently the courts (by induction), 
state cannot be amended or suppressed.
31
 
Thirdly, these supra-positivist and supra-constitutional law rules and values are the 
fundamental pillars supporting its constitutional authority, which bind even the drafter of the 
Constitution. Fourthly, these rules and values may be expressly or implicitly provided for by 
the Constitution. Consequently, these rules and values form a basis for annulment of any 
other provisions of the Constitution that are in conflict with the basic structure or values.
32
 As 
such, every provision must be compatible with the elementary principles of the basic 
structure. 
The consequence of these rules and values is that they explicitly or impliedly impose 
substantive limitations on the constitution amendment power. Edward Everett argued that 
there is a difference between to amend and to essentially change. While to amend is to make 
changes that are consistent with the leading provisions of the Constitution, which are left 
intact and continue in „happier‟ and „more perfect operation‟, to change those essential 
provisions themselves is not to amend. He argued that „there is a prior limitation of the 
                                                 
28
 Komers (1989) 54. 
29
 Komers (1989) 39 and 54. 
30
 Roznai (2013) 676. 
31
 Roznai (2013) 714, quoting Fusaro C & Oliver D, „Towards a theory of constitutional change‟ in How 
Constitutions Change: A Comparative study (2011) 405, 428.  
32
 See Barak A „Unconstitutional constitutional amendments‟ (2011) 44 Israel Law Review 321, 329.  
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amending power, growing out of the nature of the Constitution as a compact‟.33 The 
amending power is understood as having been intended to apply to amendments which would 
modify the mode of carrying into effect the original provisions and powers of the 
Constitution, and not to include a power to abolish or destroy it.
34
 „An amendment cannot 
annihilate or eliminate the constitution.‟35 
2.3.2 Comparative jurisprudence on the basic structure 
The Bavarian and German Constitutional Courts pioneered the modern judicial recognition of 
the concept of the basic structure which imposes limitations on the amendment power by 
implication. The Bavarian Constitutional Court expressed the doctrine of the basic structure 
as follows: 
That a constitutional provision itself may be null and void is not 
conceptually impossible just because it is a part of the Constitution. There 
are constitutional principles that are so fundamental and so much an 
expression of a law that has precedence even over the Constitution that they 
also bind the framers of the Constitution, and other constitutional provisions 
that do not rank so high may be null and void because they contravene these 
principles.
36
 
As such, every provision must be compatible with the elementary principles of the basic 
structure. The German Constitutional Court in the Southwest State Case approvingly referred 
to the above statements and asserted that „[a] constitution has an inner unity, and the meaning 
of any one part is linked to that of other provisions. Taken as a unit, a constitution reflects 
certain overarching principles and fundamental decisions to which individual provisions are 
subordinate‟.37 The essence of this is that even a particular constitutional provision or 
                                                 
33
 Edward Everett,‟ Speech of the Hon. Edward Everett, in the House of Representatives of the United States, 
March 9, 1926: In Committee, on the proposition to amend the Constitution‟, cited in Roznai (2013) 671. See 
also Calhoun J, Disquisition on Government: And, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the 
United States (1951) 300-1, who argued that the amending power is implicitly limited in scope as it must be 
consistent with the nature of the system and the character of the Constitution.  
34
 Roznai (2013) 675. 
35
 Roznai (2013) 675. 
36
 Southwest State Case (1951) 1 BVerFGE 14 para 2, in Kommers (1989) 71-2. 
37
 Southwest State Case para 2, in Kommers (1989) 71.  
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constitutional amendment may be unconstitutional if it conflicts with these „overarching 
principles and fundamental decisions‟.38 The German Courts identified the Bill of Rights, 
particularly the right to human dignity;
39
 federalism and the federal character of the state;
40
 
democracy;
41
 and rule of law
42
 as some of the aspects that constitute the basic structure which 
cannot be removed from the Constitution. 
This was picked up by the Indian Supreme Court, which in a succession of cases firmly 
established that the basic structure is unamendable and that courts have jurisdiction to review 
any amendment on grounds that it is against the basic structure. First, in Golak Nath v State 
of Punjab
43
 the Supreme Court held that the amendment power could not be used to abridge 
or take away fundamental rights. The Court reasoned that a constitution amendment was a 
law within the meaning of Article 13(2) which barred any law that abridges or takes away 
fundamental rights.
44
 This reasoning was however overruled in Kesavananda Bharati v State 
of Kerala, in which the Court held that „the power to amend the Constitution does not include 
the power to alter the basic structure, or the framework of the Constitution so as to change its 
identity‟.45 This power „cannot be exercised so as to damage or destroy the essential elements 
or the basic structure of the Constitution‟.46 The doctrine established in this case was 
followed by the Supreme Court in Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, in which Chandrachud 
J explained: 
[T]he power to amend, did not include the power to abrogate the 
Constitution, that the word „amendment‟ postulates that the old Constitution 
must survive without loss of identity, that the old Constitution must 
accordingly be retained though in the amended form, and therefore the power 
                                                 
38
 Kommers (1989) 52-3. 
39
 Kommers (1989) 37-8.  
40
 Kommers (1989) 36, 40, 69, 72 and 76.  
41
 Kommers (1989) 43, 72 and 76.  
42
 Kommers (1989) 42. 
43
 Golak Nath v State of Punjab (1967) AIR SC 1643.  
44
 See Seervai HM, Constitutional law of India: A Critical Commentary 2ed Vol 2 (1976) 1512.  
45
 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) AIR SC 1461. 
46
 See Kesavananda, the judgment of Chandrachud J, 2565. 
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of amendment does not include the power to destroy or abrogate the basic 
structure or framework of the Constitution.
47
 
In Minerva Mills Ltd v India, in which Parliament had amended the amendment clause to 
provide that the Supreme Court has no power to declare amendments unconstitutional, the 
Court justified its power thus: 
[I]f by constitutional amendment, Parliament were granted unlimited power 
of amendment, it would cease to be an authority under the Constitution, but 
would become supreme over it, because it would have power to alter the 
entire Constitution including its basic structure and even put an end to it by 
totally changing its identity.
48
 
These Indian cases have identified the following as the essential features that constitute the 
basic structure: The supremacy of the Constitution; the federal character of the Constitution; 
the republican and democratic form of government; separation of powers between the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary; and the secular character of the Constitution. Also 
identified are the dignity of the individual secured through fundamental rights, and the 
mandate to build a welfare state contained in the directive principles of state policy; the unity 
and integrity of the nation;
49
 the independence of the judiciary; and the power of judicial 
review. 
The South African courts have also indicated support for the recognition of an implied non-
amendable basic structure of the Constitution, although not identifying its devolution as part 
of such a basic structure.
50
 
What constitutes the basic structure will vary from country to country. As Chandrachud J 
stated in Kesavananda, 
[f]or determining whether a particular feature of the Constitution is part of its 
basic structure, one has perforce to examine in each individual case the place 
                                                 
47
 Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain (1975) AIR SC 2461.  
48
 Minerva Mills Ltd v India (1980) AIR SC 1789, 1824.  
49
 Kesavananda paras 292 and 582. 
50
 See Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (10) 
BCLR 1289 (CC) para 204. See also Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and others v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and others 1995 (12) BCLR 1561 (CC) (Premier of KwaZulu-Natal) para 49.  
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of the particular feature in the scheme of our Constitution, its object and 
purpose, and the consequences of its denial on the integrity of the 
Constitution as a fundamental instrument of the country‟s governance.51 
2.3.3 Application of concept under the Kenyan Constitution 
For a number of reasons, it is submitted that the Kenyan Constitution incorporates the 
concept of the basic structure which is unalterable. First, the Constitution making history 
indicates that devolution as a central feature of the Kenyan Constitution was a supra-
constitutional value binding the makers of the Constitution. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
devolution first appeared as such a value in the legislation governing the constitution-making 
process. It was a principle and object of review, which the process was required to pursue and 
deliver through the new Constitution.
52
 
Secondly, the Constitution explicitly provides for values and principles of governance which 
are set out by Article 10(2). They include constitutionalism, democracy, rule of law, human 
dignity, and devolution of power, values which other countries have recognised as part of the 
basic structure.
53
 The fact that „sharing and devolution of power‟ are listed among these 
Article 10 values is quite instructive about the central status of devolution in the Kenyan 
constitutional design. As an organisational element of the polity, devolution has been 
elevated by Article 1(3) and (4) to the same status as the sovereignty of the people. 
Thirdly, prior to and during the process of the making and enactment of the new Constitution, 
the High Court in Rev. Timoth M Njoya and others v Attorney General and others
54
 
recognised the concept of the basic structure of the Constitution and its implied limitations on 
Parliament‟s amendment power. The Court drew a distinction between the constituent power 
of the people to promulgate a new constitution constituting a framework of government for 
the country and the amendment power of Parliament to amend an existing Constitution. The 
issue was whether the statutory process for constitution-making which granted Parliament 
power to adopt a new constitution was constitutional. The Court held that Parliament‟s power 
                                                 
51
 Kesavananda 2465.  
52
 See Chap 3 section 4.1 
53
 See German and Indian jurisprudence, which identify the federal character of the state as part of the basic 
structure.  
54
 [2004] KLR 261(Rev Timothy M Njoya).  
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to amend the Constitution did not include the power to introduce a completely new 
constitution that changed its basic structure, since such power belonged to the people as part 
of their constituent power. Ringera J adopted the approach in the Indian Kesevananda case 
when he observed that „Parliament has no power and cannot in the guise or garb of 
amendment either change the basic features of the Constitution or abrogate and enact a new 
Constitution.‟55 
Fourthly, the Supreme Court has already recognised and asserted the centrality of devolution. 
In Speaker of the Senate Mutunga CJ noted that devolution was „instrumental in mobilizing 
support for the Constitution in the referendum‟.56 The Court acknowledged the centrality of 
devolution, noting that „[d]evolution is one of the main fulcrums on which Kenya‟s newly 
renegotiated social contract turns‟.57 It added that it „is the core promise of the new 
Constitution‟ meant to play a central role „in the deconstruction-reconstruction of the Kenyan 
state‟.58 Mutunga CJ described devolution as „a fundamental principle of the Constitution‟ 
which is „pivotal to the facilitation of Kenya‟s social, economic and political growth‟.59 It 
was regarded by Kenyans as an act of liberation, self-empowerment, freedom, opportunity, 
self-respect, dignity and recognition.
60
 It is thus submitted that devolution is an essential 
feature with which Kenya‟s new Constitution is identified. 
The basic structure of the Kenyan Constitution should include the sovereignty of the people, 
the supremacy of the Constitution, the principle of sharing and devolution of power, 
democracy, rule of law, the Bill of Rights, especially the right to human dignity, separation of 
powers, and the independence of the judiciary. One of the implications of the doctrine of the 
basic structure is that it puts substantive limitations on the amending power of certain aspects 
of the Constitution. The basic structure is put beyond the constitution amendment power 
thereby forming what are referred to as the „irrevocable‟ or „eternity clauses‟ of the 
Constitution.
61
 Although Article 255 singles out a number of constitutional provisions which 
cannot be altered without approval by the people in a referendum, the Constitution does not 
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have any explicit provision for non-amendable provisions. Nonetheless, implied non-
amendable aspects of the Constitution can be identified. 
3 Objects of devolution 
In contrast to national values and principles of governance, a clear distinction is drawn 
between objects of devolution and principles of devolution. While Article 174 sets out the 
objects and Article 175 the principles, both must be interpreted separately as different norms. 
3.1 Nature and import of objects 
As discussed in Chapter Two,
62
 the objects of devolution form part of the purposes of the 
Constitution, which Article 259(1)(a) provides must be promoted whenever the Constitution 
is interpreted. They are also part of the value system, since it has been noted that some 
chapters of the Constitution begin with value provisions. They provide justification for the 
adoption of devolution by specifying the problem areas experienced in the past which 
devolution aims to address. Thus, they direct and guide policy and legislative action towards 
certain ends, and identify the ultimate ends in pursuit of which power should be deployed. 
From this perspective, the objects serve three important purposes. First, they are aids for 
interpreting other provisions of the Constitution or legislation. Secondly, they direct and 
guide the development and implementation of policy and legislation. Thirdly, they may 
impose substantive limitations on the exercise of power to ensure the achievement of these 
ends. 
Although they are rendered in generalised terms, to the extent that they limit the exercise of 
power and guide the development of legislation and policy, they may, in some circumstances, 
especially when read jointly with other provisions of the Constitution or legislation, give rise 
to enforceable obligations. For example, when read with the power- and function-conferring 
provisions, they may transform discretionary powers into obligations. They do not, however, 
by themselves confer authority and power on any one of the two levels of government. The 
authority and power must emanate from the function- and power-conferring provisions. The 
objects point at the goals that ought to be achieved in the functional areas assigned to each 
level of government.
63
 They set the parameters within which the authority and power of the 
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two levels of government are to be exercised,
64
 and set positive standards which must be 
complied with or achieved.
65
 Such parameters can impose limitations on the extent of the 
authority and power or transform the functions and powers into obligations. They may also 
create enforceable obligations when read with the Bill of Rights. 
This approach draws lessons from the manner in which the South African courts and scholars 
have interpreted section 152 of their Constitution, which sets out the objects of local 
government, and section 153, which provides for developmental local government. In 
Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another, Yacoob J observed 
that „[m]unicipalities are obliged to provide water and electricity to the residents in their area 
as a matter of public duty‟.66 He founded this public duty on, first, section 27(1)(b) of the 
Constitution, which provides for the right of access to sufficient food and water; second, 
section 152, which provides for objects of local government, including „to ensure the 
provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner, to promote social and 
economic development, and to promote a safe and healthy environment‟; and third, section 
153, which provides that „a municipality must structure and manage its administration and 
budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to 
promote the social and economic development of the community‟.67 
The objects may in some circumstances impose development and service delivery obligations 
upon levels of government which translate into correlative justiciable individual rights. In 
Joseph and others v City of Johannesburg and others,
68
 the applicants challenged the 
decision of the City to disconnect their electricity supply, despite the fact that the applicants 
had no direct contractual relationship with the City to provide electricity. The owner of the 
apartment block in which the applicants had rented rooms and who had failed to pay the bills 
is the one who had contracted with the municipality for supply of electricity.
69
 The 
Constitutional Court relied on sections 152 and 153 of the Constitution, which set out the 
objects of the South African local government and developmental duties of local government, 
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respectively. Read together with other provisions, these sections have been interpreted as 
giving rise to the „right to basic municipal services‟ and therefore obligations to provide those 
services. The Court read these sections together with the function-assigning provisions and 
recognised „the right‟ of the tenants to receive electricity as a basic municipal service. The 
Court gave the following explanation of a basic municipal service: 
The provision of basic municipal services is a cardinal function, if not the 
most important function, of every municipal government. The central 
mandate of local government is to develop a service delivery capacity in 
order to meet the basic needs of all inhabitants of South Africa, irrespective 
of whether or not they have a contractual relationship with the relevant 
public services provider. The [City of Johannesburg] accepted that the 
provision of electricity is one of those services that local government is 
required to provide. Indeed they could not have contended otherwise. In 
Mkontwana, Yacoob J held that „municipalities are obliged to provide water 
and electricity to residents in their area as a matter of public duty.‟ 
Electricity is one of the most common and important basic municipal service 
and has become virtually indispensable, particularly in urban society. The 
obligation borne by local government to provide basic services is sourced in 
both the Constitution and legislation.
70
 
The Judge reasoned that section 152(1), which sets out the objects of local government, 
„creates an overarching set of constitutional obligations that are to be achieved in accordance 
with section 152(2)‟.71 
This approach opens up a new range of rights and obligations arising out of the objects of 
devolution. The nature and extent of such rights and duties will depend on the circumstances 
of each case and must be left open to further development.
72
 
3.2 Content of objects 
The objects of devolution set out in Article 174 can be grouped into the following broad 
categories: those promoting and advancing democracy and accountability; development and 
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service delivery; equity and inclusiveness; and those limiting centralisation. Each of these 
categories has a number of objects, some of which overlap, leaving very little difference, if 
any, among them. 
3.2.1 Democracy, accountability, participation and self-governance 
A number of objects focus on democracy, accountability, participation, self-governance, and 
subsidiarity as they are necessary for development, which ought to involve the people. 
3.2.1.1 Democracy and accountability 
Democratic governance is good for and underpins development since it aims to secure 
inclusion both politically and developmentally, and results in limiting centralisation. Thus the 
first object is „to promote democratic and accountable exercise of power‟.73 This object has 
two linked goals: the representation and participation of the people, and accountability for 
decisions. It must be secured through a combination of representative and participatory 
democracy as envisaged by Article 1(2). „The people may exercise their sovereign power 
either directly or through their democratically elected representatives.‟ Representative 
democracy is reflected in and secured through the constitutional provisions for largely 
directly and democratically elected county assemblies and county governors,
74
 which implies 
a need to establish strong political leadership at the county level to spearhead development.
75
 
Participatory democracy is secured through the obligation of the county assemblies to 
conduct their business and hold their meetings in public and in an open manner.
76
 They also 
must facilitate public participation and involvement in their legislative and other business.
77
 
Participation is also required even on the part of the executive arm of government and state 
officers when they discharge their functions. The Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 
such public participation because it „ensures that private “sweet heart” deals, secret 
contracting processes, skewed sharing of benefits – generally a contract and investment 
regime enveloped in non-disclosure, do not happen‟.78 The importance of the democratic 
exercise of power should be understood within the context of the Constitution‟s regard for 
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democracy as a core value. The Preamble to the Constitution regards democracy as an 
essential value, while Article 10(2)(a) includes it among national values and principles of 
governance.
79
 
Accountable exercise of power ensures that representatives are open, transparent and 
responsive to the views, concerns and needs of the people. This creates room for both the 
people and the representatives to take remedial action. Although the provision uses the term 
„promote‟, which appears open-ended, read together with other provisions of the 
Constitution, the object seems to have been concretised into enforceable obligations in certain 
circumstances. For example, when the object is read with Article 176(2), which empowers 
county governments to decentralise power to lower units, it imposes an obligation to do so in 
a democratic manner. Similarly, the object of accountability is concretised into obligations 
when read with the provisions on leadership and integrity which emphasise the servant nature 
of leadership with authority being presented as a public trust vesting responsibility to serve as 
opposed to a power to rule the people.
80
 Leaders are subjected to „accountability to the people 
for decisions and actions‟,81 with their activities restricted to guard against conflict of 
interest.
82
 Both national and county governments are obliged to be open and transparent to 
the public in the manner they exercise power and be open to monitoring and evaluation by the 
public with their performance being publicly discussed and criticised. These obligations 
should be interpreted as giving expression to both the right of access to information, which is 
provided for by Article 35, and the right to freedom of expression, set out by Article 33. 
Democratic and accountable exercise of power appear to require, as Steytler and De Visser 
note, „a relationship of “co-governance” between‟83 the people and the political structures of 
the counties. 
3.2.1.2 Self-governance and participation 
Another object of devolution is „to give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance 
[their] participation in the exercise of power‟ and in the making of decisions that affect 
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them.
84
 Interpreted against the Kenyan historical background of a highly centralised system, 
in which governance, development and service delivery have been a top-down affair, this 
objective requires the empowerment and participation of the people in their own governance 
and development. It is against this background that Mutunga CJ in Speaker of the Senate 
understands Kenyans to have perceived devolution of economic and political power as an „act 
of liberation … self-empowerment, freedom, opportunity, self-respect, dignity and 
recognition‟.85 Participation must not, however, be seen as contradicting representative 
democracy – representative and participatory democracy can happily co-exist and mutually 
complement each other. In Robert N Gakuru and others v The Governor Kiambu County and 
others,
86
 the High Court of Kenya, while heavily relying on the South African case of 
Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and others,
87
 held that 
„[p]ublic participation ought not to be seen as a derogation from Parliamentary representation 
or representation at the County Assembly level‟.88 The adoption of representative and 
participatory democracy by other provisions of the Constitution gives these objects of 
devolution legal bite that is enforceable.
89
 Development and service delivery decisions must 
be made in a manner that involves the people at the local level. Both national and county 
governments must structure their governance, development and service delivery systems in a 
manner that enables the people to realise their „self-governance‟ and „participation‟. The 
provision uses the terminology of „to give‟, which imposes obligations on both levels of 
government. 
The obligation to give self-governance and participation requires the national and county 
governments to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations at 
the local level to manage their own affairs.
90
 This obligation should see the communities 
involved in the political and administrative processes of the two levels of government. They 
must participate in the legislative, executive and administrative processes.
91
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3.2.1.3 Managing own affairs and development 
A further aspect of democracy is the object „to recognise the right of communities to manage 
their own affairs and further their development‟ which has the potential for better 
development.
92
 When people, communities or regions manage their own affairs, they are not 
developed but instead develop themselves. Development decisions made by the people 
themselves at the local level or by their representatives closer to them are more likely to be 
better as they may reflect their local values and preferences. This creates room for diversity 
of development priorities among the different regions of the country. This should be 
understood in the context of equity both among the different regions of the country and 
within the county for those counties that have minorities. Read together with Article 176(2), 
this should be understood as a matter to be considered when determining whether to 
decentralise county functions and services or not. The application of the subsidiarity 
principles in this case may also be guided by this object to recognise the right of communities 
to manage their own affairs and development. To „recognise the right of communities‟ could 
simply mean allowing communities to manage their own affairs and development. But it 
could include taking positive steps that may help communities develop the capacity to 
manage their own affairs. This object ties in with the definition of development, which 
emphasises that people are not developed but develop themselves.
93
 
3.2.2 Development and service delivery 
The democratic and accountable exercise of power must be deployed to achieve development 
and service delivery.
94
 According to Article 174(f), devolved government is meant „to 
promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible 
services throughout Kenya‟. Development is, however, often desired but rarely properly 
defined.
95
 Traditionally, it was narrowly defined in terms of economic growth and measured 
by a single narrow instrument of per capita income, which was restrictive and neglected its 
other important aspects. 
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Read with the other objects, this object indicates that the constitutional conception of 
developmental devolved government captures the contemporary broad definition of 
development which encompasses various elements. Development involves upliftment of the 
people aimed at improving the quality of their life and well-being,
96
 addressing the 
satisfaction of material needs. From this perspective, economic development must not be 
allowed to occur at the expense of the environment.
97
 Development must also be equitable 
and inclusive targeting inter-social and intergenerational equity aimed at ensuring social 
justice and redistribution, which address poverty, gender equity and protection of 
marginalized groups and communities. It must target environmental protection and be 
sustainable, ensuring that „the development of one generation must not deny the development 
of the next generation.‟98 Finally, development entails empowerment and participation of the 
people in their own development.
99
 The object of development must be read with the value of 
sustainable development which the Supreme Court has defined in very broad terms, noting 
that it „requires that we at least link it to the vision of the Constitution which is transformative 
and mitigating‟.100 
As mentioned, development includes service delivery. As such, this object also talks about 
„provision of proximate, easily accessible services‟.101 First, this object establishes a service 
delivery obligation on the part of the two levels of government. As in the case of South 
Africa‟s section 152 which provides for the objects of local government, this Kenyan 
provision may establish a service delivery obligation.
102
 Secondly, the services must be 
proximate and accessible. Proximity of services connotes nearness while accessibility may 
include concerns for persons with disabilities such as providing them with assistive devices 
that give them easier access to the services. 
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3.2.3 Equity and inclusiveness 
At the centre of the Kenyan devolution is the quest for equity and inclusiveness which are 
captured by a number of objects of devolution. The Constitution by implication makes a 
commitment to inclusive development that benefits all, right at the beginning where the 
Preamble declares the commitment of the Kenyan people „to nurturing and protecting the 
well-being of the individual, the family, communities and the nation.‟ 
3.2.3.1 National unity in diversity 
The starting point for equity and inclusiveness is the recognition of diversity and the need for 
unity in such diversity. Consequently, one of the objects of devolved government is „to foster 
national unity by recognizing diversity‟.103 The key terms and phrases that call for 
interpretation are the notion of „national unity‟ and the concept and extent of „diversity‟ in the 
Kenyan society, which call for recognition as means of achieving national unity. National 
unity is fostered by the recognition of diversity, so that no group is or feels left out as this 
would undermine national unity.  
Unity connotes a state of harmony, accord, and mutual agreement or co-existence among two 
or more different entities.
104
 Thus, „national unity‟ connotes a state of harmonious co-
existence among different entities within the whole nation of Kenya. The Preamble to the 
Constitution talks of the Kenyan people being „determined to live in peace and unity as one 
indivisible sovereign nation‟. The constitutional conception of national unity therefore, is that 
of living together peacefully as one nation. But what are the different entities among which 
there is need for harmonious and peaceful co-existence? What are the differences that divide 
the Kenyan people? These are answered by the interpretation of the term „diversity‟. 
Diversity refers to a state of being different or heterogeneous
105
 manifested in various 
dimensions such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, culture and language. According to the 
Preamble to the Constitution, the constitutional conception of diversity recognises the „ethnic, 
cultural and religious‟ dimensions. In addition, Article 130(2) recognises the dimension of 
spatial diversity when it requires that the national executive in its composition should „reflect 
                                                 
103
 Art 174(b). 
104
 See Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and Word Power Guide (2001) 1414. 
105
 Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and Word Power Guide (2001) 362. 
 
 
 
 
145 
 
Chapter 4: Values, objects and principles of devolution 
the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya‟.106 Thus, from the devolution 
perspective the main diversity to be addressed is the ethnic diversity which is linked to 
regional diversity as well as the marginalised communities. Indeed some of the objects 
discussed herein explicitly refer to these diversities. 
The concept of „recognizing‟ therefore envisages taking positive and proactive steps to 
address the causal nexus between diversity and national unity or disunity. Chapter Three has 
established that the centralised system in Kenya has been perceived as using some of these 
diversities as discriminating factors in the allocation of resources, development opportunities 
and other social services. Arising out of these exclusions, national unity and cohesion have 
been compromised by feelings of inequity, inequality, social injustice, regional disparities, 
and marginalisation. Mutunga CJ in Speaker of the Senate referred to these negative effects 
of historically skewed development and allocation of resources in the Kenyan highly 
centralised political and economic system thus: 
The fusion of political and economic power has led to the emergence of 
state-made rather than market-created economic elites. Indeed, Kenya‟s 
socio-economic character is a product of public-policy choices made and 
pursued by the government. State behaviour, flowing from this politico-
economic fusion, and expressed mainly through official policy, markedly 
shape the specific character of Kenya‟s development outlook. Additionally, 
the colossal ethnic mobilization in the acquisition and retention of state 
power has led to an illiberal and undemocratic practice, whereby the 
allocation of development resources tends to favour the ethnic base, to the 
exclusion of other factors of merit. Thus, the burden of taxation is shared and 
remains political-choice-neutral, but the benefit of public expenditure is 
skewed, and remains politically partisan. 
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He notes that this developmental imbalance is a product of what Duncan Okello and Kwame 
Owino referred to as a „rigged-development‟ approach, which is founded on partisan, divisive 
and sectarian values and has its roots in the colonial heritage of the country.
107
 
Interpreted in the context of and against this historical background, „recognizing diversity‟ 
must include taking measures that address and seek to remedy these shortcomings. It is for 
this reason that development is interpreted as including inter-regional equity. Although the 
provision uses the term “foster”, which appears open-ended and permissive, read with other 
provisions the object appears to create obligations for both national and county government. 
The object binds national government in how it conducts its affairs, ensuring that it does not 
undermine devolution, and how it relates to counties. The object also binds county 
governments to protect internally marginalised communities, which they could do through 
decentralisation. For example, the public finance chapter provides for the use of public 
finances in a manner that addresses some of the disparities and inequities that are informed 
by and founded upon some of these diversities. 
3.2.3.2 Equitable sharing of national and local resources 
In terms of Article 174(g), one of the objects of devolved government is „to ensure equitable 
sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya‟. This object must in the first place 
be understood in the Kenyan historical context of skewed development, the apparent 
inequalities and regional disparities in terms of infrastructure, and the marginalisation felt by 
various groups in different parts of the country. These inequities are acknowledged by a 
number of constitutional provisions. Article 203(1), which sets out the criteria to be 
considered when determining equitable shares, includes both „economic disparities within 
and among the counties and the need to remedy them‟,108 and „the need for affirmative action 
in respect of disadvantaged areas and groups‟.109 Similarly, Article 204, which establishes an 
equalisation fund, dedicates it to the provision of „basic services including water, roads, 
health facilities, and electricity to marginalized areas to the extent necessary to bring the 
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quality of those services in those areas to the level generally enjoyed by the rest of the nation, 
so far as possible‟.110 
From this historical perspective, equity, social justice and inclusiveness envision devolution 
as a transformative agent in Kenyan society. According to Michelman, constitutions may be 
divided into two types: those that are „primarily preservative, in the sense that their aim is to 
consolidate and memorialize in the law, in a relatively enduring form, a historical consensus 
of values and aspirations evolved incrementally from a stable and unbroken past‟; and those 
that „are primarily transformative, aimed at bringing to pass a societal future that will differ 
“starkly” and “dramatically” from a decisively rejected past‟.111 Developmental devolution 
consequently imposes obligations to work towards addressing the disparities of the past and 
transform Kenyan society. It demands balanced development of the country and delivery of 
services. For these reasons, Mutunga CJ in Speaker of the Senate held the view that Kenyans 
perceive devolution as the remedy meant to cure these historical problems: 
The Constitution‟s provisions on Devolution were key pillars in the 
deconstruction process. Indeed, a reading of the Final Report of the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) shows that, vast 
segments of the Kenyan population felt that they were victims of state, either 
in terms of political repression, or in terms of developmental exclusion.
112
 
In the second place, equity and social justice must be interpreted as going beyond the 
historical context and operating as living values that must continuously inform interaction in 
society. Since social, economic and political society is dynamic, equity and social justice 
cannot be an event but must be a continuous process. The Constitution conceives these as 
values that must guide the continuous development and sharing of resources and 
opportunities in the Kenyan society. This is why Article 203 settled for criteria rather than 
formulae for revenue-sharing. Whereas criteria can be fixed, formulae must remain dynamic 
as circumstances will keep changing. Article 201, for example, requires expenditure of public 
resources to be done in a manner that „promotes the equitable development of the country‟.113 
The general import of the criteria is to incorporate equity and financial equalisation as a 
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continuous process of revenue-sharing. In any case, the very notion of equitable sharing of 
revenue raised nationally, as captured by Articles 201, 202 and 203, envisages equity and 
social justice as a continuous process. The obligations the object creates are therefore 
continuous in nature. 
3.2.3.3 Protection and promotion of minorities and marginalised 
communities 
In furtherance of equity and inclusiveness, the Constitution makes specific provision for 
minorities and marginalised communities; one of the objects of devolution is „to protect and 
promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalized communities‟.114 This 
provision serves two distinct purposes: first, it is an affirmative action provision to benefit 
previously marginalised communities which should be uplifted from their marginalization. 
Secondly, it is a respect, protection and promotion provision meant to protect and promote 
those communities that may choose to retain a certain lifestyle that is defined as conferring 
the status of a marginalised community. Article 260 defines a marginalised community as 
including „an indigenous community that has retained and maintained a traditional lifestyle 
and livelihood based on a hunter or gatherer economy‟. It is submitted that this is a status a 
community can choose to retain. In the context of such a marginalised community, protection 
and promotion may mean refraining from interference with the community‟s lifestyle, 
preventing interference by a third party or encouraging and providing public awareness about 
the community‟s lifestyle. 
3.2.4 Limiting centralisation 
Another object is „to enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers‟.115 The 
concept of devolution is founded on the concept of a combination of self-rule and shared rule. 
This necessitates the creation of two levels of government with divided and separated powers. 
By dividing powers and assigning some to county governments and others to national 
government, devolution reduces the powers of the centre and denies it absolute control of 
power thereby limiting central power.
116
 Through the assignment of both exclusive and 
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concurrent powers,
117
 Kenyan devolution not only captures the concept of self-rule and 
shared rule, but also that of vertical separation of powers, and checks and balances. Exclusive 
powers exclude the national government from the domain of counties, thereby denying it 
absolute power.
118
 Even in the concurrent functional areas, the national government‟s laws 
can only prevail where constitutionally identified justificatory factors have been 
demonstrated. Through the protection of their functional areas, the two levels of government 
are able to check and balance the exercise of power by each other. 
The creation of a bicameral Parliament with a Senate as an integral part of devolution also 
creates mechanisms for limiting the power of the national government. The involvement of 
the Senate in law-making in matters concerning counties is envisaged as a means of checking 
and balancing the power of national government. But more important is the Senate‟s 
involvement in the amendment of the Constitution. The same applies in cases where the 
counties are also involved in constitutional amendments. From this perspective, this object of 
devolution lays a basis for a generous interpretation of powers and functions in favour of 
county governments. 
3.2.5 Decentralisation of state organs and functions 
Article 174(h) includes „to facilitate the decentralisation of State organs, their functions and 
services, from the capital of Kenya‟ among the objects of devolved government. The phrase 
„state organ‟ identifies the entities that must decentralise themselves, their functions and 
services. Read together with the phrase „from the capital of Kenya‟, it excludes county 
governments. Instead, it focuses on only the national government, organs at the national 
level, and independent institutions such as commissions and independent offices. The use of 
the phrase „from the capital of Kenya‟ requires the national government and these other 
organs to deconcentrate their functions and services to the countryside through their 
departments, offices or agents in the field which implement decisions made at the centre. 
Their functions and services must be spread across the country away from the capital, which 
is consistent with Article 6(3) that requires national state organs to ensure reasonable access 
                                                                                                                                                        
B „Beyond the federal-unitary dichotomy‟ Working paper, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of 
California, Berkeley (1999) 6 and 12.  
117
 See Chap Six s 4. 
118
 Bosire (2013) 70. 
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to their services in all parts of the country. Decentralisation in this context does not include 
the creation of local government since this is a competence of county governments. 
4 Principles of devolution 
Article 175 sets out three principles of devolved government. Properly interpreted, both the 
objects and principles of devolved government apply to the concept of devolution generally 
and to both levels of government. The three principles call for county governments that are 
subject to democratic principles and separation of powers in their design and operations; that 
respect the gender representation in their institutional composition; and that have reliable 
resources to enable them govern and deliver services. Although these principles focus on 
county governments, their effective realisation in certain instances may require the co-
operation and involvement of the national level of government. The phraseology that county 
governments „shall reflect‟ these principles appears obligatory thereby making them 
operative norms that are enforceable. Their enforceability may, however, differ from one 
principle to another. 
 4.1 Democratic principles and separation of powers 
The first principle is the requirement that county governments must reflect „democratic 
principles and the separation of powers‟. This principle addresses two things. First, the 
county governments‟ institutional arrangement must be based on the doctrine of separation of 
powers. In this respect, the Constitution has adopted a design that reflects separation between 
the county assemblies and the county executive committees, ensuring that personnel in one 
branch cannot be members of the other branch of county government. These design 
provisions read with this principle make it an enforceable operative norm which binds the 
county governments by prohibiting membership of one person in both branches of 
government. 
Secondly, in their operations, these branches of county government must also reflect and 
respect separation of powers in the sense that one branch must not unduly intrude on the 
functions of the other branch. The county assemblies, for instance, must not involve 
themselves in the performance of executive functions as this would compromise their ability 
to effectively oversee the executive. Instead, the two branches must provide checks and 
balances on each other. In addition, these branches and county governments must generally in 
their operations reflect and respect democratic principles, which incorporate a combination of 
representative and participatory democracy. Read with Article 196, which requires county 
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assemblies to facilitate public participation and involvement in their business, this principle 
becomes part of an enforceable operative norm.
119
 
4.2 Gender representation in county bodies 
The second principle of devolution prescribes that not more than „two-thirds of the members 
of representative bodies in each county government shall be of the same gender‟.120 What is 
the meaning of „representative‟ bodies? First, they include elected bodies – county 
assemblies. Second, they also include appointive positions. Article 81(b), which sets out the 
general principles for the electoral system, includes the principle that not more than „two-
thirds of the members of elective public bodies‟ should be of the same gender. Whereas this 
provision is limited in its application to elective bodies, Article 175 is general and covers all 
representative bodies, including appointed representatives. This approach is further supported 
by the fact that while in respect of the county assembly this principle is concretised by Article 
197, in respect of the county executive committee there is no such concretisation. This means 
that in the absence of any other provision specifically referring to the composition of the 
county executive, the Article 175 principle must apply. 
The gender terminology draws a distinction between men and women. Interpreted against the 
Kenyan historical background, the principle in the short term is meant to uplift women and 
give them more representation. However, it is phrased in terms of gender to ensure that in the 
long term it might benefit even men who in future may turn out to be the ones who are less 
represented. 
 4.3 Reliability of resources for counties 
The third principle is that county governments „shall have reliable sources of revenue to 
enable them to govern and deliver services effectively‟.121 Sources are reliable if they are 
predictable and county governments know what to expect every year. This is necessary to 
enable counties to budget on a short to medium term basis. The implication of this is that the 
principle requires the sharing of the revenue raised nationally to be done on a medium term 
basis such as the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which is normally a three 
year framework. 
                                                 
119
 See Chap 5 section 5.6.4.1. See also Robert N Gakuru and Doctors for Life. 
120
 Art 175(c). 
121
 Art 175(b). 
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Resources to enable counties „to govern and deliver services effectively‟ imply sufficiency of 
funds. This creates a nexus between functions and funds and embodies the doctrine of funds 
must follow and match functions. The functions comprise the administration functions 
evidenced by the word to „govern‟, and the development and service delivery functions 
evidenced by to „deliver services‟. The content of these functions must be considered within 
the context of the functional assignment to counties. This principle must be read with other 
provisions which incorporate and concretise the concept that resources must follow and 
match responsibilities.
122
 This point is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.
123
 This principle 
is addressed to national government which plays a critical role in the transfers from revenue 
raised nationally, and in identifying and authorising additional taxing powers for county 
governments. 
5 Concluding remarks 
Properly and purposively interpreted, the values, objects and principles of devolution are 
goals which set the parameters for the exercise of the authority and power conferred upon the 
national and county governments. As one of the national values of governance, devolution 
forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution, which cannot be amended out of the 
Constitution. Although their main purpose is to serve as interpretation aids, when read with 
other provisions, they may in some circumstances create enforceable obligations. 
Consequently, some of the values and objects serve to transform some functions and powers 
into enforceable obligations. The Constitution envisages their usefulness in the realisation 
and giving of effect to the other provisions of the Constitution in various ways. These include 
use in interpretation and application of other provisions of the Constitution, enactment, 
interpretation and application of other laws, and the making and implementation of public 
policy decisions. 
To some extent, comparative jurisprudence has been useful in this chapter. The German and 
Indian cases in particular have been useful in establishing the doctrine of the basic structure 
of the Constitution, of which it has been argued that the Kenyan devolution forms a part. The 
South African cases have also been useful in indicating that objects and values can transform 
discretionary powers and functions into binding obligations. 
                                                 
122 Article 203, providing for the criteria for determining the equitable shares, creates this nexus. Article 187 
requires transfer of functions with the necessary funds. 
123
 Chap 7 section 2.3. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The levels of governance, structures, institutions and systems of 
county governance 
1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the interpretation of the constitutional provisions which establish the 
orders of government as well as the county territorial units, and the demarcation and 
alteration of their boundaries. In addition, it interprets the provisions establishing the 
structures, institutions, and systems of county governance. 
2 The levels of governance 
The primary constitutional provision governing the constitutional creation of levels of 
government is Article 1 which provides: „[t]he sovereign power of the people is exercised at 
– (a) the national level; and (b) the county level‟.1 This provision indicates that the 
Constitution creates only two levels of government – the national and county. This is 
reinforced by the delegation of the legislative and executive authority of the sovereign people 
to institutions at both the national and county levels.
2
 Article 6(2) specifically refers to 
relations among only two levels of government, stating that „the governments at the national 
and county levels are distinct and inter-dependent and shall conduct their mutual relations on 
the basis of consultation and cooperation‟. 
However, this does not preclude the possibility of and a role for a statutorily created local 
government, an institution that is foreseen in the Constitution. Article 176(2), which 
empowers county governments to decentralise their functions and provision of their services 
to lower levels, envisages the creation of local government as a competency of county 
government. Such decentralisation in respect of cities and urban areas must be done within a 
national legislative framework enacted under Article 184. Under this Article national 
government has legislative power to determine criteria for classification of areas as urban 
areas or cities, establish principles of governance and management of urban areas and cities, 
                                                 
1
 Art1(4). See also John Mining Temoi v Governor Bungoma County and others [2014] eKLR (John Mining 
Temoi) para 42. 
2
 Art 1(3). See also Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review, Final Report of the Committee of Experts 
on Constitutional Review (2010) 91, where it states that „[i]n accordance with the majority‟s preferences, the 
levels of government in the RHDC were reduced to two: national and county‟. 
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and provide for the participation by residents in the governance of urban areas and cities. 
However, the power to apply the criteria and principles lies with the county governments 
which have power to decentralise their functions and provisions of services in terms of 
Article 176(2). 
3 Number and boundaries of counties 
3.1 Forty-seven counties 
Article 6(1), read with the First Schedule, establishes 47 counties which are listed by name 
but whose boundaries are not defined. Because of this listing, the number and names of 
counties are constitutional issues which can only be changed through constitutional 
amendments. Even though they are listed in the schedules to the Constitution, the South 
African Constitutional Court in Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v 
President of the Republic of South Africa held that schedules are not explanatory adjunct 
provisions subordinated to the other provisions of the Constitution: „Nor are the Schedules 
texts lacking constitutional status which could be amended by an ordinary Act of 
Parliament‟.3 Thus, to increase or reduce the number of counties which are listed in the First 
Schedule requires a constitutional amendment, as does a change in the name of any one of 
them. 
3.2 Boundaries of the 47 counties 
Although the boundaries are not defined, the 47 counties listed by name in the First Schedule 
bear names similar to those of the 41 districts provided for in the independence Constitution, 
as amended and increased to 47 districts by the 1992 Districts and Provinces Act.
4
 The 
Independence Constitution defined both the regions and the districts by listing them by name 
and defining their boundaries in a schedule to the Constitution. Section 36(1) of the 1963 
Constitution divided Kenya into 40 districts and the Nairobi area, which was both a district 
and a region. Section 36(2) defined the boundaries of the Nairobi area by reference to Part II 
and the districts by reference to Part III of Schedule 11 of the Constitution.
5
 The 1992 
Districts and Provinces Act sought to amend the number and boundaries of districts by 
increasing them from 41 to 47. It is submitted that by adopting the names of the 47 districts, 
                                                 
3
 1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature) para 34. 
4
 See ss 36(1), (2) and 91 of the Constitution of Kenya 1963; Districts and Provinces Act, 1992.  
5
 S 36(1) and (2) Constitution of Kenya, 1963. 
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the Constitution by necessary implication adopted the boundaries of those districts as defined 
in the Independence Constitution, as amended by the 1992 Districts and Provinces Act. 
As was mentioned by the High Court in Michuki and Another v Attorney General and 2 
others,
6
 the Independence Constitution was amended several times but at no time were the 
provisions with regard to boundaries affected by the amendments. What is more significant is 
the fact that the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act of 1968, which produced a revised 
version of the Constitution after repealing many of the sections that had been amended over 
the years, including the schedules of the Constitution, did not once again affect the provisions 
defining the provinces and districts as well as their boundaries. Instead, the Amendment Act 
explicitly provided for the continuation of the boundaries of the provinces and districts as if 
they had been re-enacted as part of the Amendment Act.
7
 The effect of this was that although 
Parliament revised the Independence Constitution to make it physically smaller by repealing 
the very many detailed schedules, it retained the boundaries of the provinces and districts not 
by retaining the relevant schedule but by re-enactment by reference. Accordingly, the 
boundaries remained part of the revised Constitution but the exact contents could only be 
found in Schedule 11 in the 1963 Constitution document. 
After the 1992 amendment the President by administrative action, without further 
amendments to the Constitution, created more districts, raising the number as at 2003 to 74. 
In the 2008 Michuki case, the constitutionality of the Districts and Provinces Act and the new 
districts that had been created were challenged. One major ground of challenge questioned 
section 5 of the Districts and Provinces Act which purported to amend section 4 of the 
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act 1968. The Court found that the section was 
unconstitutional as an Act of Parliament cannot amend the constitution, which can only be 
amended by a constitutional amendment following the constitutionally laid down procedures. 
It therefore declared section 4 of the Act unconstitutional. The Court however upheld the new 
districts that had been created by the Act but not those by presidential administrative action. 
Although the number of districts had been increased through presidential decree to 74 by the 
time of the writing of the Bomas Draft Constitution, the High Court in 2009 in Job Nyasimi 
and 2 others v Attorney General and Another
8
 in an interlocutory application declared that all 
                                                 
6
 (2008) 2 KLR (ep) (“Michuki”) 423-32, 426. 
7
 S 4 Constitution of Kenya (Amendment), 1968. 
8
 (2009) eKLR. 
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Districts that had been created without following the Constitution and the Districts and 
Provinces Act were illegal. The Court held that only the 47 districts established by the 1992 
Districts and Provinces Act were to be recognised as constitutional. 
It is, thus, submitted that the boundaries of the 47 counties which the Constitution adopted by 
implication are those of the independence districts as amended by this Act. For purposes of 
establishing the boundaries of the 47 counties Article 6 and the First Schedule of the 
Constitution must be read together with the re-enacted provisions and schedules of the 1963 
Constitution and the amendments to these boundaries introduced by the 1992 Districts and 
Provinces Act as extra-textual sources. This approach is fortified by the fact that according to 
the Committee of Experts, it adopted the 47 districts as the counties, since „they were 
lawfully recognized administrative units‟.9 
3.3 Alteration of boundaries 
Article 188(1) provides that „the boundaries of a county may be altered‟. The question is 
whether boundary alteration is limited to adjustment of boundaries of existing counties or 
includes creation of new counties or reduction of the existing 47 by merger. The 
constitutional provisions envisage three possibilities: (a) the adjustment and alignment of the 
boundaries of the 47 counties, (b) the merger of two or more counties to reduce the number of 
counties, and (c) the subdivision of one or more counties to create a new county thereby 
increasing the total number of counties. For the latter two, a constitutional amendment is 
necessary, while for the first the Constitution prescribes a procedure which is not a 
constitutional amendment. 
3.3.1 The grounds of alteration 
Article 188(2) identifies the following factors that may either singly or in combination justify 
alteration of boundaries. The first is „population density and demographic trends‟10 which 
refer to the concentration of population in particular places and the movement of population 
from other places towards these points of concentration. These trends may arise as a result of 
urbanisation. The „physical and human infrastructure‟11 is the second factor which may 
involve improvement in the transport, health and educational infrastructure, among others. 
                                                 
9
 Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (2010) 92.  
10
 Art 188(2)(a). 
11
 Art 188(2)(b). 
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Such improvements may attract people, leading to migration trends and population density 
that necessitate alteration of boundaries. Thirdly, people with „historical and cultural ties‟12 
may seek to be in the same county, which may require alteration of boundaries by merger of 
two or more counties, a division of one county or an adjustment of the boundaries of the 
existing counties to ensure that a particular population group or community joins their kin in 
another county. Fourthly, and related to this, are the „views of the communities affected‟13 
which must be considered. Fifthly, the „cost of administration‟14 which may require reduction 
may call for a merger of two or more counties, or alignment of boundaries. Sixthly, „the 
objects of devolution of government‟15 may call for sub-division in order to give 
communities an opportunity to manage their own affairs. Finally, „geographical features‟,16 
which may have been a hindrance to access to services, may have been addressed by the 
better aligned boundaries. 
3.3.2 The process for alteration 
The Constitution provides for a lengthy process requiring the input of an independent 
commission, Parliament and the people. 
3.3.2.1 Resolution of Parliament to establish the commission 
The first step in this process is a resolution by Parliament to establish an independent 
Commission for this purpose.
17
 The process may be initiated by Parliament on its own motion 
or by a petition by a member of the public, a county or group of counties to Parliament to set 
up the commission. The Constitution provides for participatory exercise of the parliamentary 
powers and Article 119(1) recognises the right of members of public to petition Parliament. 
This includes the right of one or more counties to initiate the process by petitioning 
Parliament. The decision setting up the commission is the responsibility of both the National 
Assembly and the Senate since the provision vests it in Parliament which comprises the two 
houses. This means that each house must have its own sitting, and following its own 
decision-making procedures not only pass a resolution to set up the commission but also, 
                                                 
12
 Art 188(2)(c). 
13
 Art 188(2)(e). 
14
 Art 188(2)(d). 
15
 Art 188(2)(f).  
16
 Art 188(2)(g).  
17
 Art 188(1). 
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either identify the persons to serve in the commission or provide for mechanisms through 
which such persons will be appointed. The resolution is a matter other than a bill which 
affects counties, and must be passed by the Senate through the county delegation votes.
18
 
Although it is not a bill, it should be processed in both houses as if it were an ordinary bill 
since it does not relate to election of members of county assembly or county executive.
19
 
Neither is it an Annual Allocation of Revenue Bill.
20
 Any differences between the two houses 
must thus be resolved through reconsideration and mediation.
21
 The resolution of the two 
houses must be based on the grounds of boundary alteration discussed above. 
Article 188(1)(a) prescribes that the boundaries of a county may only be altered by a 
Parliamentary resolution adopting recommendations „by an independent commission set up 
for that purpose by Parliament‟. This excludes the Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission because it is not set up for this purpose. Its purpose is to deal with electoral 
boundaries and not the boundaries of counties.
22
 
3.3.2.2 Recommendations by an independent commission 
Although this commission is ad hoc in nature set up for a specific task, its description by the 
Constitution as independent must be interpreted as drawing on the principles of the 
independence of commissions under Chapter Fifteen of the Constitution.
23
 In setting it up 
Parliament is bound by the provisions of this chapter in terms of composition, independence 
and reporting. Because of the emphasis on the value of participation, and the grounds which 
must be taken into account when altering the boundaries,
24
 it is submitted that the 
commission has an obligation to hear views from the public in the affected areas before 
making its recommendations. 
3.3.3.3 The resolution by Parliament 
Alteration of boundaries can only be effected if the recommendation by the Commission is 
adopted by a resolution of „the National Assembly, with the support of at least two-thirds of 
                                                 
18
 Art 123(2) and (4). 
19
 Art 110(2)(a)(i). 
20
 Art 110(2)(a)(ii). 
21
 See Arts 112(1) and (2), and 113. 
22
 Arts 88(4) (c) and 89(2) and (3). 
23
 Chap 15 of the Constitution provides for Commissions and Independent offices. 
24
 Art 188(2)(e). 
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all‟25 its members, and „the Senate, with the support of at least two-thirds of all the county 
delegations‟.26 If neither House gets the required support, the resolution is defeated. If 
successful, the next question is whether the resolution of the two Houses of Parliament is 
sufficient to effect an alteration of boundaries without a constitutional amendment. Given that 
the numbers of counties and their names are entrenched in the Constitution, any changes to 
the number and names would require a constitutional amendment.
27
 Yet Article 188 is 
explicit that boundaries of a county may be altered by a resolution of Parliament. As the 
Michuki case held, an Act of Parliament cannot purport to amend the Constitution, which can 
only be amended by a constitutional amendment following the constitutionally laid down 
procedures. Accordingly, a resolution by Parliament within the meaning of Article 188 
cannot effect boundary alterations which require a constitutional amendment.
28
 
Article 188 should be harmonised with the amendment provisions by being interpreted 
narrowly to apply to boundary alterations that do not require constitutional amendments. 
Where boundary alterations are restricted to boundary adjustment and alignment, a resolution 
within the meaning of Article 188 suffices. Such a resolution would subsequently be read as 
an extra-textual source in the same manner the boundaries in the Independence Constitution, 
as amended in 1992, are read. Where, however, the alterations involve the merger of counties 
to reduce the number, or the subdivision of counties to create new ones, a constitutional 
amendment of Article 6(1) and the First Schedule would be required. In this event, the 
resolution under Article 188 should be interpreted narrowly as being a necessary step in the 
constitutional amendment process. The resolution would then be reduced into a Bill to amend 
the First Schedule of the Constitution
29
 and processed in terms of Article 256. 
3.3.2.4 Referendum 
Once Parliament has amended the First Schedule, the next question is whether it should be 
followed by a referendum in terms of Article 255. The Constitution provides that 
amendments that relate to „the objects, principles and structure of devolved government‟ 
                                                 
25
 Art 188(1)(b)(i). 
26
 Art 188(1)(b)(ii). 
27
 Art 6(1). 
28
 Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature para 34. 
29
 Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature para 34. 
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must go to the referendum.
30
 It is submitted that boundary alterations limited to adjustment 
and alignment of the boundaries of the existing 47 counties or the change of a county name 
do not relate to the structure of devolved government and can be passed without a 
referendum. Likewise, those that increase or reduce the number of counties by just a few do 
not relate to the objects, principles and structure of devolved government. However, those 
that involve the change of the total number of counties, either by increment or reduction of 
the total number do so and must go to the referendum. For example, increasing the counties 
to a very large number will reduce their geographic size and strength, thereby undermining 
their ability to counterbalance the centre which is one of the objects of devolution. Similarly, 
reducing them to a very small number will make them stronger to counterbalance the centre, 
but this may affect the other objects of devolution, such as inclusive development, protection 
of minorities and effective delivery of proximate and easily accessible services. Either way, 
the structure and objects of devolved government would be affected. 
Furthermore, the number of counties has implications for the composition of the National 
Assembly
31
 and the Senate,
32
 and the voting and decision-making processes.
33
 A political 
party may increase its majorities in the National Assembly and the Senate and significantly 
change the entire system of governance by simply increasing counties in areas where it is 
popular and reducing those in areas controlled by the opposition. To guard against such a 
scenario amendments that change counties numbers must go to the referendum. 
4 Separation of powers 
The Constitution determines and organises county structures, institutions and systems of 
governance. Articles 175 and 176 provide for clear separation of powers between the 
legislative and executive arms: „There shall be a county government for each county, 
consisting of a county assembly and a county executive.‟34 In addition, Article 235 recognises 
the right of each county to establish its own administration. 
                                                 
30
 Art 255(1)(i) and (2). 
31
 In terms of Art 97(1)(b), the 47 women members of the National Assembly are based on the total number of 
counties. 
32
 In terms of Art 177(1)(a), each county elects one Senator.  
33
 Art 123 reflects the principle of equality of counties with each having one vote. 
34
 Art 176(1). 
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The county government follows pure separation of powers along the lines of the national 
presidential system, which bars cabinet members from being members of Parliament at the 
same time. Furthermore, the structure, the recruitment to and removal from office of the 
county executive draw heavily from the procedures followed at the national level. Similarly, 
the county legislative arm goes the same route except for the fact that it is not bicameral like 
the national Parliament. Because of these similarities, it is submitted that where the 
Constitution is silent about certain county matters, the interpreter may draw analogies from 
the corresponding provisions in respect of the national government institutions to give 
meaning to county institutions. 
5 County assembly 
5.1 Composition and election of the county assembly 
In terms of Article 177(1) a county assembly comprises four broad categories of members to 
represent a variety of interests in a county. These are: members elected in wards; members of 
marginalised groups; special seat members to ensure gender balance; and the Speaker. 
5.1.1 The ward representatives 
The primary group comprises „members elected by the registered voters of the wards, each 
ward constituting a single member constituency‟.35 Although this provision presupposes that 
each county must be divided into geographic constituencies known as wards, Article 89(3) 
only provides for the „review of the number, names and boundaries of wards periodically‟ by 
the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. This provision implies the power to 
initially determine the number of wards and demarcate their boundaries as the framers of the 
Constitution could not have meant review of non-existent wards. 
The distribution of wards among the counties should be informed by the criteria and factors 
set out by Article 89. Delimitation is primarily based on population quotas set out in Article 
89(6). However, the number of inhabitants of a constituency or ward may be greater or lesser 
than the population quota by a margin of not more than forty per cent for cities and sparsely 
populated areas,
36
 and thirty per cent for other areas.
37
 It is submitted that just as in the case 
of delimitation of constituencies for parliamentary elections, the delimitation of wards should 
                                                 
35
 Art 177(1)(a). 
36
 Art 89(6) (a). 
37
 Art 89(6) (b). 
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also take into account geographical features and urban centres; community of interest, 
historical, economic and cultural ties; and means of communication.
38
 
Members in this category are elected for a term of five years „on the same day as a general 
election of members of Parliament, being the second Tuesday in August, in every fifth 
year‟.39 This is in contrast with the position in some non-centralised countries which hold 
national and constituent level elections at different times and conducted by different election 
management bodies.
40
 
5.1.2 Members of marginalised groups 
The second category comprises „members of marginalized groups, including persons with 
disabilities and youth, prescribed by an Act of Parliament‟.41 This provision requires 
membership of the county assembly by members of the relevant marginalised groups 
themselves and not representation by persons not belonging to these groups. In Commissioner 
for the Implementation of the Constitution v Attorney General and others,
42
 the Court viewed 
groups of this kind as having been previously marginalised and denied a chance to participate 
in governance institutions. Thus, it understood the rationale of such seats as being „to open up 
political space for entry and participation of persons, groups and categories of people who, 
due to various disadvantages and vulnerabilities, have historically been unable or incapable 
of generally and effectively finding their way through a strictly competitive methodology and 
have thus been relegated to the peripheries of the political playground‟.43 
Article 260 defines disability in a very broad manner that discloses a variety and diversity of 
disabilities,
44
 and incorporates elements of the social approach to the definition of disability 
                                                 
38
 See Art 89(5). 
39
 Art 177(1)(a). See Arts 101(1) and 136(2)(a). 
40
 This is likely to undermine devolution in the sense that the elections will not focus on local county issues, as 
the voters will be more focused on and guided by party affiliations informed by the presidential and 
parliamentary candidates they support. County assembly candidates may lose not because of the local issues 
they stand for, but the fact that they are not supported by or vying on political party tickets of the presidential 
and parliamentary candidates preferred at the local level.  
41
 Art 177(1)(c). 
42
 [2013] eKLR (Commissioner for the Implementation of the Constitution). 
43
 Commissioner for the Implementation of the Constitution para 55.  
44
 According to Art 260, disability includes „any physical, sensory, mental, psychological or other impairment, 
condition or illness that has, or is perceived by significant sectors of the community to have, a substantial or 
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envisioned by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
45
 
Despite this definitional recognition of diversity of disabilities, the High Court in the context 
of the composition of the Senate, in Ben Njoroge and another v Independent Electoral 
Boundaries Commission (I.E.B.C) and others,
46
 rejected an attempt by the IEBC to depart 
from the order of priority in the party lists on grounds of diversity of disability. Ougo J stated: 
The wording of Article 98(2) (c) in my view is mandatory in that IEBC‟s 
mandate was to consider the party lists in order of priority in which the 
nominees were listed. To argue that they had to achieve the principle of 
diversity and ensure the two disabilities of physical and visual were 
represented and that they had to strike a balance in my view was wrong in 
light of Article 90(2) (b) of the Constitution.
47
 
The IEBC is thus bound by the priority in the party lists and cannot change that priority on 
grounds of the diversity of disability. 
Article 177(1)(c) also provides for membership of the county assembly by persons who are 
themselves youths. Article 260 of the Constitution defines youths as persons who have 
attained the age of eighteen years but not thirty-five years.
48
 The members must be 18 years 
                                                                                                                                                        
long-term effect on an individual‟s ability to carry out ordinary day-to-day activities‟. Also see the discussion on 
disabilities in Chap 10 section 3.2.3. 
45
 The Convention recognises that disability is an evolving concept and „results from interaction between 
persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinder their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others‟. It therefore focuses more on the external, attitudinal and 
environmental barriers which hinder the persons with disabilities from participating fully in the activities of 
society and seeks to address them. It sees the external barriers as the problem and not the impairments 
themselves. See UNHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Monitoring the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Guidance for Human Rights Monitors (2010) Professional Training 
Services No 17. 
46
 [2013] eKLR (Ben Njoroge) 17. 
47
 Ben Njoroge 16. 
48
 This is consistent with age of adulthood of 18 years at which Article 83(1)(a) as read with the Registration of 
Persons Act prescribes for a person to qualify to be registered as a voter and become eligible to vote and stand 
for election to political office. See also African Union The African Youth Charter (2006), which defines youth 
as young people between the ages of 15 and 35 years; Commission of the European Communities Youth, 
Investing and empowering (2009) EU Youth Report p 6 
http://ec.europa.eu/youth/documents/youth_report_final.pdf (accessed 13 October 2013); and Government of the 
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and less than 35 years when elected to office. They must remain within this age bracket 
throughout their term for if they attain the age of 35 years before the end of the term, they 
must vacate their seats. This is because youth is a qualification for the youth seats and it is to 
be regarded as any other qualification, the loss of which leads to vacation of the office. 
By use of the term „including‟, Article 177(1)(c) indicates that the marginalised groups are 
not limited to persons with disabilities and the youth. Other groups and other interests such as 
community and cultural groups can be identified and included in the group. This 
interpretation is reinforced by Article 197(2)(a) which requires Parliament to enact legislation 
to „ensure that community and cultural diversity of a county is reflected in its county 
assembly and county executive committee‟. Through the County Governments Act49 
Parliament has provided for six persons to represent the marginalised groups. Their 
nomination must ensure that community and cultural diversity of the county is reflected in the 
county assembly,
50
 and that there is adequate representation to protect minorities within the 
county in accordance with Article 197 of the Constitution.
51
 
In terms of Article 177(2), the election of members in this category is done through 
nomination by political parties, in proportion to the ward county assembly seats the parties 
win in the county. The nomination process is guided by Article 90(1) and (2) which in part 
requires each political party participating in the general elections to nominate and submit in 
advance of the elections a list of persons who would stand elected if the party were to be 
entitled to all the seats provided for under this category. The list must alternate between male 
and female candidates in the priority in which they are listed. The Election Act prescribes that 
the list submitted by each political party for this category of members must have eight 
candidates, four of whom must be persons with disability, while four must be youth.
52
 The 
list must alternate between male and female in the priority in which they are listed.
53
 It must 
also prioritise a person with a disability, the youth and any other candidate representing a 
                                                                                                                                                        
Republic of South Africa The National Youth Policy (2009-2014), which however provides for the age range 14 
to 35 years. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/medislib/downloads/home/publications (accessed 13 October 
2013).  
49
 The County Governments Act 17 of 2012 (CGA) 
50
 See s 7(1)(a) CGA. 
51
 See s 7(2) CGA. 
52
 S 36(1)(f) of the Election Act. 
53
 S 36(2) of the Election Act. 
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marginalised group.
54
 The political parties participating in the elections are responsible for 
the preparation and submission to the IEBC of lists of their nominees in this category.
55
 They 
must ensure that their lists comprise the appropriate number of qualified candidates, arranged 
as required by the law. Following the declaration of the final results, each party is allocated 
members from its list in proportion to the total of its elected ward county assembly 
members,
56
 prioritised in terms of their positioning in the party list. 
The IEBC has the responsibility to receive, scrutinise and confirm that the lists comply with 
the requirements of the Constitution and other laws, and reject any that does not comply.
57
 
After the election of the ward county assembly members, the IEBC must determine the 
proportion of each political party, allocate and designate from its list of county assembly 
members under this category.
58
 In allocating and designating the members, the IEBC is 
bound by the prioritisation in the party lists. Although the County Government Act of 2012 
provides for six members in this category,
59
 the Election Act of 2011 empowers the IEBC to 
draw from the lists only four members.
60
 It is submitted that this conflict should be resolved 
in favour of the CGA which, being a later statute, should be interpreted as having implicitly 
repealed the provision of the Election Act. 
5.1.3 The gender balance special seats 
The third category comprises a „number of special seat members necessary to ensure that no 
more than two-thirds of membership of the assembly are of the same gender‟,61 which gives 
effect to Article 197(1).
62
 Both Articles 177(2) and 90 prescribe that the two-thirds gender 
balance members have to be nominated by political parties according to their proportion of 
members elected from the wards.
63
 Each party is required to submit in advance of the 
                                                 
54
 S 36(3) of the Election Act. 
55
 Art 90(2)(a). 
56
 Art 90(3).  
57
 See Lydia Mathia v Naisula Lesuuda & another [2013] eKLR (Lydia Mathia) 23.  
58
 See Arts 90(3), and s 36(4) Election Act. 
59
 S 7(1)(a) CGA. 
60
 S 36(8) Election Act. 
61
 Art 177(1)(b). 
62
 Art197(1) prescribes that not more than two-thirds of the county assembly members shall be of the same 
gender. 
63
 Art 177(2). 
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elections a list of its proposed members equal to the number of wards in the county.
64
 The 
gender balance members required shall be determined only after the declaration of the elected 
members from the wards.
65
 Indeed, the total number of members in each county assembly can 
only be determined after such a declaration, and this has to be done in a three-stage process. 
First, the election of the members from the wards determines not only the gender balance 
question but also the political party proportions for sharing the six slots for the marginalised 
groups and the additional gender special members, if any. The second stage involves the 
nomination of the members of marginalised groups shared among political parties on the 
basis of their proportion arising out of the party members elected in the wards.
66
 The third 
stage uses the total numbers of members from the two categories to determine whether the 
gender balance has been attained. If at this stage the two-thirds gender balance is attained 
from members elected from the wards together with those nominated to represent 
marginalised groups, then the nominated gender balance candidates would not become 
members of the county assembly. However, if the balance is not attained then the third stage 
proceeds to the filling of the slots with members from party lists on the basis of proportional 
representation informed by the members elected from the wards and the marginalised group 
representatives. 
5.1.4 The Speaker 
Article 177(1)(d) provides for „the Speaker, who is an ex officio member‟ as a distinct 
category of membership of the county assembly. Ex officio refers to the fact that the Speaker 
becomes a member of the county assembly not through the regular election processes such as 
those relating to the other three categories already discussed, but by virtue of holding the 
office of Speaker. If the member ceases to be the Speaker, he or she loses membership in the 
county assembly. Korir J in Republic v Transitional Authority and Another; ex parte Crispus 
Fwamba and 4 others
67
 observed in this regard that „[t]he fact that he is ex-officio member 
means that he is a member by virtue of his office. He is not like the other members who 
become members after undergoing certain electoral processes‟.68 
                                                 
64
 S 36(1)(e) Election Act. 
65
 See Art 177(3). 
66
 Art 177(3). 
67
 [2013] eKLR (Ex parte Fwamba). 
68
 Ex parte Fwamba page 9. 
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The member is elected as Speaker by the members of the assembly. The county assembly 
elects a Speaker from among persons who are not members of the assembly.
69
 The High 
Court in Ex parte Fwamba, relying on Frankline v Interim Clerk of Machakos County 
Assembly and 4 others
70
 rejected the proposition that disputes relating to the election of 
speakers of a county assembly must be dealt with as election petitions. It noted that „the 
election of a speaker of a county assembly is sui generis.‟71 Article 178(3), read together with 
Article 200(2)(c), on the other hand, requires Parliament to enact legislation providing for the 
election and removal from office of speakers of county assemblies. These provisions 
envisage legislation which provides for matters such as any additional and specific 
qualifications for seeking election as speaker; the procedures for nomination and election; the 
vote percentages required for being declared a winner; and the need for a second vote if these 
percentages are not secured in the first round of voting. Given that the speaker is listed as a 
member of the county assembly, the person seeking election as speaker must in the first place 
be qualified for election as a county assembly member in terms of Article 193.
72
 
Since all sittings of a county assembly must be presided over by the Speaker,
73
 or in his or 
her absence, another member of the assembly elected by the assembly,
74
 the implication is 
that the election of the speaker must be done at the first sitting of the county assembly after 
the general election. It thus follows that the envisaged legislation must provide for the 
convening of the first sitting of the assembly after the elections of all the other categories of 
members have been concluded, to ensure that the county assembly is fully and properly 
constituted. Section 36(4) of the Election Act requires the IEBC to designate from each 
qualifying party list the nominated candidates who are duly elected as county assembly 
members, within thirty days after the declaration of the election result. This means that the 
first sitting of county assemblies ought to be after these thirty days. Yet all county assemblies 
elected their speakers within 14 days, within which the first sitting was in terms of the 
transitional provisions of the County Governments Act, required to be held after the first 
                                                 
69
 Art 178(1). 
70
 Frankline v Interim Clerk of Machakos County Assembly and 4 others Election Petition No 5 of 2013. 
71
 Ex parte Fwamba page 9. 
72
 See Justus Nyaribo v Clerk to Nyamira County Assembly [2013] eKLR page 3.  
73
 Art 178(2)(a). 
74
 Art 178(2)(b). 
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elections.
75
 The conflict between the two laws should be understood and harmonised within 
the context of the fact that the provisions of the County Governments Act are transitional, 
governing the first sitting of county assemblies after the first elections under the Constitution. 
The High Court in Ex parte Fwamba erroneously rejected the argument that the Nairobi 
county assembly was not properly constituted when it elected the speaker before the 
designation of the other members of the assembly. The Court failed to consider section 12 of 
the First Schedule to the Election Act, which provides that „a person shall not be elected as 
speaker of a county assembly, unless supported by votes of two-thirds of all the members of 
the county assembly‟ and that if none of the candidates gets such votes that there would be a 
second vote in which only the two top candidates shall participate, with the one getting the 
highest votes being declared the winner. „All the members‟ in this provision refers to „all the 
members‟ when the assembly is fully constituted. Even after holding as he did, the judge‟s 
conscience was not clear. He thus hastened to add that: „However, I must state that our 
Constitution promotes inclusiveness. In future the Commission should ensure that the 
nominated members are gazetted at the same time with the elected members so that they can 
equally participate in the business of the county assembly starting with the election of the 
speaker‟.76 It is submitted that any legislative provision envisaging election of the speaker 
before the designation of these other members is unconstitutional and invalid. 
5.2 Disqualification for election 
A person must first successfully go through the test of the disqualifications set out in Article 
193(2) before being evaluated for the qualifications set out by Article 193(1). Article 193(1) 
provides for qualifications a person requires to be eligible for election as a member of a 
county assembly unless the person is disqualified under sub-article (2). If a person is found 
ineligible by reason of any of these disqualifications, the fact that he or she meets all the 
qualifications stipulated under Article 193(1) is irrelevant. Although Article 193(1) explicitly 
refers to eligibility „for election as a member of a county assembly‟, it is submitted that read 
together with other provisions, such as Article 194 discussed later, these matters also become 
relevant for vacation of office once elected. Article 193(3) sets the following 
disqualifications: 
                                                 
75
 See s 136(1) CGA. 
76
 Ex parte Fwamba page 17. 
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5.2.1 Being a state officer or other public officer 
Article 193(2)(a) renders ineligible for election a person who „is a State Officer or other 
public officer, other than a member of the county assembly‟. A „State Officer‟ includes a 
„member of a county assembly‟77 and a „public officer‟ includes a person who holds any 
office in the county government or public service, whose remuneration and benefits are 
payable directly from the Consolidated Fund or out of money provided by Parliament.
78
 This 
includes employees of all state entities which are fully or partly funded by money provided 
by Parliament. This ensures that the civil service is not politicised and that it remains 
professional. 
5.2.2 Having held office as a member of the IEBC 
Article 193(2)(b) renders ineligible for election a person who „has, at any time within the five 
years immediately before the date of election, held office as a member of the Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission‟. This refers to a person still serving as a member of 
the IEBC or one who at any time in the last five years served even if he or she is no longer 
serving. The rationale for barring such members is to allow a cooling-off period and maintain 
the impartial and independent status of the IEBC. Essentially, the IEBC members must not 
degenerate into politicians with vested interests in the processes they manage. 
5.2.3 Having not been a citizen for the last ten years 
In terms of Article 193(2)(c), a person is ineligible for election if he or she „has not been a 
citizen of Kenya for at least the ten years immediately preceding the date of election‟. This 
provision refers to citizens by registration who are only eligible for election after being such 
citizens for at least ten years.
79
 It also refers to citizens by birth who under the former 
Constitution had lost their citizenship by reason of acquiring citizenship of another country, 
since the former Constitution did not provide for dual citizenship. Since Article 14(5) entitles 
such a person to regain Kenyan citizenship on application, he or she would not be eligible 
unless ten years have lapsed since regaining citizenship. 
                                                 
77
 Art 260. 
78
 Art 260.  
79
 See Art 14 on citizenship by registration.  
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5.2.4 Being of unsound mind 
A person is rendered ineligible if he or she „is of unsound mind‟.80 A person of unsound mind 
is an adult who from infirmity of mind is disordered, deranged, unstable, or unbalanced and is 
incapable of managing himself or his affairs.
81
 Thus, the reason for disqualifying a person of 
unsound mind is that his or her mental status cannot be trusted to handle the responsibilities 
of the office. A person is to be regarded of „unsound mind‟ if there has been a formal state 
process declaring such a status – for example, if a person has been lawfully placed under 
curatorship. 
5.2.5 Being an undischarged bankrupt 
Article 193(2)(e) renders ineligible a person who is „an undischarged bankrupt‟. The effect of 
bankruptcy in law is that a person is declared as being unable to manage his own affairs. If he 
cannot manage his own affairs, the law deems the person as being incapable of managing the 
affairs of other people as their representative. The use of the term „undischarged‟ means that 
the person must have been declared by a formal court process bankrupt and remains 
undischarged at the time of the election process. 
5.2.6 Serving imprisonment of at least six months 
According to Article 193(2)(f), a person who „is serving a sentence of imprisonment of at 
least six months‟ is ineligible for election. This provision focuses not on the conviction but 
the type of sentence the person is serving. Persons serving shorter periods or sentenced to pay 
a fine would be able to serve their sentences and still be able to attend to the business of the 
assembly. The person is disqualified from „being elected a member‟ and not from being 
nominated for election as a member. As such, a person who is serving a sentence at the time 
of nomination but will not be serving at the time of election should be allowed to contest. 
This must, however, be distinguished from the disqualifications discussed in the next section 
under which a mere conviction for offences that may, for instance, amount to misuse or abuse 
of office would suffice regardless of the nature of the sentence. 
                                                 
80
 Art 193(2)(d). 
81
 See the Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and Word Power Guide (2001) 1421. 
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5.2.7 Having misused or abused a state or public office or contravened Chapter 
Six 
Article 193(2)(g) provides for ineligibility of a person who „has been found, in accordance 
with any law, to have misused or abused a State office or public office or to have contravened 
Chapter Six‟ of the Constitution. This provision has two important elements that must be 
examined. The first identifies three distinct grounds that can lead to ineligibility – misuse of a 
State office or a public office; abuse of a State office or a public office; and contravention of 
Chapter Six of the Constitution. The second requires that a person must have „been found, in 
accordance with any law‟ to have misused or abused office, or contravened Chapter Six for 
him or her to be rendered ineligible. The finding of misuse or abuse of office or contravention 
of Chapter Six must be in terms of the relevant law in place, and need not be in a court of 
law. A finding on the basis of any other mechanisms provided for by law suffices. „In 
accordance with any law‟ includes a law that allows a finding of abuse, misuse or 
contravention of Chapter Six in non-judicial proceedings.
82
 For example, a person against 
whom disciplinary proceedings by the employer were taken, leading to a finding of misuse or 
abuse of office would be ineligible on the basis of such a finding. Similarly, a state officer 
who is a professional, such as a lawyer, doctor or accountant who is a member of a 
professional body, and is found by the disciplinary mechanisms of such a body to have failed 
to observe the ethical and professional requirements of the body, would be ineligible for 
election.
83
 However, if there is a pending appeal against the finding to a body lawfully 
provided for to determine such appeals, the person would be eligible for election.
84
 The IEBC 
does not itself make a finding about the identified grounds – it only relies on findings made 
by other entities. 
 5.3 Qualifications for election 
If a person is not rendered ineligible by Article 193(2), he or she must meet the qualifications 
prescribed by Article 193(1). 
                                                 
82
 Ss 40, 41 and 42 of the Leadership and Integrity Act, for instance, delegate the enforcement of the Leadership 
and Integrity Code to other public entities, which are empowered to investigate any complaint lodged against 
state officers, working under them and take the prescribed disciplinary action that may lead to ineligibility for 
election. 
83
 See s 11(e) of the Leadership and Integrity Act, 2012. 
84
 See Art 193(3). 
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5.3.1 Registered as a voter 
Article 193(1)(a) requires that a person must be a registered voter for him or her to be 
eligible.
85
 As a non-citizen does not qualify for registration,
86
 he or she is not eligible for 
election as a county assembly member. Moreover, Article 78(1), which is part of Chapter Six, 
is explicit that „a person is not eligible for election or appointment to a State office unless the 
person is a citizen of Kenya‟. Being a citizen for purposes of registration and eligibility for 
election includes dual citizenship. Although Article 78(2) prescribes that „a State officer or 
member of the defence forces shall not hold dual citizenship‟, this has been interpreted as not 
rendering a person ineligible for election or appointment but as barring a person from holding 
office once elected or appointed.
87
 
Though Article 83(2) requires that a person be registered at only one registration centre, there 
is no requirement for purposes of eligibility that the person be registered in the county where 
he or she seeks election. 
5.3.2 Satisfy educational requirements 
Although Article 193(1)(b) does not directly prescribe any educational requirements for 
election as a county assembly member, it empowers Parliament to do so. The foundation of 
the requirement of educational qualifications is that Kenya has adopted a republican 
representative democratic system, which recognises that representatives require certain 
competencies to be able to discharge their representative mandates and tasks. In Thuo 
Mathenge and another v Nderitu Gachagua and 2 others,
88
 the High Court underscored this 
rationale in the context of the educational qualifications required for election as governor. 
Since Article 193(1)(b) empowers Parliament to provide for additional educational 
qualifications, the issue of unconstitutionality can only arise when standards are set that 
would be undemocratic. Otherwise a mere setting of educational standards is not in itself 
unconstitutional. Article 193(1)(b) permits a limitation of Article 38(3)(c) as all the other 
qualifications and disqualifications. Here, however, the content is determined in legislation. 
                                                 
85
 See also Diana Kethi Kilonzo and another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and 10 
others [2013] eKLR para 86 which deals with registration as voter for eligibility for election as a Senator. 
86
 Art 83(1)(a). 
87
 Bishop Donald Kisaka v Attorney General and 2 others [2014] eKLR (Bishop Kisaka) para 14. 
88
 [2013] eKLR (Thuo Mathenge). 
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The limitation clause applies to the extent that the educational requirement would render 
election impossible for ordinary citizens. It is submitted that the county assembly is assigned 
very important functions which should call for reasonably high standards of formal 
education. In determining the educational standards to be fixed, Parliament should be guided 
by the principles of leadership and integrity, which include „competence and suitability‟.89 
5.3.3 Satisfy moral and ethical requirements 
Article 193(1)(b) requires a member of the county assembly to satisfy „moral and ethical 
requirements prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament‟. The leadership and 
integrity standards prescribed in Chapter Six are some of the ethical and moral requirements a 
person seeking election as county assembly member must satisfy. As in the case of abuse or 
misuse of office, or contravention of Chapter Six, lack of the moral and ethical qualifications 
required must be based on a finding made, not by the IEBC, but some other entity lawfully 
authorised to do so. A pending appeal against such a finding would make the person eligible 
for election.
90
 
The High Court in International Centre for Policy and Conflict and others v Attorney-
General and others
91
 explained the rationale and objectives of these integrity provisions thus: 
In addition, the Constitution and particularly the provisions of Chapter Six 
are aimed at improving the lives of citizens through good governance. The 
processes by which public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public 
resources, and guarantee the realization of human rights must be in a manner 
that is free of abuse and with due regard for the rule of law. Impeccable 
moral and ethical standards on the part of State officers are important 
prerequisites, in inspiring confidence in the citizens. They also influence, 
motivate, and enable others to contribute towards the effectiveness and 
success of the public institutions in which State officers serve or lead.
92
 
This qualification becomes operational more as a disqualification leading to ineligibility, as 
discussed in the foregoing sections, than as a qualification. 
                                                 
89
 Art 73(2)(a). 
90
 Art 193(3). 
91
 [2013] eKLR (ICPC case).  
92
 ICPC case para 133.  
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5.3.4 Nominated by a political party or an independent candidate 
According to Article 193(1)(c), for a person to be eligible he or she must be „either 
nominated by a political party; or an independent candidate supported by at least five hundred 
registered voters in the ward concerned‟. The provision thus allows a person to by-pass 
political parties and stand as an independent. 
5.4 Vacation of office of a county assembly member 
Article 194(1) provides for vacation of office of a member of a county assembly on a number 
of grounds. The first instance is if the member dies.
93
 The second is if the member is absent 
from eight sittings of the assembly without the permission in writing of the speaker of the 
assembly, and is unable to offer a satisfactory explanation for the absence.
94
 Sittings in this 
case should be calculated on the basis of a full day‟s sittings depending on the days the 
assembly is scheduled to meet. A member in default who renders a satisfactory explanation to 
the Speaker can be excused. The Speaker must, however, exercise his or her discretion in this 
regard, judiciously and fairly. Such exercise may lawfully be regulated by the rules of 
procedure which may require the speaker to act through a committee of the Assembly. The 
third case arises where the member is removed from office under this Constitution or 
legislation enacted under Article 80 to give effect to the integrity standards set out in Chapter 
Six.
95
 The fourth arises where a member tenders a resignation in writing addressed to the 
Speaker of the assembly.
96
 The fifth instance is where, if having been elected to the assembly 
as a member of a political party, the member resigns from the party or is deemed to have 
resigned from the party as determined in accordance with the legislation contemplated in 
clause (2); or, as an independent candidate, the member joins a political party.
97
 Article 
194(2) requires Parliament to enact legislation to provide for the circumstances under which a 
member of a party may be deemed to have resigned from it.
98
 Sixth, all members must vacate 
office at the end of the term of the assembly which is the last day before the next elections are 
                                                 
93
 Art 194(1)(a). 
94
 Art 194(1)(b). 
95
 Art 194(1)(c). 
96
 Art 194(1)(d). 
97
 Art 194(1)(e). 
98
 The Political Parties Act 11 of 2011 has made provision in this regard.  
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held.
99
 Seventh, the member must vacate if he or she becomes disqualified for election on 
grounds specified in Article 193(2).
100
 As already mentioned, some of the matters relevant for 
eligibility for election are also relevant for removal from office as a county assembly 
member. If, for instance, in terms of Article 194(1)(g), a member becomes disqualified for 
election, the member ceases to be a member of the county assembly. 
The Constitution also envisages removal from office of a county assembly member on 
grounds other than those discussed above. Article 104 read together with Article 200(2)(c) 
envisages removal of a county assembly member by the electorate in the ward he or she 
represents by way of recall. This is a removal under which the voters are simply saying that 
they are dissatisfied by the performance of their member. Parliament must however prescribe 
the grounds and procedure for such a recall.
101
 
5.5 Internal structures and systems 
The effective functioning of the county assembly requires that the assembly should have well 
designed and organised internal structures, systems and functionaries that facilitate its work. 
The Constitution provides for the office of the speaker and a committee system for the county 
assembly. Although the CGA provides for the offices of the Speaker, the Clerk, the majority 
and minority party leaders, the county assembly service board, and the committees of the 
county assembly, this chapter discusses only the constitutionally recognised committee 
system and the office of the Speaker. 
5.5.1 The Speaker and his or her functions 
The office of Speaker of the county assembly is an extremely important office in the new 
constitutional dispensation. The Speaker is to preside over the proceedings of the county 
assembly
102
 and generally manage its processes. In Judicial Service Commission v Speaker of 
the National Assembly and another,
103
 the High Court of Kenya emphasised the importance 
of the office of the national Speaker and identified a number of its important roles and 
functions. The Speaker determines the business of the assembly; restrains disorderly conduct 
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 Art 194(1)(f). 
100
 Art 194(1)(g). 
101
 Arts 104(2) and 200(2)(c). 
102
 Art 178(2) (a). 
103
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and restricts debate. He or she determines „whether motions tabled by members of Parliament 
are admissible. If they are in violation of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, he may 
propose changes or rule that they are inadmissible.‟104 The Speaker „is the representative of 
the House in relation to other organs and authorities such as the Presidency and the Senate‟, 
and „his rulings are binding precedents‟ in the House.105 The Court then concluded that the 
Speaker is „the presiding and principal officer of the National Assembly on whose shoulders 
lie the responsibility for the proper constitutional conduct of proceedings and decisions in the 
National Assembly‟.106 Quoting from the decision of the Tanzanian High Court in Hon 
Augustine Lyatonga Mrema v Speaker of the National Assembly and another, the Court added 
that the Speaker is „the chief functionary and constitutional head‟ who is required „to 
discharge duties of a judicial or interpretative character, having finality attached to the 
same‟.107 
It is submitted that although these statements were made in respect of the Speaker of the 
National Assembly, they apply in a similar manner to the Speaker of the county Assembly. In 
Martin Nyaga Wambora and others v The Speaker of the Senate and others, the High Court 
found the Speaker and Clerk of a county assembly guilty of contempt of court for proceeding 
with a motion for removal of the Governor from office even after being served with court 
orders stopping the proceedings.
108
 The Court stated that „it is the responsibility of the 
Speaker of the County Assembly to preside over the business of the County Assembly. In 
addition, it is his duty to direct the Clerk of the County Assembly in the preparation of the 
Order Paper showing the business for each sitting day of the County Assembly.‟109 The 
essence of this is that the Speaker has the responsibility to admit or not any motion or 
business for discussion by the assembly, based on the legality and constitutionality of the 
motion. 
The Constitution obligates the county assembly to ensure that its business is conducted in an 
open manner and that its sittings and those of its committees are held in public.
110
 The county 
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assembly must facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative and other 
business of the assembly and its committees,
111
 and the public and the media may not be 
excluded from any sittings unless in exceptional circumstances determined by the Speaker.
112
 
The responsibility of ensuring that all these constitutional requirements are met by the county 
assembly squarely falls on the Speaker. It is also envisaged that each county assembly will 
have its own rules of procedure and it will be the responsibility of the Speaker to ensure that 
the assembly over which he or she presides maintains rules that are functional and can 
facilitate the proceedings. Furthermore, it is envisaged that sometimes the county assemblies 
will work through committees; and it will be the responsibility of the Speaker to ensure that 
such committees are formed and discharge their responsibilities. The county assembly is also 
charged with the function of vetting and approving appointments by the county executive to 
various public service positions. The Speaker will need to ensure that the processes are 
conducted in a transparent and constitutional manner. 
The functions of the office must be discharged in an independent and impartial manner, and 
in good faith, especially given that this is a constitutional public office constituted by one 
person. The Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate underscored the importance of the office 
of Speaker, particularly, its „role of the presiding officer‟ which it regarded as critical.113 To 
maintain the impartiality of the Speaker in discharging these very important functions, the 
county assembly Speaker, just like the Speakers of Parliament, has no vote.
114
 
5.5.2 Removal from office of Speaker 
Article 178 provides that „Parliament shall enact legislation providing for the election and 
removal from office of the speakers of county assemblies‟.115 In addition, Article 200 
empowers Parliament to enact legislation to make provision with respect to „the manner of 
election or appointment of persons to, and their removal from, offices in the county 
governments, including the qualifications of voters and candidates‟.116 In determining the 
grounds for removal, once again the moral and ethical standards established under Chapter 
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Six of the Constitution, become relevant since the Speaker is a „state officer‟ to whom the 
chapter applies. 
Both the CGA and the Elections Act make contradictory provision in this respect. Section 11 
of the CGA provides for removal of the Speaker through a resolution of the county assembly, 
supported by not less than seventy five per cent of all the members of the county assembly.
117
 
Section 21 of the Elections Act, on the other hand, provides for such by a resolution 
supported by at least two-thirds of the members of the county assembly.
118
 Given that the 
Election Act was enacted in 2011 and the CGA in 2012, the provisions of the CGA should 
prevail over those of the Election Act on grounds that the later law implicitly repealed the 
earlier law. 
5.5.3 The committee system 
A critical amount of the work of a legislative body is done in committees and not in sittings 
of the full house of the legislative body. Even though there is no constitutional provision that 
explicitly provides for the establishment of committees of the county assembly; a number of 
provisions envisage the existence of committees by repeatedly making reference to them. 
Article 195(1) grants the power to summon witnesses to not only the county assembly but 
also to „any of its committees‟. Similarly, Article 196(1) (a) requires the county assembly to 
„conduct its business in an open manner, and hold its sittings and those of its committees, in 
public‟. The same provision empowers Parliament to legislate „providing for the powers, 
privileges and immunities of county assemblies, their committees and members‟.119 Thus, the 
Constitution by implication provides for committees of the county assemblies. 
5.6 Functions and powers of the county assembly 
The county assembly has two broad categories of functions – legislative, and oversight. 
5.6.1 Legislative functions and powers 
A core function of the county assembly is to legislate on behalf of the people.
120
 The political 
autonomy of the county governments is expressed in the legislative power under which the 
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county assemblies enact laws on behalf of the county.
121
 In terms of Article 185 the county 
assembly is conferred with legislative functions and powers of making laws that are 
necessary for effective performance of the functions and exercise of the powers of the county 
government conferred under the Fourth Schedule.
122
 They also have the functions and powers 
of making laws that are incidental to the effective performance of the functions and exercise 
of the powers of the county government conferred under the Fourth Schedule.
123
 
5.6.2 Constitution amendment powers 
As part of its legislative functions and powers, the county assembly plays a role in 
constitutional amendments commenced by popular initiative. Once the promoters of a 
constitutional amendment by popular initiative have commenced the process
124
 and the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission has confirmed that the preliminary 
requirements have been complied with,
125
 the Constitution requires each county assembly to 
consider and approve or reject the bill within three months before forwarding it to the joint 
speakers of the two houses of Parliament.
126
 A constitutional amendment of this kind is only 
introduced in Parliament if it has been approved by a majority of the county assemblies.
127
 
This is an important function because it brings counties to the centre of law-making by giving 
them a critical voice on the preservation of the Constitution as a whole and devolution 
provisions in particular. 
5.6.3 Oversight functions and powers 
The Constitution prescribes that the county assembly, while respecting the principle of 
separation of powers, has authority to exercise oversight over the county executive committee 
and any other county executive organ.
128
 In Judicial Service Commission, the High Court 
referred to and adopted the definition of oversight
129
 rendered by Corder et al, who have 
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defined it as „the crucial role of legislatures in monitoring and reviewing the actions of the 
executive organs of government‟.130 The oversight function flows from the concept of 
separation of powers in terms of which the legislature also monitors the implementation of its 
legislation by the executive.
131
 The Court in Judicial Service Commission added that 
„oversight encompasses the review, monitoring and supervision of government and public 
agencies including the implementation of policy and legislation‟.132 The essence of oversight 
is that while the county executive is assigned executive functions, the county assembly, as 
part of the mechanisms of checks and balances, oversees how the executive discharges these 
executive functions. However, oversight functions and powers do not give the county 
assemblies the right to take over and perform executive functions. 
The county assembly has authority to approve various actions by the county executive, 
divided into two – prior approvals before the actions take effect; and reviews after the fact to 
ensure that things have been done lawfully and properly. 
5.6.3.1 Prior approvals 
The first is the power of the county assembly to vet and approve appointments by the 
governor of the members of the county executive committee.
133
 The county assembly is 
required to ensure that the governor when making such appointments complies with the 
constitutional requirements and prescriptions. In accordance with Chapter Six of the 
Constitution, such vetting evaluates the persons concerned not only for their technical 
competence and suitability for the office they are being appointed to but also the personal 
integrity required for leadership.
134
 In addition, the vetting must ensure not only gender 
balance and ethnic accommodation but also protection of minorities within the county.
135
 
While the county assembly may reject the proposed appointment of a person to a particular 
office and require the governor to propose another person, it cannot itself appoint a 
replacement as this would be taking over executive functions. The county assembly also 
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plays a role in the removal from office of both the Governor and the members of the 
executive committee, as detailed below. 
Secondly, Article 185 confers on the county assembly the responsibility of receiving and 
approving plans and policies for the management and exploitation of the county‟s 
resources,
136
 and the development and management of its infrastructure and institutions.
137
 
Thirdly, county governments cannot spend their money unless such expenditure is approved 
by the county assembly. The county assembly must enact an appropriation bill to authorise 
any proposed expenditure by the county government.
138
 The South African Constitutional 
Court held that approval of a budget is a legislative function.
139
 Fourthly, any borrowing of 
money by the county government must be approved by the county assembly.
140
 
5.6.3.2 After-the-fact reviews 
Another oversight function of the county assembly is to monitor and review the actions of the 
executive to ensure that the executive is acting properly. First, once the county assembly has 
passed a budget voting money for expenditure by the executive, the county assembly has a 
responsibility to monitor and ensure that the money is being properly spent. It is for this 
reason that the Auditor-General is required to submit his or her audit reports to both 
Parliament and the relevant county assembly.
141
 The county assembly must within three 
months after receiving the report debate and consider the report, and take appropriate 
action.
142
 Appropriate action may include corrective measures of a legislative nature and not 
executive action, where problems have been identified in the manner the county executive 
has implemented the budget. In considering the report the county assembly may summon any 
member of the executive for questioning regarding any issue raised by the report. Without 
compromising the independence of the office of the Controller of budget, the assembly may 
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summon the CoB to clarify issues regarding how the county executive is implementing the 
budget. 
This monitoring and review oversight extends to the implementation of all legislation by the 
executive and other county entities involved in the discharge of county functions. 
5.6.4 Performance of functions in a participatory manner 
In the discharge of its functions, the Constitution creates obligations for county assemblies to 
engage the public in their processes. Key among them is Article 196(1)(b) that prescribes that 
„a county assembly shall facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative and 
other business of the assembly and its committees‟. The issues to be considered are: whether 
the provision creates an obligation on the part of the county assembly to facilitate 
participation; the intersection of the participation right and the duty to facilitate participation; 
the mutual co-existence of representative democracy and the people‟s participation; the 
nature and scope of the obligation; the threshold of the obligation to facilitate participation; 
and justiciability of the obligation. 
5.6.4.1 Obligation to facilitate public participation and 
involvement 
By use of the mandatory term „shall‟, the provision imposes a constitutional obligation to 
facilitate public participation and involvement. In Robert N Gakuru and others v The 
Governor Kiambu county and others,
143
 the High Court, relying on a number of South 
African decisions, came to the conclusion that the provision indeed establishes an 
obligation.
144
 The duty to facilitate public participation and involvement in the work of the 
county assembly is an aspect of the right to political participation.
145
 This includes engaging 
in public debate and dialogue with elected representatives at public hearings, and ensuring 
that the citizens are given the necessary information and an effective opportunity to exercise 
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their right to political participation.
146
 This gives effect to one of the core values of Article 
10(2). This Article includes among the values of governance, democracy and participation of 
the people, good governance, transparency and accountability to the people, which evidence 
Kenya‟s combination of representative and participatory democracy.147 
5.6.4.2 Co-existence of representation and participation 
Although it had been argued in Robert N Gakuru that all the wards had elected members of 
the county assembly who were involved in the enactment of the County Finance Act and 
therefore adequately represented the applicants, the Court held that „[p]ublic participation 
ought not to be seen as a derogation from Parliamentary representation or representation at 
the County Assembly level‟.148 Neither should representation in the county assembly by 
elected members be a substitute for public participation and involvement. The Court rejected 
this argument and held that the people must be facilitated to participation.
149
 Representation 
and participatory elements should not be seen as being in tension with each other as they are 
mutually supportive. On the value and benefits of public participation, the High Court quoted 
with approval from the South African case of Doctors for Life. Elections as the foundation of 
representative democracy would be meaningless without massive participation by the voters. 
Continuous participation by the public encourages citizens to be actively involved in public 
affairs, identify themselves with the institutions of government and become familiar with the 
laws as they are made. It promotes democratic and pluralistic accommodation which 
produces laws that are widely accepted, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the laws. 
Participation also acts as a counterweight to secret lobbying and influence-peddling. 
Democracy must be both representative and participatory for it to be accountable, responsive 
and transparent to the people.
150
 
5.6.4.3 Nature and scope of the obligation 
The nature and scope of the obligation to „facilitate public participation and involvement‟, 
calls for examination of the terms „facilitate‟, „participation‟ and „involvement‟. To facilitate 
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refers to „make easy or easier‟, to „promote‟ or to „help forward‟.151 To participate is to take 
part, be or become actively involved with others in an action or matter.
152
 „Involvement‟ 
refers to the action of including, engaging or significantly associating someone in 
something.
153
 To involve the public is therefore to include, engage and significantly associate 
the public with the legislative process. It is the process of allowing the public to participate in 
the decision-making process. To facilitate public participation and involvement in the 
legislative process, therefore, means taking steps to ensure that the public participate in the 
legislative process of the county assemblies.
154
 In Francis Chachu Ganya and 4 others v 
Attorney General and another,
155
 the High Court observed that „[p]articipation of the people 
necessarily requires that the information be availed to the members of the public whenever 
public policy decisions are intended and the public be afforded a forum in which they can 
adequately ventilate their views‟.156 
The county assemblies have the discretion of determining how best to fulfill their duty to 
facilitate public participation and involvement. The Constitutional Court in Doctors for Life 
however noted that although the legislature itself has the discretion to determine the best way 
to go about it, „the duty to facilitate public involvement will often require Parliament and the 
Provincial Legislatures to provide citizens with a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the 
making of the laws that will govern them. Our Constitution demands no less.‟157 When a 
court is called upon to determine whether the county assembly has complied with its duty to 
facilitate public participation in a particular case, consideration must be given to what the 
county assembly has itself assessed as an appropriate method for participation. In the Doctors 
for life case the Court observed that: 
The question will be whether what Parliament has done is reasonable in the 
circumstances. And factors relevant to determining reasonableness would 
include rules, if any, adopted by the Parliament to facilitate public 
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participation, the nature of the legislation under consideration, and whether 
the legislation needed to be enacted urgently. Ultimately, what Parliament 
must determine in each case is what methods of facilitating public 
participation would be appropriate. In determining whether what Parliament 
has done is reasonable, this court will pay respect to what Parliament has 
assessed as being the appropriate method. In determining the appropriate 
level of scrutiny of Parliament‟s duty to facilitate public involvement, the 
court must balance, on the one hand, the need to respect Parliamentary 
institutional autonomy, and on the other, the right of the public to participate 
in the public affairs. In my view, this balance is best struck by this court 
considering whether what Parliament does in each case is reasonable.
158
 
This duty requires the county assembly to take positive steps and measures to facilitate public 
participation in Bills under consideration. The court then identified at least two aspects of the 
duty: „the duty to provide meaningful opportunities for public participation‟ and „the duty to 
take measures to ensure that people have the ability to take advantage of the opportunities 
provided‟.159 It should be perceived as a continuum that ranges from providing information 
and building awareness to partnering in decision-making.
160
 
The nature and extent of public participation that is reasonable in a given case depend on 
factors such as the nature and importance of the legislation and the intensity of its impact on 
the public. If there is a specific group that can be identified as directly affected by the 
legislation, the legislature will be expected to ensure that such a group is given a reasonable 
opportunity to have a say. 
Having examined and referred to these South African cases, the High Court in Robert N 
Gakuru came to the conclusion that „public participation ought to be real and not illusory and 
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ought not to be treated as a mere formality for purposes of fulfillment of the Constitutional 
dictates …. [I]t behoves the County Assemblies in enacting legislation to ensure that the 
spirit of public participation is attained both quantitatively and qualitatively‟.161 The Court 
observed that the county assemblies must go beyond mere tweeting of messages and leaving 
it to those who care to scavenge for information. They must „do whatever is reasonable to 
ensure that as many of their constituents in particular and the Kenyans in general are aware of 
the intention to pass legislation and where the legislation in question involves such important 
aspects as payment of taxes and levies, the duty is even onerous‟.162 The Court, however, 
cautioned that being involved does not necessarily mean that everybody must be heard 
orally.
163
 Similarly, it does not mean that one‟s views must prevail;164 they however, have to 
be considered in good faith before arriving at a decision. 
5.6.4.4 Justiciability of the obligation 
Public participation is a critical part of the legislative process and is part of the manner and 
form of the legislative process prescribed by the Constitution. Thus, failure by the county 
assemblies to facilitate public participation and involvement is justiciable and the courts can 
intervene to correct the error. The Court in Robert N Gakuru after extensively quoting from 
South African decisions arrived at the position that the courts must intervene where the 
obligation to facilitate public participation and involvement has not been discharged.
165
 For 
instance, the Court quoted Doctors for Life thus: 
Under our Constitution, therefore, the obligation to facilitate public 
involvement is a requirement of the law-making process. It is trite that 
legislation must conform to the Constitution in terms of both its content and 
the manner in which it was adopted. Failure to comply with manner and 
form requirements in enacting legislation renders the legislation invalid.
166
 
Being a critical part of the manner and form of the legislative process, all the rules discussed 
in Chapter Ten regarding the justiciability of the manner and form of the legislative process 
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by the Senate apply to the county assemblies in the same manner. A county law would be 
rendered invalid for failure to facilitate public participation and involvement. 
6 The county executive 
The Constitution provides that each county shall have a county executive, which is the 
equivalent of the Cabinet at the national level and in which, vests the county executive 
authority.
167
 
6.1 Election of the governor 
The head of the executive arm of a county government is the governor. Even though the 
Constitution describes the governor and his deputy as the chief executive and deputy chief 
executive of the county respectively,
168
 this does not connote the concept of a chief executive 
from a management perspective, but is meant to identify him as the political head of the 
county government in the same manner the Constitution describes the president as the head of 
government. 
In line with the presidential system the Constitution provides for the election of the county 
governor directly by the registered voters in the county,
 169
 together with a deputy as a 
running mate.
170
 
The governor and deputy governor must be eligible for election as members of a county 
assembly.
171
 The rules regarding the election of the county assembly, particularly those 
dealing with qualifications and disqualifications, apply to the election of the governor and the 
deputy.
172
 Such a person must be a registered voter, satisfy any educational, moral and ethical 
requirements prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, and should be 
nominated by a political party.
173
 Alternatively, the person could be an independent candidate 
who in the case of election as a county assembly member must be supported by at least five 
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hundred registered voters in the ward.
174
 Should the candidate be supported by five hundred 
registered voters from the county or five hundred from each ward in the county? Article 
137(1)(d), which requires that a candidate who stands election for president, whether 
independent or not, must be nominated by not fewer than two thousand voters from each of a 
majority of the counties, should be adapted for use for the election of the governor and his 
deputy. Thus, a candidate for governor or deputy governor should be supported by five 
hundred registered voters in a majority of the wards in the county. The qualifications are not 
a closed list as the Constitution recognises and permits the introduction of additional 
educational, moral and ethical qualifications by legislation.
175
 In Thuo Mathenge the High 
Court emphasised the need for educational qualifications for election as governor thus: 
In answering this question one needs to look at the intention and purpose of 
having educational requirement (sic) both in the Constitution and Election 
Act. I take the view that the said provisions was (sic) aimed at improving 
standard of representation and an attempt at good governance because the 
business of a County requires certain level of competence as is required in 
other profession since education centrally broadens the vision, adds to 
knowledge, brings about maturity and enlightenment which is necessary in 
administration of the County. 
The issue of educational qualification of a candidate is therefore very crucial 
as its determination will go a long way to carve out the path on which the 
politics and leadership of the counties has to be run and I therefore take the 
view that the degree which is required for one to run for that office of 
Governor must be a valid degree issued by a university recognised in Kenya 
and that the Commission for University Education (formerly Higher 
Education) must validate the said degree and authenticate the institution 
which awarded the degree under Regulation 47(2) of the Election (General) 
Regulations 2012 otherwise the constitutional and statutory requirement of a 
degree will be defeated.
176
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The Constitution limits the governor and the deputy to two terms of five years each.
177
 This 
must, however, be read together with Articles 180(8) and 182(3) which provide a situation 
under which a deputy governor or any other person assumes office of governor for the 
remainder of the term when it falls vacant before the end of a term. Such remainder of the 
term is regarded as a full term if the person assumes office more than two and half years 
before the date of the next regularly scheduled election,
178
 and not a full term in any other 
case.
179
 
6.2 Vacation of the office of governor 
Other than the cases of death and resignation,
180
 the Constitution provides for two broad 
circumstances under which the office of governor may fall vacant: vacation of office
181
 and 
removal from office.
182
 While vacation from office is mandatory once the identified 
circumstances have arisen, removal from office is discretionary since Article 181(1) employs 
the phrase „may be removed‟. 
6.2.1 Vacation of office upon ceasing to be eligible for election 
Article 182(1)(c) prescribes that „the office of a county governor shall become vacant if the 
holder of the office ceases to be eligible to be elected county governor under Article 180(2)‟. 
As already discussed, since a candidate for election as a governor must be eligible for 
election as a county assembly member, he or she must successfully go through the test of 
disqualifications under Article 193(2) as well as meet the qualifications under Article 193(1). 
If after being elected as governor the person by reason of any one of these matters becomes 
ineligible for election to the office, the office becomes vacant by operation of law. If the 
governor purports to remain in office, a voter or other interested party can move the Court to 
declare that the office has become vacant. For example, if a governor is elected as a candidate 
sponsored by a political party, but subsequently he or she expressly or by conduct resigns 
from the party, he or she must vacate office.
183
 In addition, a governor who ceases to be 
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eligible for election by reason of contravention of Chapter Six of the Constitution 
automatically loses the office of governor by operation of law, and a party can approach the 
court for a declaration to that effect. 
6.2.2 Vacation of office upon conviction of an offence 
Article 182(1)(d) prescribes that the office of governor must become vacant if the governor 
„is convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment for at least twelve months‟. This 
provision is consistent with the fact that Article 193(2)(f) prescribes „a sentence of 
imprisonment of at least six months‟ as a disqualification for election. This is however 
subject to any appeal against the sentence being first determined.
184
 This is because the moral 
standing of such a governor would be in question in addition to such a governor being unable 
to effectively discharge the functions of his office while in prison. If the sentence is, however, 
suspended, then the office should not become vacant. 
6.2.3 Removal from office of the governor 
Consistent with the value of a republican system of government which requires that 
representatives of the people hold office during good behavior, one instance of vacation of 
office is through the removal of the governor from office before end of term for bad behavior, 
among other reasons. In terms of Article 182(1)(e) the office of a governor shall become 
vacant if the governor „is removed from office under this Constitution‟. Such removal is 
governed by Article 181, which establishes an impeachment process. 
6.2.3.1 Grounds for removal under impeachment 
The Constitution identifies the following grounds as a basis for removal of a county governor 
from office: (a) gross violation of the Constitution or any other law;
185
 (b) serious reasons for 
believing that the county governor has committed a crime under national or international 
law;
186
 (c) abuse of office or gross misconduct, or (d) physical or mental incapacity to 
perform the functions of the office.
187
 These grounds are similar to those the Constitution 
provides for the removal of the President from office by way of impeachment by 
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Parliament.
188
 Each one of them is a jurisdictional fact comprising different aspects which 
must be established to form a basis for the bringing of the motion for removal. 
6.2.3.1.1 Gross violation of the Constitution or any other law 
In the case of „gross violation of this Constitution or any other law‟,189 the jurisdictional fact 
lies not in every violation of the Constitution or any other law, but in the grossness of the 
violation. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word gross is something „blatantly wrong 
or unacceptable‟.190 In Hon Lady Justice Nancy Makokha Baraza the Tribunal established to 
remove the Deputy Chief Justice from office, defined the use of the term „gross‟ to „suggest 
that the conduct was glaring, flagrant or very bad‟.191 In Wambora, the High Court adopted 
the definition of gross rendered by the Nigerian Supreme Court in Hon Muyiwa Inakoju and 
others v Hon Abraham adeolu Adeleke,
192
 in which gross was defined as something 
„atrocious, colossal, deplorable, disgusting, dreadful, enormous, gigantic, grave, heinous, 
outrageous, odious, and shocking.‟193 It must be some extremely negative conduct.194 
The Kenyan High Court then concluded that „it is not every violation of the Constitution or 
written law [which] can lead to the removal of a governor, it has to be a gross violation‟.195 
The court held that what constitutes gross violation must „be serious, substantial and 
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weighty‟.196 It ruled out vicarious liability against the governor by holding that „there must be 
a nexus between the governor and the alleged gross violations of the Constitution or any 
other written law‟.197 The governor cannot therefore be removed on the basis of just any 
allegation of violation of the constitution or the law, but only for gross violation linked to his 
or her own actions or omissions. 
6.2.3.1.2 Serious belief that there has been commission of crime 
The second case of „where there are serious reasons for believing that the county governor 
has committed a crime under national or international law‟198 is constituted by two distinct 
factors: reasons for the belief that a crime has been committed and the nature of the crime. 
First, it is not every belief that would justify the removal of a governor. The jurisdictional fact 
lies in the requirement that the belief must be based on „serious reasons‟. The party bringing 
the removal process must allege some facts which constitute the serious reasons for his belief. 
Serious reasons are weighty, important, grave, critical or momentous reasons as opposed to 
frivolous ones. Thus, the belief that the governor has committed a crime must be based on 
strong evidence of an unproven fact. This ground must be distinguished from cases that 
require a conviction and sentence as it deals with cases where there is no conviction by a 
court. Because of the absence of a court conviction, there must be compelling reasons to 
believe guilt – pre-empting a criminal charge. 
 Secondly, the nature of the crime believed to have been committed must be recognised either 
under national or international law. Given that crimes under international law are serious 
ones, not all crimes under national law should suffice – only serious crimes should. 
Furthermore, even where a conviction leads to vacation of office, only conviction for serious 
offences punishable by imprisonment for at least twelve months suffices.
199
 
6.2.3.1.3 Abuse of office or gross misconduct 
A governor may also be removed in terms of Article 181(1)(c) for „abuse of office or gross 
misconduct‟. With regard to „abuse of office‟ the dictionary definition of „abuse‟ is „to use 
wrongly, improperly, incorrectly, corruptly or to misuse, or to abuse one‟s authority or 
                                                 
196
 Wambora para 252. 
197
 Wambora para 252. 
198
 Art 181(1)(b). 
199
 See Art 182(1)(d). 
 
 
 
 
193 
 
Chapter 5: The levels of governance, structures, institutions and systems of county 
governance 
privileges‟.200 Thus, to abuse office is to use the office of governor wrongly, improperly 
incorrectly, or corruptly for purposes other than those mandated by the Constitution. With 
regard to „gross misconduct‟ the definition ascribed to the word gross in relation to gross 
violation applies to misconduct in the same manner. Misconduct, on the other hand, is 
defined as „improper conduct, wrong behaviour, or unlawful conduct by an official in regard 
to his or her office‟.201 This ground is distinguished from the previous one in the sense that 
while on the previous ground the conduct must be what constitutes a crime, gross misconduct 
on this ground need not amount to a crime for it to suffice as a ground for removal. Conduct 
in both official office and private life could suffice as gross misconduct. However, not all 
misconduct by the governor forms a basis for removal from office – the misconduct must be 
gross. 
6.2.3.1.4 Removal on medical grounds 
In terms of Article 181(1)(d), a governor may be removed from office on grounds of 
„physical or mental incapacity to perform the functions of office of county governor‟. The 
jurisdictional fact that must be proved is the physical or mental state of the governor which 
makes it impossible for him or her to discharge the functions of the office of governor. But it 
is not every physical or mental condition that will lead to removal. It must be a condition that 
results in incapacity to perform the functions of the office. There are many conditions which 
can afflict a person without incapacitating him or her. 
Section 33 of the County Governments Act provides that the procedures followed for the 
removal of the President under Article 144 of the Constitution should, with necessary 
modifications, apply to the removal of the governor.
202
 It is submitted that the justiciability 
rules discussed in a subsequent section apply in respect of removal on medical grounds. 
6.2.3.2 Procedure for removal 
The Constitution is silent about the procedures and processes for removal; instead it leaves it 
to Parliament to attend to these through legislation.
203
 Through the CGA, Parliament has 
provided for procedures and processes which draw heavily from those provided for by the 
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Constitution for the impeachment of the President. The process is not judicial; the county 
assembly commences the proceedings by bringing the charges and the Senate investigates 
and makes a finding. The Act requires that the removal proceedings be commenced by a 
member of the county assembly who is supported by at least a third of all the members, 
giving notice to the Speaker of his or her intention to move a motion for the removal of the 
governor under Article 181 of the Constitution.
204
 If upon moving the motion it gets 
supported by at least two-thirds of all the members of the county assembly, the Speaker of the 
county assembly is obligated to inform the speaker of the Senate within two days of the 
passing of the motion.
205
 The Speaker of the Senate is then required, within seven days of 
receiving the notice to convene a meeting of the Senate, to hear the charges against the 
Governor.
206
 At such a meeting, the Senate may resolve to appoint a special committee 
comprising eleven of its members to investigate the matter.
207
 
The committee must investigate the matter and report its findings to the Senate within ten 
days.
208
 In the course of the investigations, the governor has a right to appear and be 
represented before the special committee to defend himself or herself against the allegations 
made.
209
 In the event of a report to the effect that the allegations have not been substantiated, 
there would be no further proceedings and the matter comes to an end.
210
 But if the 
committee reports that the allegations have been substantiated, the Senate shall give the 
governor an opportunity to be heard before it votes on the impeachment charges.
211
 If a 
majority of all the members of the Senate vote to uphold any impeachment charge, the 
governor shall cease to hold office.
212
 If however the Senate fails to secure the required 
majority, the governor continues in office and the motion can only be re-introduced in the 
Senate after three months.
213
 Since the removal of a governor goes to the very core of county 
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government, this is a matter concerning counties and the votes must be by the 47 county 
delegations. 
6.2.3.3 Justiciability of the removal process 
Although the responsibility for removal of a governor has been constitutionally and legally 
reposed in the county assembly and the Senate, the process of discharging this responsibility 
is justiciable. As such, the doctrine of the political question cannot be raised as a bar against 
the court‟s exercise of its supervisory and interpretative jurisdiction. The High Court in 
Wambora considered this issue and held that although the doctrine of the political question 
imposes a fundamental limitation upon judicial power in order to ensure that courts do not 
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government,
214
 the court has jurisdiction 
to interpret the constitutional limits of what has been committed to the other branches and the 
extent of such committal. It examined the United States‟ Supreme Court decision of Walter L 
Nixon v United States,
215
 which held that the political question doctrine proscribed judicial 
non-interference where „the constitutional text commits exclusive responsibility for a 
particular governmental function to one of the political branches‟.216 The US Supreme Court 
noted, however, that „the issue is whether the Constitution has given one of the political 
branches final responsibility for interpreting the scope and nature of such a power‟.217 
It is therefore the responsibility of the Court to review legislative and executive action 
including their interpretation of the Constitution, „that transgresses identifiable textual 
limits‟.218 The High Court then concluded that „the impeachment claim was not justiciable 
and could not be resolved by the Courts because the language and structure of [the 
Constitution and the law] reposed the sole authority of impeachment on the Senate‟.219 
However, if the Court „finds that either the County Assembly or the Senate contravened the 
Constitution and the law in the process of removing the [Governor] from office it must 
intervene by granting appropriate reliefs‟.220 Though the county assembly and the Senate 
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have powers to remove the Governor from office, they must do so within the limits 
prescribed by the Constitution. 
Two distinct circumstances in which the court can intervene are identified. First, a county 
assembly and the Senate cannot be allowed to take a Governor through a removal process if 
there is no allegation in respect of the listed grounds. Permitting such would be allowing an 
abuse of the process. A court of law can thus inquire into the removal process on grounds that 
the charges do not allege any one of these jurisdictional facts. In Wambora the Governor had 
been charged with „violation of the Constitution; violations of the Public Procurement and 
Disposal Act 2005 and Regulations 2013; violation of the Public Finance Management Act 
2012; violation of the County Government Act 2012; [and] abuse of office‟, and was found 
guilty and impeached by the Senate on grounds of „violation of the Public Procurement and 
Disposal Act, 2005 and Regulations 2013; violation of the Public Finance Management Act, 
2012; [and] violation of the Constitution of Kenya‟.221 The High Court, having been urged to 
find that the charges as framed did not meet the constitutional threshold for failing to allege 
gross violation,
222
 held that „[t]he charges framed against the Governor and the particulars 
thereof must disclose a gross violation of the Constitution or any other written law‟.223 It 
added that „[t]he charges as framed must state with [a] degree of precision the Article(s) or 
even sub-Article(s) of the Constitution or the provisions of any other written law that have 
been alleged to be grossly violated‟.224 
Secondly, the removal process is justiciable on grounds of lack of due process. Although the 
process is undertaken by political bodies – namely, the county assembly and the Senate – it is 
quasi-judicial and subject to the constitutional requirements of due process. Both the county 
assembly and the Senate must observe and respect constitutional due process requirements. A 
court can therefore inquire into the removal process if it is alleged that there was breach of 
constitutional due process requirements. The Court in Wambora held that „for the removal 
process to be valid, the process used must strictly adhere to both the substantive and the 
procedural law contained in both Article 181 of the Constitution and section 33 of [the 
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County Government] Act respectively‟.225 In particular, the governor must be given notice 
and a fair hearing at both the county assembly and the Senate proceedings. Indeed, the Senate 
has responsibility to investigate the process used by the county assembly in making its 
resolution for removal, and if it finds that the county assembly did not comply with the 
Constitution and the law, it may refuse to admit the resolution. According to the Court, this 
was meant to make the removal process self-correcting without precluding the Court‟s 
supervisory jurisdiction.
226
 
Since Article 181(2) requires Parliament to enact legislation to provide for procedures for 
removal, any procedural limitations provided for by the CGA are justiciable for as long as 
they are constitutional. 
6.3 Functions of the governor 
The Constitution does not explicitly set out the functions and powers of the governor but 
many are implied by a number of constitutional provisions. Others can be implied by drawing 
analogies with some of the powers of the President. The County Governments Act has 
provided clarity by identifying various categories of functions and powers of the governor. 
One set of the governor‟s functions falls in the arena of appointment of persons to various 
positions and offices and their dismissal from such offices. The governor appoints members 
of the county executive
227
 and, in terms of Article 235, he appoints and confirms persons to 
hold or act in certain county offices.
228
 According to Article 183 the governor as the head of 
the county executive committee implements county legislation,
229
 national legislation within 
the county to the extent that the legislation requires,
230
 and manages and coordinates the 
functions of the county administration and its departments.
231
 
There are also functions which the governor can draw from transfers of functions from the 
national level of government or delegation of functions by the national government through 
legislation or administrative action. These are implied by Article 187 which envisages 
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transfer of functions through agreement between the national and county levels of 
government.
232
 Arising out of this the Act has clarified that the president may from time to 
time, through mutual consultations with the governor, assign some of his or her state 
functions to the governor.
233
 
6.4 Deputy Governor 
The Constitution provides for the position of deputy governor as one of the members of the 
county executive committee.
234
 The deputy governor is elected together with the governor as 
a running mate.
235
 Each candidate for election as governor is required to nominate a person to 
run with him or her as a candidate for the office of deputy governor.
236
 Upon the candidate 
for the office of governor being declared the winner, the nominated candidate for the office of 
deputy governor is also declared elected as deputy governor.
237
 Such a person must have the 
same qualifications required from the person seeking election as governor; and must be a 
person qualified for election as a member of the county assembly. Like the governor, the 
deputy governor is prohibited from holding office for more than two terms. 
Because the deputy governor is elected with the governor and not appointed, when a vacancy 
occurs in the office of county governor, the deputy governor is constitutionally mandated to 
assume office as governor for the remainder of the term of the governor.
238
 In the event that 
this happens with more than two and a half years remaining before the next regularly 
scheduled elections, the deputy governor will be deemed to have served a full term as 
governor. In any other case, he or her shall not be deemed to have served a full term as 
governor.
239
 
Although the Constitution does not explicitly set out the functions of the deputy governor, 
like the deputy president, the deputy is essentially the principal assistant of the governor and 
deputises for the governor in the performance of his or her functions. Specifically, in the 
                                                 
232
 Art 187(1). 
233
 S 30(2)(b) CGA. 
234
 Art 179(2)(a). 
235
 Art 180(5) and (6). 
236
 Art 180(5). 
237
 Art 180(6). 
238
 Art 182(2). 
239
 Art 183(3). 
 
 
 
 
199 
 
Chapter 5: The levels of governance, structures, institutions and systems of county 
governance 
absence of the governor, the deputy governor is constitutionally empowered to act as the 
governor.
240
 
The Constitution does not expressly provide for the removal of the deputy governor from 
office. It appears that the governor is denied the right to terminate the deputy. This is perhaps 
because the deputy governor is not a mere appointee of the governor and does not owe his or 
her office to the governor, since they both were elected by the people as a team. They both 
thus represent the people. However, noting that the deputy president is removed in the same 
manner as the president, it is submitted that the manner provided for the removal of the 
governor should also apply to the removal of the deputy governor from office. Indeed, in 
Dorothy N Muchungu v Speaker of the County Government of Embu, the High Court held that 
a purposive reading of the Constitution as a whole leads to the conclusion that the 
Constitution by implication provides for removal of a deputy governor from office in the 
same manner the governor is removed.
241
 
6.5 Executive committee members and their appointment 
Article 179(2)(b) provides for county executive committee members appointed by the 
governor with the approval of the county assembly. Since Article 260 defines State officers 
as including county executive committee members, persons to be appointed to these positions 
must meet the moral and ethical qualifications required from State officers under Chapter Six 
of the Constitution, particularly by Articles 73 and 75. They must also satisfy the values and 
principles of public service set out by Article 232. As such, the approval process must 
consider three important things: competency and suitability for the offices to which they are 
being appointed; leadership integrity and ethics of the persons being appointed; and the 
community and cultural balance, representation of minorities and marginalised groups as well 
as gender balance and persons with disabilities.
242
 If any nominated candidate is not 
approved, the governor would be required to nominate another person for the relevant office. 
Since the country has adopted a presidential system which puts emphasis on separation of 
powers, Article 179(2)(b) explicitly provides that the persons appointed to the county 
executive committee must not be members of the county assembly. 
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The governor is restricted in terms of the total number of members he or she can appoint to 
the executive committee. Where the county assembly has less than thirty members the 
governor shall not appoint executive committee members that are more than one-third of the 
size of the county assembly.
243
 But where the county assembly has thirty or more members, 
the governor shall appoint a maximum of ten members.
244
 This means that the largest county 
executive committee can comprise only twelve members, namely, the governor, the deputy 
governor, and ten other members. 
6.6 Removal of executive committee members 
The members of the county executive committee are accountable to the governor for the 
performance of their functions and exercise of their powers.
245
 The Constitution is silent on 
whether or not the governor can remove members of the executive committee from office. 
Drawing analogies from the powers of the President to remove Cabinet Secretaries from 
office, the CGA provides for such removal of executive committee members. First, the 
powers of the governor to appoint executive committee members and organise and reorganise 
the committee include the power to remove a member from office. Section 31(a) of the CGA 
empowers the governor to dismiss a county executive committee member at any time, if he or 
she considers it appropriate or necessary. 
Secondly, section 40(1) of the CGA provides that a member may be removed for 
incompetence, abuse of office, gross misconduct, failure without reasonable excuse or written 
authority of the governor to attend three consecutive meetings of the county executive 
committee, gross violation of the Constitution or any other law, or physical or mental 
incapacity rendering the executive committee member incapable of performing the duties of 
his office. Section 40(2) empowers the county assembly to vote for the removal of a member 
of the executive committee. A member of the county assembly who is supported by at least 
one-third of all the members of the county assembly may on the basis of any of the above 
grounds propose a motion requiring the governor to dismiss a county executive committee 
member. The assembly then appoints a five member committee of its members to investigate 
the matter and report its findings to the county assembly within ten days.
246
 If on the basis of 
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the report of the committee a resolution is passed by a majority of the members of the county 
assembly, the Speaker of the county assembly is required to promptly deliver the same to the 
governor who is obligated to dismiss the executive committee member.
247
 
6.7 Functions of the county executive committee 
The executive committee performs the functions of implementation of county legislation, 
implementation within the county of national legislation where such is required by the 
legislation, internal management and coordination of the functions of the county 
administration and its departments and performance of any other functions conferred on it by 
the Constitution or national legislation.
248
 The executive committee also has the function of 
preparation of proposed county legislation for consideration by the county assembly,
249
 and 
provision to the county assembly of full and regular reports on matters relating to the 
county.
250
 By implication of Article 185(4), the executive committee also develops plans and 
policies for the management and exploitation of the county resources; and for the 
development of the county infrastructure and institutions, which have to be submitted to the 
county assembly for approval. 
The county executive also has the responsibility to perform any other executive functions 
conferred upon it by national government.
251
 There could also be executive functions of the 
county government arising out of transfer of functions as envisaged by Article 187 of the 
Constitution. This article provides for transfer of functions from one level of government to 
the other by agreement between the two levels of government. 
Subject to the framework of uniform norms and standards established by an Act of 
Parliament and any county law enacted by the county assembly, the county executive has the 
constitutional function and power to establish and abolish offices in the county‟s public 
service; to appoint persons to hold or act in such offices and confirm such appointments; and 
to discipline and control its staff as well as remove from office those who do not perform as 
required.
252
 These functions and powers must also be read together with the functions and 
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powers of not only the Governor but also the Executive Committee members conferred upon 
them or envisaged by the Constitution. It is argued that the powers and functions of the 
Governor are also executive powers and functions of the county government. 
7 The county administration 
Article 235(1) explicitly provides for the right of county governments to have their own 
public services. Within a framework of uniform norms and standards prescribed by an Act of 
Parliament, this Article confers on the county governments three distinct powers. First is the 
power to determine and structure their own county administration or public service. This 
includes determination, creation and abolition of offices, evidenced by reference to 
responsible for „establishing and abolishing offices in its public service‟.253 Contrasted with 
the South African Constitution which expressly provides for a single public service for the 
three levels of government,
254
 the county public service is „its public service‟255 and not part 
of the national government public service. 
Second is the power to recruit the personnel of its public services, evidenced by the reference 
to the responsibility for „appointing persons to hold or act in those offices, and confirming 
appointments‟.256 Third is the power of disciplinary control and removal, including dismissal 
of its public service personnel, evidenced by reference to the responsibility for „exercising 
disciplinary control over and removing persons holding or acting in those offices‟.257 
Examined against the background of the former local government on which the centralised 
government used to impose chief officers such as Town Clerks and Treasurers, these are 
important powers that enhance the autonomy of county governments. 
The values and principles of public service also apply to county administration.
258
 Their 
enforcement is however excluded from the functional domain of the Public Service 
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Commission established under Article 233(1).
259
 Nevertheless, the Public Service 
Commission can hear and determine appeals in respect of county governments‟ public 
service.
260
 The Public Service Commission may also indirectly have influence over the 
county public services through advising national government regarding the uniform norms 
and standards to legislatively prescribe for county governments. 
8 Conclusion 
A number of conclusions emerge from a purposive interpretation of various devolution 
provisions in this chapter. First, whereas the Constitution establishes two levels of 
government, this does not preclude the possibility of establishment of a statutory local 
government level. Local government is made a competence of the county government, 
although in respect of the urban areas and cities the competence must be discharged within a 
framework of national legislation. Secondly, the centrality and strong nature of devolution are 
demonstrated by the entrenchment in the Constitution of the levels of government, and the 
names and the number of counties. This necessitates constitutional amendments in the event 
of any changes to these aspects, which is a strong protection of the system. A purposive 
interpretation has established that while county boundary alterations that do not involve 
change of county names or number of counties can be effected by a parliamentary resolution, 
alterations that lead to the change of the names or total number of counties must go through 
constitutional amendments. Those that change the total number of counties must go through a 
referendum as well. Thirdly, the counties have institutional autonomy demonstrated by 
constitutional recognition and establishment of two institutions for each county: the 
legislative and executive including the county administration. The autonomy is also 
demonstrated by the fact that these institutions are elected by the voters in the counties and 
not appointed by the national government on behalf of the counties. The institutions are 
designed on the basis of the presidential system which applies at the national level of 
government. 
To a lesser extent, comparative jurisprudence has been useful. While the South African cases 
have been useful in the interpretation of the county assemblies‟ duty to facilitate public 
participation and involvement in their businesses, cases from Nigeria and the United States of 
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 Art 234(3)(b). 
260
 Arts 234(2)(i) and (3)(b). 
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America have assisted in the interpretation of provisions on removal of the governor from 
office. Overall the chapter lays a basis for the next chapter, which goes into the interpretation 
of the overall functional distribution among the different levels of government. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Functions and powers of the levels of government  
1 Introduction 
Central to a multilevel system of government is the distribution of functions and powers.
1
 
The scope of the functions and powers, and their entrenchment and protection in the 
Constitution, define the nature and extent of the devolution and serve its needs.
2
 Accordingly, 
it is important to have clarity about which level of government is empowered to do what. 
This avoids confusion and duplication of mandates and responsibilities, and allows for proper 
accountability to citizens in respect of service delivery.
3
 As Steytler and Fessha observe, 
when there is no clarity, „blame can easily be shifted from one sphere of government to the 
other‟.4 Clarity also enables fair allocation of resources, since resources must follow and 
match responsibilities – funds follow functions.5 Financial dimensions of powers and 
functions often drive contestation in the functional definitional area and this may lead to 
conflict over resources and authority.
6
 
This chapter interprets the constitutional assignment of functions and powers to the two 
levels of government. It provides clarity regarding which Fourth Schedule functions and 
powers are exclusive, concurrent and residual. An interpretation approach to address the 
overlaps of exclusive functions and powers and demarcate their ambit and proper cut-off 
points is also provided. Also addressed is an interpretive approach for resolution of conflict 
of national and county laws in areas of legislative concurrency. Although it is appreciated 
that functional definition cannot achieve absolute clarity since new areas of uncertainty will 
always arise,
7
 the chapter nevertheless seeks to provide guidelines useful for the 
                                                 
1
 Boeckenfoerde M, Dann P & Wiesner V Max Planck Manual on Different Forms of Decentralization (2007) 5.  
2
 Watts RL Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s (1996) 65. 
3
 Steytler N & Fessha YT „Defining local government powers and functions‟ (2007) 124 South African Law 
Journal 320, 324. 
4
 Steytler & Fessha (2007) 324. 
5
 Watts (1996) 38, 41 and 42. 
6
 Steytler & Fessha (2007) 322. 
7
 See Steytler and Fessha (2007) 32, where they state the following: „It is submitted that, however much the 
schedules may be reviewed and functional areas shifted from one sphere of government to the other, the 
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interpretation of functional assignment and exercise of powers. The chapter argues that 
county functions and powers must be purposively and generously interpreted to give effect to 
the object of devolution. 
2 Definitions of functions and powers 
Although the Constitution sometimes uses the terms „functions‟ and „powers‟ separately and 
at other times interchangeably,
8
 there is a clear distinction between these terms. 
2.1 Functions 
Functions are the specific goals or purposes comprising goods and services which 
governments provide. They are the tasks or responsibilities of a government,
9
 and are 
identified by demarcated areas of state activity called functional areas.
10
 They refer to the 
different subjects in respect of which the levels of government have responsibility to exercise 
powers or authority to provide certain required services or goods.
11
 The subject areas may be 
identified as health, agriculture, education, housing or foreign affairs, among others. 
Although, unlike the South African Constitution, the Kenyan Constitution does not use the 
phrase „functional areas‟, the functions listed in the Fourth Schedule should be understood as 
identifying functional areas by way of subject areas in which the two levels of government 
have responsibility to provide services. For example, while national government has 
responsibility in the functional area of „[f]oreign affairs, foreign policy and international 
trade,‟12 county governments have responsibility in the functional area of „[a]nimal control 
and welfare‟.13 In disputes concerning the functions of the levels of government, one must 
first determine the subject matter or subject area of the function in dispute.
14
 
                                                                                                                                                        
question of the definition of (newly) allocated functions will always be present. This is an issue inherent to any 
system of decentralized government.‟ 
8
 See Arts 1(3), 186 and 187. See also Rautenbach IM & Malherbe EFJ Constitutional Law (1996) 61.  
9
 Currie I & De Waal J The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 Constitutional Law (2001) 
235. 
10
 Bronstein V „Legislative competence‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed 
(2011) ch 15, 1. 
11
 See Rautenbach & Malherbe (1996) 62. 
12
 Item 1, Part 1 of the Fourth Schedule.  
13
 Item 6, Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
14
 See Bronstein (2011) 1. 
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2.2 Powers 
Powers are the legal authority of government to act or take certain actions within the confines 
of a permitted functional area.
15
 They are the tools in the hands of government deployed in 
pursuit of government functions. Powers are the type of actions a level of government can 
take or things it can do in an identified functional area in order to perform the functions. For 
instance, for the county government to perform its health functions, it may require policy 
formulation and legislative powers to formulate county policy on county health facilities and 
pharmacies and translate it into county law, and executive powers to administer and 
implement that law. 
Different powers over a specific functional area can be assigned to different levels of 
government either exclusively or concurrently.
16
 Such powers demarcate and limit the scope 
of operation in the functional area for which a level of government has responsibility. Thus, 
while there may be many common or concurrent functional areas, the powers in these areas 
need not be concurrent – they can be either exclusive or concurrent. Because of this, it is 
possible for each of the two levels of government to be responsible for different powers in 
respect of the same functional area. For example, although both national and county 
governments have responsibility in the functional area of housing, the responsibility of 
national government is limited to „housing policy‟ or legislative powers only.17 Similarly, 
although both national and county governments have responsibility in the functional area of 
agriculture, the responsibility of national government is restricted to „agricultural policy‟ or 
legislative powers only.
18
 The actual agricultural development actions are exclusively 
assigned to county governments. This approach to the distribution of powers requires close 
scrutiny at the interpretation level to avoid levels of government assuming powers which they 
do not have. A good example is the constitutional provision that national government has the 
function of „[e]nergy policy including electricity and gas reticulation and energy 
regulation‟.19 This provision may be misinterpreted as conferring powers upon national 
government to reticulate electricity and gas. Yet the operational phrase is „energy policy‟, 
                                                 
15
 Currie & De Waal (2001) 235. 
16
 See Rautenbach & Malherbe (1996) 62 and 95.  
17
 Item 20, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
18
 Item 29, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
19
 Item 31, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
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which demarcates and limits the responsibility and powers of national government to policy 
or legislative matters only. The energy matters in respect of which national government may 
make policy or legislate include electricity and gas reticulation. Thus, national government 
may make policy or legislate to govern the reticulation of electricity and gas, but may not 
itself reticulate electricity and gas. 
2.2.1 Legislative powers 
Legislative powers confer the authority to legislate on a functional area.
20
 Implied in the 
power to legislate are the policy formulation powers, which confer upon a level of 
government the authority to formulate policy in an identified functional area, since legislation 
is informed by and reflects policy decisions. Likewise, express powers to formulate policy 
imply powers to legislate in the relevant functional area, since a policy has no legal binding 
effect unless translated into law. A policy is a broad and a „novel principle of action‟ that 
informs legislative and administrative decisions with the aim of achieving a certain 
outcome.
21
 Whereas laws and regulations are legislative instruments, a policy is not.
22
 
However, „[a]s a matter of sound government, in order to bind the public policy should 
normally be reflected in such instruments‟.23 Moreover, „policy determinations cannot 
override, amend or be in conflict with laws (including subordinate legislation)‟, since this 
will interfere with separation of powers.
24
 
Secondly, both the national and county governments have constitutional powers to formulate 
policy in some of their functional areas. Some national government functional areas explicitly 
mention policy. For example, national government is responsible for and has powers to 
formulate policy on foreign affairs,
25
 language,
26
 national economic and planning,
27
 
                                                 
20
 See Currie & De Waal (2001) 130. 
21
 Oxford Dictionary (2002) 902. 
22
 Akani Garden Route (Pty) Ltd v Pinnacle Point Casino (Pty) Ltd [2001] 4 All SA 68 (A) (Akani Garden 
Route) para 7. 
23
 Akani Garden Route para 7.  
24
 Akani Garden Route para 7. See also Communications Commission of Kenya and others v Royal Media 
Services and others [2014] eKLR (Communications Commission of Kenya) paras 288, 289, 290 and 291. 
25
 Item 1, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
26
 Item 5, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
27
 Item 9, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
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monetary,
28
 education,
29
 housing,
30
 health,
31
 agriculture,
32
 veterinary,
33
 energy
34
 and tourism 
matters.
35
 The powers of national government in some of these areas are limited to policy 
formulation, and the translation of such policy into national legislation. The intra-county 
administration and implementation of such policy and legislation are exclusively assigned to 
county governments. However, in functional areas assigned to national government by simple 
listing, with no aspect of it being assigned to county government, the national government 
has all powers – policy, legislative and executive. For example, in the foreign policy and 
monetary policy areas, national government is not limited to policy and has powers to 
implement its own policy. 
Thirdly, even where national government functional areas are listed without any mention of 
policy, the provisions must be interpreted as including policy formulation and legislative 
powers. For example, the powers of the national government in the „[d]isaster management‟36 
functional area include the power to formulate a disaster management policy and legislate it 
into law. The same principle applies to counties. 
2.2.2 Executive powers 
Executive powers confer authority on the executive to take action in an identified functional 
area. Two types of executive action can be identified. First, executive powers confer authority 
to administer and implement legislation in a functional area. Levels of government have 
powers to administer and implement their own legislation or legislation of another level of 
government. In a number of cases the power to legislate confers upon the national and county 
governments the exclusive executive powers to administer and implement their own 
legislation. Article 183(1)(a) recognises that national government can make provision in its 
legislation, requiring a county government to implement, within the county, the national 
legislation or portions of it. In terms of Article 187(1) national government can also transfer 
                                                 
28
 Item 10, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
29
 Item 15, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
30
 Item 20, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
31
 Item 28, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
32
 Item 29, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
33
 Item 30, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
34
 Item 31, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
35
 Item 35, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
36
 Item 24, Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
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the administration and implementation of its legislation to county governments. While 
assignment by legislation is at the discretion of national government, transfer under Article 
187 is subject to agreement among the governments. 
In several other cases, the national government has powers to formulate policy and legislate, 
while county governments administer and implement such policy and legislation in respect of 
intra-county matters. However, matters that have county external dimensions must be 
administered and implemented by national government. The essence of this is that in respect 
of intra-county matters, the powers of national government are limited to policy and 
legislation. For example, in the functional area of health, the national government may 
legislate in respect of county health facilities, while the administration and implementation of 
such legislation in the counties must be done by counties. Similarly, in the area of agriculture, 
the national government may legislate in respect of the agriculture matters listed in the county 
functional list, but the county governments must themselves implement the legislation in 
respect of the intra-county aspects of these matters. 
In the health functional area in particular, the Constitution provides for „health policy‟ as a 
distinct functional area, from „national referral health facilities‟. The implication is that in the 
„national referral health facilities‟ area, national government has both legislative and 
executive or implementation functions. However, in the „health policy‟ area, national 
government is limited to legislation and inter-county implementation, while administrative 
and implementation powers and functions in respect of intra-county health services are 
assigned exclusively to county governments. Thus, national government has no power to run 
county health services. It cannot procure goods such as medical equipment and medicine nor 
medical personnel, such as doctors and nurses, on behalf of the county governments. National 
government can however establish and legislate for quality control mechanisms as well as 
procedures for monitoring and evaluation to ensure that the quality standards are adhered to 
by the counties whenever they procure medical equipment and medicine. It can also legislate 
for uniform norms and standards for service by health personnel in the county governments. 
Issues of minimum salaries and remuneration, career progression and a number of others, 
could be formulated and legislated as uniform norms and standards.
37
 A similar split exists in 
the functional areas of housing, agriculture, veterinary and energy. 
                                                 
37
 Art 235. 
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Secondly, this is contrasted with the other functional areas in which national government is 
assigned powers without specific reference to policy. In such areas, national government has 
policy, legislative and implementation powers. For example, in the functional area of 
„disaster management‟, national government has both legislative and implementation 
powers.
38
 
There are also aspects of the county functional areas which indicate that national government 
has been assigned legislative aspects. For example, counties are assigned „county health 
services, including in particular veterinary services (excluding regulation of the 
profession)‟.39 The implication is that regulation and not implementation of the profession is 
assigned to national government. Similarly, counties are assigned „trade development and 
regulation, including trade licences (excluding regulation of professions)‟.40 
3 Original powers and functions 
There are two sets of powers and functions, distinguished by their source, which both the 
national and county governments have. The first set comprises powers and functions which 
are conferred by the Constitution itself, called original constitutional powers. The second set 
comprises powers and functions that are assigned or transferred by one level to the other 
either by legislation or executive action called secondary powers. 
Original powers and functions are those which are derived from the Constitution and cannot 
be changed otherwise than by a constitutional amendment.
41
 Some original powers must 
however be exercised within a regulatory framework of national legislation. The basis of 
original powers stems from Article 1(3)(a) and (b) that delegates the authority to exercise the 
legislative and executive sovereign power of the people to both the national and county 
governments.
42
 In particular, sovereign power is delegated to „Parliament and the legislative 
                                                 
38
 Item 12, Part 1 of Fourth Schedule. 
39
 Item 2(e), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
40
 Item 7(b), Part 2 Fourth Schedule.  
41
 Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2011) Issue 5 ch 5, 5. See also City of Cape 
Town v Robertson 2005 (3) BCLR 199 (CC) 60.  
42
 Art 1(4). 
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assemblies in the county government,‟43 and to „the national executive and the executive 
structures in the county governments‟.44 
Even the powers and functions that are exercised within the framework of national legislation 
are original because they derive from the Constitution and are not conferred by national 
legislation. The national legislation only regulates the exercise of the powers and functions by 
setting out norms and standards to be followed by county governments whenever they 
exercise the powers and perform the functions. For example, although Article 235 provides 
that county governments are responsible, within a framework of uniform norms and standards 
prescribed by national legislation, for the establishment and abolition of offices in their own 
public services, the county powers derive from the Constitution and not the legislation. 
Before the enactment of such legislation, county government can exercise their powers within 
a framework of the existing legislation read with the necessary alterations and modifications 
to bring them into conformity with the Constitution. County governments can, however, add 
to the national framework legislation the necessary operational details through their own 
legislation.
45
 While Parliament can repeal the regulatory framework, it cannot repeal the 
powers themselves.
46
 
The main source of original powers and functions is Article 186 and the Fourth Schedule. 
Article 186(1) states that „except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, the functions 
and powers of the national government and the county governments, respectively, are as set 
out in the Fourth Schedule‟. The Fourth Schedule contains two lists of functional areas for the 
two levels of government. Part 1 lists functional areas for national government and Part 2 the 
functional areas for the counties. Although the Fourth schedule is titled „distribution of 
functions between the national and county governments‟, in terms of Article 186(1), it 
embodies both functions and powers which must be distinguished. 
These listed functional areas often lack clarity and overlap in a number of respects. In some 
areas both the national and county governments appear to have the same function with the 
                                                 
43
 Art 1(3) (a). 
44
 Art 1(3) (b). 
45
 See Malherbe R „The constitutional distribution of powers‟ in De Villiers B (ed) Review of Provinces and 
Local Governments in South Africa: Constitutional Foundation and Practice (2008) 19-28, 22 and 23. 
46
 See Executive Council of the Province of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development and another 1999 (12) BCLR 1360 (CC) para 26. 
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only differentiation being the attachment of the prefix of either „national‟ or „county‟. The 
definitions, contents and contours of these functions and powers still call for determination. 
The problem of lack of clarity is compounded by the fact that the assignment of functions and 
powers by Article 186 recognises three categories of functions and powers: the exclusive, 
concurrent and residual. Yet the Fourth Schedule does not explicitly specify which functions 
and powers are exclusive to each government and which are concurrent. A further problem is 
Article 186(4) which purports to confer upon Parliament seemingly very expansive 
legislative powers: „For greater certainty, Parliament may legislate for the Republic on any 
matter‟. Does this render the concept of exclusive functions and powers in respect of the 
county government non-existent? Does it transform all county functions and powers into 
concurrent functions and powers? 
4 Power-holders and types of powers and functions 
Given the nebulous nature of the functions and powers assigned to each level, the success of 
the devolution system will depend on the approach to interpretation adopted and how Article 
186 is interpreted. Article 186 must be interpreted to determine, first, the definition, content 
and contours of the functional areas assigned to each level of government; secondly, the 
meaning and extend of the legislative powers conferred upon Parliament by Article 186(4); 
thirdly, the exclusive functions and powers of each level; fourthly, the concurrent functions 
and powers as well as the distinction between them and the issues of functional overlap and 
interdependence; and fifthly, the residual functions and powers assigned to national 
government. Furthermore, the recognition of concurrency presupposes conflict whose 
resolution must be determined. But in determining all these matters, it must be appreciated 
that the two levels of government do not derive all their constitutional functions and powers 
from Article 186. Some are derived from other provisions of the Constitution which must be 
considered together with Article 186. 
It will be argued that the Constitution draws a distinction between functions and powers, and 
assigns legislative and executive powers in a functional area either exclusively or 
concurrently. Further, a functional area can also be split so that legislative powers are 
exclusive while executive powers are concurrent. Thus, while there are many common or 
concurrent functional areas, many powers in these functional areas are exclusive and others 
are concurrent. While common or concurrent functional areas do not automatically translate 
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into concurrent powers, all concurrent powers must be in common or concurrent functional 
areas. 
4.1 Exclusive powers and functions 
Exclusive powers and functions are those which are vested in only one level of government 
to the exclusion of the other level.
47
 An attempt by a level of government to exercise a power 
or perform a function that is exclusive to another level of government is unconstitutional and 
invalid.
48
 Exclusive assignment of powers and functions reinforces the autonomy of the 
governments and makes it clear which government is accountable for delivery of which 
services in that area.
49
 Although the Kenyan Constitution does not use the term „exclusive‟ 
powers and functions, it is argued that by implication it recognises that both national and 
county governments have some exclusive powers and functions in which the other level of 
government cannot interfere or share. 
4.1.1 Determination of exclusive powers and functions 
In order to determine the exclusive functional areas of each level of government, it is 
important to examine not only Article 186 and the Fourth Schedule functional lists of the two 
levels of government but also the other constitutional provisions that confer powers and 
functions upon the two levels of government and their interrelationship. In certain 
circumstances, express assignment of certain powers and functions on one level of 
government may imply assignment of certain excluded powers and functions on the other 
level. Given that national government has residual powers, the determination of exclusive 
powers and functions must be approached by first focusing on the identification of county 
exclusive powers, and second, the national and county concurrent powers and functions. 
Once these are isolated and set aside, what remain are exclusive powers and functions of 
national government. In determining the exclusive powers and functions of county 
government, it is important to note that a matter that may not be explicitly mentioned may be 
included in a functional area through the concept of incidental powers or the use of the 
                                                 
47
 See Watts (1996) 33. 
48
 Art 2(1), (2) and (4). See also Bronstein (2011) 2. 
49
 Watts (1996) 33-4. 
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„including‟ phrase. Consequently, county exclusive powers and functions „can bleed into 
areas of national exclusive jurisdiction‟.50 
4.1.2 Exclusive powers and functions of national government 
The national government has exclusive powers and functions in respect of all matters other 
than those vested in the county governments by the Constitution or national legislation.
51
 The 
Constitution identifies four sets of national government exclusive powers and functions. 
First, the national government has exclusive legislative powers and functions to legislate in 
respect of the functional areas listed in Part 1 of the Fourth Schedule. Some of the functional 
areas in this part are concurrent, since they overlap with Part 2 county functional areas, 
enabling county governments to also legislate in them. For example, both the national and 
county governments have power to legislate in respect of agriculture, health, housing and 
energy, among others. There are however other matters in this part in respect of which county 
governments cannot legislate, which are thus categorised as exclusive legislative areas of 
national government. On this basis, only the national government can legislate in respect of 
foreign policy, foreign trade and international trade; immigration and citizenship; language 
policy; national defence and the use of the national defence services; police services; the 
courts; monetary policy, currency and banking; education standards curricula, examinations 
and the granting of university charters; universities, primary schools, and secondary schools; 
national referral health facilities; and national elections. In addition, national government has 
exclusive legislative powers in respect of the regulation of the veterinary profession in the 
health functional area, and in respect of the regulation of other professions in the trade 
development, regulation and licensing functional area. This is because the Constitution 
expressly excludes county governments from the regulation of the professions in these 
functional areas.
52
 
Secondly, the national government has exclusive legislative powers through a myriad of 
provisions which explicitly require national legislation to be enacted. In some, the 
Constitution requires an „Act of Parliament‟ or „national legislation‟ to provide for certain 
matters. For example, by Article 196(1) providing that „Parliament shall enact legislation 
                                                 
50
 See Bronstein (2011) 5. 
51
 See Bronstein (2011) 5. 
52
 Items 2(e) and 7(b), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
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providing for the powers, privileges and immunities of county assemblies, their committees 
and members,‟ the national government is conferred with an exclusive function to determine 
these matters.
53
 
In respect of such matters, only national government can legislate, even if the law deals with 
or affects a matter that falls within the legislative powers of county government under the 
Fourth Schedule. For example, even though county governments have the functional area of 
„cultural activities, public entertainment and public amenities, including sports and cultural 
activities and facilities,‟54 only Parliament can legislate to „ensure that communities receive 
compensation or royalties for the use of their cultures and cultural heritage‟.55 Similarly, 
while county governments have the functional area of agriculture including crop and animal 
husbandry,
56
 only national government can legislate to „recognize and protect the ownership 
of indigenous seeds and plant varieties, their genetic and diverse characteristics and their use 
by the communities of Kenya‟.57 
Thirdly, national government has exclusive power to legislate in all areas of residual 
functions.
58
 As discussed below, all the functional areas not enumerated in the Fourth 
Schedule and other provisions of the Constitution or legislation, and assigned to county 
governments, are regarded as residual functional areas.
59
 Very close scrutiny of the functional 
areas and other provisions of the Constitution must be undertaken before it is determined that 
a matter is not assigned to the counties and is therefore residual. As discussed later, a matter 
that may not be explicitly mentioned may be included in a functional area through the 
concept of incidental powers or the use of the „including‟ phrase.60 
                                                 
53
 In Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa in re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 (1) BCLR 
1 (CC) case at para 46, the South African Constitutional Court observed that „by contrast with Schedule 5, the 
Constitution contains no express itemisation of the exclusive competences of the national legislature. These may 
be gleaned from individual provisions requiring or authorising “national legislation” regarding specific matters.‟  
54
 Item 4(h), Part 2 Fourth Schedule.  
55
 Art 11(3)(a). 
56
 Item 1(a), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
57
 Art 11(3)(b). 
58
 Art186(3). 
59
 Currie & De Waal (2001) 164. See also s 4.4. 
60
 See section 5.2.1. 
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Fourthly, national government has exclusive executive powers and functions to administer 
and implement its own laws, except those expressly excluded by the Constitution, legislation, 
or assignment and transferred by national government. Although generally every level of 
government that has power to legislate is also empowered to administer and implement its 
own laws, there are cases in which the Constitution has split the power to administer and 
implement laws from the power to make the laws. For example, in the area of agriculture and 
county health services, national government can only legislate but only the county 
governments can administer and implement the intra-county aspects of such legislation. 
There are also cases in which the national government has been empowered to assign or 
transfer its executive power to administer and implement its own laws to the county 
government.
61
 
4.1.3 Exclusive powers and functions of county government 
By providing that „[f]or greater certainty, Parliament may legislate for the Republic on any 
matter‟, Article 186(4) seemingly converts all county powers and functions into concurrent 
ones. This raises the question: Do county governments, under the Kenyan constitutional 
design, have any exclusive powers and functions? 
4.1.3.1 Constitutional justification for county exclusive powers 
and functions 
On the face of it, Article 186(4) suggests that there are no exclusive county powers as all 
become concurrent by virtue of this sub-article. It is argued, however, that a purposive 
approach renders such interpretation untenable and that, notwithstanding this provision, 
county governments have exclusive powers and functions. First, Article 1(3) and (4) 
expresses the intention of the Constitution-framers that the sovereign power of the people is 
shared out distinctly and exercised at the national and county levels. Assignment of exclusive 
powers to county governments would enhance their sovereign exercise of legislative power, 
which would be otherwise if all their powers and functions were to be concurrent. 
Secondly, the notion of distinct levels of government expressed by Article 6(2) is best 
realised through some measure of distinct and exclusive functions and powers. 
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Thirdly, the structure of devolution embodied in the Fourth Schedule also expresses the 
intention of the Constitution-framers to confer some exclusive powers and functions; there 
are two lists of functions – the national and county. If the intention was to create concurrency 
in all matters, there was no need to provide a detailed list of national functions.
62
 The 
Constitution-framers could simply have set a list of concurrent functions as was done in the 
South African Interim Constitution.
63
 Yet by drawing two lists which only partially overlap, 
there is a clear indication that a notion of exclusivity for both national and county 
governments is set, complemented by concurrency where they overlap. Furthermore, the title 
of the Fourth Schedule uses the term „distribution‟ of functions which implies a sharing out 
of the functions to the two levels of government. However, the lists themselves do not state 
what is exclusive or not and must be interpreted to determine the exclusive powers and 
functions of each level of government. 
Fourthly, within the intra-textual context of Article 186 itself, this provision appears as sub-
article (4), coming after three other provisions which make it clear that the intention of the 
framers of the Constitution is to confer both exclusive and concurrent powers and functions. 
Article 186(1) refers to „the functions and powers of the national government and county 
governments, respectively‟ being set out in the Fourth Schedule. Article 186(2), which 
expressly provides for concurrent functions and powers, by implication recognises exclusive 
functions and powers. If a function or power is not conferred on more than one level of 
government, it is assigned to only one level of government and is thus exclusive. This Article 
uses the phrase „a function or power‟ which suggests that not all functions and powers are 
conferred on more than one level of government. If all the functions and powers were 
concurrent, this provision would not have been necessary. Article 186(4) cannot thus be taken 
to nullify the previous sub-articles and must be interpreted narrowly. It must be read in 
context and harmoniously with the other sub-articles of 186, which clearly demonstrate an 
intention to confer both exclusive and concurrent powers and functions on both levels of 
government. 
Fifthly, Article 191(1), which explicitly provides for resolution of conflict between national 
and county laws in respect of matters within the concurrent powers of both levels of 
government, by implication recognises exclusive functional areas. If indeed all county 
                                                 
62
 See Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
63
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No 200 of 1993), Schedule 6. 
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powers were concurrent, this provision would be worded differently – it refers to conflicts „in 
respect of matters falling within concurrent jurisdiction of both levels of government‟. 
Implicit in this phraseology is that there are matters that do not fall within concurrent 
jurisdiction but are exclusive, which do not invite the use of Article 191. 
Sixthly, Article 186(4) confers upon Parliament legislative powers only. It does not confer on 
national government executive powers and functions in the areas of county exclusive 
executive power and functions. Moreover, as discussed later, even the legislative powers 
under this provision are limited.
64
 Finally, there are other provisions of the Constitution such 
as those in the financial area, which confer on county governments exclusive powers and 
functions. In terms of Article 209(2) and (3), county governments have exclusive power to 
impose property rates and entertainment taxes. 
In conclusion, the ambit of Article 186(4), as explained below,
65
 is limited and does not 
convert county exclusive powers into concurrent ones. 
4.1.3.2 Identifiable county exclusive powers and functions 
County governments, like national government, have both legislative and executive exclusive 
powers which are exercisable in their identified functional areas. Three broad sets of 
exclusive county government powers and functions provided for by the Constitution can be 
identified. First, county governments have exclusive legislative powers in some of the 
functional areas listed in Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule. Although Part 2 lists what are 
referred to as county functions, some of the functional areas in this list envisage concurrent 
legislative powers, since national government can also legislate in that area. There are, 
however, other areas in respect of which national government is excluded from legislating. 
These thus constitute exclusive legislative powers and functions of county government. In the 
broad functional area of cultural activities, public entertainment and public amenities, only 
county government can legislate in respect of racing,
66
 liquor licensing,
67
 cinemas,
68
 video 
shows and hiring,
69
 and libraries.
70
 Legislation in respect of trade development and regulation 
                                                 
64
 See section 4.4. 
65
 Section 4.4. 
66
 Item 4(b), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
67
 Item 4(c), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
68
 Item 4(d), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
69
 Item 4(e), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
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on matters of markets, trade licences and cooperative societies are also in the exclusive 
domain of county governments. Similarly, only county government can legislate in respect of 
ensuring and coordinating the participation of communities and locations in governance at the 
local level. They also have the exclusive power to assist communities and locations to 
develop the administrative capacity for the effective exercise of the functions and powers and 
participation in governance at the local level.
71
 
Secondly, county governments have exclusive legislative powers and functions in respect of 
certain matters explicitly identified by the Constitution. For example, only county 
government may legislate to impose property rates and entertainment taxes.
72
 National 
government may legislate to regulate the manner in which the taxes are to be imposed to 
avoid prejudicing national economic policies, economic activities across county boundaries 
or national mobility of goods, services, capital or labour.
73
 Nonetheless, national government 
cannot itself impose such property rates and entertainment taxes on behalf of the counties. 
Thirdly, in functional areas in which the national government powers and functions are 
limited to policy formulation, and translation of the policy into legislation, county 
governments have exclusive executive powers to administer and implement such policy and 
legislation. All that the national government can do regarding administration and 
implementation of its own such policy and legislation is monitoring and evaluation to ensure 
compliance. 
4.2 Concurrent powers and functions 
Concurrent powers and functions are those which can be exercised or performed by both 
national and county governments in the same functional area at the same time. The concept of 
concurrent functions involves shared jurisdiction and collaboration and joint tasks.
74
 
Concurrent powers and functions can be both legislative and executive. In the legislative 
                                                                                                                                                        
70
 Item 4(f), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
71
 Item 14, Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
72
 Art 209(3). 
73
 Art 209(5). 
74
 Watts (1996) 34. 
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arena, concurrency means that both the national Parliament and the legislatures of the various 
constituent units possess the power to pass laws on the same matters.
75
 
Concurrent legislative competence has several practical implications for the exercise of 
legislative authority by the national government. Parliament cannot prevent the constituent 
unit legislatures from enacting legislation on any of the listed functional areas, veto 
constituent unit legislation, or block constituent unit initiatives that deal effectively with 
matters over which they possess concurrent competence.
76
 Both levels of government may 
freely legislate on any concurrent matter and their legislation can exist alongside each other.
77
 
Because the legislatures at both levels have the same legislative competency, conflicts may 
occur and therefore the Constitution provides for how to determine which legislation prevails 
over the other.
78
 In contrast to situations of exclusive powers and functions in which a 
purported exercise of another government‟s exclusive powers leads to unconstitutionality and 
invalidation of the legislation, in cases of concurrency, one law prevails over the other 
without rendering it invalid. The other law is only rendered inoperative for as long as the 
overriding legislation exists.
79
 The clear principle is: if there is an overlap in the functional 
areas, then concurrency has been established. 
Article 186(2) provides that „[a] function or power that is conferred on more than one level of 
government is a function or power within the concurrent jurisdiction of each of those levels 
of government‟. The Constitution does not, however, expressly identify the concurrent 
functions and powers that the two levels of government may perform and exercise. Because 
of this, concurrent powers and functions must be determined through interpretation. The 
functional areas listed in the Fourth Schedule must be closely examined to determine which 
functions are concurrent. 
In the agriculture functional area, both the national and county governments can legislate in 
respect of crop and animal husbandry; livestock sale yards; county abattoirs; plant and animal 
                                                 
75
 Madlingozi T & Woolman S „Provincial legislative authority‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2
 
ed (2011) ch 19, 8. 
76
 Madlingozi & Woolman (2011) 8. 
77
 See Malherbe R „The constitutional distribution of powers‟ in De Villiers B (ed) Review of Provinces and 
Local Governments in South Africa: Constitutional Foundations and Practice (2008) 19-28, 23. 
78
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 5, 17. See also Bronstein (2011) 2. 
79
 Bronstein V „Conflicts‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2011a) ch 16, 15. 
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disease control; and fisheries.
80
 This arises out of the fact that in Part 1 the national 
government may legislate on agriculture policy, which is boundless, while Part 2 also 
empowers counties to legislate on agriculture. This means that the county governments have 
both legislative and executive powers. In the health functional area, the national government 
can legislate on health policy, while counties are restricted to legislating in respect of county 
health facilities and pharmacies; ambulance services; promotion of primary health care; 
licensing and control of undertakings that sale food to the public; veterinary services 
(excluding regulation of the profession on which only national government can legislate); 
cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria; and refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid 
waste disposal.
81
 They both can also legislate in respect of housing.
82
 In the energy functional 
area, both can legislate in respect of electricity and gas reticulation and energy regulation.
83
 
In all these areas, national government can only formulate policy and legislate. 
In the functional area of cultural activities, public entertainment and public amenities, the 
national and county governments have concurrent power to legislate in respect of betting, 
casinos and other forms of gambling;
84
 and sports and cultural activities and facilities.
85
 They 
both are also empowered to legislate in the transport functional area in respect of roads, 
traffic, and ferries and harbours (excluding the regulation of international and national 
shipping and matters related thereto in which only the national government can legislate).
86
 
They both have power to legislate in respect of disaster management.
87
 
There are also other provisions of the Constitution which appear to confer concurrent powers 
and functions on national and county governments. In matters of land and environment, a 
number of provisions discussed in a subsequent section appear to confer concurrent functions 
and powers upon both national and county government.
88
 
                                                 
80
 Items 29, Part 1 and 1(a)-(e), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. Agricultural policy includes the power to legislate. 
81
 Items 28, Part 1 and 2(a)-(g), Part 2 Fourth Schedule.  
82
 Items 20, Part 1 and 8(d), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
83
 Items 31, Part 1 and 8(e), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
84
 Items 34, Part 1 and 4(a), Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule. 
85
 Items 17, Part 1 and 4(h), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
86
 Items 18(a), (c) and (f), Part 1 and 5(a), (c) and (e), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
87
 Items 24, Part 1 and 12, Part 2 Fourth Schedule.  
88
 See section 6.1. 
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4.3 Residual powers and functions 
The conventional concept of residual powers and functions refers to functional areas not 
expressly mentioned and listed in the Constitution.
89
 Article 186(3) assigns the residual 
powers and functions to the national government: „A function or power not assigned by this 
Constitution or national legislation to a county is a function or power of the national 
government‟. A function or power may thus be removed from the arena of residual functions 
and powers. Where national legislation assigns a constitutionally unassigned function or 
power to the county governments, the function or power ceases to be unassigned and residual 
at least for as long as the assigning legislation continues to exist. 
To determine residual functions and powers one must first determine whether the subject 
matter has not been assigned to any one of the two levels of government by examining first 
the functional lists, second, other provisions of the Constitution which assign functions, and 
finally, any legislation that may have assigned unassigned functions and powers to the 
county. But it must be remembered that since it has been argued that the use of the term 
„including‟ in the definition of the content of some of the county functional areas means the 
listing is not exhaustive, care must be taken before labelling a function as unassigned. 
Although the Constitution mentions residual powers and functions as a separate type of 
powers and functions, these are assigned to national government as exclusive powers and 
functions, leaving only two types of powers and functions – exclusive and concurrent. 
4.4 Meaning and limited application of Article 186(4) 
Article 186(4) provides that „[f]or greater certainty, Parliament may legislate for the Republic 
on any matter‟. As already argued, the suggestion that there are no exclusive county powers 
and that all become concurrent by virtue of this Article is untenable.
90
 The text of the 
provision supports such a conclusion and Article 186(4) must be given limited application. 
First, the provision confers upon Parliament powers to legislate on any matter „for greater 
certainty‟. This limits the county exclusive matters in which Parliament may legislate to only 
those where greater certainty is lacking in the already assigned functional areas. Thus, the 
purposive interpretation leads to the conclusion that the provision only applies in situations 
where greater certainty or clarity in the functional areas already assigned by Article 186(1), 
                                                 
89
 Bronstein (2011) 1. See also Watts (1996) 34.  
90
 See section 4.1.3. 
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(2) and (3) is lacking. Consequently, Article 186(4) must be read in conjunction with these 
other sub-articles which confer exclusive, concurrent and residual powers. From this 
perspective, Article 186(4) means that although the other three sub-articles provide for 
exclusive, concurrent and residual functions and powers, some areas of uncertainty or lack of 
clarity may exist. Although there are some functional areas that clearly appear to be county 
exclusive functions and thus, on closer scrutiny, some aspects of such functional areas cannot 
clearly be placed in anyone of these three categories of functions. In cases of such uncertainty 
or lack of clarity, Article 186(4) provides that Parliament may legislate. Article 186(4) is 
therefore not meant to confer new all-embracing functional areas, but to enable Parliament to 
legislate on aspects of the already conferred functional areas where there is uncertainty and 
lack of clarity as to whether or not the matter falls in the exclusive, concurrent or residual 
functional areas. 
An example is the „trade development and regulation‟ functional area which Part 2 of the 
Fourth Schedule provides for as a county functional area.
91
 Since trade, other than 
international trade, is not provided for by Part 1 of the Fourth Schedule as a national 
government functional area, it is readily regarded as not a concurrent functional area, but a 
county exclusive area. Furthermore, since it is expressly assigned to counties, it is not 
residual. Yet inter-county trade and trade across the country cannot be regulated by county 
governments. Given the territorial dimension of functional areas, only intra-county matters 
can exclusively be regulated effectively by county governments, but not inter-county 
matters.
92
 There is therefore doubt whether or not the framers of the Constitution intended to 
assign such inter-county trade development and regulation matters as county exclusive 
functions. It is in such matters of uncertainty that Article 186(4) clarifies that Parliament may 
legislate. 
This interpretation is supported by the second qualifying element. The provision confers upon 
Parliament powers to legislate on such matters „for the Republic‟ which imports the principle 
                                                 
91
 Item 7, Part 2 Fourth Schedule.  
92
 See Liquor Bill case para 52. The Court set this appropriateness principle thus: „From this it is evident that 
where a matter requires regulation inter-provincially, as opposed to intra-provincially, the Constitution ensures 
that national government has been accorded the necessary power, whether exclusively or concurrently under 
Schedule 4, or through the powers of intervention by section 44(2). The corollary is that where provinces are 
accorded exclusive powers these should be interpreted as applying primarily to matters which may appropriately 
be regulated intra-provincially.‟ 
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that inter-county matters are best regulated by the national government, and qualifies and 
limits the powers conferred upon Parliament. It can only justify its legislation on grounds that 
it has legislated „for the Republic‟ since the matter goes beyond the ability of county 
governments to exclusively „regulate effectively‟. Conversely, Parliament cannot invoke 
Article 186(4) to legislate for counties on matters they can themselves effectively regulate. In 
a sense it imports the same test as Article 191, not as an override clause but as an 
empowerment clause. It is not an override clause because counties would have no jurisdiction 
to legislate on matters that have an extra-county dimension. 
Based on this second point, it may be argued that Article 186(4) is another version of the 
residual clause embodied in Article 186(3). It allows Parliament to legislate „for the 
Republic‟ and not for the counties. This suggests that it legislates on inter-county matters 
which fall outside county exclusive powers. However, read together with the first point 
regarding uncertainty, Article 186(4) is not just another version of the residual clause. It 
serves a separate, limited, but very important role of conferring legislative power on 
Parliament in ostensibly county exclusive functional areas, but where there may be doubts, 
including whether or not a function is residual. The provision addresses uncertainty in what 
appear to be county exclusive functional areas, but does not empower Parliament to legislate 
on what are clearly county exclusive areas.
93
 Beyond the limits defined by Article 186(4), the 
intra-county aspects of the functional area remain exclusive county functions, over which 
national government has no role. 
4.5 Summary of exclusive and concurrent powers 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the following table attempts to place the functional areas 
and powers in the Fourth Schedule in their respective categories of exclusive and concurrent. 
The table does not, however, include functions and powers that are clearly national 
government exclusive powers and functions such as foreign affairs, immigration and 
citizenship, defence, and security. The table focuses on the difficult functional areas that 
required close scrutiny. 
Table of functional areas and powers  
                                                 
93
 See Executive Council of the Province of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development and another 1999 (12) BCLR 1360 para 25. 
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Common or 
concurrent 
functional areas 
 
National exclusive 
powers  
 
National and county concurrent 
powers 
 
County exclusive 
powers  
Education Education standards, 
curricula, examinations 
and the granting of 
university charters (Part 
1, Item 15) 
Education 
policy (Part 1, 
Item 15) 
Pre-primary 
education and 
village 
polytechnics (Part 
2, Item 9) 
Home craft centres 
and childcare 
facilities (Part 2, 
Item 9) 
Universities, tertiary 
educational institutions 
and other institutions of 
research and higher 
learning and primary 
schools, special 
education, 
secondary schools and 
special education 
institutions (Part 1, Item 
16) 
   
Transport  Transport including the 
construction and 
operation of national 
trunk roads (Part 1, Item 
18(b)) 
Road traffic 
(Part 1, Item 
18(a)) 
 
Traffic (Part 2, 
Item 5(c)  
County transport 
including parking 
(Part 2, Item 5(c)) 
Standards for the 
construction and 
maintenance of other 
roads by counties (Part 1, 
Item 18(c)) 
  The construction 
and maintenance of 
other roads by 
counties (Implied 
by Part 1, Item 
18(c)) 
Regulation of 
international and national 
shipping matters (implied 
by Part 2, Item 5(e)) 
Marine 
navigation 
(Part 1, Item 
18(f)) 
Ferries and 
harbours (Part 2, 
Item 5(e)) 
 
Health 
 
 
 
 
 
National referral health 
facilities (Part 1, Item 23) 
Health Policy 
(Part 1, Item 
28) 
Policy on county 
health services, 
including county 
health facilities and 
pharmacies; 
ambulance 
Implementation of 
national 
government health 
policy in respect of 
intra-county 
matters (implied by 
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services; 
promotion of 
primary health 
care; licensing and 
control of 
undertakings that 
sell food to the 
public; cemeteries, 
funeral parlours 
and crematoria; and 
refuse removal, 
refuse dumps and 
solid waste 
disposal (Part 2, 
Item 2) 
Part 1, Item 28) 
  Policy on county 
health services, 
including county 
health facilities and 
pharmacies; 
ambulance 
services; 
promotion of 
primary health 
care; licensing and 
control of 
undertakings that 
sell food to the 
public; cemeteries, 
funeral parlours 
and crematoria; and 
refuse removal, 
refuse dumps and 
solid waste 
disposal (Part 2, 
Item 2) 
Implementation of 
county health 
policy on county 
health services, 
including county 
health facilities and 
pharmacies; 
ambulance 
services; 
promotion of 
primary health 
care; licensing and 
control of 
undertakings that 
sell food to the 
public; cemeteries, 
funeral parlours 
and crematoria; 
and refuse removal, 
refuse dumps and 
solid waste 
disposal (Part 2, 
Item 2) 
Agriculture   Agricultural 
policy (Part 1, 
Agriculture, 
including crop and 
Implementation of 
national 
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Item 29) 
 
animal husbandry; 
livestock sale 
yards; county 
abattoirs; plant and 
animal disease 
control; and 
fisheries (Part 2, 
Item 1(a), (b), (c) 
and (e))  
government 
agricultural policy 
in respect of intra-
county matters 
(implied by Part 1, 
Item 29) 
  Agriculture, 
including crop and 
animal husbandry; 
livestock sale 
yards; county 
abattoirs; plant and 
animal disease 
control; and 
fisheries (Part 2, 
Item 1(a), (b), (c) 
and (e))  
Implementation of 
county policy on 
agriculture 
including crop and 
animal husbandry; 
livestock sale 
yards; county 
abattoirs; plant and 
animal disease 
control; and 
fisheries (Part 2, 
Item 1(a), (b), (c) 
and (e))  
Regulation of veterinary 
profession (implied in 
Part 2, Item 2(e)) 
Veterinary 
policy (Part 1, 
Item 30) 
County policy on 
veterinary services 
(implied by Part 2, 
Item 1(a) and (b))  
Implementation of 
national 
government 
veterinary policy in 
respect of intra-
county matters  
   County policy on 
veterinary services 
(implied by Part 2, 
Item 1(a) and (b)) 
Implementation of 
county policy on 
veterinary services 
in respect of intra-
county matters 
(Part 2, Item 2(e)) 
Environment and 
natural resources 
 Protection of 
the 
environment 
and natural 
resources with 
a view to 
Control of air 
pollution, (Part 2, 
Item 3) 
 
Control of noise 
pollution, other 
public nuisances 
and outdoor 
advertising (Part 2, 
Item 3) 
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establishing a 
durable and 
sustainable 
system of 
development 
(Part 1, Item 
22) 
 
Policies on natural 
resources and 
environmental 
conservation, including 
soil and water 
conservation; and forestry 
(Implied by Part 2, Item 
10) 
  Implementation of 
specific national 
government 
policies on natural 
resources and 
environmental 
conservation, 
including soil and 
water conservation; 
and forestry (Part 
2, Item 10) 
 Protection of natural 
resources in the field of 
fishing, hunting and 
gathering (Part 1, Item 
22(a))  
   
Water  Water protection and 
securing sufficient 
residual water (Part 1, 
Item 22(c)) 
  County public 
works and services, 
including water 
and sanitation 
services (Part 2, 
Item 11(b) 
Hydraulic engineering 
and the safety of dams 
(Part 1, Item 22(c)) 
 
  County public 
works and services, 
including storm 
water management 
systems in built-up 
areas (Part 2, Item 
11(a)) 
The use of international 
waters and water 
resources (Part 1, Item 2)  
   
Energy  Protection of County energy Implementation of 
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 the 
environment 
and natural 
resources with 
a view to 
establishing a 
durable and 
sustainable 
system of 
development 
including 
energy policy 
(Part 1, Item 
22(d)) 
regulation (Part 2, 
Item 8(e)) 
 
national 
government energy 
policy in respect of 
intra-county 
matters (implied by 
Part 1, Item 22(d) 
 
 Energy policy 
including 
electricity and 
gas reticulation 
and energy 
regulation 
(Part 1, Item 
31) 
 County electricity 
and gas reticulation 
(Part 2, Item 8(e)) 
  
Economic policy, 
planning and 
development 
(including built 
environment) 
National economic policy 
and planning (Part 1, Item 
9) 
 
   County planning 
and development in 
the areas of land 
survey and 
mapping; and 
boundaries and 
fencing (Part 2, 
Item 8(b) and (c))  
General principles of land 
planning and the co-
ordination of planning by 
the counties (Part 1, Item 
21) 
   
Criminal law  Criminal law 
(Part 1, Item 
7(b)) 
Control of drugs 
and pornography 
(Part 2, Item 13) 
 
Animal health and 
welfare 
 Veterinary 
policy (Part 1, 
Animal control and 
welfare, (Part 2, 
Implementation of 
national 
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Item 30) Item 6) government 
veterinary policy in 
respect if intra-
county matters 
(implied by Part 1, 
Item 30) 
   Licensing of dogs 
(Part 2, Item 6(a))  
  Facilities for the 
accommodation, 
care and burial of 
animals (Part 2, 
Item 6(b)) 
 
Housing  Housing policy 
(Part 1, Item 
20) 
County planning 
and development, 
including housing 
(Part 2, Item 8(d)) 
Implementation of 
national 
government 
housing policy in 
respect of intra-
county matters 
(implied by Part 1, 
Item 20) 
Trade International trade (Part 
1, Item 1) 
 
Consumer 
protection 
(Part 1, Item 
14)  
Fair trading 
practices (Part 2, 
Item 7(c)) 
Trade development 
and regulation 
including markets 
(Part 2, Item 7(a)) 
Regulation of professions 
(implied by Part 2, Item 
7(b)) 
  Trade licences 
(Part 2, Item 7 (b)) 
   Trade development 
including 
cooperative 
societies (Part 2, 
Item 7(e)) 
Tourism  Tourism policy 
and 
development 
(Part 1, Item 
35) 
Trade development 
and regulation 
including local 
tourism (Part 2, 
Item 7(d)) 
 
Statistics and data   National 
statistics and 
County planning 
and development 
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data on 
population, the 
economy and 
society 
generally (Part 
1, Item 11) 
including statistics 
(Part 2, Item 8(a)) 
Culture and sports Ancient and historical 
monuments of national 
importance (Part 1, Item 
25) 
 
Promotion of 
sports and 
sports 
education (Part 
1, Item 17) 
Sports and cultural 
activities and 
facilities (Part 1, 
Item 4(h)) 
Cultural activities 
including museums 
(Part 2, Item 4(g)) 
Language policy and the 
promotion of official and 
local languages (Part 1, 
Item 5) 
   
Public 
entertainment  
 National 
betting, 
casinos and 
other forms of 
gambling (Part 
1, Item 34) 
Public 
entertainment 
including 
betting, casinos and 
other forms of 
gambling and 
racing (Part 2, Item 
(a) and (b)) 
Public 
entertainment 
including liquor 
licensing; cinemas; 
and videos shows 
and hiring (Part 2, 
Item 4(c) and (e)) 
Public amenities     Public amenities 
including libraries; 
and county parks, 
beaches and 
recreation facilities 
(Part 2, Item 4(f) 
and (i)) 
Disaster    Disaster 
management 
(Part 1, Item 
24)  
Fire fighting 
services and 
disaster 
management (Part 
2, Item 12) 
 
Decentralization 
and local 
governance 
   Ensuring and 
coordinating the 
participation of 
communities and 
locations in 
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governance at the 
local level (Part 2, 
Item 14) 
   Assisting 
communities and 
locations to 
develop the 
administrative 
capacity for 
effective exercise 
of the functions 
and powers and 
participation in 
governance at the 
local level. (Part2, 
Item 14) 
 
Using this table as a rough guide, the conclusion that arises is that the county exclusive 
functions and powers are mainly the traditional local government functions and powers, 
while the concurrent ones are the new and enhanced powers of the county governments. 
5 Ambit of powers 
When determining the exclusive powers and functions of the two levels of government, 
questions of the ambit or scope of such powers often arise because exclusive powers and 
functions tend to overlap. The terms of the functional areas listed in the Fourth Schedule or 
set out in other constitutional provisions create overlaps that can make broadly defined 
national government powers and functions subsume the more narrowly defined county 
powers and functions in the same functional area, leaving county governments without any 
exclusive functions. For example, the national government „national economic policy and 
planning‟94 functional area may appear to include the „county planning and development‟ 
functional area.
95
 The ambit of the powers and functions, therefore, refers to the boundaries 
and cut-off points of the powers and functions of the two levels of government.
96
 Such 
                                                 
94
 Item 9 of Part 1 of the Fourth Schedule. 
95
 Item 8 of Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule. 
96
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 5, 19.  
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boundaries and cut-off points define and determine the scope of the powers and functions of 
each government. 
5.1 Bottom-up approach to interpretation of exclusive functional areas 
The problem of overlaps in exclusive functional areas should be addressed through the 
„bottom-up‟ approach to interpretation, which commences by asking the question of whose 
functions should be defined first. The essence of the bottom-up approach is that the 
interpretation must begin by determining and scooping out the exclusive powers and 
functions of the county governments before determining the remainder as national 
government exclusive powers and functions.
97
 Steytler and De Visser have argued that this 
approach has been developed by the South African courts when interpreting local government 
powers and functions vis-à-vis national and provincial spheres of government.
98
 The bottom-
up approach was first established by the South African Supreme Court of Appeal as follows: 
It is to be expected that the powers that are vested in government at the 
national level will be described in the broadest of terms, that the powers that 
are vested in provincial government will be expressed in narrower terms, and 
that the powers that are vested in municipalities will be expressed in the 
narrowest terms of all. To reason inferentially with the broader expression as 
the starting point is bound to denude the narrower expression of any meaning 
and by so doing to invert the clear constitutional intention of devolving 
powers on local government.
99 
                                                 
97
 See Steytler & Fessha (2007) 331. 
98
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 5, 21. See also Steytler & Fessha (2007) 332. This contrasts with the narrow 
restrictive approach adopted by the South African Constitutional Court with respect to provincial powers. 
99
 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 (2) BCLR 157 
(SCA) (DFA (SCA)) paras 35-6. The case concerned the exercise of the land use planning powers and functions. 
While the Constitution assigned to local government the municipal planning functions, it assigned to provincial 
government provincial planning, regional planning and development, and urban and rural development 
functions. The national government enacted the Development Facilitation Act which established provincial 
development tribunals and permitted them to determine applications for the re-zoning of land and the 
establishment of townships. The City of Johannesburg challenged this arguing that rezoning formed part of 
„municipal planning‟ which was constitutionally a local government function. The High Court interpreted the 
provincial government function of urban and rural development expansively to include re-zoning. The Supreme 
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Although the Kenyan Constitution does not expressly identify the exclusive and concurrent 
functional areas, it is submitted that once the exclusive powers and functions of county 
governments have been determined, the rules developed under this approach should provide 
instructive lessons for the determination of the cut-off points of those exclusive powers and 
functions. In particular, these rules are useful where the broad functional area is the same, 
with the only difference between the two levels of government being determined by the 
prefixes „national‟ and „county‟. For example, in the broad planning functional area, the 
powers of the two levels are differentiated by being described as „national economic policy 
and planning‟100 and „county planning and development‟.101 Likewise, in the area of public 
works, the Constitution provides for „national public works‟102 as contrasted with „county 
public works and services‟.103 Furthermore, the constitutional provision for „ancient and 
historical monuments of national importance‟104 must be distinguished from county 
museums
105
 which must be understood as being those of county importance. 
5.2 Interpreting the Fourth Schedule powers 
The interpretation of the fourth Schedule powers to determine whether they are exclusive or 
concurrent involves the examination of the specific functional areas in both lists. Likewise, 
the process of using the bottom-up approach involves the examination of specific county 
exclusive functional areas against the corresponding national functional areas to determine 
which aspect is reserved for county government exclusively. In adopting and adapting this 
approach there are a number of factors to be considered, which broaden, limit or give full 
effect to the powers. These include the „including‟ principle; the territorial dimension; the 
„full effect‟ principle; and the concept of incidental powers, which apply to not only the 
determination of exclusive but also concurrent powers. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Court of Appeal rejected this approach and established the bottom-up approach, holding that municipal planning 
includes the power to approve applications for the re-zoning of land and the establishment of townships.  
100
 Item 9, Part 1 of the Fourth Schedule. 
101
 Item 8, Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule. 
102
 Item 19, Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule. 
103
 Item 11, Part 1 of the Fourth Schedule. 
104
 Item 25, Part 1 of the Fourth Schedule. 
105
 Item 4(g), Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule. 
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5.2.1 The ‘including’ principle 
The content of most of the county government functions is defined and broadened by the use 
of the term „including‟ followed by a listing of some of the activities that constitute the 
functional area. The significance of the use of this term is that the list is not exhaustive and 
closed, other items can be added to the list.
106
 For example, the county governments have the 
functional area of „agriculture, including crop and animal husbandry; livestock sale yards; 
county abattoirs; plant and animal disease control; and fisheries.‟107 The rule of interpretation 
is that on the basis of the ejusdem generis principle, other activities that are related to the 
listed ones can be identified and included as functions of county government.
108
 First, this 
means that a number of functional areas that may at a glance appear to be unassigned may 
actually have been assigned by such implication and are therefore not residual functions and 
powers of national government. Secondly, in trying to fill these lists of „including‟, the 
interpreter must also examine the national functional list for what is excluded to ensure that 
additions are not made to the county list of what has been expressly assigned to national 
government. 
5.2.2 The territorial dimension 
The determination of the scope of exclusive county functional areas must also be guided by 
functional appropriateness which requires that functions be assigned or left to the level of 
government that can best perform them.
109
 This is informed by the territorial dimension, 
which requires that matters that are best regulated intra-county are exclusive to the county, 
while those that are inter-county are left to national government. A county government would 
therefore not have exclusive power to regulate a matter that has external dimensions.
110
 
Although some items specifically refer to „county‟, it is an inherent principle of all county 
functions and powers that they are limited to the intra-county matters. Territorial dimension 
thus serves to limit the scope of the county functions and powers. 
                                                 
106 See Communications Commission of Kenya para 359. 
107
 Item 1 of Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule. 
108
 De Ville JR Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) 124. 
109
 In the Liquor Bill case para 51 the court noted that: „The Constitution-makers‟ allocation of powers to the 
national and provincial spheres appears to have proceeded from a functional vision of what was appropriate to 
each sphere, and accordingly the competences itemised in Schedules 4 and 5 are referred to as being in respect 
of “functional areas”‟. 
110
 See Liquor Bill case para 52. 
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It should be noted however that the mere prefixing of a functional area as „county‟ does not 
necessarily mean that the functional area is intra-county. What constitutes a functional area 
prefixed as „county‟ can only be determined in the context of each functional area. The 
factors which determine what is county and what is national may include the objects of or the 
use to which a facility is put, the ownership of the facility and the control of the facility.
111
 
The use to which a facility is put may bring into play the intra-county and inter-county 
dichotomy of defining functional areas. For example, a health service may be called county 
simply because it is intended for use within the boundaries of the county or that it is a service 
confined within the county boundaries. A road may be referred to as county because it begins 
and ends within the county and can serve only travelers within the county. Similarly, a 
functional area may be prefixed „county‟ from the perspective of its control and regulation. 
This may even mean that a service is owned and rendered by the private sector but controlled 
and regulated by the county. Accordingly, „county health services, including, in particular – 
county health facilities and pharmacies‟ may incorporate both the control and regulation 
functions.
112
 While the county may control and regulate health facilities that are privately 
owned, it may also own its own health facilities. 
5.2.3 The ‘full effect’ principle 
A purposive approach which has been recommended by the South African Constitutional 
Court requires that functional areas and powers be interpreted in a manner that gives full 
effect to the functions and powers of the levels of government. The Court rejected the idea of 
any presumptions in favour of any one of the levels of government. Instead, it emphasised a 
functional view which seeks to ensure that each level of government is enabled to discharge 
its „responsibilities completely and successfully‟ and to exercise its powers fully and 
effectively.
113
 Each functional area must be determined in the light of its vision informed by 
its textual context, the objects of devolution and the core values of the Constitution. Justice 
Ngcobo stated in this regard that „[t]he functional areas must be purposively interpreted in a 
manner which will enable the national Parliament and the provincial legislatures to exercise 
                                                 
111
 See Steytler & Fessha (2007) 334. 
112
 Item 2(a) of Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule.  
113
 Bronstein (2004) 9-10. 
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their respective legislative powers fully and effectively.‟114 Therefore, national government 
functions cannot be interpreted in a manner that includes county government functions as this 
will deny the counties their constitutional right to exercise their powers fully and effectively. 
The purpose of the legislation must be determined by taking into account its stated objective 
as well as its unstated effect.
115
 This principle serves to broaden the scope of the county 
powers. 
5.2.4 Incidental powers and functions 
The ambit of the powers may be extended beyond the specific terms of the functional list by 
the notion of incidental powers and functions. Article 185(2) empowers a county government 
to „make any laws that are necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance‟ of its 
functions and exercise of its powers under the Fourth Schedule. An incidental power refers to 
a situation where a matter that would have fallen in the functional area of the national 
government is regarded as being so integrally linked to matters in a functional area of county 
government as to be incidental and form part of that functional area.
116
 Incidental powers and 
functions deal with grey areas around cut-off points of the functional areas; however, they are 
not meant to introduce new functional areas for county governments.
117
 
The operative words in Article 185(2) are the phrases „necessary for, or incidental to, the 
effective performance‟ of a function or exercise of a power. These phrases should be 
interpreted purposively and informed by not only the subsidiarity principle but also the 
objects and principles of devolution. The South African Constitutional Court defined the 
phrase „reasonably necessary for, or incidental to‟ as meaning „reasonably necessary for and 
reasonably incidental to‟.118 Thus, a law may address an issue that is not directly mentioned 
as part of the functional area, yet be viewed as part of the functional area because it is 
                                                 
114
 Ex parte Western Cape Provincial Government and others: In re: DVB Behuising (Pty) Limited v North West 
Provincial Government and Another 2000 (4) BCLR (CC) (DVB Behuising) para 17.  
115
 See Ex Parte Speaker of the KwaZulu Natal Provincial Legislature: In re KwaZulu Natal Amakhosi and 
Iziphakenyiswa Amendment Bill of 1995 1996 (7) BCLR 903 (CC) 19. 
116
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) Chapter 5, 7. See also DVB Behuising para 58 in which the South African 
Constitutional Court perceived the incidental nature of the powers in terms of the provisions in question being 
so „inextricably linked‟ to the other provisions that they became foundational and integral to the achievement of 
the purpose of the legislation. 
117
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 5, 7 and 8. 
118
 Liquor Bill case para 81. 
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„necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance‟ of the function. For example, 
although the Constitution does not expressly assign county governments functions in respect 
of criminal matters, the success of the county governments in the discharge of some of their 
functions necessarily requires that they exercise some criminal jurisdiction by creating 
offences. For instance, the effective performance of the county government liquor licensing 
function may necessarily include county liquor regulatory laws, which create criminal 
offences and impose penalties for non-compliance.
119
 The same applies to their „control of 
drugs and pornography‟ powers.120 
While Article 185(2) expressly provides for county government incidental powers, it is 
instructive to note that the Constitution does not expressly provide for national government 
incidental powers. This should be interpreted as a deliberate omission intended to protect the 
county domain from invasion by national government. Article 185(2) read together with this 
deliberate omission imply an intention to protect and empower county governments to be 
able to effectively perform their functions and exercise their powers. 
An issue regarding incidental powers will arise when legislation of county government is 
challenged for going beyond its functional areas and intruding into the exclusive functional 
areas of the national government. The determination of whether such legislation falls within 
the ambit of incidental powers revolves around determining the dominant characteristic of the 
legislation in question. In Canadian jurisprudence, the classification of the subject which the 
legislation deals with is done through what is referred to as the „pith and substance‟ analysis. 
The „pith and substance‟ of the legislation is identified by finding „the dominant or most 
important characteristic‟ of the legislation,121 or the most important purpose of a particular 
provision.
122
 First, impugned provisions must be given natural interpretation but within their 
context, and then their role must be examined in isolation in order to characterise them.
123
 
Where the impugned provisions „can stand alone‟ because they are within the powers of the 
                                                 
119
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 5, 7.  
120
 Item 13, Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule. 
121
 See Hogg PW Constitutional Law of Canada 3 ed (1992) 15.7. See also Watts RL Federalism: The 
Canadian Experience (1997) 45-6.  
122
 See Kitkatla Band v British Columbia (Minister of Small Busness, Tourism and Culture) 2002 SCC, 31 [200] 
2 SCR 146 para 58. See also General Motors of Canada Ltd v City National Leasing [1989] 1 SCR 641, 58 
DLR (4
th
) 255.  
123
 See Bronstein (2011a) 18. 
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county government, they require no further inquiry. Where the impugned provisions intrude 
into the exclusive legislative area of national government, it becomes necessary to establish 
the extent of the incursion. It must be determined how invasive the intrusion is.
124
 
Secondly, is the impugned provision part of a broader legislative scheme that is within the 
competence of county governments? Where the legislative scheme is within the powers of 
county government, the relationship between the specific impugned provision and the scheme 
must be examined. It must be asked how well the provision is integrated into the scheme of 
the legislation and how important it is for the effectiveness of the legislation.
125
 This may 
involve a proportionality approach to the interpretation. The more the impugned provision 
pushes the legislative boundaries of county government and encroaches on the national 
government domain, the more essential the provision must be to an otherwise valid legislative 
scheme for it to be considered incidental. The less it pushes the boundaries of county 
legislative powers, and intrudes into the national government domain, the easier and more 
likely that it will be sustained as an incidental power.
126
 
5.3 Consequences of clear exclusive powers 
Once the scope of the exclusive powers has been determined, the consequence is that each 
government is entitled to exercise its powers without interference from the other. The 
problem, however, is that such distinct exclusive powers may be exercisable in respect of the 
same subject matter creating a functional inter-dependence problem because completely 
exclusive functions may support or depend on each other. For example, while national 
government has exclusive powers and functions over primary and secondary schools, county 
governments have exclusive powers and functions over county planning and development. 
They also have exclusive powers over water and sanitation, as well as electricity reticulation. 
Problems may therefore arise when national government designates the setting up of a 
primary school in an area county government has in exercise of its planning functions zoned 
not for schools. Similarly, a school may not be complete without provision of water and 
sanitation and electricity, which are exclusive functions of county government. 
                                                 
124
 See Bronstein (2011a) 19. 
125
 See Bronstein (2011a) 19.  
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 See Bronstein (2011a) 19.  
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Rules for the resolution of the problem of such functional interdependence are that, first, each 
level of government is entitled to perform its functions and none can displace the functions of 
the other. Once the bottom-up approach has been used to demarcate the exclusive functions 
of both the county and national governments, each government must be allowed to perform 
its own functions. In both Swartland v Louw
127
 and City of Cape Town v Maccsands,
128
 it was 
held that a person with a mining license must also comply with the planning requirements of 
the municipality.
129
 He or she must obtain approval from both national and local government 
since the land on which the mining was to take place falls within the municipal planning 
jurisdiction.
130
 The two levels of government have coordinate powers in their respective 
functional areas.
131
 Secondly, the two levels of government must cooperate with each other 
when discharging their coordinate exclusive functions.
132
 
6 Other original sources other than the functional lists 
Four other sets of additional powers and functions can be identified in the Constitution: those 
relating to land; local government; public service; and amendment of the Constitution. 
6.1 Powers and functions over land 
Article 69(1) requires the „state‟ to undertake a wide range of activities in the environmental 
area. Some of these activities fall within the exclusive functional areas of the two 
                                                 
127
 [2010] JOL 26136 (CC). 
128
 [2010] JOL 25970 (CC). 
129
 Maccsands para 28. In these cases, mining was an exclusive responsibility of the national government while 
land use planning was an exclusive function of local government. The mining companies secured mining 
permits from the national government under the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act but the 
relevant local authorities argued that the land on which the mining was supposed to be done had not been zoned 
for mining and that unless the companies applied for and secured re-zoning, they could not be allowed to mine. 
The mining companies supported by the national Department of Minerals and Energy, argued that the national 
government‟s power over mining is an exclusive power, which trumps municipal authority over municipal 
planning and that the mining permit already included the land use right required.  
130
 See also Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western 
Cape v Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd and Another 2014 (2) BCLR 182 (CC). 
131
 See Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v 
Habitat Council and others (City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality as amicus curiae) 2014 (5) BCLR 
591 (CC) para 19. 
132
 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Irene Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 883 (Grootboom) (CC) 
paras 39-40.  
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governments, identified by the functional list, while others are new entrants. These powers 
and functions are concurrent because the provision uses the phrase „the state‟, which 
encompasses both national and county government. Article 260 defines the „state‟ as being 
the collectivity of offices, organs and other entities which comprise the government of the 
Republic of Kenya as defined under the Constitution. The provision then defines „State 
office‟ as including offices in the county government. 
The provisions relating to community land draw a distinction between powers and functions 
which are conferred exclusively upon the national government and those that are conferred 
upon both levels of government. Whereas Article 63(5) places the responsibility to enact 
legislation to give effect to the entire Article on Parliament, Article 63(4) prescribes that 
„community land shall not be disposed of or otherwise used except in terms of legislation 
specifying the nature and extent of the rights of members of each community individually and 
collectively‟. The language of the Constitution in various respects suggests that whenever the 
term „legislation‟ is used alone, it encompasses both national and county legislation. But 
when the Constitution uses „Parliament‟, „Act of Parliament‟ or „national legislation‟ the 
terms are restricted to legislation of national government. In this case, community land can be 
disposed of or used in terms of county legislation or national legislation.
133
 
6.2 Powers and functions over local government. 
The Constitution creates a possibility for the creation of local government below the county 
level.
134
 Article 176(2) requires every county government to „decentralize its functions and 
the provision of its services to the extent that it is efficient and practicable to do so‟.135 This 
implies that counties may establish local authorities below them. Decentralisation was 
defined in Chapter One as the transfer of powers by a central government to sub-units which 
exercise those received powers under the ultimate control of the decentralising 
government.
136
 
Article 176(2) should be interpreted as conferring upon county governments the local 
government competence to decentralise in a manner that goes beyond mere 
                                                 
133
 See for example, Art 71.  
134
 See section 2 of Chap 5. 
135
 Art 176(2). 
136
 See section 7.3 of Chap 1. 
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deconcentration.
137
 The Fourth Schedule confers on the county government the responsibility 
of ensuring and coordinating the participation of communities and locations in governance at 
the local level. It also empowers them to assist communities to develop the administrative 
capacity for the effective exercise of the functions and powers and participation in 
governance at the local level.
138
 Read together the conclusion that county governments have 
power to organise local government as one of their competences becomes irresistible. 
Article 184, however, also requires national legislation to provide for the governance and 
management of urban areas and cities.
139
 It is submitted that when county governments 
decentralise in respect of urban areas, they must do so within a regulatory framework of 
national legislation. A harmonised interpretation of Articles 176(2) and 184 is that the 
organisation of local government whether urban or rural is an exclusive function and power 
of county governments. National government can only legislate for how county governments 
can decentralise to urban areas to provide a regulatory framework. Although Ghai and Ghai 
observe that „decentralizing functions does not mean creating lower levels of government – 
having local offices of the county government is enough to satisfy the Constitution,‟ 140 given 
the conclusion made about deconcentration, the requirement to decentralise under Article 
176(2) read together with the objects of devolution would not be satisfied by a mere opening 
of administrative offices. 
However, this competence is discretionary since the Constitution uses the phrase „to the 
extent that it is efficient and practicable to do so‟. The essence of this is that county 
governments are the ones to determine when and the extent to which it is efficient and 
practicable to do so. 
The power of national government under Article 184 is limited to, first, legislating and does 
not extend to the actual management of urban areas and cities. Secondly, the Article imposes 
an obligation and not discretion to legislate. Thirdly, the scope of what national government 
can legislate on is limited to: establishing criteria for classifying areas as urban areas and 
cities;
141
 categorising the urban areas into different types;
142
 establishing the principles of 
                                                 
137
 Ghai & Ghai (2011) 129. 
138
 Item 14, Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule. 
139
 Art 184(1). 
140
 Ghai & Ghai (2011) 129. 
141
 Art 184(1)(a). 
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governance and management of urban areas and cities;
143
 and providing for participation by 
residents in the governance of urban areas and cities.
144
 
6.3 Powers and functions over public service. 
The Constitution has settled for a dual system of public service under which each of the two 
levels of government has its own public service or public administration. However, the 
powers and functions relating to the establishment of the county government public service 
are subject to regulation by national government which must establish norms and standards to 
guide counties. The county governments have responsibility, „within a framework of uniform 
norms and standards prescribed by an Act of Parliament,‟ for the establishment and abolition 
of offices in their public services, appointment and confirmation of persons to serve in those 
offices, and exercise of disciplinary control over and removal from office of such persons.
145
 
6.4 Powers and functions over constitutional amendment. 
The constitutional amendment provisions confer powers and functions on both the national 
and county levels of government. While all constitutional amendments must be considered 
and passed by both houses of Parliament,
146
 amendments commenced by way of popular 
initiative must be considered by the county assemblies before being introduced in Parliament. 
After going through the preliminary stages and processes, the Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission is required to submit the constitutional amendment Bill „to each county 
assembly for consideration‟.147 The Bill must be considered by each county assembly and 
once a majority of the county assemblies have approved it, it is introduced in Parliament for 
consideration.
148
 This provision was meant to ensure that before a constitutional amendment 
is regarded as a popular initiative, it must have support spread across a wide area in the 
country. This particular power and function falls within the domain of exclusive powers and 
functions since each level is assigned its own identifiable functions or role which must be 
discharged sequentially before an amendment can validly be effected. 
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 Art 184(2). 
143
 Art 184(1)(b). 
144
 Art 184(1)(c). 
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 Art 235(1)(a), (b) and (c).  
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7 When powers become duties 
The intersection of powers and functions with the Bill of Rights provisions transforms some 
of the powers and functions of both levels of government into binding duties. The 
Constitution imposes a rights implementation duty on „the state and every state organ to 
observe, respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill 
of Rights‟.149 Similarly, „the state‟ is required to „take legislative, policy and other measures, 
including the setting of standards, to achieve the progressive realisation‟ of the socio-
economic rights guaranteed under Article 43 of the Constitution.
150
 Article 43(1) provides for 
economic and social rights which it itemises as including the highest attainable standards of 
health, accessible and adequate housing and reasonable standards of sanitation, freedom from 
hunger and adequate food of acceptable quality, clean and safe water in adequate quantities, 
social security and education. The provision then requires „the state‟ to „provide appropriate 
social security to persons who are unable to support themselves and their dependants‟.151 
Furthermore, all „state organs and all public officers‟ are required to address the needs of 
vulnerable groups within society, such as women, older members of society, persons with 
disabilities, children, youth, members of minority or marginalized communities, and 
members of particular ethnic, religious or cultural communities.
152
 There is also an obligation 
for the state to „enact and implement legislation to fulfill‟ international obligations in respect 
of human rights.
153
 
All these provisions impose duties upon the state which, in appropriate circumstances, 
transform the constitutionally assigned policy, legislative and executive powers and functions 
into binding duties of the levels of government. The use of the term „state‟ in all these 
provisions means that they impose duties on both the national and county government.
154
 
This interplay or intersection increases the burden on the part of the levels of government. 
When discussing the nexus between functional assignment and the allocation of financial 
resources, the Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate and another v Attorney General and 
                                                 
149
 Art 21(1).  
150
 Art 21(2). 
151
 Art 43(3).  
152
 Art 21(3).  
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 Art 21(4). 
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 Art 260. See also Grootboom para 82 where the South African Constitutional Court expressed the view that 
the socio-economic rights bind all spheres of government. 
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others
155
 recognised this intersection and was of the view that the greater burden of socio-
economic rights falls upon county governments. It observed that: 
It is relevant to consider the range of responsibilities shouldered by these 
nascent county governments. The Bill of Rights (Chapter 4 of the 
Constitution) is one of the most progressive and most modern in the world. It 
not only contains political and civil rights, but also expands the canvas of 
rights to include cultural, social, and economic rights. Significantly, some of 
these second-generation rights, such as food, health, environment, and 
education, fall under the mandate of the county governments, and will thus 
have to be realized at that level. This means that county governments will 
require substantial resources, to enable them to deliver on these rights, and 
fulfil their own constitutional responsibilities.
156
 
The Bill of Rights provisions do not however trump the other chapters and provisions of the 
Constitution. They must therefore be interpreted in the context of the whole Constitution to 
harmonise them with the rest of the provisions. Moreover, the level and nature of the duties 
for each level of government, which arise out of the intersection between the Bill of Rights, 
particularly socio-economic rights, and powers and functions, vary considerably. While some 
rights fit neatly into functional areas of each of the two levels of government, others do not 
and their application is nuanced.
157
 For example, social security is a broad and nebulous 
subject which encompasses some of the listed functional areas and others not listed. Whereas 
national government is assigned agricultural policy and county governments are assigned 
agriculture, it is not clear whether food security is included in these functions, yet it forms 
part of the right to social security. 
In order to clarify which rights transform which functions into duties for both national and 
county governments, a close examination of the intersection between the rights and the 
functional areas of the two governments is necessary. Steytler and De Visser suggest two 
types of intersection between socio-economic rights and functional areas. These are direct 
intersection, where the realisation of the right fits neatly within a functional area of a 
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 [2013] eKLR (Speaker of the Senate). 
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 Speaker of the Senate para 193.  
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government, and supportive intersection, where the functional area does not cover the right 
directly, but a government nevertheless plays an important contributory or supportive role in 
its realisation.
158
 
7.1 Direct intersection 
Direct intersection refers to a situation where the nature and scope of a socio-economic right 
corresponds with a functional area or areas of either national or county government. For 
example, the county government functional areas of „water and sanitation services‟,159 
intersect directly with the right to „clean and safe water in adequate quantities‟.160 However, 
depending on the nature of a particular functional area and the manner of its assignment, the 
duty to fulfill a particular right may be shared between the national and county 
government.
161
 The county government health functional area
162
 and the national government 
health policy and national referral health facilities
163
 directly intersect with the right to „the 
highest attainable standards of health‟, including the right to health care services and 
reproductive health care.
164
 Thus, the right imposes an obligation on both governments.
165
 
Since some of the socio-economic rights dovetail into each other, the determination of the 
intersection between these rights and functional areas largely depends on the definition of the 
content of the rights. For example, the right to food may be defined as including the right to 
water.
166
 
7.2 Supportive intersection 
Supportive intersection refers to a situation where there is no direct intersection between a 
socio-economic right and a particular functional area of a level of government, yet the 
fulfillment of the right is dependent on that government playing a supportive role to the 
efforts of the other level of government. Since the fulfillment of the right is dependent on 
                                                 
158
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 9, 14(1).  
159
 Item 11(b), Part 2 Fourth Schedule.  
160
 Art 43(1) (d). 
161
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 9, 14(1).  
162
 Item 2(a), (b), (c), and (d), Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule. 
163
 Items 23 and 28, Part 1 Fourth schedule.  
164
 Art 43(1) (a). 
165
 See also the housing functions of both county and national government and their intersection with the right to 
accessible and adequate housing under Art 43(1)(b). 
166
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 9, 14(1)-14(2).  
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both the national and county governments, coordination and cooperation in terms of the 
principles of cooperative government are critical.
167
 In the South African Grootboom case, 
although there was no direct intersection between the right to housing and any of the 
municipal government functional areas, the Constitutional Court held that all spheres of 
government „must ensure that the housing programme is reasonably and appropriately 
implemented in the light of all the provisions of the Constitution‟.168 According to the Court, 
„each sphere of government must accept responsibility for implementation of particular parts 
of the [national housing] programme‟.169 The right to housing entails more than „bricks and 
mortar‟ and includes „appropriate services such as the provision of water and removal of 
sewage‟.170 
A good example in the Kenyan case is the right to education.
171
 Although there is no direct 
intersection between any of the county functional areas and the right to education at the 
university, secondary and primary school levels, national government which is assigned 
education at these levels cannot discharge its functions without the supportive role of county 
governments. Universities, secondary and primary schools require water and sanitation; 
refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal; electricity; street lighting; and county 
access roads, all of which fall within county government functional areas.
172
 
8 Secondary sources of powers and functions 
Secondary sources of powers and functions of counties are powers and functions either 
assigned or transferred by national government. Assignment and transfer of powers and 
functions could be effected to all the counties or individually to specific counties. 
                                                 
167
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 9, 14(2). 
168
 Grootboom case para 82. 
169
 Grootboom case para 40. 
170
 Grootboom case para 35. See also Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 9, 14(2).  
171
 Art 43(1) (f). 
172
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 9, 14(2), where they observe that „the scope of local government‟s 
supportive role can be wide, and may reach most, if not all, socio-economic rights. For example, in fulfilling the 
right to basic education, the proper functioning of primary and secondary schools is dependent on municipalities 
providing water, refuse removal and access roads to such schools.‟  
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8.1 Assigned powers and functions 
The Constitution by implication in Article 186(3) empowers the national government to 
assign any of its powers and functions to the county governments through legislation. Since 
national government cannot assign to county governments functions and powers which the 
Constitution itself has already assigned to counties, it can only assign its own constitutionally 
assigned functions and powers. Such assignment involves its exclusive including residual 
powers and functions but not concurrent powers and functions since the Constitution itself 
assigns such concurrent powers and functions upon counties. There are, however, some 
powers and functions which the national Parliament cannot assign to county governments 
since they are intended to be discharged by Parliament itself. For example, any legislative 
power drawn from a constitutional provision requiring an Act of Parliament cannot be 
assigned. 
Article 183(1)(b) also empowers national government to assign some of its executive powers 
and functions to implement its own legislation to county government. It identifies among the 
functions of the county executive committee the responsibility to „implement, within the 
county, national legislation to the extent that the legislation so requires‟. The phrase „to the 
extent that the legislation so requires‟, indicates that such additional powers and functions are 
assigned by the legislation. In addition, a county executive committee can „perform any other 
functions conferred on it by this Constitution or national legislation‟.173 While under Article 
186(3) national government can assign both legislative and executive powers and functions, 
under Article 183(1)(b) and (d) national government can only assign executive powers and 
functions limited to implementation of national legislation or parts of it. Unless the assigning 
legislation expressly says so, the assigned powers and functions are exclusive to county 
government until the legislation is repealed or amended to redesignate them.
174
 
In both cases, this kind of assignment is envisaged as being in the discretion of national 
government which does not require the agreement of the county governments to assign them 
the powers and functions. 
                                                 
173
 Art 183(1) (d).  
174
 See Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (10) 
BCLR 1289 (CC) para 49. See also S v Mhlungu and others 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC) para 32.  
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Though there is no explicit provision for accompanying financial resources to discharge such 
assigned functions, the assigned functions ought to be considered at the time of division and 
allocation of revenue to avoid burdening counties with unfunded mandates.
175
 This may lead 
to increased allocations to county governments. When considering the criteria under Article 
203, the Commission on Revenue Allocation must take these additional functions into 
account before making its recommendations. Likewise, Parliament must consider these 
functions before passing the DORA. 
8.2 Transferred executive powers and functions 
According to Article 187(1), one level of government may, by agreement with government at 
the other level, transfer any of its functions and powers to it. Although the provision appears 
to authorise the transfer of both legislative and executive powers and functions, the provision 
must be interpreted as limited to transfer of executive powers and functions, because national 
government need not negotiate on the transfer of legislative powers since it can assign them 
at its own discretion. 
The transfer must be informed and guided by the subsidiarity principle. The transfer may be 
done where „the function or power would be more effectively performed or exercised by the 
receiving government‟.176 What is not clear is whether this aspect of the provision serves to 
put pressure on the governments to agree to transfer functions and powers where subsidiarity 
is proved. In addition, the transfer of such a function or power must not have been „prohibited 
by the legislation under which it is to be performed or exercised‟.177 
Compared to assignment by legislation, such transferred powers and functions depend on the 
terms of the agreement. The agreement could reduce the functions and powers to mere 
agency. Where the agreement confers discretion, the transferring government remains with 
the constitutional responsibility to ensure that the function is properly discharged.
178
 This 
means that the transfer can be terminated any time and the transferring government resumes 
actual performance of the functions. 
                                                 
175
 See Art 175(b). 
176
 Art 187(1)(a). 
177
 Art 187(1)(b). 
178
 Art 187(2)(b). 
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To avoid the emergence of unfunded mandates, the Constitution explicitly provides that when 
such transfer is effected, arrangements must be made to ensure that the necessary resources 
for the performance of the functions or exercise of the powers are also transferred to the 
receiving government.
179
 Because this is by agreement, counties can ensure that the transfer 
is accompanied by sufficient funds. 
9 Conflict in the powers and functions 
As a consequence of concurrent legislative competences contemplated by Article 186(2), 
conflict of laws may arise. Following the example of South Africa,
180
 Article 191 of the 
Kenyan Constitution provides for resolution of conflicts between the national and county 
laws. Conflict refers to inconsistency between laws enacted by the national and county 
governments in respect of concurrent functional areas in which both governments are 
competent to legislate.
181
 Conflict may also occur when Parliament legislates for the Republic 
in terms of Article 186(4) in what otherwise appear to be county exclusive functional areas. 
Resolution of conflict of laws under Article 191 must follow a three phased analysis and 
interpretation process.
182
 First, the Court must establish that both the national and county 
laws are competent and valid.
183
 Second, it must be established whether or not a conflict 
between the two laws exists. Third, if the threshold of conflict is established the process 
proceeds to the application of Article 191 in resolving the conflict. 
9.1 Establishing competence 
In terms of Article 191(1) the provisions of the Article apply to conflicts in respect of 
legislation on matters falling within the concurrent, and not exclusive, functional areas. 
                                                 
179
 Art 187(2)(b). 
180
 Section 146 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
181
 See Currie & De Waal (2001) 221. 
182
 See Bronstein (2004) (ch 15, 2). The author proposed four phases to the analysis and interpretation of similar 
provisions under the South African Constitution, although two of them can be merged into one.  
183
 Bronstein (2011) 2; Currie & De Waal (2001) 220. 
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Legislation in an exclusive functional area of another government would be 
unconstitutional.
184
 
9.2 Establishing the existence of a conflict 
The determination of the existence of conflict begins with efforts to avoid conflict. Article 
191(5) provides:  
In considering an apparent conflict between legislation of different levels of 
government, a court shall prefer a reasonable interpretation of the legislation 
that avoids a conflict to an alternative interpretation that results in conflict. 
Thus, where it is possible to adopt a narrow construction of a statute which avoids conflict 
with another law, such construction must be preferred to a broader construction which would 
give rise to conflict. The implication of this is that a finding of conflict necessitating the 
application of Article 191 is a last resort when the conflicting provisions cannot be reconciled 
and harmonised through interpretation.
185
 
This preference must however be based on „a reasonable interpretation‟. Reasonableness 
should be guided by a purposive approach which seeks to give maximum effect to the objects 
and purposes of devolution. Avoiding conflict should not be seen as an end in itself, but a 
means to an end, seen in the context of the overall purposes and objects of devolution and 
how the two laws contribute to these purposes and objects. If avoiding conflict is what 
advances the purposes and objects of devolution in the given situation, then such preference 
becomes useful. If however, a declaration of conflict is what advances these objects then a 
conflict would rather be declared so that the dispute is resolved with a view to protecting and 
advancing the purposes and objects of devolution.
186
 
                                                 
184
 In the South African case of Certification of the Kwazulu-Natal Constitution (1996) 11 BCLR 1419 (CC), the 
Constitutional Court drew a distinction between legislation that are competent and valid but conflict with each 
other, and legislation that are unconstitutional for want of competence. 
185
 See Currie & De Waal (2001) 221. See also Re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the National Education Policy Bill, No 83 of 1995 1996 (4) BCLR 518 (CC) para 15.  
186
 See Bronstein V „Conflict‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2004a) ch 16, 
14, where she observes that „I have argued above that it is counter-productive to routinely harmonize legislative 
conflict by screening out cases before FC s 146 analysis can take place. The argument depends upon the 
assumption that the FC s 146 analysis will ultimately be worthwhile. On my view, FC s 146 should not become 
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In establishing the existence of a conflict, a distinction must be drawn between two types of 
conflict – direct and indirect conflict. 
9.2.1 Direct conflict 
Direct conflict refers to a situation where there are express provisions of the national and 
county laws which are inconsistent with each other. Comparative experience has suggested a 
test for direct conflict, which asks whether or not the two conflicting laws can be enforced at 
the same time. In the Australian case of Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn the High Court 
noted that „where the two laws can be obeyed at the same time there is no inconsistency‟ and 
therefore no conflict.
187
 The South African Constitutional Court rendered this test in the 
following terms: 
For purposes of this inquiry as to inconsistency we are of the view that a 
provision in a provincial bill of rights and a corresponding provision in 
Chapter 3 are inconsistent when they cannot stand together, or cannot both 
be obeyed at the same time. They are not inconsistent when it is possible to 
obey each without disobeying either.
188
 
It is submitted that this direct conflict approach should be used in the application of Article 
191. However, in some circumstances, it would need to be supplemented by the indirect 
conflict approach in order to give full effect to the objects of devolution and protect county 
space.
189
 
9.2.2 Indirect conflict 
Indirect conflict refers to situations in which a finding of conflict may be made in the absence 
of express conflicting provisions. A national or county law may be silent on a matter and 
leave a gap. The silence or gap must not be taken as an oversight that should be filled with 
details by the other level of government. It may be deliberate and meant to protect certain 
targeted interests from the rigorous compliance demands of the law. In such a situation, the 
silence or gap has textual content that can create conflict with another law that is express on 
                                                                                                                                                        
a rubber stamp for centralization of power. Rather, it should facilitate “democratic accountability at the most 
appropriate level.”‟ 
187
 Clyde Engineering 504. 
188
 Certification of the Kwazulu-Natal Constitution (1996) 11 BCLR 1419 (CC) para 24. 
189
 See Bronstein (2011a) 10. 
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that matter. Bronstein refers to such legislative silence or gaps as regulatory spaces and 
observes that „silence in national legislation is capable of having sufficient texture to conflict 
with provincial legislation. Gaps in provincial legislation can also conflict with Acts of 
Parliament‟.190 
By such a silence that exempts such interests or groups from the compliance demands, the 
legislation should be understood to have fully covered the field that required to be regulated. 
If the other level of government legislates to fill the gap with details that require the 
exempted groups to comply, a direct conflict test would find that there is no conflict since the 
two laws can be obeyed at the same time. Yet the targeted groups would have lost the 
protection the silence afforded them. If however an indirect conflict test is used, the 
regulatory spaces would be regarded as deliberate, and a finding of conflict, requiring Article 
191 resolution, would be made. Given that the effect of Article 191 is to reject the doctrine of 
the pre-eminence of national legislation over county legislation, the use of a combination of 
both direct and indirect tests, depending on the circumstances, will provide the necessary 
flexibility required to protect devolution. 
9.3 Article 191 resolution of the conflict of laws 
Upon the establishment of the existence of a conflict, the inquiry then engages the provisions 
of Article 191 to determine how to resolve the conflict. 
9.3.1 Purposive interpretation 
This provision should be interpreted strictly against the national government in order to 
protect the sphere of the county governments against encroachment by national government. 
The general principle is that devolution to counties is one of the mechanisms of achieving 
democratic and accountable exercise of power. Consequently, counties must not be hindered 
from exercising their assigned powers and functions. National government‟s power to 
override county legislation can only be sustained upon proof of the listed circumstances as 
jurisdictional facts. Article 191 must not then become a backdoor for recentralisation of 
power.
191
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 Bronstein (2011a) 10. 
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 See Bronstein (2011a) 14 and 16.  
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Article 191 gives preference to county legislation, and protects it against national legislation, 
unless specified circumstances exist which justify an override by national legislation.
192
 The 
Article imposes upon national government the burden of proving the identified circumstances 
whenever it seeks to intrude into or encroach upon the domain of county government. This 
approach is consistent with that which South Africa, from whose Constitution Kenya 
borrowed these provisions, has used in the interpretation of similar provisions.
193
 
9.3.2 Consequences of conflict 
Article 191(6) prescribes that a finding „by a court that a provision of a legislation of one 
level of government prevails over a provision of legislation of another level of government 
does not invalidate the other provision, but the other provision is inoperative to the extent of 
the inconsistency‟. This means that even when the court declares that national legislation 
prevails over county legislation, this does not render the county legislation null and void.
194
 
Neither of the two levels has the power to invalidate the laws of the other. As the South 
African Constitutional Court has stated: 
Neither Parliament nor a provincial legislature has the competence to 
invalidate laws of the other passed in accordance with the Constitution; nor 
does the Constitution lay down that a consequence of inconsistency will be 
the invalidity of one of the laws. It follows that a law that is subordinated by 
virtue of the application of section 126(3) is not nullified; it remains in force 
and has to be implemented to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the 
law that prevails. If the inconsistency falls away the law would then have to 
be implemented in all respects.
195
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 Art 191(4). See also Currie & De Waal (2001) 223 with reference to South Africa.  
193
 See Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 1 
BCLR 1 para 109, where the South African Constitutional Court observed that section 146 of the Final 
Constitution „gives preference to provincial legislation, and protects it against national legislation, unless 
circumstances exist in which a national override can be justified‟. 
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 See Bronstein (2004a) 15. 
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 Education Bill case para 19 with reference to the South African Interim Constitution. See Hogg PW, 
Constitutional Law of Canada (1992) 3
 
ed para 16.6, cited in the Education Bill case at para 17, where he states: 
„The most usual and most accurate way of describing the effect on the provincial law is to say that it is rendered 
inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency. Notice that the paramountcy doctrine applies only to the extent of 
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Moreover, where it is county legislation which has prevailed, the national legislation remains 
in force in all other counties that do not have prevailing county laws in place.
196
 The 
subordinated legislation also remains in force and must be implemented to the extent that it is 
not inconsistent with the law that has prevailed. Further, if the inconsistency in the legislation 
ceases either because it has been repealed or amended, the subordinated legislation is revived 
and becomes operative.
197
 
9.4 The override circumstances which must be proved 
Article 191(2)(a) provides for two broad circumstances under which national legislation may 
prevail over county legislation. The first is where it is proved that the „national legislation 
applies uniformly throughout Kenya‟ and satisfies any of the following three conditions: (a) 
the national legislation deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by an 
individual county legislation,
198
 (b) requires uniformity across the nation for it to be dealt 
with effectively, and the legislation provides for such uniformity through norms and 
standards, or national policies,
199
 (c) is necessary for the achievement of certain specified 
purposes discussed below.
200
 
The second broad circumstance is where it is proved that national legislation is aimed at 
preventing unreasonable action by a county which is prejudicial to the economic, health or 
                                                                                                                                                        
the inconsistency. The doctrine will not affect the operation of those parts of the provincial law which are not 
inconsistent with the federal law, unless of course the inconsistent parts are inseparably linked with the 
consistent parts. There is also a temporal limitation on the paramountcy doctrine. It will affect the operation of 
the provincial law only so long as the inconsistent federal law is in force. If the federal law is repealed, the 
provincial law will automatically "revive" (come back into operation) without any reenactment by the provincial 
Legislature.‟ See also Ex parte Speaker of the Kwazulu-Natal Provincial Legislature: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal, 1996 (1996 11 BCLR 1419 (CC). See also Butler v Attorney-
General (Vict.) (1961)106 CLR 268 at 286; and Western Australia v The Commonwealth (1994-1995) 183 CLR 
373, 464 464, in respect of the position of the Australian High Court. 
196
 See Currie & De Waal (2001) 222.  
197
 See Currie & De Waal (2001) 222.  
198
 Art 191(3)(a). 
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 Art 191(3)(b). 
200
 Art 191(3)(c). Also see section 9.4.1.3. 
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security interests of Kenya or any other country, or impedes the implementation of national 
economic policy.
201
 
The conditions for a national override are justiciable. Although the South African 
Constitutional Court indicated that there was need to handle the subjective intent of 
Parliament with caution and respect, it nevertheless emphasised the following: 
The courts would have jurisdiction to determine whether “the interests of the 
country as a whole require that a matter be dealt with uniformly” for the 
purposes referred to in NT 146(2)(b), or that it is necessary for the objectives 
set out in NT 146(2)(c), or that the matter concerned cannot, within the 
meaning of NT 146(2)(a), be regulated effectively by individual provincial 
legislation. Such an exercise involves both an objective and a subjective 
element. The test in each case is ultimately objective because it is not the 
subjective belief of the national authority which is the jurisdictional fact 
allowing the national legislation to prevail over the provincial legislation, but 
there is inherently some subjective element involved in the assessment of 
what the interests of the country require or what is necessary. Some 
deference to the judgment of the national authority in these areas is 
inevitable.
202
 
Each of these broad circumstances raises a number of interpretation questions which are 
separately discussed in the following sections. 
9.4.1 National legislation must apply uniformly 
According to Article 191(2)(a), national legislation prevails over county legislation if it 
„applies uniformly throughout Kenya, and any of the conditions specified in clause (3) is 
satisfied‟. The key issue in this provision is the phrase „applies uniformly‟: the national 
legislation must not be selective and targeted at specific individual counties but apply to all 
counties or the country as a whole. However, in terms of Article 191(2)(b), selectively 
targeted legislation may prevail where it seeks to prevent unreasonable action by a county.
203
 
The main challenge, however, is when one seeks to enact a national legislation but which in 
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 Art 191(2)(b)(i) and (ii). 
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 First Certification judgment at footnote 277. 
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258 
 
Chapter 6: Functions and powers of the levels of government 
reality is meant for a specific sector that can be found in only one or a few counties. For 
instance, although legislative powers in respect of agriculture are a concurrent function, 
within agriculture there are various sectors, some of which may be confined to specific 
counties, making enactment of legislation that may appear to be aimed at uniform 
applicability across the country look deceptive. Klaaren suggests that  
a law purporting to apply nationally, but crafted to pertain only to a 
manufacturing process in the Western Cape, may well fail to satisfy the 
requirement of uniform applicability. Should the province choose to regulate 
such a matter, its legislation would prevail.
204
  
It is submitted that this approach would be instructive for purposes of protecting county space 
and promoting the value and benefits that lie in diversity. Once the uniform applicability is 
established then the other three conditions must be tested. 
9.4.1.1 The matter provided for cannot be regulated effectively 
by the counties 
In terms of Article 191(3)(a) national legislation that applies uniformly prevails if „the 
national legislation provides for a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by legislation 
enacted by the individual counties‟. The phrase „cannot be regulated effectively‟ must be 
understood in light of the principle of functional appropriateness. Given that by adopting 
devolution, Kenya has recognised the value of subsidiarity, of seeking „democratic 
accountability at the most appropriate level‟,205 the claim that a matter cannot be regulated 
effectively by individual county governments must be interpreted strictly against national 
government. The courts must accordingly be inclined to protect the county autonomy where 
„no collective choice is necessary‟.206 Thus, a matter that can appropriately and effectively be 
regulated by county government must not be subjected to national uniformity. In Mashavha v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and others,
207
 the South African Constitutional 
Court found that the provinces could not individually effectively regulate the administration 
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 Klaaren (1999) ch 5, 5. 
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 See Bronstein (2011a) 16. 
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 See Bronstein (2011a) 16. 
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of social assistance, hence it held that it needed uniform norms and standards. The Court 
stated the following in this respect: 
In my view social assistance to people in need is indeed the kind of matter 
referred to in section 126(3)(a), and in a wider sense envisaged by the 
meaning of the need for minimum standards across the nation in subsection 
(c). Social assistance is a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by 
provincial legislation and that requires to be regulated or co-ordinated by 
uniform norms and standards that apply generally throughout the Republic, 
for effective performance. Effective regulation and effective performance do 
not only include procedural and administrative efficiency and accuracy, but 
also fairness and equality for example as far as the distribution and 
application of resources and assistance are concerned. A system which 
disregards historical injustices and offends the constitutional values of 
equality and dignity could result in instability, which would be the antithesis 
of effective regulation and performance.
208
 
9.4.1.2 The legislation establishes uniform norms, standards and 
national policies 
A national override will also be justified if the legislation „provides for a matter that, to be 
dealt with effectively, requires uniformity across the nation, and the national legislation 
provides that uniformity by establishing norms and standards;
209
 or national policies‟.210 This 
provision has three elements which national government must prove. First, the matter 
requires to be dealt with „effectively‟, which requires the national government to prove that 
county governments cannot individually deal with or regulate the matter effectively. 
Secondly, such effectiveness requires uniformity across the country. The national government 
must prove that indeed the matter requires uniformity across the nation, which the legislation 
                                                 
208
 Mashavha para 57. S 126(3)(a) of the South African Interim Constitution provides thus: „An Act of 
Parliament which deals with a matter referred to in subsection (1) or (2) shall prevail over a provincial law 
inconsistent therewith, only to the extent – (a) it deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by 
provincial legislation.‟ 
209
 Art 191(3)(b)(i). 
210
 Art 191(3)(b)(ii). 
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is providing, and which cannot be provided for by the counties individually. Bronstein 
cautions that „the courts should not advance uniformity for uniformity‟s sake‟. Whereas 
the courts have a duty to defend national unity, they are not required to impose identical 
regulatory regimes throughout the country.211 Uniformity must be applied in a manner 
that also appreciates that by adopting a non-centralised system of government, the 
country also undertook to protect diversity, which may require different regulatory 
regimes in different counties. A non-centralised system seeks to balance unity with 
diversity. In Mashavha, the Constitutional Court observed that:  
It is inherent in our constitutional system, which is a balance between 
centralised government and federalism, that on matters in respect of which 
the provinces have legislative powers they can legislate separately and 
differently. That will necessarily mean that there is no uniformity.
212
  
Diverse approaches provide opportunities for experimentation and innovation by some 
counties which, if successful may set the pace for other counties. As Justice Luis Brandeis 
stated in New State Ice Co v Liebmann: „It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.‟213 
Thirdly, the national legislation provides for the necessary uniformity through either norms 
and standards, or national policies. This limits the national legislation to broad framework 
legislation which avoids details that may occupy the entire county policy and legislative 
arena. The use of the terms „norms‟, „standards‟, and „national policies‟ evidences a 
restriction to framework legislation. The essence of norms and standards is to establish a 
measure against which other actors can be assessed and evaluated. National government is 
thus empowered to establish a framework of norms and standards, and national policies with 
which counties must conform, when they legislate for their own details. The South African 
Constitutional Court in Second Certification case defined standards and norms in a manner 
that suggests this perspective: 
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Under the [Interim Constitution], an override for the purpose of uniformity is 
permitted where legislation contained norms or standards. Neither of these 
words is capable of precise definition. The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
defines „standard‟ as „an object or quality or measure serving as a basis or 
example or principle to which others conform or should conform or by 
which the accuracy or quality of others is judged‟. „Norm‟ is defined as „a 
standard or pattern or type‟. Given the ill-defined import of the words norms 
and standards, and the governing criterion of uniformity, it is likely that even 
under the [Interim Constitution], framework legislation and national policies 
which sought to establish uniformity by establishing standards, rules or 
patterns of conduct would have been held to fall within the scope of norms 
and standards.
214
 
This means that there is a level of detail beyond which national government cannot go when 
providing uniformity through norms, standards and national policies. It must not regulate the 
matter in full to pre-empt and exhaust the concurrent field to such an extent that it leaves no 
scope for the counties to legislate in that field.
215
 
9.4.1.3 The legislation must be necessary for certain specified 
purposes 
A national override will also be justified if „the national legislation is necessary for: the 
maintenance of national security; the maintenance of economic unity; the protection of the 
common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital and labour; the 
promotion of economic activities across county boundaries; the promotion of equal 
opportunity or equal access to government services; or the protection of the environment‟.216 
9.4.1.3.1 The legislation must be necessary 
The first key requirement that must be proved is that the legislation is „necessary‟. The use of 
the term „necessary‟ creates a link between the national legislation and the objective sought to 
be achieved. Thus the national government must clearly indicate and prove which objective 
the legislation seeks to meet. In this context, „necessary‟ means that the national legislation is 
                                                 
214
 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa para 159. 
215
 See Malherbe (2008) 19-28, 22 and 23. 
216
 Art 191(2) and (3)(c). 
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a step that must be taken in order to achieve the intended objective – it is something that one 
cannot do without. 
Both the necessity of the national legislation and the identified objective are jurisdictional 
facts that must be proved by the national government for its legislation to prevail over county 
legislation. The Constitutional Court in the Second Certification case held that these matters 
are objectively justiciable. 
The issue as to whether or not the particular national legislation dealt with a 
matter which was necessary for the maintenance of national security or 
economic unity or the protection of the common market or any of the other 
factors listed in [New Text] 146(2)(c) is now objectively justiciable in a 
Court without any presumption in favour of such national legislation. 
In light of this observation it is submitted that these required objectives are meant to constrain 
the national government and protect the legislative domain of county governments. As such 
they must be interpreted narrowly and strictly against the national government. Each of the 
identified objectives must thus be considered. 
9.4.1.3.2 For the maintenance of national security 
The Constitution defines „national security‟ in very broad terms as being „the protection 
against internal and external threats to Kenya‟s territorial integrity and sovereignty, its 
people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity, and other national 
interests‟.217 Because of these broad terms, it is argued that matters of national security are 
broad and nebulous, and straddle the functional areas of and indeed have been assigned to 
both national and county governments. While some are assigned to each government 
exclusively, others are concurrent. Because of this broad definition, national government 
must specifically identify the national security aspect it seeks to deal with and which it says is 
beyond the ability of effective county regulation. It will not be enough to simply allege 
„national security‟ without specific substantiation.218 In Randu Nzai Ruwa and others v 
Internal Security Minister and another,
219
 the High Court stated that: 
                                                 
217
 Art 238(1). 
218
 Republic v Muneer Harron Ismail and others [2010] eKLR (Muneer Harron). 
219
 [2012] eKLR (Randu Nzai Ruwa). 
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Where, however, there is a complaint raised as in this petition, that national 
security has been wrongly invoked to take away a fundamental right the 
court needs to be judicially satisfied that the action of the State is reasonable 
and justifiable. If this were not so, the State could make any decision or take 
any action in the name of national security with the comfort that it will never 
be required to account for that action. The State could be tempted to use the 
blank cheque to overdraw! ... The need for the State to demonstrate 
satisfaction of the limitation clause is therefore not only constitutional but in 
line with public policy.
220
 
It is submitted that this approach suffices in the application of Article 191, when the 
maintenance of national security is alleged as the justification for national legislation 
prevailing over county legislation. 
9.4.1.3.3 For the maintenance of economic unity 
The maintenance of economic unity is a ground that seeks to avoid county governments 
legislating in a manner that creates barriers to trade within the national economy. It aims at 
ensuring that while diversity among the counties is good and has its own value counties must 
not be allowed to exercise their concurrent legislative powers in a manner that fragments the 
economy. Counties must not be allowed to regulate activities in a manner that is too costly 
and burdensome for the entire national economy. The South African Constitutional Court 
defined economic unity from this perspective thus: 
In the context of trade, economic unity must in my view therefore mean the 
oneness, as opposed to the fragmentation, of the national economy with 
regard to the regulation of inter-provincial, as opposed to intra-provincial, 
trade. In that context it seems to follow that economic unity must 
contemplate at least the power to require a single regulatory system for the 
conduct of trades which are conducted at a national (as opposed to an intra-
provincial) level.
221
 
The implication of this is that in economic activities that are not confined to one county but 
instead spill over into other counties or take place across the country, county legislation may 
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 Randu Nzai Ruwa para 53. 
221
 See Liquor Bill case para 75. 
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not be appropriate and national government may plead that a national regulatory framework 
that prevails over county legislation is necessary. 
9.4.1.3.4 For the protection of the common market 
The Constitution provides that national legislation would prevail over county legislation if it 
is „necessary for the protection of the common market in respect of the mobility of goods, 
services, capital and labour‟.222 The commonness of the market in this provision refers to the 
whole country as a market available to all citizens. Citizens from one county should be 
allowed free access to the market for their goods, services, capital or labour in other counties. 
This is a provision that aims to ensure that county governments do not resort to unnecessary 
trade and economic protectionism. Such inter-county protectionism can have a disintegrating 
effect on the country as a whole because it can elicit retaliation by other counties.
223
 It can 
also undermine macro-economic stability of the country‟s economy as a whole. 
9.4.1.3.5 For the promotion of economic activities across county 
boundaries 
In terms of Article 191(3)(c)(iv), national legislation may prevail where it is necessary for the 
promotion of economic activities across county boundaries. Like economic unity and the 
common market requirements, this focuses on inter-county as opposed to intra-county 
activities. Some economic activities may have both national and international dimensions. 
Activities such as manufacturing, production and distribution across the country and county 
boundaries may be severely constrained if governed by a multiplicity of county laws.
224
 
Constraints of this kind may be addressed by national legislation that prevails over county 
legislation.
225
 
9.4.1.3.6 For the promotion of equal opportunity and access to 
government services 
National legislation may also be necessary if it aims at „the promotion of equal opportunity or 
equal access to government services‟.226 This focuses on the need to avoid county 
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 Art 191(3)(c)(iii). 
223
 See Bronstein (2011a) 22.  
224
 See Liquor Bill case para 72. 
225
 See Liquor Bill case paras 73 and 74. 
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 Art 191(3)(v). 
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governments legislating in a manner that discriminates against citizens from other counties. 
For example, a county may deny citizens from other counties medical services in its facilities. 
To address problems associated with such approach, national government may allege and 
prove that national legislation that prevails over county legislation is necessary. 
9.4.1.3.7 For the protection of the environment 
The national government can plead the protection of the environment as a reason that makes 
it necessary for national legislation to prevail over county legislation.
227
 Environmental 
matters by their nature are capable of having spill-over effects. Regulatory and legislative 
measures in one county can create environmental burdens or negative externalities in other 
counties.
228
 The governments and citizens in the other counties that are affected would be 
disadvantaged since they are not represented in the county assembly legislating and would 
not be in a position to exert democratic accountability from such a county assembly. 
9.4.2 The legislation aims at preventing unreasonable action by county 
The national legislation will prevail if it „is aimed at preventing unreasonable action by a 
county that – is prejudicial to the economic, health or security interests of Kenya or another 
county; or impedes the implementation of national economic policy‟.229 
First, „preventing‟ refers to measures to stop something that is already happening or avoid 
that which is about to happen. Second, unreasonable action has the connotation of 
arbitrariness and lacking any rational basis.
230
 Action comprises both acts of commission and 
omission with the result that failure to take action amounts to unreasonable action. What is 
unreasonable will not be determined on the basis of the subjective view of national 
government. Instead, it must be objectively proved as a jurisdictional fact.
231
 With reference 
to the South African Constitution, Klaaren sets the standard of unreasonableness quite high, 
calling it a „high threshold‟ which is aimed at preventing „renegade or out-of-place provincial 
legislation‟.232 He further argues that „provincial legislation which either directly 
                                                 
227
 Art 191(3)(c)(vi). 
228
 See Bronstein (2011a) 24. 
229
 Art 191(2)(b)(i) and (ii). 
230
 See Stone RTH „The inadequacy of privacy: Hunter v. Southam and the meaning of “unreasonable” in 
section 8 of the Charter‟ (1988-1989) 34 McGill Law Journal 685-704, 688.  
231
 See Stone (1988-1989) 688-9. 
232
 Klaaren (1999) ch 5, 16. 
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discriminates against out-of-province actors does so indirectly without justification‟ would be 
a type of legislation over which national legislation should prevail. Thirdly, „prejudicial 
action‟ refers to action that causes injury or damage.233 This, too, cannot be based on the 
subjective view of national government, but must objectively be proved as jurisdictional 
facts.
234
 Fourthly, „interests‟ in this provision are the identified public interest areas to which 
injury or damage could be caused by the action of county government. These are identified as 
economic, health or security interests of the country or another county. Fifthly, „impedes‟ 
means to hinder or obstruct the doing of something. „Implementation‟ refers to the process of 
administering and giving effect to decisions already made. „National economic policy‟ refers 
to general principles established to govern economic matters in the whole country. 
By its nature, this ground presupposes that national legislation targeted at a particular county 
can be enacted. That is why the provision does not include the requirement of uniform 
applicability. 
10 Conclusion 
Through a purposive interpretation of the constitutional provisions on the assignment of 
powers and functions, this chapter has established a number of things. First, the Constitution 
assigns to national and county governments both exclusive and concurrent functions. 
Contrary to the impression created by Article 186(4), county governments have some very 
clear exclusive functions. Secondly, although the functional lists do not specify and 
distinguish the exclusive powers and functions of the two levels of government, through the 
bottom-up approach the county exclusive functions can be isolated before the remainder is 
regarded as national government exclusive powers and functions. Thirdly, Article 186(4) 
plays a limited but very important role of assigning to Parliament legislative powers in 
respect of unclear aspects of what otherwise are county government exclusive functional 
areas. Fourthly, although the functional lists do not specify the concurrent powers and 
functions, there are significant areas of concurrency. When conflict of national and county 
laws arises in these areas of concurrency, Article 191 must be interpreted narrowly and 
strictly against the national government in order to resolve such conflicts in a manner that 
does not unduly interfere with the county legislative domain. 
                                                 
233
 See Hawkins, RJ „Substantially modifying the Visual Artist‟s Rights Act: A copyright proposal for 
interpreting the Act‟s prejudicial modification clause‟ (2008) 55 UCLA Law Review 1437-77 p 1449.  
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The South African jurisprudence has been very useful in this chapter in a number of respects. 
First, the bottom-up approach it developed has proved useful in demarcating the cut off 
points in the national and county exclusive functional areas. Secondly, the concept of the 
intersection of powers and functions with the Bill of Rights has drawn lessons from that 
developed by the South African jurisprudence and scholarship. Thirdly, the interpretation and 
application of Article 191, which is in similar terms to section 146 of the South African 
Constitution, has benefited immensely from the South African jurisprudence. Overall, a 
purposive interpretation reveals that what on first reading appear to be very limited county 
powers and functions are actually very substantial. Against this background, the next chapter 
examines the fiscal and financial powers and functions of the two levels of government. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Financing counties 
1 Introduction 
The success of a non-centralised system of government is dependent upon not only a clear 
assignment of functions and competences but also an adequate allocation of financial 
resources to enable the levels of government to effectively discharge their functions. There is 
no point assigning functions and powers to a level of government if it does not have the 
capacity and financial resources to perform the functions and exercise the powers.
1
 The 
general principle is that resources must follow and match responsibilities.
2
 Among the 
fundamental changes the new Constitution has introduced are those in the public finance area, 
in which the raising, sharing, expenditure, control, audit and overall management of public 
finances are informed by devolution and follow an approach completely different from what 
the country has previously known.
3
 
2 Principles of financial devolution 
The Constitution establishes a financial model that fundamentally changes the approach to 
the management of public resources, especially public finances and how they are allocated 
given the devolved system of government. The model is based on the economic theory of 
fiscal decentralisation which links the allocation of expenditure responsibilities to that of 
                                                 
1
 Ghai YP & Ghai JC Kenya’s Constitution: An Instrument for Change (2011) 122, where they state that „giving 
powers to a government is of little consequence unless it has not only capacity, but also the resources to exercise 
them‟. 
2
 The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Special Working Document for the National Constitutional 
Conference: Report on Devolution of Powers (2003) 100-1 states that: „Financial resources are important to 
each level of government as they enable or constrain governments in the exercise of their constitutionally 
assigned responsibilities particularly legislative and executive. Responsibilities should not be given without 
accompanying means necessary for the effective discharge of the responsibilities. This may suggest the need to 
match the means to the responsibilities.‟ See also Murray C & Simeon R „South Africa‟s financial constitution: 
towards better delivery?‟ (2000)15 SAPR/PL pp 477-504, 477; and Brand D Financial Constitutional Law: A 
Comparison between Germany and South Africa (2006) 104.  
3
 Kirira N „Public finance under Kenya‟s new Constitution‟ (2011) Society for International Development (SID) 
Constitution Working Paper No. 5, 1. 
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revenue sources, and recognises a number of principles.
4
 Both Articles 201 and 175 have 
provided principles of financial devolution and public financial management, which must 
guide revenue raising, sharing and expenditure. First is the principle of financial autonomy of 
levels of government which emphasises own revenue and financial effort to ensure better 
accountability by the governments.
5
 Secondly, this is balanced against the principle of 
solidarity which recognises vertical and horizontal imbalances in the fiscal capacity of the 
governments, necessitating financial equalisation measures.
6
 Equalisation is pursued through 
constitutional provision for transfers from revenue raised nationally, aimed at supplementing 
county own revenues to enable them to effectively deliver on their constitutional mandates. 
Thirdly, in making the transfers, the principle of funds following functions is provided for 
and aims at avoiding unfunded mandates.
7
 Fourthly, because of financial autonomy in respect 
of ability to determine their own budgets and budgetary priorities, there should be prudent 
and responsible use of funds, which demands value for money and use of money for the right 
purposes.
8
 Fifthly, the Constitution consequently establishes the principle of accountability to 
the residents of the counties who must see that the funds have been used prudently and 
responsibly.
9
 This must be secured through the constitutional principles and requirement of 
transparency.
10
 
In nature these principles are goals and mostly serve as interpretation tools for giving 
meaning to other substantive constitutional provisions on financial matters. The principles 
have informed the design of the concrete financial provisions, which themselves are hard 
enforceable rules of the Constitution. All the other provisions of the chapter on public finance 
must therefore be read together with these principles. Thus, when the courts review financial 
legislation for constitutionality, these principles must serve as yardsticks against which the 
legislation must be measured. 
                                                 
4
 Brand (2006) 76.  
5
 Arts 175(b) and 203(1)(e) & (i). 
6
 Art 201(b). 
7
 Art 175(b). 
8
 Art 201(d). 
9
 Art 201(a). 
10
 Art 201(a). 
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2.1 Financial autonomy and financial own effort 
The Constitution establishes county governments that are meant to have financial autonomy 
in two respects: access to sufficient revenue from both their own sources and transfers from 
revenue raised nationally, and ability to determine their own budgets and budgetary priorities. 
In terms of Article 175(b) county governments must have „reliable sources of revenue to 
enable them govern and deliver services effectively‟. Moreover, the Constitution establishes 
criteria to be used in the sharing of revenue raised nationally, which focuses on the need to 
develop and enhance the fiscal capacities of the counties as they are a factor that determines 
their equitable share entitlement. Article 203(1)(e) requires consideration of „the fiscal 
capacity and efficiency of county governments‟. To realise part of this principle, the 
Constitution assigns to county governments some original taxing and other revenue-raising 
powers which they should use to raise revenue locally. The counties must therefore first make 
their own local efforts to fully utilise these revenue-raising powers before turning to their 
equitable share of the revenue raised nationally. 
This principle aims at the full realisation of the fiscal potential and financial efficiency of the 
counties. It will also serve to „promote a stronger accountability relationship between the 
county governments and their citizens, whose tax money they would be collecting and 
spending‟.11 Accordingly, one criterion focuses on the need to optimise the economy of each 
county „to provide incentives for each county to optimize its capacity to raise revenue‟.12 
Pursuant to this goal the Constitution leaves it to Parliament to determine and authorise any 
other tax that may be imposed by both national and county governments.
13
 Similarly, it is for 
this purpose that the power of both the national and county governments to raise revenue 
through imposition of charges and fees is rendered in very open-ended terms, so as to allow 
them adequate flexibility for future identification of additional instruments of raising 
revenue.
14
 To translate this principle into hard enforceable rules of law, the Constitution 
specifically identifies one of the functions of the Commission on Revenue Allocation
15
 as 
                                                 
11
 World Bank Devolution without Disruption: Pathways to a Successful new Kenya (2012) 60.  
12
 Art 203(1)(i). 
13
 Art 209(2) and (3)(c).  
14
 Art 209(4). 
15
 See section 3 of this chapter. 
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being to, when appropriate, „define and enhance the revenue sources of the national and 
county governments‟.16 
2.2 Solidarity and financial equalisation 
As a corrective measure of unequal access to county own revenue and historical 
disadvantages, the Constitution includes among the principles of public finance the 
promotion of an equitable society in which the burden of taxation is shared fairly,
17
 the 
revenue raised nationally is shared equitably among national and county governments,
18
 and 
expenditure promotes the equitable development of the country.
19
 The provision goes beyond 
inter-social equity and demands for even inter-generational equity. Therefore, the principles 
of public finance require that „the burdens and benefits of the use of resources and public 
borrowing shall be shared equitably between present and future generations‟.20 
These provisions embody the principle of solidarity which is founded upon the need for 
social justice.
21
 Solidarity is a notion that recognises the unacceptability of disparities 
between various parts and the need for appropriate action to reduce the disparities in such a 
manner that the stronger players assist the weak.
22
 The objective of this principle is to secure 
uniformity of living conditions or at least comparable basic public services at comparable tax 
rates for all citizens wherever they may be within the country. Viewed against a historical 
background of regional disparities in the country, the main concern of the principle is 
redistribution and ensuring a balanced development of the country. The principle responds to 
the reality that it is very difficult to effectively match revenue-raising powers to expenditure 
responsibilities since it is not possible to achieve equal spatial distribution of the tax base and 
the other revenue raising sources. It seeks to avoid extreme competition that may destabilise 
                                                 
16
 Art 216(3)(b). 
17
 Art 201(b)(i). 
18
 Art 201(b)(ii). 
19
 Art 201(b)(iii). 
20
 Art 201(c). 
21
 Task Force on Devolved Government Final Report on Devolved Government in Kenya: Developmental 
Government for Effective and Sustainable Counties (2011) 248: „The adoption of this philosophy was informed 
by the fact that Kenya was coming from a history of extreme disparities in terms of infrastructure development 
and incomes due to inequalities in the financial resource endowments and allocation.‟ 
22
 Brand (2006) 22.  
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the necessary economic stability and equilibrium. The principle recognises that not all the 
regions of the country are endowed with an equal resource base.
23
 
Solidarity is balanced against the financial autonomy of the counties as it does not seek the 
equality of the counties in their fiscal capacities but, instead, equity that can enable them to 
provide comparable public services to their inhabitants. Solidarity is therefore not a threat to 
financial autonomy as it aims at reducing the gap between the counties but does not and 
cannot permanently erase the gap.
24
 
2.3 Finances must follow functions 
This principle aims at ensuring that funds follow and match functions to enable each level of 
government to effectively discharge its constitutional responsibilities.
25
 Therefore, in a 
country with a history of regional disparities the design of the revenue-raising powers must 
be balanced against the design of the spending power. If the revenue-raising powers cannot 
yield sufficient resources, the design must include a system of transfers to ensure the 
matching of the resources to the expenditure responsibilities.
26
 Article 175 provides for the 
                                                 
23
 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (2003) 96-100. See also Art 106(3) and (2), Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which incorporates this principle in the system of sharing of certain revenues 
among the Federal and Land governments by noting that „the financial requirements of the federation and the 
Lander shall be coordinated in such a way as to establish a fair balance, to avoid excessive burdens on tax-
payers, and ensure uniformity of living standards throughout the federal territory‟. Section 36(1) and (2) of the 
Constitution of Canada of 1967, on the other hand, justifies its financial equalisation on, among other things, the 
need to address regional disparities, promote equal opportunities for the well-being of all Canadians, further 
economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities, and provide essential public services of reasonable 
quality to all Canadians with a view to securing „reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably 
comparable levels of taxation‟. 
24
 Brand (2006)164 and 251.  
25
 Kriel RR & Monadjem M „Public Finances‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed 
(2011) 14, who note that in the South African system the maxim that „finances follows functions‟ has been 
legislated in to the Division of Revenue Act 7 of 2003 section 27(2). 
26
 Mutakha JK „Regional inequalities in Kenya in the context of decentralization and devolution: Dynamics and 
policy options‟ in Report of the National Conference on Equity and Growth: Towards a Policy Agenda for 
Kenya (2006) Regal Press Ltd pp 115-42, 139. 
http://www.sidint.net/docs/inequalities%20Conference%202006.pdf (accessed 1November 2013). 
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matching of funds to functions when it requires that „county governments shall have reliable 
sources of revenue to enable them to govern and deliver services effectively‟.27 
Since the Constitution provides for assignment and transfer of functions by national 
government to county governments, an important objective of this principle is the avoidance 
of unfunded mandates when counties become responsible for national functions.
28
 The 
concept of unfunded mandates has been defined as referring to situations where 
responsibilities are shifted from the national government to sub-national governments without 
providing the necessary funding to perform them.
29
 The avoidance of unfunded mandates is 
necessary because the additional assigned responsibilities strain the allocated resources which 
have been matched with the constitutionally assigned duties. 
2.4 Prudent and responsible use of public finances 
Article 201(1)(d) prescribes that „public money shall be used in a prudent and responsible 
way‟. The Constitution also prescribes that „financial management shall be responsible, and 
fiscal reporting shall be clear‟.30 „Prudent‟ here connotes a measure of carefulness, 
precaution, wisdom and good judgment in the expenditure and use of money. It calls for 
sensible, economical and frugal use of public funds.
31
 As used in this provision, the term 
embodies the concept of value for money and use of money for the right purposes. 
„Responsible‟, on the other hand, involves the quality of being accountable for one‟s actions 
and responsive to the needs of the people.
32
 As used in this provision, the two terms imply 
avoidance of wasteful use of funds and the choosing of priorities that are beneficial to the 
people. 
The provisions should be interpreted and understood within a historical context of rampant 
corruption, outright theft and wasteful use of public resources. The principles seek to redress 
                                                 
27
 Art 175(b). 
28
 Kriel & Monadjem (2011) 14. 
29
 See Dilger RJ & Beth RS „Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History, impact, and issues‟ Congressional 
Research Service Report www.crs.gov (accessed 18 September 2013) 10-11, where he notes that such 
assignments have been referred to in Canada as service responsibility „downloading‟ and in Australia as „cost 
shifting‟.  
30
 Art 201(e). 
31
 Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and Word Power Guide (2001) 1033-4.  
32
 Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and Word Power Guide (2001) 1102. 
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a past of leaders‟ self-interest and greed at the expense of the interests of the people. The 
High Court in Timothy Njoya and others v Attorney General and others commented on the 
history that motivated these principles in the context of members of Parliament defending 
their continued exemption from paying taxes as follows: 
The country is coming from a background of greed and financial 
misappropriation. Public money has in the past not always been applied in its 
intended purpose of the development of the country. It is for this reason that 
principles of public finance were included in the Constitution. In my view, 
the reason that the Committee of Experts included the provision that „the 
burden of taxation would be shared fairly‟ was to put a stop to the manner in 
which public finances were used before and to put in place more equitable 
and transparent financial management processes, in a manner that applies to 
all.
33
 
2.5 Accountability through transparency 
The principles of public finance call for accountability from all public entities dealing with 
public finances, including the two levels of government. Article 201(a) prescribes that all 
aspects of public finances should be guided by „openness and accountability‟, which must 
include the participation of the public in financial matters. Accountability is defined by 
Corder et al as follows: 
Basically accountability means „to give an account‟ of actions or policies, or 
„to account for‟ spending and so forth. Accountability can be said to require 
a person to explain and justify – against criteria of some kind – their 
decisions or actions. It also requires that the person goes on to make amends 
for any fault or error and takes steps to prevent its recurrence in the future. A 
condition of the exercises of power in a constitutional democracy is that the 
administration or executive is checked by being held accountable to an organ 
of government distinct from it.
34
 
                                                 
33
 [2013] eKLR 22.  
34
 Corder H, Janganth S & Soltau F Report on Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability (1999) 2. 
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Reference to „openness‟ should be understood as incorporating the concept of transparency. 
This principle should be understood within the context of concerted efforts by the 
constitution-framers to institute a system of good governance through stringent controls on 
those who exercise power so that the interests of the people are truly served. The provision 
should be read as building on one of the key values of governance in Article 10 which 
include „good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability‟.35 Transparency abhors 
financial operations that are shrouded in secrecy, and instead requires openness and 
involvement of the people. 
3 Sources of revenue of counties 
The Constitution identifies two sources of revenue for the county governments: own revenue 
from taxation, fees and charges for services and goods; and transfers from revenue raised 
nationally. Borrowing is a possible further source. 
3.1 Own revenue-raising powers 
Pursuant to the principle of financial autonomy, the Constitution empowers the two levels of 
government to raise revenue through the imposition of taxes and charges for services. The 
High Court in Cereal Growers Association and another v County government of Narok and 
others adopted Black’s Law Dictionary definition of a tax as „[a] monetary charge imposed 
by the government on persons, entities, transactions or property to yield revenue‟.36 The 
Court, however, failed to draw the necessary distinction between a tax and a charge, and 
instead wrongly regarded a charge as a tax.
37
 A tax is a levy imposed by the state on people, 
businesses, property, income, commodities, or transactions.
38
 It is distinguished from charges, 
because it is not linked to, nor does it necessarily bear any direct relationship to the benefits 
of government goods and particular services received. It is not assessed against the 
                                                 
35
 Art 10(2)(c). 
36
 [2014] eKLR (Cereal Growers) para 46. 
37
 Cereal Growers para 46 where the Court wrongly stated: „In my view therefore and reading the provisions of 
Article 209(3) and 209(4) of the Constitution, the County government may impose an entertainment tax as it is 
constitutionally provided for but then any other tax or charge that may be imposed by the county government 
must be provided for under an existing Act of Parliament. I say so because in my view a charge is a form of tax.‟ 
38
 See City of Johannesburg v Renzon and Sons (Pty) Ltd 2010 (1) SA 206 (W) (Renzon) 215.  
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consumption of goods or services, while charges for services have a bearing to services and 
commodities provided as well as the burdens created by a person or property.
39
 
County governments have been granted limited taxing powers; they can only raise revenue 
through the imposition of property rates, entertainment taxes, and any other taxes authorised 
by an Act of Parliament.
40
 They also have powers to raise revenue by imposition of charges 
for services limited to the functions they perform.
41
 Their borrowing powers are severely 
curtailed as they must secure national government guarantees.
42
 Compared to the national 
government revenue-raising powers, the county governments have very limited own revenue 
powers and must share in the revenue raised nationally. 
The national government is empowered to raise revenue through the imposition of income 
tax, value added tax, customs duties and other duties on import and export goods, excise tax, 
and any other tax or duty authorised by an Act of Parliament which must not include property 
rates and entertainment taxes.
43
 It can also impose charges for services in respect of the 
functions it performs. While the revenue raised by county governments is regarded as own 
revenue, that raised by the national government is, as discussed below,
44
 not own revenue of 
the national government. 
3.1.1 Property Rates 
Property rates are the main tax own source of revenue for county governments, particularly 
those that have major urban areas but not those that are mainly rural. A property rate is a tax 
on the value of immovable property, calculated by applying a rate (an amount in the Kenya 
shilling) against the value of the property.
45
 Thus, the property rates have two elements: the 
                                                 
39
 Renzon 215. 
40
 Art 209(3). 
41
 Art 209(4).  
42
 Art 212. 
43
 Art 209(1)(2). 
44
 Section 3.2.1 of this chapter. 
45
 See Steytler N & De Visser J „Local Government‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2
 
ed (2011) ch 22, 95. See also Gerber and others v MEC for Development Planning and Local 
Government, Gauteng, and Another 2003 (2) SA 344 (SCA) (Gerber) para 23, in which the South African 
Supreme Court of Appeal noted that rates are „the assessment levied by local authorities at so much per pound 
of assessed value of buildings or land owned‟. 
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property which must be valued and a rate in a money unit set. The rates due are thus 
determined by multiplying the value of the property with the money unit set as the rate.
46
 The 
definition distinguishes rates from any other levies that are based on a flat rate irrespective of 
the value of the property. The valuation of property is thus critical for imposition of property 
rates.
47
 
A clear distinction must thus be drawn between a property rate which is based on the value of 
the property and a service charge which in most cases is based on consumption.
48
 A clear 
definition of what constitutes property rates is necessitated by the fact that the Constitution 
identifies property rates and entertainment taxes as exclusive taxes of the county 
governments, which will avoid national government imposing property rates and 
entertainment taxes under the guise of other names. 
3.1.1.1 Original powers 
The power of the county governments to impose property rates is an original power as it 
derives directly from the Constitution and is not delegated by enabling national legislation.
49
 
It can therefore be exercised even in the absence of any enabling national legislation as 
Article 209(3)(a) is sufficient anchorage.
50
 Moreover, this is an exclusive power of county 
government since Article 209(2), when providing for an Act of Parliament to authorise 
                                                 
46
 Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2013) Issue 5 ch 13, 9-10, and Steytler & 
De Visser (2011) ch 22, 95.  
47
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 13, 12 where they point out that „flat rates‟ do not qualify as rates on 
property. 
48
 See, for comparison, the South African case of Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town 2004 (12) BCLR 
1328 (C) paras 53 and 68, in which the municipality had determined the cost of the sewage service on the basis 
of the assessed value of the property. The South African High Court held that this was a property rate regardless 
of the name the City called it. Budlender AJ observed that: „The nature of the payment which has to be made is 
determined by its actual nature, not the label which is put on it. 
49
 In City of Cape Town and another v Robertson and another 2005 (3) BCLR 199 (CC) the South African 
Constitutional Court held the power of local government to impose rates as being an original one. See also 
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and others 
1998 (12) BCLR 1458 para 39. See also Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 13, 7 who have observed that one 
„consequence of being an original power is that a municipality‟s power to levy rates is not dependent on 
enabling national legislation‟. 
50
 Art 209(3)(a). 
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national government to impose any other tax or duty, specifically provides that such other tax 
or duty may not be property rates and entertainment taxes. 
Viewed against the nature of local government under the repealed Constitution, this power 
serves to enhance the financial autonomy of the county governments and to affirm the 
intention of the framers of the Constitution to devolve real power. As discussed below, 
national government can, however, through legislation, regulate the manner in which the 
power is exercised. 
3.1.1.2 Legislative powers 
The Constitution explicitly prescribes that „no tax or licensing fee may be imposed, waived or 
varied except as provided by legislation‟.51 A county assembly must therefore pass legislation 
that forms a basis for imposition of property rates or entertainment tax. This makes the act of 
imposing a tax a legislative act.
52
 Being a legislative power, the exercise of the power to 
impose property rates is discretionary as the county assemblies are not under an obligation to 
exercise it. However, this discretion must be informed by the county government‟s need to 
make its own efforts to raise revenue. The „discretion not to levy rates may be constrained‟53 
by a county government‟s duty to efficiently utilise its own local revenue sources „to enable 
[it] to govern and deliver services effectively‟.54 As already noted, failure to efficiently utilise 
its own local fiscal capacity is a factor that may be considered adversely against a county in 
the process of sharing revenue raised nationally. 
3.1.1.3 Limitation of the powers 
Although the imposition of property rates is an original and legislative power, its exercise is 
nevertheless subject to some limitations. First, the county assemblies and Parliament are 
prohibited from enacting any law that excludes or authorises the exclusion of a state officer 
from payment of tax on grounds of the office he or she holds or the nature of the work that he 
or she does.
55
 Secondly, the power of the county assemblies, just like that of Parliament, to 
waive any tax or licensing fees is subjected to the maintenance of a public record of such 
                                                 
51
 Art 210(1). 
52
 See Fedsure para 45, where the Court held that the power to raise taxes or rates is a legislative power.  
53
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 13, 8. 
54
 Art 175(b). 
55
Art 210(3). 
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waiver and the reasons for the waiver.
56
 Moreover, such waiver and the reason for it must be 
reported to the Auditor-General.
57
 Thus any national or county legislation that is contrary to 
these limitations is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.
58
 
Thirdly, the Constitution prohibits county assemblies from exercising their taxation and other 
revenue-raising powers in a manner that „prejudices national economic policies, economic 
activities across county boundaries or the national mobility of goods, services, capital or 
labour‟.59 It is argued that these requirements, which are set out by Article 209(5), imply a 
regulatory power on the part of the national government to establish a legislative framework 
for the exercise of county taxing powers. When invoked and a conflict of laws arises, it must 
be resolved in terms of Article 191 to determine whether the national legislation will prevail 
over county legislation. Such power would, however, be limited to regulating the power of 
the county governments to impose property rates and cannot be used by national government 
to completely eliminate their taxing power.
60
 
Such national government regulatory power would also be subject to the principles of co-
operative government discussed in Chapter Nine, which would require consultation with the 
county governments. In addition, when a Bill seeking to establish such a regulatory 
framework is published, the Commission on Revenue Allocation must be consulted since the 
Bill deals with a „financial matter concerning county governments‟.61 This obligation to 
consult is an active one requiring the national government to solicit and consider the 
                                                 
56
 Art 210(2) (a). 
57
Art 210(2) (b). 
58
 In Timothy Njoya and others v Attorney General and others [2013] eKLR the High Court considered this 
matter in the context of a claim by members of Parliament that they should, in terms of the National Assembly 
Remuneration Act, continue to be exempted from payment of taxes. The Court concluded that this would be 
contrary to the intention and will of the Kenyan people when they made the Constitution and that any legislation 
exempting members of Parliament from payment of taxes would be unconstitutional. „It is my determination 
that the National Assembly Remuneration Act will continue to be in force with regard to the remuneration of the 
members of the National Assembly. This legislation was enacted before the promulgation of the current 
Constitution. The Act however, must, by virtue of section 7 of the Sixth Schedule, be brought into conformity 
with the Constitution. As a result, any legislation made by Parliament or agreement that is made in violation of 
the provisions of the Constitution is void.‟ (emphasis in original).  
59
 Art 209(5). 
60
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) Ch 22, 89. 
61
 Art 205(1).  
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recommendations of the CRA.
62
 If Parliament fails to consult the CRA, the resultant 
legislation would be inconsistent with the Constitution for failure to follow the prescribed 
procedure.
63
 
3.1.2 Entertainment taxes 
The only other tax source which the Constitution identifies in Article 209(3)(c) and 
empowers county governments to impose is „entertainment taxes‟. Like property rates, this is 
an original exclusive taxing power that derives directly from the Constitution and is not 
delegated by national legislation.
64
 It can therefore be exercised even in the absence of any 
enabling national legislation as the constitutional provisions are sufficient anchorage.
65
 
Indeed, since this is an exclusive county government taxing power, national government 
cannot legislate in respect of this tax, unless it is legislating a regulatory framework in terms 
of Article 209(5). It must limit itself to framework regulatory legislation touching on the 
matters listed under Article 209(5), and Article 191 must be invoked for resolution of any 
conflict of laws. According to Article 210(1) it is one of the taxes that cannot be imposed, 
waived or varied otherwise than by legislation. The imposition of entertainment tax is a 
legislative act which can only be exercised by the county assemblies and not the county 
executive.
66
 
3.1.2.1 Definition of entertainment tax 
„Entertainment taxes‟ embodies two important concepts: „tax‟ and „entertainment‟. As 
already noted, a tax is „a contribution to state revenue, compulsorily levied on people, 
businesses, property, income, commodities, or transactions‟.67 „Entertainment‟, on the other 
hand, is defined as any exhibition, performance, amusement, game, sport or race to which 
persons are ordinarily admitted on payment. It includes entertainment through cable 
                                                 
62
 Art 205(2), Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 22, 92.  
63
 Robertson v City of Cape Town and Another; Truman-Baker v City of Cape Town 2004 (9) BCLR 950 (C) 
paras 93 and 109. See also Chap 9, section 3.1.2.2. 
64
 Cereal Growers para 46. 
65
 Art 209(3)(a). 
66
 Art 210(1). 
67
 See Renzon and Sons 215. See also section 3.1 above.  
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television networks for which persons are required to make payment by way of contribution 
or subscription or installation and connection charges.
68
 
Entertainment tax is thus a tax or duty which sub-national governments levy specifically on 
any form of entertainment itself, such as on an entry ticket and, which is not part of some 
broader tax such as value-added tax. Such activities must be understood in the sense of 
amusement of some sort. Entertainment in this sense connotes something in the nature of 
organised entertainment.
69
 The entertainment activities upon which the tax or duty may be 
levied are varied and limitless as they represent the diversity of society. As such, different 
sub-national governments are able to identify different entertainment activities on which they 
can levy entertainment tax. They generally include any exhibitions, performances, 
amusements, game, sport or race to which persons are ordinarily admitted on payment.
70
 
The tax is paid by the patrons or spectators who are admitted on payment to an entertainment 
activity. It is, however, collected and remitted to the government by the proprietors or 
organisers of the entertainment activity.
71
 It is often included in the price of the entry ticket or 
admissions fees as a percentage.
72
 This suggests that a county government can impose a tax 
on an event organised by national government. 
Under the replaced constitutional dispensation entertainment taxes were provided for by the 
Entertainments Tax Act,
73
 which at first glance appears to have taken a narrow view of 
entertainment. Section 2, for example, defines entertainment as including an exhibition, 
performance or amusement to which persons are admitted for payment. Close scrutiny, 
however, discloses that the use of the term „includes‟ creates room for a broad meaning of the 
activities on which entertainment tax may be imposed. Its use indicates that the listed 
activities are not a closed exhaustive list.
74
 However, given that the Constitution assigns to 
                                                 
68
 Government of India Department of excise entertainment and luxury tax http://excise.delhigovt.nic.in/ex4.asp 
(accessed 28 February 2014) (Government of India).  
69
 Government of India State receipt audit manual: Entertainment tax and entertainment duty 
http://agpunjab.gov.in/pdf/met.pdf (accessed 27 February 2014) para 1.2. 
70
 Government of India State receipt audit manual para 3.1. 
71
 Government of India. 
72
 Government of India. 
73
 Entertainments Tax Act, Cap 479. 
74 Communications Commission of Kenya and others v Royal Media Services and others [2014] eKLR (Communications 
Commission of Kenya) para 359. 
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county governments entertainment taxes as an exclusive taxing power, this Act being a 
national legislation is invalid unless national government justifies it as a regulatory 
framework legislation meant to give effect to the limitations the Constitution imposes on 
county government taxing powers under Article 209(5). Such justification must also satisfy 
the requirements of Article 191. 
3.1.3 Charges and fees for services and goods 
Article 209(4) empowers County governments, just like national government, to „impose 
charges for services‟ as one of the ways of raising revenue. This is a source of revenue that is 
ordinarily directly linked to the discharge of the functions the county governments are 
assigned by the Constitution. It empowers them to levy and recover fees, charges or tariffs in 
respect of any function or service they perform or provide. While some functions entail the 
production and sale of tangible goods for which the governments may charge a price, other 
functions entail the provision of a service for which the providing government may charge 
fees – what in some jurisdictions is referred to as user charges or fees. Yet other functions 
entail regulation and licensing of activities for which the regulating and licensing government 
may charge licensing fees and impose fines or penalties for infractions of the regulations. As 
sources linked to functional areas, these are exclusive to the level of government that has 
been assigned a function upon which the charge is to be imposed. 
3.1.3.1 Definition of charges for services 
„Charges for services‟ as used in Article 209(4), first, entail payments a person makes for a 
government provided service which are sometimes referred to as user fees, levy or tariff. 
They are the equivalent of a price for goods in the private business sector. Secondly, services 
are the commodities which the government supplies and for which a fee or price is paid. 
Commodities are used in the broad sense to encompass tangible goods for which the 
government may charge a price; non-tangible services for which the government may charge 
fees; and regulation and licensing services for which licensing fees may be charged. There 
are cases in which there may be a combination of tangible goods and services for which the 
government charges fees. 
It is submitted that charges for services within the meaning of Article 209(4) must be 
understood in broad and not narrow terms and must include four broad categories: charges as 
price and fees for commodities supplied and utility services; charges as user fees for services 
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rendered; charges as fees for regulation, licensing and permits; and charges as rent and 
royalties from land and other natural resources. 
3.1.3.1.1 Charges as price for commodities and utility services 
Utility and commodity charges and user fees are viewed as public sector counterparts to 
prices in the private sector and are associated with services and utilities necessary for 
everyone in a community.
75
 However, their main distinguishing feature is that they are 
voluntary payments based on direct, measurable consumption of publicly provided goods and 
services. Payments by users vary depending on the quantity of goods and services 
consumed.
76
 
A number of functions assigned to county governments will involve the supply of tangible 
goods and provision of utility services for which charges as a price will be appropriate. The 
agriculture function may involve the production of quality seeds by county governments for 
supply to the farmers.
77
 County government pharmacies may make medicine available at a 
price, while the water and sanitation function involves the production and supply of water to 
the citizens at a price.
78
 In addition, the county government function relating to electricity and 
gas reticulation involves the distribution of consumer products for a price.
79
 
3.1.3.1.2 Charges as user fees for services 
These are user fees and charges associated with a broad range of public services that 
generally add to the quality of life in the community but which may not be required by all 
residents.
80
 The Constitution assigns to county governments certain functions that in nature 
are focused on delivery of this kind of services for which the governments may appropriately 
charge user fees. They can charge fees in respect of their plant and animal disease control 
functions,
81
 pharmacies, ambulance services, veterinary services, cemeteries, funeral parlours 
                                                 
75
 Bezruki D et al Best Practices Report: Local Government User Fees (2003-2004) Joint Legislative Audit 
Committee, 11.  
76
 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Local Revenue Diversification: User Charges (1987) 
Staff Report, 3.  
77
 Item 1 Part 2, Fourth Schedule. 
78
 Item 2(a) Part 2, Fourth Schedule. 
79
 Item 8(e) Part 2, Fourth Schedule. 
80
 Bezruki et al (2003-2004), 11. 
81
 Item 1(d), Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
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and crematoria, and refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal functions.
82
 They 
can levy fees for cinemas, video shows and hiring, library services, museums, parks, beaches 
and recreation facilities.
83
 Likewise, charges can be levied for motor vehicle parking, ferries 
and harbours services.
84
 Finally, land survey, mapping, boundaries and fencing services can 
attract levies.
85
 
3.1.3.1.3 Charges as licensing fees 
If a county government may regulate an area, it may levy license fees on individuals who 
may want to operate in the area. A number of functions assigned to county governments are 
regulatory in nature and suitable for imposition of charges in the form of licensing fees. 
Licensing fees may, for example, be levied for privately owned county abattoirs,
86
 health 
facilities,
87
 undertakings that sell food to the public,
88
 „liquor licensing‟,89 and betting, 
casinos and other forms of gambling.
90
 Licensing charges can also be levied for „trade 
development and regulation,
91
 and for approval of housing development plans.
92
 
As part of the mechanisms for the enforcement of the regulatory powers of a government, a 
government must have the power to impose and recover fines and penalties for failure to 
comply with the regulations. The county government‟s powers to impose charges for services 
must include the imposition and recovery of fines and penalties. In the area of „control of air 
pollution, noise pollution, other public nuisances and outdoor advertising‟, which are 
regulatory in nature, the counties may impose penalties for release of pollutants.
93
 In terms of 
Article 157(9) the Director of Public Prosecutions may authorise and specially instruct county 
                                                 
82
 Item 2(a), (b), (e), (f) and (g) Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
83
 Item 4(d), (e), (f), (g) and (i) Part 2 Fourth Schedule.  
84
 Item 5(c) and (e) Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
85
 Item 8 (a), (b), (c) and (d) Part 2 Fourth Schedule. 
86
 Item 1(c) Part 2 Fourth Schedule.  
87
 Item 2 (a) and (b) Part 2, Fourth Schedule.  
88
 Item 2(d) Part 2, Fourth Schedule.  
89
 Item 4(a), (d), (e) and (c) Part 2 Fourth Schedule.  
90
 Item 4(a), (d), (e) and (c) Part 2 Fourth Schedule.  
91
 Item 7 Part 2, Fourth Schedule.  
92
 Item 8 Part 2, Fourth Schedule.  
93
 Item 3 Part 2, Fourth Schedule.  
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governments to prosecute offenders under their laws and regulations, and impose and recover 
fines and penalties. 
3.1.3.1.4 Charges as rent and royalties from land and other 
natural resources 
Revenue can be derived from land and other natural resources. Article 62(1),(2) and (3) 
allocate public land to both national and county governments, making county governments 
one of the owners of public land. Article 65 implies recognition of leasehold tenure of land 
which could earn rent for the county governments. Furthermore, Article 66(2) recognises 
investment in property which could earn county governments some revenue, by providing 
that „Parliament shall enact legislation ensuring that investments in property benefit local 
communities and their economies‟. 
3.1.3.2 Original powers 
The power to impose charges for services is an original power as it is directly derived from 
Article 209(4) and is not dependent on enabling national legislation.
94
 In terms of Article 
210(1), charges are not taxes, thus their imposition can be done by the executive. The power 
need not be exercised through county legislation. However, the principle of legality requires 
all executive action to be anchored in enabling legislation. 
3.1.3.3 Limitations of the power 
The Constitution requires that this power be exercised in a manner that does not prejudice 
„national economic policies, economic activities across county boundaries or the national 
mobility of goods, services, capital or labour‟.95 As already noted, national government can 
realise this objective through a regulatory framework law to regulate the manner in which this 
power is exercised by the county governments. Such regulatory power is subject to the 
provisions of Article 191 and must stay within the permitted regulatory parameters and not 
take over the power of the county governments to impose charges. As an original power, one 
level of government cannot make decisions about the power of the other, except where there 
is concurrency. 
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3.1.4 Additional assigned taxation powers 
Article 209(3)(c) provides that county governments may impose „any other tax that [they are] 
authorized to impose by an Act of Parliament‟. This may not, however include any of the 
national government exclusive taxing powers. In terms of Article 209(1), „only the national 
government may impose‟ income tax, value-added tax, customs duties and other duties on 
import and export goods, and excise tax. Nonetheless, the „authorized‟” tax may be one of the 
other national government‟s existing taxing powers. Since assigned tax powers originate from 
national legislation, they can be repealed by similar legislation. 
Although on the face of it the authorisation falls under the discretion of the national 
government, does Article 175(b), which establishes the principle of reliable sources of 
revenue for county governments, impose a justiciable obligation on national government to 
do so? The discretion should be exercised in a cooperative manner which allows county 
governments to petition national government to assign them more taxing powers on the basis 
of Article 175(b). As a minimum, the High Court in Robert N Gakuru recognised that 
counties may petition the national government to do so. 
I must however stress that County Governments are under Article 175(b) of 
the Constitution entitled to have reliable sources of revenue to enable them to 
govern and deliver services effectively. However this entitlement must be 
exercised in accordance with the Constitution and the law and where the 
existing legislation is not adequate for the purposes of ensuring the efficient 
governance and delivery of services the County Government ought to 
petition the National Government to increase allocation to them or enact 
appropriate legislation to enable them carry out their constitutional mandate 
as required under Articles 190(1), 202 and 203 of the Constitution.
96
 
The next question is how national government should approach the petition. It is suggested 
that in view of the principle of cooperative government, the national government should at 
least show and provide reasons why the petition is rejected. 
                                                 
96
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3.2 Transfers from ‘revenue raised nationally’ 
The Constitution provides for three forms of transfers: an entitlement to an equitable share of 
revenue raised nationally, additional allocations from the national government‟s share of the 
revenue raised nationally given either conditionally or unconditionally, and equalisation 
funding from the revenue raised nationally. 
3.2.1 The concept of equitable shares 
Article 202(1) of the Constitution provides that „revenue raised nationally shall be shared 
equitably among the national and county governments‟. This provision builds on the financial 
model which the Constitution has adopted and one of the principles of public finance set out 
in Article 201(b)(ii). The equitable share is a right of each government and not a discretionary 
donation by national government to the county governments, and is as such an entitlement, 
which is justiciable.
97
 
The county entitlement stems from the fact that because national government is assigned all 
the major taxing sources, this revenue does not accrue exclusively to it.
98
 The design of 
revenue-raising powers ensures that the tax bases which raise more money, cannot easily be 
given a geographic home, are not equitably distributed across the country, and are best suited 
for redistributive purposes, are assigned to the national government.
99
 The proceeds are, 
however, equitably shared among the two levels of government in an objective way.
100
 This 
is because such allocation of revenue-raising powers has the effect of creating both vertical 
and horizontal imbalances which call for equalisation through transfers. Thus the revenue 
raised by national government is not own revenue of national government. While the revenue 
raised by the county governments accrues to each county that raises it and is retained for 
                                                 
97
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 22, 104; Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 12, 5, who have interpreted 
section 214 of the South African Constitution, from which Kenya borrowed the concept of equitable shares, as 
creating an „entitlement and not national largesse‟. In Uthekela District Municipality and others v President of 
the Republic of South Africa and others (2002) (5) BCLR 479 (N) the South African High Court held that each 
of the three spheres of government has an entitlement to receive an equitable share of revenue raised nationally. 
In the DORA of 2000 district municipalities were not given allocations from the revenue raised nationally. A 
number of district municipalities challenged this omission and the court ruled in their favor. 
98
 World Bank (2012) 53.  
99
 Mutakha (2006)139. 
100
 Mutakha (2006)139. 
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expenditure by it, revenue raised by the national government does not exclusively accrue to 
it. It accrues jointly to national and county governments and must be shared.
101
 
3.2.2 The meaning of revenue raised nationally 
A major interpretation challenge is the determination of what is meant by „revenue-raised 
nationally‟.102 Meaning must be given to three distinct aspects of this phrase: „revenue‟, 
„raised‟ and „nationally‟. 
3.2.2.1 Revenue 
In government revenue is an in-flow of resources that the government demands, earns, or 
receives by donation, which is to be used to finance public expenditure.
103
 Such revenue 
comes from government exchange transactions such as charges for goods and services and 
privatisation of government assets; and non-exchange transactions such as taxes, duties, fines, 
penalties, and voluntary donations. As used in the provisions under discussion, revenue must 
be broadly understood as referring to all money received by or due to the national 
government from all its sources in the course of its operations. 
3.2.2.2 Raised 
In government accounting, revenues are recorded on the basis of the recognition principle, 
which regards anticipated revenue as revenue.
104
 Thus, „raised‟ should be understood in the 
context of government budgeting for a financial year which is normally based on expected 
income and projected expenditure. Thus, when governments budget, revenue „raised‟ for that 
financial year can only refer to expected income for that year and not cash already collected 
or received, since what may be already collected and received is revenue „raised‟ for the 
                                                 
101
 Mutakha (2006) 139. See also Kriel & Monadjem (2011) 8, who state in respect of South Africa that: 
„Revenue raised nationally‟ is synonymous with what is termed „equitable share‟ and is allocated between the 
three spheres of government. Prior to allocation, this revenue is not yet „national government revenue‟, even 
though it is received into the National Revenue Fund. Only when national government has received its portion 
of equitable share, through a constitutionally controlled allocation process, is this revenue called „national 
government revenue‟.  
102
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 252.  
103
 Government of the United States of America Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards Number 
7 www.fasab.gov/pdffiles/handbook_sffas_7.pdf para 2. 
104
 Government of the United States of America para 2. 
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previous financial year. This is because budgets,
105
 and the Division of Revenue Bill as well 
as the Allocation of Revenue Bill, are adopted before a current financial year comes to an 
end.
106
 „Raised‟ therefore refers to projected and anticipated revenue107 coming from national 
government revenue-raising powers under Article 209, and includes in-flows to the national 
government from all other sources, such as donations and borrowing. It does not mean actual 
cash already collected; rather, it refers to what is due or reasonably anticipated in the coming 
financial year. 
3.2.2.3 Nationally 
„Nationally‟ refers to revenue raised by national government as distinguished from revenue 
raised by county governments in the context of the two-level system of government. Revenue 
raised nationally therefore refers to all the revenue accruing from the efforts of national 
government either from revenue-raising powers conferred upon it in terms of the Constitution 
or any other legitimate source of revenue. It includes all money reasonably anticipated
108
 by 
the national government from taxes, charges for services, royalties, sales, fines, interest, 
dividends and rent on land as well as financial transactions in assets and liabilities.
109
 Article 
218(1)(a) explicitly refers to a „Division of Revenue Bill, which shall divide revenue raised 
by the national government‟ among the national and county governments. Thus, revenue 
raised nationally is not restricted to revenue raised in exercise of the constitutional revenue-
raising powers.
110
 It includes revenue received or anticipated from other sources such as 
grants from foreign governments and international organisations,
111
 forfeitures ordered by the 
courts and proceeds of crime traced and recovered by the government. Article 206 recognises 
a distinction between money received, and money raised when it establishes the Consolidated 
Fund as a fund „into which shall be paid all money raised or received by or on behalf of the 
                                                 
105
 See Arts 221(1) and 224. 
106
 See Art 218(1). 
107
 See Art 220(1)(a), which refers to „estimates of revenue and expenditure‟.  
108
 See Art 220(1)(a), which refers to „estimates of revenue and expenditure‟. 
109
 See Art 209(1),(2) and (4); and Kriel & Monadjem (2011) ch 27, 29. 
110
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 252.  
111
 International Monetary Fund, Chapter 5 „Revenue‟ 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/pdf/ch5.pdf (accessed 9 October 2013) 47. 
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national government‟.112 Revenue raised nationally is therefore much more than revenue 
raised by the national government within the meaning of Article 209. 
The Task Force on Devolved Government, relying on the Audit and Exchequer Act, which 
defines revenue as including „penalties, forfeitures, rents and dues and all other receipts of the 
government, from whatever source arising, over which Parliament has power of 
appropriation‟, arrived at the same conclusion.113 Revenue raised nationally is therefore all 
money raised or received by or on behalf of the national government and over which 
Parliament has the power of appropriation. 
3.2.2.4 Revenue excluded from the Consolidated Fund 
The Constitution expressly establishes the principle of single general-purpose accounts for 
both the national and each county government into which all revenue raised by or on behalf 
of each government is received and out of which revenue can only be appropriated by the 
legislative arm of such a government. Article 207 establishes a general-purpose Revenue 
Fund for each county, while Article 206(1) and (2) establishes a general-purpose 
Consolidated Fund for revenue raised at the national level of government. Article 206, 
however, makes exceptions to the general-purpose single account rule and allows for 
reasonable exclusion and dedication of certain funds to specific purposes. Revenue may 
reasonably be excluded from the Consolidated Fund by an Act of Parliament and be payable 
into another public fund established for a specific purpose.
114
 Likewise, excluded revenue 
may, under an Act of Parliament, be retained by the state organ that received it for the 
purpose of defraying its expenses.
115
 
Money raised by the national government can only be excluded from the Consolidated Fund 
if it is dedicated revenue. Dedicated revenue is money from any source that is earmarked for 
a specific purpose. Taxes, levies, charges and donor grants may be earmarked for or 
dedicated to a specific issue. Dedication of revenue generally has the effect of removing that 
revenue from the normal budgetary process and parliamentary accountability checks and 
                                                 
112
 Art 206(1). 
113 
Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 252. 
114
 Art 209(1)(a). 
115
 Art 206(1)(b). 
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balances the process entails.
116
 It is against the background of this kind of risk that the 
Constitution requires that revenue can only be excluded from the Consolidated Fund if such 
exclusion is reasonably done. This limits the power of Parliament to dedicate funds to 
specific purposes. The limitation is necessary to ensure that all projects fairly compete for 
prioritisation through the annual budget processes.
117
 
It is submitted that such dedication of revenue does not exclude it from the revenue raised 
nationally, which must be shared. The vertical division of revenue must be based on all 
revenue raised whether or not it is in the Consolidated Fund. First, Article 206(3) prohibits 
any withdrawals from dedicated national public funds without authorisation by an Act of 
Parliament. This means that dedicated funds must remain under control of Parliament and 
form part of the broader intergovernmental financial framework, including the Division of 
Revenue processes.
118
 Secondly, within the Kenyan devolved system, equitable shares are 
allocated to governments informed by the constitutional duties and responsibilities assigned 
to them. Thus money dedicated to a national government entity which performs national 
government constitutional functions must be taken into account in the Division of Revenue 
process in order to avoid national government receiving double payment for one and the same 
function. Dedication of funds to national government‟s constitutionally assigned functions 
can distort the process of the vertical division of revenue. As such, if any revenue is dedicated 
                                                 
116
 The South African Katz Commission on Tax Reform Report of the Katz Commission into Tax Reform (1994) 
http:www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/commission/katz3.html para 3.3.6 warned in 1994 that „[a]lthough many 
countries make considerable use of dedicated taxes of one kind or another, there is now widespread recognition 
internationally that a proliferation of dedicated financing mechanisms distorts public sector resource allocation 
unduly and tends to undermine fiscal management‟. 
117
 The Katz Commission on Tax Reform para 3.3.7 counseled against proliferation of dedicated funds noting 
that „under circumstances of considerable change in the Government‟s spending priorities, the integrity and 
transparency of the budgetary processes through which national and provincial expenditure appropriations are 
made should not be compromised by pre-assignment of tax revenue to specific programmes or functions‟ 
118
 The Katz Commission on Tax Reform paras 3.5.4 and 3.5.5 points out that „[a]lthough these constitutional 
provisions do not altogether preclude the earmarking of nationally collected taxes for the (conditional) financing 
of specific schedule 6 services within the budgetary process, it is clear that any such arrangements could only be 
considered as an integral part of the broader inter-governmental financial framework … . As the financial 
viability and health of provincial governments depend in part on the development of robust own revenue bases, 
it is important that their comparatively limited taxing capacity should not be unnecessarily exploited by national 
government.‟  
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to such functions, it must be taken into account in the vertical division of revenue as forming 
part of the national government equitable share. 
In light of this definition of revenue raised nationally, section 2 of the Commission on 
Revenue Allocation Act
119
 which defines revenue in a manner that excludes certain revenue 
from the „revenue raised nationally‟ is unconstitutional for a number of reasons. It provides: 
„revenue‟ means all taxes imposed by the national government under Article 
209 of the Constitution and any other revenue (including investment income) 
that may be authorised by an Act of Parliament, but excludes revenues 
referred to under Articles 209(4) and 206(1)(a)(b) of the Constitution.
120
 
There are three major problems which this section creates. First, whereas the Constitution 
repeatedly refers to „revenue raised nationally‟ as being the revenue to be shared among the 
national and county governments, this section refers to and defines a new concept of 
„revenue‟. Section 10 of the Act suggests that the new concept replaces the constitutional 
concept of „revenue raised nationally‟. It requires the CRA to submit „recommendations to 
the Senate, National Assembly, national executive, County Assembly and county executive 
on the proposal made for equitable distribution of “revenue” between the national and county 
governments and amongst the county governments‟.121 The CRA should submit 
recommendations about the sharing of „revenue raised nationally‟ and not „revenue‟ as 
defined here. Secondly, while Article 209(4) explicitly includes charges for services, among 
the revenue that is to be raised by the national government, the section of CRAA expressly 
excludes such revenue from the „revenue‟ it defines. Although charges for services may be 
dedicated to specific purposes, they cannot be excluded from „revenue raised nationally‟, 
which must be vertically shared. Such charges are imposed in respect of the constitutional 
duties and functions of national government, which ultimately are taken into consideration 
when determining the equitable share of the national government. Thirdly, Article 206(1)(a) 
and (b) of the Constitution, which provides for dedicated revenue and excludes it from the 
Consolidated Fund, does not exclude such dedicated funds from the revenue raised 
                                                 
119
 Commission on Revenue Act No 16 of 2011(CRAA). 
120
 S 2(1) CRAA. 
121
 S 10(1)(c) CRAA. 
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nationally. As already noted, dedication of revenue does not exclude it from the shareable 
revenue raised nationally. 
Similarly, the Public Finance Management Act also seeks to define yet another concept not 
provided for in the Constitution. Section 2 of the Act provides that: 
“national government revenue” means all taxes imposed by the national 
government under Articles 206(1) (a) and (b) and 209 of the Constitution, 
excluding county government revenue.
122
  
This section is unconstitutional for the same reasons set out in relation to the provisions of the 
Commission on Revenue Allocation Act. First, „national government revenue‟ is different 
from „revenue raised nationally‟ and only becomes known after the vertical division of the 
revenue raised nationally.
123
 Secondly, the provision tries to restrict revenue to be shared to 
only tax money leaving out other funds which the Constitution regards as part of revenue 
raised nationally. 
3.2.3 The process of the vertical division 
Implied in Articles 201, 202 and 203 is a revenue-sharing process that has two distinct 
aspects: the vertical division of revenue which ensures equity between the national and 
county governments, discussed in this section; and the horizontal allocation of revenue which 
ensures equity among the 47 counties, discussed in the next section. The vertical division 
must be done annually and be embedded in an Act of Parliament known as the Division of 
Revenue Act.
124
 Equity or equitable share is a broad normative value that may be difficult to 
measure, yet entitlement to it gives rise to competing claims by both national and county 
governments that must be determined. As such, the Constitution provides for criteria, which 
are discussed in subsequent sections that can be used to give shape and content to the notion 
of equitable shares. In using the criteria, a delicate balancing must be done not only between 
the claims of national and county governments but also among the criteria themselves since 
some carry more weight than others. This balancing process must consider fairness in the 
vertical division of revenue between the two levels of government, fairness in the horizontal 
                                                 
122
 S 2(1) Public Finance Management Act.  
123
 See Kriel & Monadjem (2011) 8, where they note that national government revenue only becomes known 
after the vertical division of revenue.  
124
 Art 218(1)(a).  
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allocation of revenue among the 47 counties, and good governance factors in both the vertical 
and horizontal sharing processes. 
3.2.3.1 The institutional framework for the vertical division 
The Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate and another v Attorney General and others
125
 
stated that „[t]he Division of Revenue Bill, 2013 was an instrument essential to the due 
operations of county governments, as contemplated under the Constitution, and so was a 
matter requiring the Senate‟s legislative contribution‟.126 As such, the enactment of the 
Division of Revenue Act requires the participation of both the National Assembly and the 
Senate. 
Article 95(4)(a) provides that the National Assembly determines the allocation of national 
revenue between the levels of government, as provided in Part 4 of Chapter Twelve. This 
seems to suggest that this is an exclusive function of the National Assembly. However, 
Article 96(2) provides that „the Senate participates in the law-making function of Parliament 
by considering, debating, and approving Bills concerning counties, as provided for in Articles 
109 to 113‟. Article 110 defines a Bill concerning counties in a manner which makes it clear 
that the Division of Revenue Bill is a Bill that must be considered and passed by both the 
National Assembly and the Senate. The Bill not only affects the functions of the county 
governments,
127
 but it is also a Bill referred to in Chapter Twelve affecting the finances of 
county governments.
128
 The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that: 
It is quite clear to us that the Division of Revenue Bill is a Bill bearing 
provisions that deal with the equitable sharing of revenue – which will 
certainly affect the functioning of county government. We have found no 
justification in the contention that the Division of Revenue Bill deals strictly 
with „national economic policy and planning‟ and so, on this account, it is a 
measure unrelated to county government. The Bill deals with equitable 
allocation of funds to the counties, and so any improper design in its scheme 
                                                 
125
 [2013] eKLR (Speaker of the Senate). 
126
 Speaker of the Senate para 148.  
127
 Art 110(1)(a). 
128
 Art 110(1)(c). In South Africa, the Division of Revenue Bill is regarded as a Bill affecting provinces and 
dealt with in accordance with section 76 instead of 75.  
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will certainly occasion inability on the part of the county-units to exercise 
their powers and to discharge their functions as contemplated under the 
Constitution.  
This is a critical test which will require that the Division of Revenue Bill be 
perceived as „a Bill concerning county government‟ and, therefore, a subject 
of the legislative competence of both the National Assembly and the 
Senate.
129
 
The process begins with the Commission on Revenue Allocation which must make 
recommendations concerning the basis for the equitable sharing of revenue between the 
national and county governments,
130
 to the Senate, the National Assembly, the national 
executive, county assemblies and the county executives.
131
 On the basis of these 
recommendations and the criteria set out in Article 203(1),
132
 a Division of Revenue Bill is 
prepared and must „be introduced in Parliament‟ at least two months before the end of each 
financial year.
133
 Once the Bill has been published, the CRA must be consulted and given an 
opportunity to consider its provisions and make recommendations to the National Assembly 
and the Senate,
134
 both of which must consider those recommendations before voting on the 
Bill.
135
 
Although the process culminates in an Act of Parliament, creating the impression of a 
political process, the Constitution envisages an objective and professional process and 
product in which the CRA is a key player. Even though the Parliamentary Select Committee 
had proposed in 2010 the removal of the CRA from the Constitution, the Committee of 
Experts (CoE) reinstated it as an expert independent body to provide professional and 
independent advice on the division of revenue to the Senate, national and county 
                                                 
129
 Speaker of the Senate paras 114 and 115 (emphasis in the original).  
130
 Art 216(1)(a). 
131
 Art 216(5). 
132
 Art 218(1)(b) & (c).  
133
 Art 218(1)(a). 
134
 Art 205(1). 
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 Art 205(2). 
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governments.
136
 The CRA is established as an independent constitutional commission,
137
 
eight of whose nine members serve for a non-renewable term of six years.
138
 Two of the 
members are nominated by the political parties represented in the National Assembly
139
 and 
five by parties represented in the Senate, in accordance with the proportion of their members 
in the two houses, respectively.
140
 However, once appointed, the commission is independent, 
subject only to the Constitution and the law, and not subject to direction or control of any 
person or authority.
141
 The commission is envisioned as a technical professional body whose 
members are appointed on the basis of „extensive professional experience in financial and 
economic matters‟.142 
The CRA provides technical and professional analysis of projected revenue sharing, and 
protects the criteria for revenue-sharing.
143
 It provides expert, independent, impartial and 
long-term advice on financial matters; links county governments to national government 
decision-making on their finances; and enhances transparency and accountability in revenue 
and other revenue access mechanisms.
144
 Although its recommendations are advisory in 
nature, they cannot be ignored without explanation. Article 218(2)(c) requires that the 
Division and Allocation of Revenue Bills be presented in Parliament together with a 
summary of any significant deviations from the CRA‟s recommendations explaining each 
such deviation. 
3.2.3.2 The factors for determining the vertical division 
In the determination of the vertical division of revenue both the CRA in making its 
recommendations and the two houses of Parliament in enacting the DORA must consider the 
criteria set out in Article 203. These criteria can be divided into two broad categories – those 
                                                 
136
 Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review Final Report of the Committee of Experts on Constitutional 
Review (2010) 128.  
137
 Art 215(2)(2). 
138
 Arts 215(1)(2) and 250(6)(a). The commission includes the Principal Secretary for finance as an ex officio 
member who does not have a fixed term.  
139
 Art 215(2)(b). 
140
 Art 215(2)(c). 
141
 Art 249(2). 
142
 Art 215(4).  
143
 Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (2010) 132.  
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 Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (2010) 132.  
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that relate to county government concerns and constitutional obligations, and those that relate 
to the national government concerns and constitutional obligations. 
3.2.3.2.1 Factors in respect of national government 
The first issue to be considered is provision for debt servicing „that must be made in respect 
of the public debt and other national obligations‟.145 Repayment of the public debt is a legal 
obligation enforceable in law and must carry more weight than some of the other factors. 
There are two perspectives of public debt in this provision. First, national government may 
borrow to boost the revenue raised nationally which is shared among the two levels of 
government. This debt must be serviced by national government and that is the reason it must 
be taken into account as part of the share of national government.
146
 Secondly, public debt 
may include county loans guaranteed by national government and on which county 
governments have defaulted requiring national government to bail them out. Such county 
debts should be taken into account, subject to arrangements for recovery from the concerned 
county‟s future equitable share. It is for this reason that Article 214(2) defines the public debt 
as including loans guaranteed by the national government, suggesting that debts of the county 
governments form part of the public debt. Other national obligations may encompass 
contributions to regional and international organisations such as the African Union and the 
East African Community, which arise out of treaty obligations. 
The second factor is „the needs of national government determined by objective criteria‟.147 
„Needs‟ must be considered as carrying less weight than „obligations‟ which are founded in 
law, but are stronger and carry more weight than „interests‟. Since „needs‟ are not based in 
law while „interests‟ may be politically driven, the Constitution qualifies the needs and 
interests by requiring that they should be „determined by objective criteria‟. This implies that 
the needs and interests can be objectively determined independently of what the national 
government thinks. Such objectivity could be informed by the constitutionally assigned 
functions and responsibilities of national government. Recognition must be given to the fact 
that, arising out of the intersection between socio-economic rights under Article 43 and some 
of the functions of the national government,
148
 some functions become enforceable 
                                                 
145
 Art 203(1)(b). 
146
 See for example the Division of Revenue Bill, 2011, of the Republic of South Africa 58.  
147
 Art 203(1) (c). 
148
 See section 7 of Chap 6.  
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obligations which must carry more weight. Furthermore, in considering the assigned 
functions, appreciation must be given to the fact that the two governments have been 
assigned both exclusive and concurrent functions. The allocation of resources to concurrent 
functional areas obviously poses some practical challenges which must be addressed. 
The third factor to be considered is „the national interest‟,149 which though nebulous must be 
interpreted to mean genuine interests and concerns which are captured by the governance 
goals set and which benefit the country as whole.
150
 This factor relates to both national and 
county governments and involves balancing of the claims of the national government against 
those of the county governments in order to get a proper balance and proportion to apply. 
From this perspective, „the national interests‟151 must be distinguished from „the needs of the 
national government‟.152 The national interests focus on the broader concerns that affect both 
levels of government and ensure the proper functioning and realisation of the overall 
objectives of devolution of power. 
The fourth factor addresses good governance concerns, and aims at risk management and 
cushioning the governments against any unforeseeable events and emergencies. In this 
respect provision for a contingency fund affording national government the necessary 
„flexibility in responding to emergencies and other temporary needs, based on similar 
objective criteria‟,153 must be made. While the other factors focus on the known obligations, 
needs and interests, this factor addresses unpredictable and unforeseen events. Emergency as 
defined by Article 58(1)(a) revolves around the temporary and unforeseen nature of the 
occurrence. It does not thus compensate for poor planning and unbudgeted expenditures that 
the governments should have foreseen and provided for. Provision to national government in 
this respect must be structured to include conditional grants that may allow for swift 
allocation and transfer of funds to counties affected by emergencies that could not be 
provided for through the budgets or supplementary budgets of the governments.
154
 However, 
a thin line must be drawn between funding for contingencies and emergencies, and funding 
                                                 
149
 Art 203(1)(a). 
150
 See for example the Division of Revenue Bill, 2011, of the Republic of South Africa 58. 
151
 Art 203(1)(a).  
152
 Art 203(1)(c). 
153
 Art 203(1)(k). 
154
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for disaster management which is a concurrent function of national and county 
governments.
155
 
3.2.3.2.2 Factors in respect of county governments 
The criteria translate into four broad factors relating to county governments. The first is the 
consideration of „the need to ensure that county governments are able to perform the 
functions allocated to them‟.156 This must be understood in light of the fact that Article 
175(b) requires that county governments be availed „reliable sources of revenue to enable 
them to govern and deliver services effectively‟. This factor has obligations that are 
enforceable in law and must carry more weight. The county functional areas must be 
considered bearing in mind their intersection with socio-economic rights such as health care, 
housing and sanitation, food, clean water and education.
157
 In Speaker of the Senate the 
Supreme Court recognised this interplay between the functions assigned by Article 186 and 
the Fourth Schedule, on the one hand, and the Bill of Rights obligations on the other. It 
therefore stated thus: 
It is relevant to consider the range of responsibilities shouldered by these 
nascent county governments. The Bill of Rights (Chapter 4 of the 
Constitution) is one of the most progressive and most modern in the world. It 
not only contains political and civil rights, but also expands the canvas of 
rights to include cultural, social, and economic rights. Significantly, some of 
these second-generation rights, such as food, health, environment, and 
education, fall under the mandate of the county governments, and will thus 
have to be realized at that level. This means that county governments will 
require substantial resources, to enable them to deliver on these rights, and 
fulfil their own constitutional responsibilities.
158
 
Consideration of this factor must take into account both the constitutionally assigned 
functions and the additional functions assigned by national legislation as recognised by the 
                                                 
155
 Items 24, Part 1 and 12, Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule.  
156
 Art 203(1)(d).  
157
 Art 43(1). See also section 7 of Chap 6. 
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 Speaker of the Senate para 193.  
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Constitution. Read together with Article 175(b), the factor includes the administrative costs 
necessary to govern effectively. 
Secondly, „the developmental and other needs of the counties‟159 must be considered. This 
element recognises the fact that county governments, unlike the former local authorities, are 
not restricted to service delivery but are also important engines for development meant to 
drive development at the local level. Article 174(f) identifies promotion of „social and 
economic development‟ and provision of „proximate [and] easily accessible services‟ as a 
major object of devolution. Given that development objects of devolved government may 
transform some of the county government functions and powers into binding obligations 
which can be enforceable in law,
160
 this factor must carry more weight. Effective service 
delivery may also depend on the development of the necessary infrastructure for such service 
delivery. Thus, the service delivery functions of the county governments must be understood 
within the context of the developmental and other needs including the backlogs of the 
individual counties, whose sum total provides the full picture of what county government as a 
level of government requires as an equitable share. The development needs of the counties 
must be reflected in the vertical division of revenue either by an increased equitable share of 
the county governments or the specific conditional grants coming through from the share of 
the national government.
161
 
Thirdly, „the fiscal capacity and efficiency of county governments‟ must be considered.162 
This ensures that counties make their own efforts to raise revenue as this is important in 
meeting the devolution objective of democratic, accountable and responsive government.
163
 
Residents who pay taxes to county governments would be incentivised to demand for 
accountability from them. This provision has two important terms that require interpretation: 
„capacity‟ and „efficiency‟. While capacity refers to the available sources of revenue such as 
the tax base, efficiency refers to the ability or willingness of the county government to utilise 
those sources such as the ability to administer or collect the revenue once determined. The 
fact that county governments are assigned very limited taxing powers and other revenue-
                                                 
159
 Art 203(1)(f). 
160
 See section 3.1 of Chap 4.  
161
 See for example the Division of Revenue Bill, 2011, of the Republic of South Africa 59. 
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raising sources must be taken into account. Capacity must be considered in the vertical 
division while efficiency suffices in the horizontal allocation. 
A fourth factor relates to good governance concerns and serves to complement the other 
factors that are based on quantifiable obligations, needs and interests of county governments. 
This relates to the stability, predictability and reliability of the revenues to enable county 
governments to plan long-term and embark on development projects that can be undertaken 
and implemented over a number of years without disruption because of lack of funds. Article 
203(1)(j) requires consideration of „the desirability of stable and predictable allocations of 
revenue‟. It is also for this reason that Article 175(b) establishes a principle of „reliable 
sources of revenue‟ for county governments. This seeks to avoid sudden and radical changes 
in the allocations which the other factors may dictate. Any changes in the allocations must be 
done gradually to allow county governments to prepare for the change in the allocation and 
cushion themselves against the possible impact on their functioning. Predictability 
encourages forward planning, and avoids short-term annual based budgeting. 
One major implication of this factor is that since the county government equitable share 
allocations are based on estimates of „revenue raised nationally‟, these allocations should be 
protected. Where the revenue raised nationally falls short of the estimates, the equitable share 
will not be adjusted downwards.
164
 The shares are assured since they are voted for, legislated 
and guaranteed and must be transferred accordingly. Article 219 guarantees the transfer of the 
equitable share to the counties without undue delay or deduction unless stopped under Article 
225. Furthermore, stability, predictability and reliability read together with the MTEF should 
be interpreted as mandating the publication, together with the annual Division of Revenue, 
forward estimates for a further two years to enable counties to plan ahead.
165
 
3.2.3.3 The amount of the county government equitable share 
Article 203(2) provides that „the equitable share of the revenue raised nationally that is 
allocated to county governments shall be not be less than fifteen per cent of all revenue 
collected by the national government‟.166 This minimum amount „shall be calculated on the 
basis of the most recent audited accounts of revenue received, as approved by the National 
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 See for example the Division of Revenue Bill, 2011, of the Republic of South Africa 59. 
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 See for example the Division of Revenue Bill, 2011, of the Republic of South Africa 59. 
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Assembly‟.167 It must be noted that these provisions do not play a role in the definition of 
„revenue raised nationally‟. They provide a minimum floor, which should act as a guide for 
resolving any dispute between national and county governments over the amount due to 
county governments. Otherwise, counties could get more depending on the assignment and 
costing of functions and the Article 203(1) criteria.
168
 Moreover, since division of revenue is 
based on projections and not actual money received, Article 203(3) clarifies that for purposes 
of resolution of such disputes, the fifteen per cent is calculated on the basis of the most recent 
audited accounts of revenue received and approved by the National Assembly. This suggests 
that the dispute revolves around the issue of the projections and the fear that such projections 
may not be realised. That explains why the framers of the Constitution saw it necessary to 
rely on hard evidence of what has actually be collected and received. The Supreme Court 
stated the following about these provisions: 
The real issue regarding the passing of the Division of Revenue Act, 2013 
was: What amount of revenue would be given to the counties? In providing 
[Article 203(2)] that the revenue allocated to counties „shall be not less than 
fifteen per cent of all revenue collected by the national government‟, the 
framers of the Constitution were making an important statement, namely: 
“we are aware that this is not enough, and as we work towards a more perfect 
devolution, the fifteen per cent will constitute the minimum bundle of 
financial goods for counties even though certainly, more is desirable”. The 
array of functions of county governments, as listed in the Fourth Schedule in 
the Constitution, would confirm this. 
The “politics of formulae” yielded the minimum allocation-provision of not 
less than fifteen per cent, a plain indication that more was anticipated. If 
there was no expectation for more, the framers would have prescribed not a 
floor, but an upper ceiling or, in the alternative, a specific and static 
percentage. However, the “justice of formulae”, which is the arena of the 
Supreme Court, moves the Court‟s interpretative indicator in the direction of 
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the Senate‟s application, which stands for more resources to the counties, in 
the future.
169
 
The general rule which emerges from the criteria in Articles 203 and 175(b) is that 
governments are allocated resources on the basis of the functions they have to perform. The 
minimum must not therefore be a reason not to consider what is equitable because the county 
governments‟ entitlement is to an equitable share and not the minimum.170 
3.2.3.4 The nature of the equitable share 
Equitable shares are usually unconditional in the sense that they come without any attached 
conditions about the use of the money, often referred to as block grants.
171
 The object is to 
enhance the financial autonomy of the county governments from the perspective of ability to 
determine their own budgets. Within the general constitutional requirement that equitable 
shares are to enable county governments „to govern and deliver services effectively‟172 and 
„to perform the functions allocated to them‟,173 county governments have discretion to 
determine their own priorities.
174
 Equitable shares of this kind are, therefore, very important 
as they enable county governments to achieve the objectives of devolution set out in Article 
174. For example, the money can enable communities to determine their own priorities 
regarding socio-economic development and service delivery as well as manage their own 
affairs. This is in contrast to additional allocations which may come with conditions precisely 
because this allocation falls to the discretion of the national government.
175
 
                                                 
169
 Speaker of the Senate paras 191 and 192.  
170
 Art 202(1). See also Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (2010) 127, where it is reported that 
this aspect was introduced by the Parliamentary Select Committee as a bare minimum and was not meant to be a 
definitive figure for what the counties are entitled to. 
171
 Brand (2006) 90-1 observes that „general or unconditional grants, on the other hand, are funds allocated to 
the recipient government to be used at its own discretion. These grants are sometimes referred to as block 
grants. Recipient governments prefer unconditional grants that can increase flexibility in their decision making.‟ 
172
 Art 175(b). 
173
 Art 203(1)(d). 
174
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 12, 9-10 discuss this issue in the context of South Africa and observe that 
„because a municipality receives its equitable share as an entitlement, its use falls to the discretion of the 
municipality. When compared to the conditional grants, the nature of the equitable share is apparent; it is an 
unconditional allocation, as the DORA cannot prescribe conditions for its spending.‟ 
175
 See section 3.2.6 for detailed argument.  
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3.2.4 The process of horizontal allocation 
The horizontal sharing of revenue involves splitting the share allocated to the county level of 
government equitably among the 47 counties. This involves two distinct processes: the 
development of the five year formula and the annual allocation of revenue. 
3.2.4.1 The institutional framework for horizontal allocation 
The five year formula is developed by the Senate in terms of Article 217,
176
 informed by both 
the Article 203(1) criteria and the recommendations by the CRA.
177
 The process must be 
consultative with the Senate being obligated to „consult the county governors, the Cabinet 
Secretary responsible for finance and any organisation of county governments‟ and to „invite 
the public, including professional bodies‟, to make submission on the matter.178 Once the 
Senate has made a resolution adopting a formula, the resolution is sent to the National 
Assembly which may amend or reject the resolution only by a two-thirds vote of its 
members.
179
 If the National Assembly rejects the resolution, the Senate may adopt a new 
resolution or request for the formation of a mediation committee to resolve the matter.
180
 
When the CRA makes recommendations for the annual allocation of revenue among the 47 
counties, it must be informed by the formula. The formula remains in force for the five year 
period which it covers. The recommendations of the CRA then form a basis for the 
preparation of the County Allocation of Revenue Bill (CARA) dividing the share allocated to 
the county level of government among the 47 counties.
181
 Although Article 218 of the 
Constitution does not provide for who prepares this Bill, the Public Finance Management Act 
provides for its preparation by the National Treasury.
182
 The National Treasury is under an 
obligation to accompany this Bill with a memorandum that explains the revenue allocation it 
proposes,
183
 evaluates the Bill in relation to the Article 203(1) criteria,
184
 and summarises any 
significant deviation from the recommendations of the CRA one by one.
185
 
                                                 
176
 Art 196(3) 
177
 Art 217(2)(a) and (b). 
178
 Art 217(2)(c) and (d). 
179
 Art 217(5)(b)(i) and (ii). 
180
 Art 217(6)(a) and (b). 
181
 Art 218(1)(b).  
182
 S 191(1) Public Finance Management Act, 2012. 
183
 Art 218(2)(a). 
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3.2.4.2 The factors for determining the formula for allocation 
In the determination of the horizontal allocation of revenue, the CRA in making its 
recommendations, the Senate in developing the five year formula and the two houses of 
Parliament in enacting the CARA must consider the criteria set out in Article 203. However, 
procedurally, the factors in the criteria determine the formula while the formula in turn 
determines both the vertical division and the horizontal allocation of revenue. This process 
focuses on fairness among the counties. First, the formula must consider „economic 
disparities within and among counties and the need to remedy them‟.186 This must be read 
together with „the need for affirmative action in respect of disadvantaged areas and 
groups‟.187 The factor must aim at rectifying inequalities. As such, it must consider variations 
in the poverty levels and in the inequalities in the counties to ensure that the formula is 
redistributive and focuses on economic development that can reduce poverty levels and 
inequalities. It also covers the overall unequal distribution of wealth in the 47 counties and 
the constitutional commitment to ensure a minimum level of public services to the whole 
population, regardless of their geographic location. It ought to take into account any 
variations in the functional responsibilities of the various counties and the services they are 
required to provide. Demographic variations in terms of their numbers, profiles and 
composition must be considered. A population that largely comprises old retired people may 
be more expensive in terms of healthcare than that comprising middle-aged people. Further, 
the geographic locations and sizes of the counties must be considered since the cost of service 
delivery in large and distant areas may be higher than in smaller-sized counties. Likewise, 
counties that are far removed from the capital may have higher costs of service delivery. 
Secondly, consideration must be made of the county own revenue efforts which are based on 
and informed by the „fiscal capacity and efficiency of the county governments‟.188 Here, both 
„capacity‟, which refers to the revenue-raising bases, and „efficiency‟, which refers to the 
ability to make use of the capacity available, must be taken into account. Thus, a county that 
has good fiscal capacity which it has failed to utilise efficiently may not be compensated for 
                                                                                                                                                        
184
 Art 218(2)(b). 
185
 Art 218(2)(c). 
186
 Art 203(1)(g). 
187
 Art 203(1)(h). 
188
 Art 203(1)(e). 
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its failure. On the contrary, a county which has fully utilised such a capacity must not be 
penalised as this may serve as a disincentive in the use of local efforts and fiscal capacity. 
County governments must be given incentives to raise more revenue locally. In this respect, 
allocations may also be informed by the „need for economic optimization of each county‟189 
that may „provide incentives for each county to optimize its capacity to raise revenue‟.190 
This factor may inform a deliberate policy of investment in previously neglected areas in 
order to enhance not only the county government own revenue-raising ability but also the 
revenue raised nationally. 
Thirdly, the formula must consider the variations in the operational requirements of the 
counties. The institutional costs in some counties may be higher for various reasons, 
including the fact that some have larger county assemblies than others. While some counties 
include many urban areas which must be provided for, others have fewer urban areas. 
3.2.4.3 The transfer of the equitable share 
Unless the transfer has been stopped in terms of Article 225, Article 219 provides that a 
„county‟s share of revenue raised by the national government shall be transferred to the 
county without undue delay and without deduction‟. This provision must be understood in the 
context of the equitable share being an entitlement of the county government. Once the 
DORA and the CARA have been enacted determining the equitable share of each county 
government, then the amounts become due and should be transferred from the Consolidated 
Fund as a direct charge.
191
 Since the equitable share of the county government is an 
entitlement, the Constitution has sought to protect it from interference by the national 
government. As discussed in Chapter Eight, stoppage of transfer of funds is permitted in very 
limited circumstances and with very stringent checks and balances imposed on the exercise of 
the power. 
However, since the division of revenue is based on projections, it should be lawful for the 
governments to develop a payment schedule dividing the amount due into reasonable periodic 
tranches. The phrase „without undue delay and without deduction‟ must therefore be 
understood in the context of such reasonable periodic tranches. 
                                                 
189
 Art 203(1)(i).  
190
 Art 203(1)(i). 
191
 Art 206(2)(a) and (c) and (4). 
 
 
 
 
307 
 
Chapter 7: Financing counties 
3.2.5 The justiciability of division and allocation of revenue 
The question whether or not the division and allocation of revenue are justiciable must 
consider two distinct issues – the process of arriving at those shares and the equitable shares 
themselves. Undoubtedly, the process of arriving at the shares and, in some respects, the 
equitable shares themselves are justiciable. 
3.2.5.1 Process 
Constitutional supremacy and legality require all processes prescribed by the Constitution to 
strictly comply with the constitutional prescriptions. In Speaker of the Senate the Supreme 
Court stated that the Constitution „vests in us the mandate when called upon, to consider and 
pronounce ourselves upon the legality and propriety of all constitutional processes and 
functions of State organs‟.192 It added that it has jurisdiction to resolve „any questions 
touching on the mode of discharge of the legislative mandate‟.193 Thus, all the institutions 
such as the Parliament, the Executive, the CRA and the Treasury, which have been mandated 
to play a role in the determination of both the vertical division and the horizontal allocation of 
revenue, must comply with the constitutional prescriptions.
194
 
The Constitution has a number of substantive and procedural provisions and prescriptions 
relating to sharing of revenue both vertically and horizontally, which can be subjects of 
judicial determinative interpretation and review. First, a decision relating to the sharing of 
revenue that is arrived at without allowing for participation of all the constitutionally 
mandated institutions such as the CRA, the National Assembly, and the Senate is justiciable 
and can be referred back for all the institutions to play their prescribed role. In Speaker of the 
Senate, the main issue was that the National Assembly had denied the Senate a role in the 
consideration, debate and approval of the Division of Revenue Bill. The Court held that the 
Senate had a role to play which the Speaker of the National Assembly should have allowed it 
to discharge.
195
 Although the Court did not in the specific circumstances of the case 
invalidate the DORA, it noted that this „would not compromise its options in the future‟ in 
any matter of a similar nature.
196
 Likewise if the DORA and the CARA were to be enacted 
                                                 
192
 Speaker of the Senate para 54. 
193
 Speaker of the Senate para 54. 
194
 Speaker of the Senate para 61. 
195
 Speaker of the Senate para 116.  
196
 Speaker of the Senate para 153.  
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without the CRA being given an opportunity to comment on the provisions of the Bills, such 
Acts of Parliament would be justiciable on that ground alone.
197
 
Even where all the mandated institutions participate, the Constitution makes provision for a 
variety of procedural requirements which must be complied with. The CRA when preparing 
its recommendations, and the Senate when preparing the five year formula, are required to 
consider the criteria set out in Article 203(1). The documents they present must indicate their 
own consideration and evaluation of the criteria, and how they have taken them into account. 
A failure in this respect is justiciable and reviewable by the courts. Although the court will 
not substitute its own view of the correct consideration of the criteria, it can review a failure 
to consider the criteria and refer the matter back to the relevant institution for consideration. 
Article 218(2) requires that when the two Bills for the vertical and horizontal sharing of 
revenue are introduced in Parliament, they must be accompanied by a memorandum which 
explains the proposed revenue allocation, evaluates the relation between the bills and the 
Article 203(1) criteria, and summarises any significant deviation from the recommendations 
of the CRA and why. These provisions indicate that the criteria were intended to be taken 
seriously and a failure to present such a memorandum or to address all the matters the 
Constitution requires it to address would be evidence that the views were not considered. 
Furthermore, a decision by any of the two houses of Parliament which fails to follow the 
constitutionally required vote majorities is justiciable. 
3.2.5.2 Substance 
Since Article 203(2) prescribes a minimum equitable share for the county governments, the 
vertical division of revenue can be challenged in court on this ground. If proved, the court 
must refer the matter back to the other institutions to make the necessary adjustments. 
3.2.6 Conditional grants 
Article 202 provides that „county governments may be given additional allocations from the 
national government‟s share of the revenue, either conditionally or unconditionally‟.198 Such 
                                                 
197
 Art 205(1). See also the South African case of Robertson and Another v City of Cape Town 2004 (9) 950 (C) 
(Robertson HC) para 109 in which the Court invalidated an amendment on the grounds that the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission was not given an opportunity to present its comments on the amendment bill before it was 
passed. 
198
 Art 202(2). 
 
 
 
 
309 
 
Chapter 7: Financing counties 
conditions limit the discretion and budgetary autonomy of county governments in respect of 
how they spend funds. Accordingly, the more money is allocated to counties in the form of 
conditional grants as opposed to equitable shares, the more their budgetary autonomy is 
curtailed. 
Conditional grants imply monitoring by national government, including a requirement for a 
reporting mechanism on the part of the receiving county government. It may also imply 
stoppage of funds outside the mechanisms of Article 225 as part of the mechanisms for 
enforcement of conditions. 
On the face of it, additional grants from the national government‟s share appear to be in the 
discretion of the national government. However, it is submitted that there is textual evidence 
that this discretion is structured in terms of process and content as the grants are subject to the 
constitutionally prescribed revenue-sharing process. First, grants form part of the process of 
equitable sharing of revenue. The provision for conditional and unconditional grants is part of 
Article 202, which is titled „equitable sharing of national revenue‟. In addition, Article 203(1) 
introduces the criteria by requiring that it be „taken into account in determining the equitable 
shares provided for under Article 202 and in all national legislation concerning county 
government enacted in terms of this Chapter‟. National legislation concerning county 
government under the finance chapter must be interpreted as including any Bills making 
provision for additional grants to the counties. The import of this is that the criteria set out in 
Article 203 apply to these grants. Secondly, the CRA has an obligation to also „make 
recommendations on other matters concerning the financing of‟ county governments; this 
includes financing by way of additional grants.
199
 Article 216(3) makes it clear that in 
formulating its recommendations, the commission must promote and give effect to the 
criteria set out in Article 203(1). 
3.2.7 The equalisation fund 
The Constitution establishes the Equalisation Fund, secured at the rate of one half per cent 
from the revenue collected by the national government.
200
 This is an affirmative action Fund 
to be used „to provide basic services including water, roads, health facilities and electricity to 
                                                 
199
 Art 216(2).  
200
 Art 204(1).  
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marginalized areas‟.201 Since money from this fund is meant for specific purposes, if 
allocated to county governments the allocations must be regarded as conditional grants. The 
affirmative nature of the Fund stems from the fact that it is to last for a fixed period of twenty 
years, though Parliament may extend the period.
202
 The use of the term „including‟ indicates 
that the list of services for which the fund is to be used is not a closed one; other services of a 
similar nature could be identified to benefit from the Fund.
203
 
A reading of this provision together with Article 204(3)(b) reveals that the Fund is not 
dedicated to counties but to marginalised areas and groups, though such areas and groups 
would be within counties. Although Article 204(3)(b) provides that the Fund is to be used by 
the national government, either directly or indirectly through conditional grants to counties in 
which there are marginalised groups, such use is subject to certain limitations. First, the 
identification of the marginalised areas must be done on the basis of policy and criteria 
determined by the CRA.
204
 Secondly, the use of the Fund must be based on appropriations 
approved by Parliament,
205
 after the CRA has been consulted to make recommendations and 
such recommendations have been considered by Parliament.
206
 Thirdly, since the amount of 
money that goes into the Equalisation Fund is based on percentages of the revenue raised 
nationally, its determination is subject to the process leading to the enactment of the DORA 
in which it must be included. Fourthly, the national government is not the owner of the 
money in the Equalisation Fund but a mere trustee. For this reason, Article 204(5) requires 
any unexpended money in the Fund to remain in the Fund and be rolled-over to be used 
during subsequent financial years. 
4 Borrowing by county governments 
The Constitution provides for borrowing by both national and county government. Two types 
of borrowing are envisaged by the Constitution – borrowing by county governments to boost 
their own share of revenue; and borrowing by the national government to boost the „revenue 
                                                 
201
 Art 204(2). 
202
 Art 204(6), (7) and (8). 
203 Communications Commission of Kenya and others v Royal Media Services and others [2014] eKLR (Communications 
Commission of Kenya) para 359. 
204
 Art 216(4). 
205
 Art 204(3)(a). 
206
 Art 204(4). 
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raised nationally‟ which must be shared among the two levels of government. First, the power 
of the county government to borrow is not original as it is subject to national legislation first 
prescribing terms and conditions under which the national government may guarantee 
loans.
207
 Secondly, counties can borrow but only if the national government guarantees the 
loan, and the county assembly has approved.
208
 A national government guarantee involves the 
national government undertaking to step in and repay the loan if the county government 
defaults on its payments.
209
 For purposes of transparency and fairness to ensure that the 
guarantees are given or denied on the basis of objective criteria, the national government is 
required to publish a report on the guarantees that it gave each year, within two months after 
the end of each financial year.
210
 
When both national and county governments borrow, each is duty-bound to repay its own 
debt from its own share of revenue. It is for these reasons that Article 220(1)(c), which 
provides for the form, content and timing of budgets, requires that budgets of the national and 
county governments must contain „proposals regarding borrowing and other forms of public 
liability that will increase public debt during the following year‟. When, however, national 
government borrows to boost the revenue raised nationally, which is shared among the two 
levels of government, the repayment of such debt must be taken into account in the vertical 
division of revenue process. It is this borrowing that is envisaged by Article 203(1)(b) when it 
requires consideration of „any provision that must be made in respect of the public debt and 
other national obligations‟. 
5 Expenditure of revenue 
As part of the financial autonomy of the county governments, the Constitution confers upon 
the county governments the power to determine their own budgets and expenditure priorities 
                                                 
207
 Art 213(1). 
208
 Art 212. 
209
 Vulovic V „Sub-national borrowing, is it really a danger?‟ (2011). Economic Dissertation. Paper 77 
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ_diss (accessed 10 October 2013) 43 where a sovereign guarantee is defined as 
an indication that the „national government accepts the responsibility of dealing with potential fiscal crises 
resulting from sub-national over-borrowing‟. See also Vulovic CV The Effect of Sub-national Borrowing 
Control on Fiscal Sustainability: How to Regulate? http://www.ieb.ub.edu/aplicio/fitxers/SMI10vuloic.pdf at p 
5.  
210
 Art 213(2).  
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without any undue interference from the national government.
211
 Budgets are financial 
statements which show how government‟s resources are to be generated and used in a given 
fiscal period, and are the key instruments for promoting a government‟s objectives, strategies 
and programmes.
212
 Once the DORA and CARA have been enacted by Parliament, each 
county government is empowered „to prepare and adopt its own annual budget and 
appropriation Bill‟.213 Moreover, each county government has a Revenue Fund into which 
„all money raised or received on behalf of the county government‟ is paid and out of which 
its expenditure is drawn.
214
 Withdrawals from the Revenue Fund can only be done on the 
basis of authorisation by appropriation legislation of a county.
215
 
5.1 Legislative power 
In terms of Article 224, each county government adopts its own annual budget and 
appropriation Bill. As the budget and appropriation Bills are the exercise of legislative 
authority, county executives can only expend public finances appropriated to them in terms of 
legislation adopted by their county assemblies. As noted, withdrawals from such a county 
government Revenue Fund can only be done on the basis of authorisation by an appropriation 
legislation of a county.
216
 
5.2 Limitation and legislative regulation of the expenditure power 
County governments‟ expenditure power must be exercised within a framework of certain 
limitations identified by the Constitution and national legislation. Whereas the Constitution 
identifies a framework relating to the primary contents of the budgets,
217
 it also requires 
national legislation to prescribe matters of process and procedures of the budget.
218
 However, 
the failure of Parliament to enact such legislation cannot stop the county government from 
                                                 
211
 Art 224. See also Fleiner T & Fleiner LRB „Federalism, federal states and decentralization‟ in Fleiner LRB & 
Fleiner T (eds) Federalism and Multiethnic States: The Case of Switzerland (2000) 1-40, 30-1.  
212
 Kriel & Monadjem (2011) 23-4. 
213
 Art 224. 
214
 Art 207(1) and (2). 
215
 Art 207(2)(b). 
216
 Art 207(2)(b). 
217
 Art 220(1). 
218
 Art 220(2). 
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exercising its power.
219
 But once enacted the legislation binds the county government to 
exercise its power within the set framework. 
5.2.1 The primary content of budgets 
In prescribing requirements relating to content of county budgets, Article 220(1) provides 
that they must disclose the estimates of revenue and expenditure and differentiate between 
recurrent and development expenditure,
220
 proposals for financing any anticipated deficit for 
the period,
221
 and any proposed borrowing and other form of liabilities which may increase 
the public debt.
222
 Revenue in this provision must be understood as referring to all money 
collected by the government in the course of its operations. This may include all money 
coming from taxes, charges for services, sales, transfers, fines, interest, dividends and rent on 
land as well as financial transactions in assets and liabilities.
223
 
Expenditure, on the other hand, refers to payments the government makes out of the revenue. 
The estimates for expenditure must draw a clear distinction between recurrent and 
development expenditure.
224
 Reference to proposals for financing any anticipated deficits 
should be understood as requiring an indication of sources of funds that will be used to cover 
the deficit. It may require an indication of any borrowing if that is how the government 
intends to finance the deficit. Any other forms of public liability that may increase the public 
debt may refer to acquisition of goods, services or works on credit. 
5.2.2 Process and procedures of budgets 
Matters of process and procedures are set out by Article 220(2) which provides for national 
legislation that must prescribe „the structure of the development plans and budgets of 
counties, when the plans and budgets of the counties shall be tabled in the county assemblies, 
and the form and manner of consultation between the national government and county 
governments in the process of preparing plans and budgets‟. Section 125(1) of the PFMA 
gives effect to this process. 
                                                 
219
 See Chap 11 section 3.2. 
220
 Art 220(1)(a). 
221
 Art 220(1)(b). 
222
 Art 220(1)(c). 
223
 Kriel & Monadjem (2011) ch 27, 29. 
224
 Art 220(1) (a). 
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6 Supervision 
The county governments‟ expenditure power is subjected to a variety of supervision and 
control mechanisms and confers supervision and control powers upon a variety of 
institutions: the offices of Controller of Budget, the Auditor-General, the national 
government, and the Senate. 
6.1 Controller of expenditure 
The Constitution establishes the office of Controller of Budget
225
 and vests it with the power 
to control expenditure by both the national and county governments. It is listed as one of the 
Chapter Fifteen independent offices.
226
 The core function of the Controller of Budget as spelt 
out by Article 228(4) is to „oversee the implementation of the budgets‟ of not only the county 
governments but also the national government. This aims at ensuring the expenditure by the 
governments is consistent with their own budgets. This is discharged by authorising the 
withdrawals of any public funds under Article 207, which it cannot do unless satisfied that 
the withdrawal is authorised by county law.
227
 This is a significant power, but does not 
interfere with the financial autonomy of the county governments. It only binds the county 
governments to their own priorities as budgeted. The Controller has no role in the budget-
making process of the counties as his or her role only arises after such budgets have been 
adopted. 
6.2 National government supervision and control 
As discussed in Chapter Eight, national government has limited power in terms of Article 225 
to stop transfer of funds to a county government in certain circumstances. Once again, the 
national government also has legislative and regulatory powers through which it can legislate 
for a financial management system which the county governments must comply with
228
 and a 
budgetary system which they must follow when preparing county budgets.
229
 
                                                 
225
 Art 228(1). 
226
 Art 248(3). 
227
 Art 228(5). 
228
 Art 190(2). 
229
 Art 220(2). 
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6.3 The oversight role of the Senate 
Article 96(3) provides that the Senate „exercises oversight over national revenue allocated to 
county government‟. The extent of the oversight powers which this provision confers upon 
the senate is discussed in Chapter Ten, which concludes that the Senate‟s oversight power is 
limited to revenue raised nationally allocated to county governments and does not extend to 
counties‟ own raised revenues. It is also limited to „soft‟ supervision as it has no direct 
mechanisms for enforcement. The Senate‟s powers must be harmonised with that of other 
institutions, such as the county assembly, which are assigned similar powers.
230
 
6.4 Auditor-General 
The Auditor-General, as with the Controller of Budget, is established by the Constitution as 
one of the independent offices expected to audit the accounts of both the national and county 
governments.
231
 In terms of Article 229, the Auditor-General is obligated to annually audit 
and report on the accounts of the national and county governments among others. As a 
Chapter Fifteen institution, it is independent and reports to the President and Parliament.
232
 
7 Conclusion 
A purposive interpretation of the financial provisions of the Constitution leads to the 
following conclusions: First, the national and county governments are assigned both revenue 
sources and expenditure responsibilities in a manner that ensures that each government is 
able to meet its constitutional obligations. Although the county governments have very 
limited own revenue-raising powers, including powers to impose taxes, charges for services 
and to borrow, they are entitled to equitable shares, and other additional grants, from 
„revenue raised nationally‟. Secondly, although the national government has been assigned 
revenue raising powers over the most important and lucrative tax bases, the revenue 
generated accrues jointly to national and county governments, which must share it. Thus, the 
transfers from this revenue to county governments are not discretionary donations by national 
government, but constitutional entitlements that must be determined in an objective manner 
and not on the basis of political patronage. Thirdly, revenue raised nationally has been 
purposively and generously defined to include all revenue raised and due to national 
                                                 
230
 See section 5.2.3 of Chap 10. 
231
 Arts 229 and 248. 
232
 Art 254(1). 
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government, to ensure the objectivity of the sharing process and the matching of funds to 
functions. National government cannot escape the objective processes by dedicating revenue 
to specific purposes, as such dedicated revenue must be taken into account in the division of 
revenue. Fourthly, these provisions give county governments a reasonable measure of 
financial autonomy. They have not only limited revenue-raising powers which they can 
independently exercise but also budgetary autonomy in terms of which they can determine 
their own policy priorities and appropriations. 
The chapter has drawn lessons from South African jurisprudence and scholarship, particularly 
on the concept of equitable shares as entitlements and the objective criteria for sharing the 
revenue raised nationally. This is because of textual similarity between the Kenyan and South 
African Constitutions on these matters. The chapter contributes to the understanding of the 
nature of the county governments as relatively autonomous although, as will be seen in 
Chapter Eight, the national government is granted some limited intervention and supervision 
powers. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Supervision of county government affairs 
1 Introduction 
The Constitution creates national and county governments that are „distinct and inter-
dependent‟.1 Although this has been interpreted in Chapter Nine to mean that the county 
governments have reasonable autonomy, just as in every non-centralised system, provision is 
made for a certain measure of supervision of the county government affairs by the national 
government. Even though the Constitution does not expressly use the term „supervise‟, this 
chapter interprets a number of constitutional provisions relating to the relationship between 
national and county governments as establishing and recognising some measure of 
supervision. Supervision, as was defined by the South African Constitutional Court in Re: 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, is the „power of one 
level of government to intrude into the functional terrain of another‟.2 Such intrusion entails 
four distinct broad elements: regulation, monitoring, support, and intervention. Supervision 
powers can be used either, to assist and support the county governments, for instance, in 
building their own capacity, or to restrain and correct them when they are acting contrary to 
the constitutional requirements or failing to discharge their functions and deliver services. 
Although supervision is hierarchical in nature and appears to detract from the federal 
principle of autonomy of the levels of government, it is justified as a necessary part of any 
non-centralised system. Supervision is necessary to ensure that there is no „failure of the 
constitutional machinery‟,3 and that the autonomy of the subnational governments is 
exercised within the national constitutional parameters. While examining the Indian federal 
system which some had labeled as not federal on account of its supervision and intervention 
provisions, Seervai argues that provision for national supervision or intervention powers does 
                                                 
1
 Article 6(2). 
2
 (1996) 10 BCLR 1252 (CC) (First Certification judgment) para 370. The Court explained that it is the process 
of review by a higher level government of the actions of sub-national governments to measure the fulfillment of 
the sub-national government‟s executive, statutory and constitutional obligations. It involves implementation of 
both supportive and corrective measures should the sub-national governments fall short on their obligations. See 
also Steytler N and De Visser J „Local Government‟ in Woolman, S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (2011) ch 22, 112.  
3
 Seervai, HM Constitutional Law of India 2 ed Vol 111 (1979) 1621. 
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not in itself detract from the federal principle.
4
 He correctly refers to Article 4 section 4 of the 
Constitution of the United States of America which requires the Federal government to 
guarantee to every State a republican form of government. He argues that „if a State were to 
adopt a non-republican form of government, the United States would be under an obligation 
to intervene, and to restore by force, if necessary, a republican form of government to the 
State‟.5 The State governments must operate within the provisions of the Federal 
Constitution,
6
 failing which the federal government can intervene to ensure compliance with 
the Constitution.
7
 Saunders identifies two circumstances under which, in most federations the 
federal or national government can intervene in the affairs of subnational governments. 
Intervention may occur, first, in cases of external aggression or internal insurrection; and 
second, in cases where subnational governments are required to administer national 
legislation, but fail or become unwilling or unable to carry out the task effectively.
8
 In 
situations of a devolved system emerging where the subnational governments did not 
previously exist as independent units, there is a real possibility of state failure in the sub-
units. Newly created subnational governments may easily fail to govern or deliver services. 
Supervision thus becomes necessary to prevent such an eventuality. De Visser views 
supervision as a „counterweight‟ meant to minimise the „disadvantages of autonomy and to 
prevent a possible “centrifugal” effect of decentralisation on government functioning‟.9 
However, supervision powers are often open to abuse and thus create some kind of dilemma. 
Saunders observes that, on the one hand, intervention is sometimes necessary in the interest 
of the security of the entire community, the integrity of the state, or the effective performance 
of government functions. On the other hand, intervention is inconsistent with the normal 
assumption in federal systems that constituent units have final responsibility for the conduct 
of their affairs.
10
 Because of the possibility of abuse of the supervision powers, and 
                                                 
4
 Seervai (1979) 1632.  
5
 Seervai (1979) 1618. 
6
 Seervai (1979) 1620. 
7
 Seervai (1979) 1621. 
8
 Saunders C „Legislative, executive, and judicial institutions: A synthesis‟ in Le Roy K & Saunders C (eds) 
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries (2006) 371. 
9
 De Visser J Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South Africa (2005) 169. 
10
 Saunders (2006) 371. 
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particularly given their actual abuse during the Indian emergency of the mid-1970s,
11
 more 
recent scholarship on the subject and constitution-making emphasise circumscribed and 
restrained use of the powers.
12
 Supervision is therefore perceived as an exception to the 
autonomy of the subnational governments. As such, Saunders points out that in most 
countries the powers are only permissible in extraordinary circumstances.
13
 In Argentina, for 
example, intervention is only permitted in extremely exceptional circumstances such as 
repelling foreign invasions and guaranteeing the republican system. It is also permitted upon 
request by the provincial authorities on grounds that it faced sedition or invasion from 
another province.
14
 
Consistent with this more modern approach, Kenya explicitly provides for very 
circumscribed and constrained national government intervention in county government 
affairs. This chapter examines the distinct modes of supervision and, more importantly, the 
three distinct forms of intervention provided for by the Constitution. While Article 190 
governs what is regarded as ordinary supervision and intervention, and Article 192 governs 
the extreme form of intervention by way of suspension of county governments, Article 225 
focuses on what should be considered as indirect intervention by way of stoppage of transfer 
of funds. 
2 Types and forms of supervision 
The Constitution expressly and implicitly provides for four major modes of supervision: 
regulation, monitoring, support, and intervention. 
2.1 Regulation 
National government can supervise the affairs of county governments through regulation or 
rule-making. Regulation refers to the situation in which the national government sets a 
                                                 
11
 Seervai (1979) 1621. 
12
 According to Seervai (1979) 1633, the Indian Constitution was through the 44
th
 Amendment, subsequently 
amended to circumscribe the emergency powers in order to reduce the possibility of abuse. Similarly, South 
Africa, which Kenya‟s devolution borrowed from, provides for very circumscribed and constrained supervision 
and intervention powers.  
13
 Saunders (2006) 371. 
14
 Hernandez AM „Republic of Argentina‟ in Le Roy K & Saunders C (eds) Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
Governance in Federal Countries (2006) 11. 
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framework within which county governments must operate and exercise their autonomy.
15
 
Such supervisory regulatory framework may be secured through Acts of Parliament or 
subsidiary legislation. An examination of the constitutional provisions reveals three distinct 
categories of legislative regulatory framework. First, Parliament can establish supervisory 
regulatory framework affecting the institutions of the county governments and their 
operations in a number of respects. In terms of Article 176(2), which empowers county 
governments to decentralise, they can establish local government structures below them.
16
 In 
respect of cities and urban areas, they must do so in terms of national legislation 
contemplated under Article 184.
17
 Such local government units would constitute part of the 
institutions of county government. Although the office of Speaker of a county assembly is an 
important institution of county government, Parliament is empowered to legislate for the 
election and removal from office of county assembly speakers.
18
 Similarly, Article 181(2) 
empowers Parliament to legislate the procedures for the removal of a county governor from 
office. Furthermore, the powers, privileges and immunities of county assemblies, their 
committees and members are subject to regulation by national legislation.
19
 Finally, the 
establishment of a county public service and administration as an important institution of 
county government must be in accordance with a regulatory framework of uniform norms 
and standards established by an Act of Parliament.
20
 
Secondly, Parliament can establish a supervisory regulatory framework affecting the 
functions of the county governments and how they are performed. As discussed in Chapter 
Six, in a number of functional areas such as housing, agriculture, veterinary services, health 
and energy, national government is only assigned the power to make policy and legislate,
21
 
while county governments are assigned the power, to a large extent, to administer and 
implement such policies and legislation. 
                                                 
15
 See De Visser (2005) 170. See also Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government of South African (2011) ch 
15, 5. 
16
 See Chap 5 section 2. 
17
 The required legislation must set the criteria for the classification of areas as urban areas and cities, and the 
mechanisms for identification of different categories of urban areas and cities. 
18
 Art 178(3). 
19
 Art 196(3). 
20
 Art 235(1). 
21
 See for example Items 20, 28, 29, and 30, Part 1 of the Fourth Schedule.  
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Thirdly, Parliament can establish a supervisory regulatory framework affecting the county 
finances and how they are managed. County governments are required to operate financial 
management systems that comply with national regulations prescribed by national 
legislation.
22
 Furthermore, whereas the county governments have financial autonomy 
including the power to make their own budgets, this must in various respects, be done within 
a regulatory framework of national legislation.
23
 In addition, although county governments 
have powers to procure goods and services, such powers must be exercised within a 
framework of national legislation.
24
 
It must however be noted that regulatory powers cannot be used to usurp the constitutional 
powers of county governments. They must be used to facilitate and provide support to county 
governments to ensure that they are able to perform their functions and exercise their powers 
effectively. The regulatory power can be used to strengthen the structures, powers and 
functions of the county governments and prevent a decline or degeneration of such structures, 
powers and functions.
25
 The powers should be exercised in a purposive manner to give effect 
to the promise of devolution and not to obstruct it. 
2.2 Monitoring 
Monitoring is the process of observing and keeping under review.
26
 It is the power to measure 
and test at intervals constituent unit governments‟ compliance with the government directives 
or regulations and constitutional requirements.
27
 As a supervision mechanism, monitoring is 
hierarchical in nature in the sense that it enables national government to intrude into the 
domain of the county governments in various ways.
28
 First, monitoring may be achieved 
through the imposition of a reporting obligation on the county governments, requiring them 
to regularly report to the national government.
29
 This is regarded as the least intrusive 
                                                 
22
 Art 190(2). See also Chap 7 section 5. 
23
 Art 220(2). 
24
 Art 227(2). 
25
 First Certification (1996) para 371. 
26
 See First Certification (1996) paras 372-3. 
27
 See City of Cape Town v Premier, Western Cape 2008 (6) SA 345 (C) para 50. See also First Certification 
(1996) paras 372-3. 
28
 Arts 190, 192 and 225 envisage monitoring to inform the need to intervene in any of the ways provided under 
these provisions.  
29
 De Visser (2005) 180-1. 
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mechanism as it is too general and applies generally to all county governments. For example, 
the Public Finance Management Act provides for monitoring by imposing a reporting 
obligation upon the county government.
30
 Secondly, monitoring empowers national 
government to request for information from specific county governments in specific cases.
31
 
Thirdly, national government may conduct inquiries and investigations and collect 
information about specific matters relating to county governments or any of them. Section 
121(1) of the County Governments Act, for instance, empowers the ministry or government 
department responsible for matters relating to intergovernmental relations to conduct 
investigations, inquiries, research, and collect information regarding the performance of the 
county governments. 
Monitoring is aimed at achieving two broad objectives: to inform the support and capacity 
needs and to inform of non-compliance and intervention needs and measures.
32
 This creates a 
nexus between monitoring and the other mechanisms of supervision. Monitoring is thus 
viewed as being facilitative of the other mechanisms of supervision, such as regulation, 
support and intervention.
33
 National government may not know what policies and standards 
to legislate for and the regulatory measures to take if it does not monitor the policy and 
standards needs on the ground.
34
 Furthermore, any support obligation or intervention measure 
is predicated upon information that can only be obtained through monitoring. The South 
African Constitutional Court commented thus: „The monitoring power is more properly 
described as the antecedent or underlying power from which the provincial power to support, 
promote and supervise [local government] emerges.‟35 
Monitoring is discretionary in nature and not mandatory. However, its essence of observe and 
keep under review „does not represent a substantial power in itself … but has reference to 
other, broader powers of supervision and control.‟36 It is however submitted that the 
                                                 
30
 Art 92(3) PFMA. See further Chap 7. 
31
 The appropriate steps envisaged by Art190(4) may include requesting for information.  
32
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 15, 5. 
33
 De Visser (2005) 178. 
34
 De Visser (2005) 178. 
35
 See First Certification (1996) paras 372-3.  
36
 See First Certification 1252 paras 372-3. 
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discretion must be exercised in a delicately balanced and cautious manner that does not 
compromise the constitutionally intended autonomy of the county governments.
37
 
Although the term „monitoring‟ is not used in the Constitution, a careful examination of 
various constitutional provisions establishes that the Constitution by implication 
contemplates and envisages monitoring as one of the mechanisms of supervision. The duty of 
the national government to support county governments is premised on knowledge of when 
to support and what kind of support is required. Likewise, any power of intervention is 
premised on information about the functioning of the county government. In all such 
circumstances, the monitoring power is implied. 
2.3 Support to county government 
The scheme of the Kenyan devolution through a number of constitutional provisions imposes 
an obligation upon the national government to assist and support the county governments to 
ensure that they are able to discharge their functions. Article 190(1) empowers Parliament to 
enact legislation to „ensure that county governments have adequate support to enable them to 
perform their functions‟. This provision is very broad, and covers financial, human resources 
capacity building, physical infrastructure, and legislative and regulatory support. However, 
the support envisaged must be related to the functions of the county governments since it is 
meant to enable them to perform their functions. The Fourth Schedule includes among the 
functions of the national government, that of „capacity building and technical assistance to 
the counties‟.38 Section 15 of the Sixth Schedule envisages and addresses matters of support 
and assistance to county governments during the transition period. 
Support has been defined in the context of the South African system as the process of 
strengthening the capacity of constituent unit governments to enable them to manage their 
own affairs, exercise powers and perform functions.
39
 Such powers could be used by the 
                                                 
37
 In City of Cape Town v Premier, Western Cape (para 51) Swain J explained that „the Constitution revealed a 
concern for the autonomy and integrity of local government and prescribes a hands-off relationship between 
local government and other levels of government on the one hand, but on the other hand, acknowledges the 
requirement that higher levels of government monitor local government functioning and intervene where such 
functioning is deficient or defective, in a manner that compromises this autonomy. This is a necessary hands-on 
component of the relationship.‟ 
38
 Item 32 Part 1 Fourth Schedule. 
39
 See First Certification para 371. 
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national government to strengthen existing constituent unit government‟s structures, powers 
and functions and to prevent a decline or degeneration of such structures, powers and 
functions.
40
 Section 121(1) of the County Governments Act empowers the national 
government through the ministry or government department responsible for 
intergovernmental relations to provide support to county governments to enable them 
perform their functions. 
Like the South African Constitution, the Kenyan Constitution draws a distinction between 
support that is supervisory in nature and that which is cooperative in nature.
41
 Supervisory 
support flows from national government to county government in a hierarchical manner, 
while cooperative support is intergovernmental and may flow from any one of the 
governments to the other. Supervisory support is coercive in nature since national 
government can intervene if the county government does not agree with the support being 
offered. While supervisory support imposes an obligation upon the national government to 
support the county governments, cooperative government support imposes obligations on 
both national and county governments to assist and support each other. The South African 
Constitutional Court pronounced itself on supervisory support thus: 
The legislative and executive powers to support [local government] are, 
again, not insubstantial. Such powers can be employed by provincial 
governments to strengthen existing [local government] structures, powers 
and functions and to prevent a decline or degeneration of such structures, 
powers and functions. This support power is to be read in conjunction with 
the more dynamic legislative and executive role granted to provincial 
government … In terms hereof, the provinces must assert legislative and 
executive power to promote the development of [local government] capacity 
to perform its functions and manage its affairs and may assert such powers, 
by regulating municipal executive authority, to see to the effective 
performance by municipalities of their functions in respect of listed [local 
government] matters. Taken together these competences are considerable 
                                                 
40
 See First Certification para 371. 
41
 Arts 190(1) and 189(1)(b). See further Chap 9 section 3.1.4 
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and facilitate a measure of provincial government control over the manner in 
which municipalities administer those matters in parts B of … schs 4 and 5.42 
2.4 Intervention 
Intervention is defined as the competence, and sometimes a duty, of the national government 
to direct the activities and outcome of the counties. It involves national government 
supplanting the decision-making power of the county government. The Constitution provides 
for three distinct types of intervention: general or ordinary intervention in terms of Article 
190, intervention by way of suspension of county governments in terms of Article 192, and 
intervention by way of stoppage of transfer of funds in terms of Article 225. Each one of 
these has its own specific constitutionally-identified factors which must be proved as 
jurisdictional facts to justify the intervention.
43
 Similarly, each has its own remedies and 
safeguards which vary depending on the jurisdictional facts. 
It is submitted that since intervention is an intrusion into the domain of the county 
governments, the provisions should be interpreted narrowly and restrictively against the 
national government, putting the burden of justification upon the intervening government. A 
jurisdictional fact is not a subjective personal opinion but an objective fact that exists 
independently, which must have existed before the intervention power could validly be 
exercised. Such existence of the jurisdictional fact is justiciable in a court of law.
44
 If the 
court finds that the factual situation did not exist, it may invalidate the intervention.
45
 
3 General or ordinary intervention under Article 190 
Article 190 provides for three distinct matters. First, it identifies the circumstances under 
which intervention can be justified. Secondly, once the circumstances have been established, 
it provides for the intervention measures which national government can take. Thirdly, it 
provides for limits on and safeguards against abuse of the intervention powers. 
Article 190(3)(a) identifies the circumstances under which intervention by national 
government in the affairs of county government can be justified. 
                                                 
42
 First Certification para 371.  
43
 See Mnquma Local Municipality and Another v Premier of the Eastern Cape and others (2009) ZAECBHC 
14 (Mnquma) para 49. 
44
 See South African Defence and Aid Fund and Another v Minister of Justice (1969) 1 SA 31 (A) 34A-35D. 
45
 See Mnquma para 50. 
 
 
 
 
326 
 
Chapter 8: Supervision of county government affairs 
Parliament shall, by legislation, provide for intervention by the national government if a 
county government –  
1) is unable to perform its functions; or 
2) does not operate a financial management system that complies with the 
requirements prescribed by national legislation. 
These provisions lay a basis for general intervention in two broad circumstances which must 
be proved as jurisdictional facts. 
3.1 Unable to perform functions 
There are two elements of this provision which must objectively be established as 
jurisdictional facts: „unable to perform‟ and „its functions‟. In the context of this provision, 
„unable to perform‟ must be interpreted as having two meanings. One, unable to perform 
refers to lack of capacity to perform which could be remedied by supportive intervention 
aimed at creating the necessary capacity for the county government to perform the function in 
question.
46
 Two, unable to perform refers to failure to perform due to unwillingness on the 
part of the county government. This means that the county government has the capacity to 
perform but it is unwilling to do so, which may call for corrective intervention. In the South 
African Constitution, both section 100, in respect of intervention by national government in 
provincial affairs, and section 139, in respect of intervention by provincial government in 
municipal affairs, use the phrase „cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation‟. The 
Court in Mnquma correctly held that this phrase should be interpreted as capturing situations 
of both inability to perform and failure to perform the functions. Although the Kenya 
provision is worded differently as „is unable to perform‟, it is submitted that it should be 
interpreted in the same manner. The Kenyan provision could not have been intended to cover 
cases of lack of capacity only but ignore cases of negligent or intentional dereliction of duty. 
In both cases unable to perform should be interpreted to include the inability or failure to 
effectively perform, which means that where a county government has attempted to perform 
but has been unsuccessful, intervention is justified.
47
 
                                                 
46
 „Unable‟ means not able or lacking the necessary power, competence, or ability to do or accomplish some 
specified act. 
47
 See Mnquma Local Municipality and Another v Premier of the Eastern Cape and others 2009 ZAECBHC 16 
para 52. 
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In both cases the jurisdictional fact revolves around and is constituted by an omission or 
inaction on the part of the county government. In City of Cape Town v Premier, Western 
Cape and others the Court drew a distinction between jurisdictional facts that are constituted 
by omissions or inactions and those constituted by positive misconduct.
48
 It concluded that in 
the case of section 139(1) of the South African Constitution, the jurisdictional fact was 
constituted by an omission or inaction and not a positive misconduct. It also observed that the 
section applied to an ongoing failure and not a past one which has already been addressed. 
Section 139(1) provides that intervention is justified where a municipality 
“cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of the Constitution 
or legislation” and is the only conceivable provision of this section which 
could apply in this case. This case is concerned with omission or inaction by 
the municipality and not positive misconduct. It is also framed in the present 
tense, being concerned with an ongoing failure and not a past failure. 
Intervention would not be appropriate where a past omission had already 
ceased.
49 
The phrase „its functions‟, on the other hand, encompasses three types of functions: the 
original constitutional functions of the county governments, the statutorily assigned 
functions, and the executive delegated or transferred functions. Unlike the South African 
situation under which the national government can only intervene for failure to fulfill an 
executive obligation, the Kenyan provisions suggest that intervention may be justified in 
executive, legislative and administrative functions of the county government. Since, however, 
it is the executive arm of the national government which intervenes it may be argued that the 
provision does not envisage intervention in the legislative matters. Yet, if the function the 
county government fails to perform is the passing of its own budget, an intervention that 
passes a budget for the county would be justified. The conclusion thus is that there may be a 
few cases where national government may justifiably intervene to legislate for the county, 
namely, where the county assembly is unable to legislate, for example, where it is unwilling 
or incapable of passing a budget. 
                                                 
48
 2008 (6) SA 345 (C) (City of Cape Town) para 79. 
49
 City of Cape Town para 79. 
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3.2 Failure to operate the prescribed financial management system 
The other broad circumstance in which the intervention power can be invoked concerns 
where it is established that a county government „does not operate a financial management 
system that complies with the requirements prescribed by national legislation‟.50 „Does not 
operate‟ could flow from two situations. First, this means an inability to operate the system, 
which may arise out of the lack of capacity necessary to operate the system, and may be 
addressed by supportive intervention to provide the needed capacity. Secondly, it means a 
deliberate unwillingness or refusal to operate the prescribed system. This may be addressed 
by corrective intervention aimed at enforcement of the statutory requirements. 
The jurisdictional fact which must be proved in this case is constituted by a county 
government‟s failure to operate its financial management system in compliance with 
requirements prescribed by legislation. In determining a failure in this case it must be noted 
that this particular ground deals with matters relating to finances only and is distinguished 
from other cases of inability to perform functions. It is similarly distinguished from the cases 
of serious financial breach and persistent material breaches which are covered by Article 225 
and which lead to stoppage of transfer of funds to the county government although overlaps 
are possible. Serious material breach and persistent material breaches may also suffice as 
grounds under Article 190(3)(b), but not all non-compliance matters under this Article suffice 
as material breaches under Article 225. 
3.3 The intervention measures 
Once any one of the identified jurisdictional facts has been established, Article 190(4) 
provides for the intervention measures that can be taken as follows: 
Legislation under clause (3) may, in particular, authorise the national 
government –  
a) to take appropriate steps to ensure that the county 
government‟s functions are performed and that it operates a 
financial management system that complies with the 
prescribed requirements ; and 
                                                 
50
 Art 190(3)(b). 
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b) if necessary, to assume responsibility for the relevant 
functions. 
Legislation is a precondition to any steps being taken. The provision identifies two broad sets 
of measures that may be undertaken, namely, appropriate steps, and assumption of 
responsibility for the functions. Under the first set, the national government takes measures 
that may include directing the county government on what to do to ensure that the county 
government functions are performed, or that the county‟s financial management system 
complies with prescribed requirements. Under the second set, however, the national 
government not only takes the decisions regarding what to do but also executes them by 
assuming responsibility and performing the functions on behalf of the county government. 
3.3.1 Appropriate steps 
„Appropriate‟ refers to something suitable or fitting for a particular purpose or occasion. The 
South African High Court in Mnquma noted that the word „appropriate‟ means „specially 
suitable‟ or „proper‟.51 Thus, the phrase „appropriate steps‟ refers to steps that are specially 
suitable and proper for the purpose of ensuring that the county government‟s functions are 
performed or that the financial management system is operated in a manner that complies 
with the prescribed requirements. In accordance with the legality principle, there must be a 
rational relationship between the appropriate steps chosen and the purpose pursued.
52
 
The use of the phrase „appropriate steps‟ suggests that there is an open list of steps that may 
be considered appropriate which the national government may choose from. The legislation 
envisaged by the Constitution must therefore provide for this list from which national 
government can be able to choose when taking appropriate steps. Section 121 of the County 
Government Act provides for some steps which may be taken by the ministry or government 
department responsible for intergovernmental relations that may be regarded as appropriate 
steps to pick from. While some of them are best viewed as monitoring and support, nothing 
stops national government from utilising them as appropriate steps. For example, the national 
government may assess the performance of the county government,
53
 and may conduct 
research and inquiries, to determine the support requirements and their extent.
54
 It may also 
                                                 
51
 See Mnquma para 74 (emphasis in original). 
52
 City of Cape Town paras 88-9. See also Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 15, 21.  
53
 S 121(2)(a) CGA. 
54
 S 121(2)(c) CGA. 
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assist the county government to identify the causes of their performance problems and the 
potential solutions.
55
 In respect of failure on the part of county government to operate a 
financial management system that complies with the prescribed requirements, section 121 
only provides for collaboration between the relevant county secretary and the cabinet 
secretary for finance on any support matters relating to finance.
56
 It is submitted that this is 
inadequate for purposes of identifying the appropriate steps to be taken where the county 
government does not operate a financial management system that complies with the 
prescribed requirements. Apart from the reporting obligations imposed upon the county 
government by section 92(3), the Public Finance Management Act does not make provision 
for any other appropriate steps that are specific to the intervention contemplated under Article 
190(3) of the Constitution. 
In choosing the appropriate steps, the national government must ensure that any intrusion on 
the functional integrity of the county government comes as a last resort. Moreover, measures 
that are least intrusive must be preferred to those that are more intrusive.
57
 
3.3.2 Assumption of responsibility 
Article 190(4) provides that the legislation may authorise national government „if necessary, 
to assume responsibility for the relevant functions‟. The implication is that assumption of 
responsibility for the functions in question is one of the most drastic measures in the 
circumstances of intervention and can only be invoked where all other lesser measures are not 
viable. This is because „if necessary‟ refers to: first, assumption of responsibility may be 
necessary to maintain essential national standards, or to meet established minimum standards 
for rendering services by the counties.
58
 National legislation dealing with sectoral areas such 
as health, agriculture, and housing may prescribe minimum standards and levels for service 
delivery, to be observed by county governments. Secondly, it may also be necessary to 
                                                 
55
 S 121(2)(f) CGA. 
56
 S 121(2)(h). 
57
 First Certification Judgment para 124 and Mnquma para 41. See also Premier of Western Cape & others v 
Overberg District Municipality & others 2011 (4) SA 441(SCA), in which the provincial executive dissolved 
the council for failure to approve the budget on the required date. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the 
Provincial Executive wrongly interpreted section 139 (4) which gave it power to take appropriate steps to ensure 
that the budget is approved. The Court found that the appropriate steps were not limited to the drastic action of 
dissolving the councils. 
58
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 15, 23 writing in respect of South Africa‟s section 139. 
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prevent one county from taking unreasonable action that is prejudicial to the interests of 
another county or the country as a whole.
59
 A dysfunctional county can be detrimental or a 
hindrance to cooperation with other counties and can damage processes of agreements among 
counties and delivery of shared services. It can also create problems for and obstruct national 
government laws and programmes implemented by the county government. Intervention may 
also avoid the problems of one county being replicated in other counties. Thirdly, it refers to 
demands of maintaining economic unity aimed at avoiding detrimental effects to the whole 
country, of erratic county policies and behavior that may necessitate assumption of 
responsibilities. 
When discussing this issue in the context of the South African Constitution, Steytler and De 
Visser observe that „appropriate steps‟ may „range from the relatively mild directive to the 
more intrusive assumption of responsibility and dissolution‟.60 There is, however, no legal 
requirement that assumption of responsibility must be a measure of last resort after all other 
measures have been considered unviable.
61
 The essence of assumption is that the powers of 
the county government are ousted and are taken over for performance by the national 
government. 
Assumption of responsibility as an appropriate step taken for corrective purposes must be 
linked and limited to functions which the county government has been unable to perform. It 
can therefore only be undertaken to the extent that it is necessary to ensure the performance 
of those specific functions and cannot be a blanket takeover of all the functions of the county 
government.
62
 National government cannot be allowed to intrude into the entire functional 
areas of the county government where it does not serve the purpose of the intervention. 
                                                 
59
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 15, 23. 
60
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 15, 21. 
61
 See Mnquma para 72 where the South African Court rejected the suggestion that the steps be taken in a 
progressive sequence.  
62
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 15, 27 note that „the extent of the assumption of responsibility must be linked 
to the purpose of the intervention‟. 
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3.4 Limitation of the power and safeguards against abuse 
Since intervention is a severe intrusion into county autonomy it can easily be abused if not 
appropriately constrained.
63
 Accordingly, the Constitution imposes a number of limitations to 
the exercise of the intervention power. 
3.4.1 Intervention must be founded upon national legislation 
The first limitation is the requirement that the intervention must be provided for by 
legislation. In the absence of such legislation, the national government would be unable to act 
lawfully.
64
 Section 121 of the County Governments Act has provided for such authority in the 
form of an elaborate process that starts with monitoring and evaluation which may lead to the 
invocation of intervention under Article 190(2) of the Constitution. 
3.4.2 Requirement of notice to county before intervention 
Article 190(5)(a) prescribes that „[t]he legislation under clause (3) shall require notice to be 
given to a county government of any measures that the national government intends to take‟. 
This is necessary since the grounds for intervention are accusations against the county 
government alleging a failure on the part of the county government to either perform its 
functions or comply with the prescribed financial management system. The county 
government must be given an opportunity to be heard about the allegations made against it. 
Since intervention is corrective in nature, notice may enable the county government to take 
remedial steps rendering the intervention unnecessary. Besides, rules of natural justice would 
require that the county government be given a hearing before being condemned. 
The notice must (a) give details of the alleged failure, and (b) give the county government 
adequate time to take any steps that may be necessary to remedy the situation. Section 121(5) 
of the County Governments Act requires the Cabinet Secretary responsible for 
intergovernmental relations to give notice to the county government stating the nature of the 
intended intervention, the measures to be taken and the period required to rectify the problem. 
                                                 
63
 Murray C &Simeon R „From paper to practice: the National Council of Provinces after its first year‟ (1999) 
14 SA Public Law 103. 
64
 Art 2(2) prohibits a claim or exercise of state authority „except as authorised under this constitution‟. 
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3.4.3 Measures that assist the county to resume its functions 
Since intervention is corrective and restorative in nature, Article 190(5)(c) prescribes that 
„[t]he legislation under clause (3) shall – require the national government, when it intervenes, 
to take measures that will assist the county government to resume full responsibility for its 
functions‟. This serves to limit the discretion of national government to measures that can 
restore the ability of county government as soon as possible. The measures must be forward-
looking and not punitive in nature. 
3.4.4 Intervention limited to only measures that are necessary 
Article 190(5)(b) provides that „[t]he legislation under clause (3) shall – permit the national 
government to take only measures that are necessary‟. In addition, assumption of 
responsibility for the relevant function can only be an appropriate step „if necessary‟.65 What 
is necessary must be guided by the purpose of intervention, which as noted is corrective and 
restorative. 
Since Article 190(5)(b) limits the autonomy of county government, it should be interpreted 
strictly and restrictively in the same manner that limitations to fundamental rights are 
interpreted.
66
 In this manner the provision should be understood as requiring details of the 
measures that are necessary to be identified and provided for by the legislation contemplated 
under Article 190. Given that the measures in these circumstances conflict with county 
sovereignty, the rule of law demands that they be spelt out in legislation to enable the county 
governments whose conduct is to be governed by the legislation to know the risk of operating 
the government in a manner that may invite intervention and where possible be able to avoid 
intervention. The rule of law also requires that the law be sufficiently precise, clear and 
accessible to avoid vagueness
67
 and where it confers discretionary powers, the discretion 
must be defined and restricted or controlled to ensure the general applicability of the law to 
avoid arbitrariness.
68
 
The Public Finance Management Act does not identify any measures that the national 
government may take when it intervenes in the affairs of county government under Article 
                                                 
65
 Art 190(4)(b). 
66
 See Chap 2 section 5.2. 
67
 See Chap 2 section 5.1. 
68
 See Chap 2 section 5.1. 
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190(3) of the Constitution.
69
 It is submitted that this failure will render any attempt to 
intervene under this legislation questionable on grounds of illegality. 
3.4.5 Termination of the intervention by the Senate 
In terms of Article 96(1) the Senate must perform its protective mandate, by reviewing the 
national government‟s decision to intervene in the affairs of the county government. In this 
regard Article 190(5) provides that the legislation contemplated under Article 190(3) must 
„provide for a process by which the Senate may bring the intervention by the national 
government to an end‟. This serves to ensure that the national government does not abuse its 
power of intervention. For instance, if the national government intervenes in circumstances 
that do not warrant such intervention, or takes measures that are not appropriate, or takes 
measures that are punitive, the Senate may terminate the intervention. The provisions serve to 
recognise both legal and political safeguards against abuse of the intervention power by the 
national government.
70
 
The provision requires the legislation to „provide for a process‟ by which the Senate may 
bring the intervention to an end, which should be interpreted as envisaging a process 
empowering the Senate to get notification, hear the parties, make a decision on the matter, 
and to monitor the entire process.
71
 Implied in this provision is an obligation on the part of 
the national government to inform the Senate whenever it takes intervention measures against 
any county government. The role of the Senate is limited to overseeing the intervention 
actions of the national government but does not include managing or prescribing to national 
government how best to execute the intervention. Rather, the provision only empowers the 
Senate to scrutinise the measures taken by the national government and not to decide for it 
what measures to take.
72
 
4 Intervention by way of suspension of county government 
The most drastic and intrusive intervention measure is provided for by Article 192(1): 
The President may suspend a county government –  
                                                 
69
 S 121(2)(g) and (4) CGA at least identifies both a recovery plan and assumption of responsibility for the 
functions by the national government as some of the measures that may be taken against a county government. 
70
 See Mnquma para 82. 
71
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 15, 25 with respect to South Africa. 
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 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 15, 26. 
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a) in an emergency arising out of internal conflict or war; or 
b) in any other exceptional circumstances. 
A suspension is a temporary withholding of a privilege or interruption from a position.
73
 
Suspension of a county government therefore is a temporary extinguishment, interruption or 
halting of the government which during the period of suspension does not exist and serve as 
the government. It is argued later that it actually amounts to dismissal of the county 
government from office.
74
 This means that the entire county government, any one of its two 
arms, or both, could be suspended. Article 200(2)(e), which requires Parliament to enact 
legislation providing for „the suspension of assemblies and executive committees‟, implies 
that the suspension can lawfully be directed at either the county assembly or the county 
executive. Indeed, if, as is discussed below, a suspension must be founded upon proven 
allegations against the county government, then it is reasonable to argue that such allegations 
could be made and proved against only one arm of a county government. In this event, only 
such an arm would be liable to suspension. It would be unfair to punish one arm for the sins 
of the other. 
The President is conferred with the power to suspend a county government only in certain 
specified circumstances which constitute jurisdictional facts. These are an emergency arising 
out of internal conflict or war, and any other exceptional circumstances. 
4.1 Emergency arising out of internal conflict or war 
The suspension power can be invoked only if there is „an emergency arising out of internal 
conflict or war‟.75 Must a state of emergency first be declared? It is submitted that a state of 
emergency must have been factually established and lawfully declared in terms of Article 58 
for it to be a basis for suspension. This approach would make invocation of suspension more 
difficult since it is a very drastic intrusion into the central objective of democratic 
government.
76
 While under Article 58 an emergency can be declared on more grounds than 
just internal conflict and war, for purposes of suspension, only emergencies arising out of 
internal conflict or war suffice. If a state of emergency has been declared for any other 
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 See Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and Word Power Guide (2001) 1304.  
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 Art 192(6). 
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 Art 192(1)(a).  
76
 Art 174(a). 
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reason, such as a natural disaster, it would not justify the invocation of suspension of a county 
government. 
Moreover, the mere fact of the declaration of an emergency is not sufficient to warrant the 
suspension of a county government. There must be something alleged against the county 
government in relation to the emergency to warrant the suspension of the government. A 
good example would be a situation under which the county government is perhaps the cause 
of the internal conflict or is taking part in the conflict or war. It is for this reason that the 
Constitution requires an independent commission to first investigate allegations made against 
the county government and for the President to be satisfied that the allegations are justified, 
before a county government is suspended.
77
 
Suspension being a very drastic measure that seeks to curtail democratic governance, must be 
interpreted strictly against the intervening national government and narrowly to confine the 
intervention grounds to only those mentioned in the provision. The existence of an 
emergency must be established both as a matter of fact and a matter of law. As a matter of 
fact, Article 58 identifies various factual circumstances that may lay a basis for a declaration 
of a state of emergency. As a matter of law the provision sets out procedures that must be 
followed before a declaration is lawfully made. These are matters that must be established 
objectively and not subjectively as jurisdictional facts. 
4.2 Any other exceptional circumstances 
The ground of „any other exceptional circumstances‟ is broad and undefined. To avoid abuse, 
this ground should be restrictively interpreted. Having specifically mentioned emergencies 
arising out of internal conflict and war, this particular ground should be interpreted ejusdem 
generis and strictly to ensure that suspension can only be invoked when the circumstances are 
exceptionally serious. This would require that the national government proves that the gravity 
of the circumstances is something comparable to internal conflict or war. As a measure of last 
resort, the national government must show that it has considered all other possible measures 
and found them not viable for dealing with the problem. Where the county government has 
become the problem and cannot function by its failure, for example, to approve a budget, 
exceptional circumstances may be justified. If the working relationship between the county 
assembly and the county executive has become too polarised to a level of making it 
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impossible for the two to govern and deliver services, this can constitute justifiable 
exceptional circumstances. The suspension measure must be taken against both the county 
executive and county assembly where they both make governance impossible.
78
 
Although the South African Constitution does not have provision for suspension of provincial 
or local governments, it has provision for dissolution of municipal councils in „exceptional 
circumstances‟.79 In Mnquma, the High Court noted that it is neither desirable nor possible to 
lay down precise rules as to what circumstances are to be regarded as exceptional. For 
purposes of dissolution of a municipal council, the Court raised the bar high and defined 
„exceptional circumstances‟ as something „markedly unusual or specially different‟.80 It 
offered two reasons for such a high standard. First, the purpose for requiring exceptional 
circumstances where intervention takes the form of dissolution of the municipal council is to 
ensure that no inroads are made without good reason into the autonomy of another sphere of 
government.
81
 Secondly, it is recognised that the dissolution of the municipal council is the 
more drastic and far-reaching of the forms of intervention authorised by the Constitution.
82
 
„Not only must the dissolution be an “appropriate” step to remedy the situation, it can only be 
resorted to if exceptional circumstances have been found to exist.‟83 From this perspective, 
the court saw exceptional circumstances for purposes of dissolution of a municipal Council as 
signifying that this is „a step that should not easily be resorted to‟.84 Thus, the phrase must be 
given a narrow rather than a broad interpretation. This approach, it is submitted, is 
appropriate for the suspension of county government in the Kenyan context. 
The use of the phraseology limits the circumstances under which the national government can 
drastically intrude into the affairs of county governments. The provision envisages extreme 
circumstances calling for extreme measures, not to be used if things are normal and are 
ordinarily functioning normally. Suspension of the county government is an extreme attack 
on the democratic right of the people of the county and can only be permitted in rare cases. 
                                                 
78
 See section 123(1) of the CGA which envisages suspension „if the county government engages in actions that 
are deemed to be against the common needs and interests of the citizens of the county‟. 
79
 Section 139 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
80
 Mnquma para 79.  
81
 Mnquma para 79. 
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 Mnquma para 79.  
83
 Mnquma para 79.  
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 Mnquma para 80.  
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4.3 The process of suspension 
Article 192(2) provides for a three-step process for suspension of a county government that 
involves three institutions: the President, an independent commission of inquiry and the 
Senate. Although the Constitution confers upon the President the power to suspend a county 
government, the decision to suspend cannot be taken unless an independent commission of 
inquiry has investigated the allegations made against the county government, to the 
satisfaction of the President that the allegations are justified, and the Senate has authorised 
the suspension. But how does the process commence in the first place? 
While the Constitution does not expressly provide for this, it recognises that the power of the 
President has to be exercised within a framework of national legislation enacted by 
Parliament.
85
 The County Governments Act envisages that the action of the President may be 
activated by a citizen who may petition the President to suspend a county government in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution if the county government engages in 
actions that are deemed to be against the common needs and interests of the citizens of a 
county.
86
 Such petition must be supported by the signatures of not less than ten per cent of the 
registered voters in the county.
87
 Within fourteen days the President in turn must submit a 
report on the allegations made and the grounds giving rise to the petition for suspension to the 
Summit, which is established as the apex intergovernmental relations body for approval,
88
 
and appointment of members of the commission to inquire into the allegations.
89
 
4.3.1 The independent commission of inquiry 
Because of the grave consequences of a suspension, an independent commission of inquiry 
must be established to investigate the allegations made against the county government and 
report back to the President.
90
 This is to ensure that the decision to suspend a county 
government is very carefully considered by an independent body as opposed to, for instance, 
                                                 
85
 Art 200(2)(e) provides that „in particular, provision may be made with respect to the suspension of the 
assemblies and executive committees‟. 
86
 S 123(1) CGA.  
87
 S 123(2) CGA. 
88
 S 123(3) CGA. 
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investigations by a parliamentary committee.
91
 Since the commission investigates allegations 
made against the county government, such government must be given notice and an 
opportunity to defend itself against the allegations. 
4.3.2 The President’s decision on the commission’s report 
Once the commission finalises its work it must report its findings to the President. The 
commission may find that the allegations against the county government are not justified or 
that they are justified. If it finds that they are not justified, then the matter ends there and a 
suspension power cannot be invoked against the county government. If, however, it finds that 
the allegations against the county government have been proved, the matter then goes to the 
next stage. The President considers the matter and if satisfied that the county government 
should be suspended, the matter is referred to the Senate for authorisation. 
4.3.3 Authorisation by the Senate 
The need for Senate authorisation is founded in the fact that the Senate is established as a 
house that represents and protects the interests of the counties and their governments.
92
 This 
provision puts the Senate in a position of wielding a veto power over the President. This is 
necessary because where there is no termination of the suspension by the Senate, the county 
government stands dismissed at the end of the 90 days stipulated by Article 192(5). The 
county government does not come back to office but instead, elections for a new county 
government are held.
93
 But even if the Senate authorises the suspension of a county 
government allowing it to take effect, it can at a later stage terminate the suspension before 
the expiry of the prescribed ninety days.
94
 The need for such termination may arise if it turns 
out that the decision to suspend the county government was a mistake or the emergency or 
exceptional circumstances cease to exist. The emergency or the internal conflict or war 
leading to the declaration may come to an end necessitating the termination of the 
suspension. On the other hand, the exceptional circumstances giving rise to the suspension 
may be addressed satisfactorily thereby necessitating the re-establishment of democratic 
                                                 
91
 For comparison with experience elsewhere, see Ghai YP & Regan AJ The Law, Politics and Administration of 
Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea (1992) 371, where they discuss the use of a Parliamentary Committee in 
Papua New Guinea, thereby politicising the process.  
92
 Arts 192(2) and 96(1). 
93
 Art 192(6).  
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government. The Senate is therefore empowered to re-evaluate the situation and see whether 
or not to terminate the suspension. Once the Senate terminates the suspension, the county 
government then resumes its position and responsibilities. 
It is submitted that the decision to authorise a suspension or to terminate the suspension is a 
matter concerning counties in which the vote belongs to the county delegations and not a vote 
of the individual senators.
95
 The vote would have to be taken in terms of Article 123 of the 
Constitution. 
4.4 Consequences of suspension 
A suspension of the county government means that both the county executive and the county 
assembly, or either of them, are temporarily stopped from performing their functions or 
acting as the government of the county as an interim measure before an election is called 
within 90 days if there is no termination by the Senate. The Constitution requires that an Act 
of Parliament be enacted to provide for arrangements to ensure the performance of the county 
government functions during the period of suspension.
96
 The legislation should thus provide, 
first, for who should run the affairs of the county government during suspension; and second, 
the rules which such a person will use when performing the functions of the county 
government during suspension. 
One important matter to note is that the corporate existence and identity of a county 
government are not affected by the suspension. As a result, the exercise and performance of 
the powers and functions of the county government by any other entity during the suspension 
period is done on behalf of the county government. Any rights acquired or liabilities incurred 
by the entity therefore belong to the county which would continue to benefit from or be 
bound by them even after the suspension has ended. 
4.5 Restoring democratic rule 
Suspension by its very nature is to be temporary, lasting for a fixed period of ninety days 
only
97
 and cannot be extended. The county government resumes office if the suspension is 
terminated before the end of 90 days, otherwise elections for a new government are held on 
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 See Chap 10 section 3.2.5. 
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the expiry of the 90 days.
98
 In essence, suspension is a remedial measure aimed at quickly 
correcting the situation and re-establishing an elected government for the county. If the 
suspension runs its full course of 90 days, it amounts to the dismissal of the county 
government which must be replaced by a newly elected government. 
5 Intervention by stoppage of transfer of funds 
Article 225(3) provides for what should be considered as an indirect supervisory intervention 
by way of stoppage of transfer of funds to county government: 
Legislation under clause (2) may authorise the Cabinet Secretary responsible 
for finance to stop the transfer of funds to a State organ or any other public 
entity –  
a) only for a serious material breach or persistent material breaches 
of the measures established under that legislation; and 
b) subject to the requirements of clause (4) to (7). 
In the absence of the required legislation which meets all the requirements, stoppage of 
transfer would not be lawful. Since the constitutional provisions do not specify the funds that 
are subject to stoppage, they must be understood to refer to all types of funds due to county 
governments, including equitable shares and conditional and unconditional grants. 
5.1 Grounds for stoppage of transfer of funds 
The constitutional provisions contemplate an objective process in which stoppage can only be 
invoked in two specified circumstances, which are jurisdictional facts:
99
 (a) a „serious 
material breach‟ or (b) „persistent material breaches‟ of the measures established by national 
legislation. 
5.1.1 Serious material breach 
The concept of „serious material breach‟ must be understood in the context of the legislation 
envisaged by Article 225(2) of the Constitution, which should provide for expenditure 
controls and transparency, and mechanisms for the implementation of such controls. The 
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 Art 192(6). 
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 See First Certification judgment para 283 where the South African Constitutional Court held with reference to 
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controls aim at ensuring responsible and prudent management of resources to enable the 
county governments meet their financial obligations as and when they fall due. A breach 
justifying stoppage of transfer must therefore be a breach of these expenditure controls and 
transparency. It is for this reason that the term „material‟ is used, which means substantive, 
and not petty or peripheral breach of the expenditure control and transparency rules 
contemplated by Article 225(2). Such material breach must also be „serious‟ in the sense of 
being of a grave, weighty or important nature; every material breach cannot lead to stoppage 
of transfer of funds.
100
 
The requirement of „serious‟ focuses on a singular material breach. This is contrasted with 
„persistent material breaches‟ which are plural and become a ground for stoppage because 
they are many and repeated or ongoing.
101
 Such breaches would be serious material breaches 
if they involve the county government being unable to meet its financial commitments.
102
 
As mentioned earlier, the Public Finance Management Act attempts to provide for this matter 
but combines it with matters arising out of Article 190(3) in a manner that fails to clearly 
bring out this distinction.
103
 This fails to recognise the clear distinction the Constitution 
makes between the two jurisdictional facts. Section 94(1) of the Act fails to draw a clear 
distinction between the factors that may evidence the occurrence of a serious material breach 
and those that may evidence the occurrence of persistent material breaches. Factors are given 
which apply to both situations, yet the Constitution presents the two as distinct jurisdictional 
facts. The section read together with others seems to leave the determination of what 
constitutes a serious material breach or persistent material breaches to the discretion of the 
Cabinet Secretary. This discretion is not appropriately defined and controlled to ensure 
                                                 
100
 See Kriel RR & Monadjem M „Public finances‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2 ed (2011) 1-57, 42.  
101
 Kriel & Monadjem ((2011) 42), have pointed out with respect to South Africa that „the phrase “serous” is 
intended to create a high threshold‟ for the remedy of stoppage of transfer to be invoked. 
102
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) Ch 15, 30 who, while discussing intervention in South African 
municipalities experiencing serious financial problems, observe that: „A serious financial problem refers 
generally to a municipality‟s inability to meet its financial commitments. This not only refers to meeting its 
contractual obligations to pay creditors, whether they be staff or suppliers; it also refers to its commitment to 
manage its financial system soundly. The reference to a municipality also includes any municipal entity.‟  
103
 See s 93(3) of the Public Finance Management Act.  
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general applicability of the law and can lead to arbitrariness, which can invalidate the 
provision.
104
 
5.1.2 Persistent material breaches 
The concept of „persistent material breaches‟ must be contrasted with that of „serious material 
breach‟. In this case the breaches need not be serious but what elevates them to a level of 
justifying stoppage is their persistence. If the county government repeatedly defaults in 
making payment of its debts when they fall due, it may be said to have committed persistent 
material breaches.
105
 While one serious material breach may justify stoppage of transfer, 
persistent material breaches would require more than just one breach or an isolated 
occurrence of a material breach.
106
 
5.2 The process and safeguards against abuse 
Stoppage of transfer of funds is an exception to the general rule that county governments 
have financial autonomy arising out of the fact that their equitable shares of revenue raised 
nationally are entitlements. They must be transferred to county governments promptly and 
without undue delay and deduction, except where the transfer has been stopped in terms of 
Article 225.
107
 Stoppage of transfer must thus be interpreted strictly with a view to protecting 
the financial autonomy of the county governments. Articles 225(4) to (7) set out both the 
process to be followed and the safeguards against abuse of the stoppage power which are 
discussed in the following sections. 
5.2.1 Report of the Controller of Budget 
Before Parliament approves or renews the decision, a report by the Controller of Budget 
regarding the situation must be presented to Parliament.
108
 This is necessary because the 
Controller of Budget is an independent office which has constitutional mandate to oversee the 
                                                 
104
 See section 3.4.3 above.  
105
 See s 93(3)(b). 
106
 See Kriel & Monadjem (2011) 42 who observe that „[t]he word “persistent” suggests continuing in some 
action “against opposition” and may indicate a remedy of last resort‟.  
107
 Art 219 is similar to provisions relating to the provincial sphere of government in South Africa where the 
equitable share is regarded as an entitlement that cannot be tampered with in any way by the national sphere of 
government. See ss 227(3) and 216(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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implementation of budgets by the two levels of government. The office may therefore have 
information relevant to the decision that may lead to a different decision by Parliament. 
5.2.2 Notice and right to be heard 
Article 225(7)(b) prohibits Parliament from approving or renewing a decision to stop transfer 
of funds unless the county government „has been given an opportunity to answer the 
allegations against it, and to state its case, before the relevant parliamentary committee‟. The 
implication of this is that the jurisdictional facts of „serious material breach‟ and „persistent 
material breaches‟ must be constituted by something blamable against the county 
government. The county government must be alleged to have done or omitted to do 
something which is the cause of either the serious material breach or the persistent material 
breaches. There is therefore a causal link between the conduct of the county government and 
the reasons giving rise to the need to stop transfer of funds. The county government is 
entitled to be heard and defend itself against any such allegations before any stoppage 
decision is approved or renewed. The mere fact that a county government has financial 
problems and is unable to meet its financial obligations is not sufficient reason to stop 
transfer of funds to it. 
In addition, these provisions appear to emphasise the corrective and restorative nature of 
intervention and fairness in the entire process of stoppage of transfer of funds. Accordingly, if 
the problem cannot be linked to the conduct of the county government, the corrective and 
restorative measure is not appropriate for these purposes.
109
 
5.2.3 Parliamentary approval 
Although the initial decision to stop transfer of funds is the responsibility of the Cabinet 
Secretary responsible for finance,
110
 the decision must be submitted to Parliament for review 
and approval. Article 225(5)(b) provides that the decision „may be enforced immediately, but 
will lapse retrospectively unless, within 30 days after the date of the decision, Parliament 
                                                 
109
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) chap 15, 31 who, with reference to the South African provincial intervention 
in the affairs of a municipality experiencing serious financial problems, observe that: „The financial problem 
must be caused by, or result in, a failure by the municipality to comply with its executive obligations in terms of 
legislation or the Constitution. There must thus be a causal link between the problem and the executive 
obligation which has not been complied with.‟  
110
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approves it by resolution passed by both houses. In terms of this provision, the Cabinet 
Secretary has two options: to either approach Parliament for its approval of the decision first 
before implementing it, or to implement it immediately and subsequently seek Parliament‟s 
approval. If immediate enforcement is opted for, the same may not continue beyond 30 days 
and the decision must lapse retrospectively, if it does not get the necessary parliamentary 
approval. 
Each house of Parliament must make its own resolution approving or rejecting the stoppage. 
This is a matter concerning counties in which the Senate must vote by the delegation 47 
votes. The resolution should be processed as an ordinary Bill concerning counties in which 
either house can veto the other by a simple majority vote. 
5.2.4 The amount of money subject to and period of stoppage 
Stoppage can only be imposed on not more than fifty per cent of the funds due to a county 
government.
111
 As already mentioned, any funds due to the county government, including 
equitable shares, conditional and unconditional grants can be a subject of stoppage of 
transfer. The use of the term „funds‟, read in the context of Article 202, which provides for 
different types of funds due to county government, should be given a plural connotation 
referring to these different types of funds. Where a county government‟s use of the equitable 
share is in compliance with the prescribed requirements, and only the use of a conditional 
grant is non-compliant, there would be no justification for stoppage of transfer of the 
equitable share. Stoppage is a corrective intervention which must focus only on problem 
areas and funds requiring correction. Accordingly, the fifty per cent refers to the specific fund 
the Cabinet Secretary has decided to stop. If the stoppage is of the transfer of the equitable 
share, then only fifty per cent of that share can be stopped. If, on the other hand, the stoppage 
targets a conditional grant, then only fifty per cent of such grant can be stopped. 
A further safeguard is that stoppage of transfer is a temporary measure that lasts for only 60 
days at a time. If Parliament approves the decision to stop the transfer of funds to a county 
government, the stoppage cannot last for more than 60 days.
112
 In addition, Parliament is 
granted power to renew and extend the decision to stop transfer of funds. Nonetheless, this 
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power is equally limited to renewal for no more than 60 days,
113
 which is meant to put 
pressure on the county government to remedy the situation so that it can return to normal 
operations. 
5.3 Efficacy of stoppage of transfer of funds 
The efficacy of stoppage of transfer of funds as a supervisory mechanism for national 
government is limited. First, stoppage of transfer of funds is an indirect supervisory 
mechanism in the sense that other than stoppage of transfer of funds, the national government 
takes no other corrective measures, leaving the county to correct its conduct. It acts as a threat 
which forces a county government to ensure fiscal discipline by taking steps and acting in a 
manner that avoids the imposition of stoppage of transfer of funds. Secondly, this is not a 
good corrective and restorative mechanism since it may make it impossible for the county 
government to perform its functions. For example, if the problem leading to the intervention 
is that the county government has been unable to perform its functions by reason of being 
unable to meet its financial obligations by failing to pay those owed money, stoppage of 
transfer of funds to the county government only worsens the situation. A county government 
without funds would be unable to perform its functions and pay for services, resulting in the 
suffering of innocent citizens who rely on such services. Thirdly, the process of imposition 
and the safeguards against abuse of the power of stoppage of transfer of funds already 
discussed make this intervention difficult to work. The stoppage can only be imposed for 60 
days and extended for not more than 60 days at a time. The process of imposition requires 
approval by both Houses of Parliament after receiving a report from the Controller of Budget 
and hearing the county government concerned. By the time the Controller of Budget 
completes investigations and files a report, and each of the two Houses hears the county 
government and makes its resolution, the 60 days would have lapsed. Because of all these 
factors, South Africa from whose system Kenya borrowed these provisions, rarely uses 
stoppage of transfer of funds since it has been found to be ineffective. 
6 Conclusion 
In this chapter a purposive interpretation has been very useful in a number of respects. First, 
it reveals that even without the use of the term „supervision‟, the Constitution by implication 
envisages the supervision of county governments by national government through various 
                                                 
113
 Art 225(6). 
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methods. Supervision through regulation is envisaged but must be discharged on the basis of 
clear constitutional provisions which empower Parliament to legislate on certain matters that 
affect county governments. Monitoring is also envisaged to serve clear objectives such as 
support and intervention. Secondly, the Constitution expressly provides for three types of 
intervention – general or ordinary intervention in terms of Article 190, intervention by way of 
suspension of county governments in terms of Article 192, and intervention by way of 
stoppage of transfer of funds in terms of Article 225. The powers in these cases are expressly 
and sufficiently circumscribed and constrained to avoid abuse and not to detract from the 
principle of distinct and autonomous county governments. In each case specific jurisdictional 
facts which must be proved have been set out. It has been argued that a narrow and restrictive 
interpretation of these powers is what will give full effect to the central role of devolution and 
its objectives. 
South African comparative jurisprudence and scholarship have been beneficial. The text of 
the Kenyan and South African provisions on intervention and stoppage of transfer of funds 
have striking similarities. Thus, the strict and narrow interpretation approach used by South 
African courts has been instructive. Moreover, even without provision for suspension of 
lower level governments in South Africa, interpretation of the Kenyan suspension provisions 
has drawn lessons from the South African interpretation of provisions on the dissolution of 
municipal councils. 
 
 
 
 
348 
 
Chapter 9: Cooperative government and intergovernmental relations 
CHAPTER NINE 
Cooperative government and intergovernmental relations 
1 Introduction 
The Constitution has established a cooperative system of devolved government which 
necessitates a system of intergovernmental relations and resolution of disputes among and 
within the different levels of government. This chapter interprets the constitutional provisions 
dealing with cooperative government, intergovernmental relations, and dispute and conflict 
resolution. 
2 Cooperative government 
Article 6(2) of the Constitution provides that „[t]he governments at the national and county 
levels are distinct and inter-dependent and shall conduct their mutual relations on the basis of 
consultation and cooperation‟. This provision forms the foundation of Kenya‟s cooperative 
form of devolved government which combines a certain measure of autonomy on the part of 
each of the two levels of government, with a measure of joint and collaborative action and 
decision-making by the two levels of government. This provision indicates that Kenya, like 
South Africa, has made a deliberate choice to adopt a system of cooperative as opposed to 
competitive devolved government. 
Where there is a measure of concurrent competences a system of cooperative government 
becomes essential.
1
 In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, the South African Constitutional Court commented on a similar choice by South Africa 
thus: 
The Constitutional system chosen by the [Constitutional Assembly] is one of 
cooperative government in which powers in a number of important 
functional areas are allocated concurrently to the national and provincial 
levels of government. This choice, instead of one of “competitive 
federalism” which some political parties may have favoured, was a choice 
                                                 
1
 Currie I and De Waal J The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume 1 Constitutional Law (2001) 
119.  
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which the [Constitutional Assembly] was entitled to make in terms of the 
[Constitutional Principles].
2
 
Cooperative government could, if well managed and operated, avoid disputes arising. 
Disputes among governments or organs of state have the potential of interrupting the smooth 
functioning of the political and government system, thus making a system that can avoid 
them a worthy venture.
3
 For fuller understanding of cooperative government, 
intergovernmental relations and dispute resolution, four important terminologies in this 
provision call for interpretation: „distinct‟, „interdependent‟, „consultation‟ and „cooperation‟. 
2.1 Distinct governments 
„Distinct‟ or distinctiveness refers to the autonomy of the levels of government. It connotes, 
first, a certain measure of autonomy for each of the orders of government as entities and in 
powers and functions.
4
 Article 1 of the Constitution which states that the sovereign power of 
the people is shared among the two levels of government
5
 demonstrates the significance of 
this autonomy. The 47 counties are creatures not of national government but of the 
Constitution as the expression of the sovereign will of the people.
6
 Each level elects its own 
political structures and institutions which it controls. In this sense each level of government is 
distinct from the other. Understood against the historical background of local government 
that was completely subservient to the central government, the Constitution has made a 
paradigmatic shift by adopting orders of government that are distinct.
7
 
                                                 
2
 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (First Certification judgment) para 287.  
3
 See Minister of Police and others v Premier of the Western Cape and others 2013 (12) BCLR 1365 (CC) para 
19.  
4
 Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government of South African (2011) chap 16, 3.  
5
 Article 1(3) and (4).  
6
 See Chap 5 section 2. 
7
 The South African Constitution uses the terms spheres of government that are distinctive, interrelated and 
interdependent, which the courts and scholars have already given legal meaning to. In Premier of Western Cape 
v President of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (4) BCLR 382 (CC) para 50, the Constitutional Court observed 
that „[d]istinctiveness lies in the provision made for elected governments at national, provincial and local 
levels‟. See also Levy N & Tapscott C „Intergovernmental relations in South Africa: The challenges of co-
operative government‟ in Levy N & Tapscott C (eds) Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa: The 
Challenges of Co-operative Government (2001) 11 where they observe that the spheres of government are 
„distinctive from the perspective of their legislative and executive autonomy‟. 
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Secondly, distinctness as autonomy connotes exclusion of hierarchy in the relations between 
the governments.
8
 This is an extension of the autonomy concept which ensures that in the 
areas where county governments are final decision-makers they are not treated as mere agents 
but equal partners of the national government, to which they are not subordinate.
9
 When 
explaining the status of local government in South Africa as a distinct sphere of government, 
Steytler and De Visser associate this terminology with autonomy and elevate local 
government to the status of „equal partners‟.10 
This meaning of distinctness applies to county governments which are described as a distinct 
level of government, and which are not the equivalent, of the former local government. 
However, as in the South African case, the autonomy of the county governments is relative as 
the national government is granted limited powers of supervision and intervention in county 
affairs.
11
 Steytler and De Visser describe this relative autonomy as a relationship that 
                                                 
8
 Steytler & De Visser „Local government‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed 
(2011) ch 22, 15 where they observe that „[t]he result was that “[t]he Constitution has moved away from a 
hierarchical division of government power in favour of a new vision, in which local government is 
interdependent, and (subject to permissible constitutional constraints) inviolable and has latitude to define and 
express its unique character.‟”  
9
 In the South African case of Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd & others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Authority Metropolitan Council and others 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (Fedsure) para 126, which was decided in the 
context of the Interim Constitution, Kriegler J made it very clear that „for the first time in our history, provision 
was made for autonomous local government with its own constitutionally guaranteed and independent existence, 
powers and functions.‟ At para 38 the Court described this new status of local government in a historical context 
thus: „The constitutional status of a local government is thus materially different to what it was when Parliament 
was supreme, when not only the powers but the very existence of local government depended entirely on 
superior legislatures. The institution of elected local government could then have been terminated at any time 
and its functions entrusted to administrators appointed by the central or provincial governments. That is no 
longer the position. Local governments have a place in the constitutional order, have to be established by the 
competent authority, and are entitled to certain powers, including the power to make by-laws and impose rates.‟ 
10
 Steytler & De Visser in Woolman et al (2011) ch 22, 126-7. See also Steytler & De Visser Local Government 
Law of South Africa (2011) chap 16, 3. See also Woolman S & Roux T „Co-operative Government & 
Intergovernmental Relations‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2011) chap 14, 
7 where they recognise the notion of autonomy and exclusion of hierarchy. See also Stauffer T & Topperwien N 
„Balancing self-rule and shared rule‟ in Fleiner LRB &Feiner T (eds) Federalism and Multiethnic States: The 
Case of Switzerland, 2 ed (2000) 52. 
11
 See Chap 8. 
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„simultaneously exhibits elements of autonomy and hierarchy‟.12 However, since the 
supervision and intervention powers are constitutionally circumscribed and constrained, they 
do not subordinate the county government to national government and must be exercised 
within the framework of cooperative government. This interpretation is consistent with the 
drafting history of the Constitution.
13
 
In sum therefore, the two levels of government are distinct and have autonomy from each 
other in the sense that there is no subordination of one order of government to the other as 
they are coordinate to each other. 
2.2 Interdependent governments 
The two levels of government are also interdependent, which connotes dependency, 
interconnectivity and the need to work in concert in the discharge of the constitutional 
mandate of governance. Though each has been assigned its own functions, the governments 
are dependent on each other and none can operate in isolation. As the Supreme Court in the 
Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission observed, „[t]here is, therefore, in 
reality, a close connectivity between the functioning of national and county government‟.14 
Rawal DCJ has in Speaker of the Senate and another v attorney General and others asserted 
„that the core value of devolution is hinged upon the twin principles of co-operation and 
interdependence. The beads in a chain may have different appearances; however, when 
joined by a thread, they all become part of one ring; one cannot stand without the other.‟15 
The governments are interdependent because of the assignment of functions. First, the 
assignment under Article 186 recognises the concept of both exclusive and concurrent 
functions. Secondly, other functions are assigned on the basis of the national government 
formulating policy and setting standards while the county governments implement the 
policies and standards.
16
 Thirdly, because of the economies of scale, shared services, and the 
spillover effect of both services and taxes, the counties may be interdependent among 
themselves. For this reason, the Supreme Court noted that „it is clear to us that an 
interdependence of national and county governments is provided for‟ because of the 
                                                 
12
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) chap 22, 126-7.  
13
 See Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (2010) 125. See Also Chap 3. 
14
 [2011] eKLR para 40. 
15
 [2013] eKLR (Speaker of the Senate) para 228. 
16
 See the Fourth Schedule generally.  
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concurrence of functions and operations, „as is clear from the terms of the Fourth Schedule 
which makes a distribution of functions between the national and county governments‟.17 
Once again the notion of interdependence draws from the South African system where the 
courts have given similar meaning to the terminology.
18
 
Cooperative government obligations result in certain restraints and limitations upon the 
exercise of the distinct powers of the levels of government.
19
 In International Legal 
Consultancy Group v The Senate and Another, the High Court of Kenya observed that when 
the Senate exercises its oversight powers over county finances „in reference to members of 
County Government, there must be a measure of restraint by the Senate‟.20 The national and 
county governments must have a common loyalty to the country, its people and the 
Constitution and must all seek to secure the welfare of the Kenyan people.
21
 The Task Force 
on Devolved Government reported that „[t]he thrust of this principle is that governments must 
function as a cohesive whole in order to achieve the desired outcomes including the effective 
delivery of services and national integration‟.22 Interdependence is indeed the foundation of 
cooperative government. 
                                                 
17
 [2011] eKLR para 39 (emphasis in the original). 
18
 In Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg (2001) 9 BCLR 883 (Langeberg) paras 39-40, Yacoob J 
of the Constitutional Court stated that: „All the spheres are interdependent and interrelated in the sense that the 
functional areas allocated to each sphere cannot be seen in isolation of each other. They are all interrelated. 
None of these spheres of government nor any of the governments within each sphere have any independence 
from each other. Their interrelatedness and interdependence is such that they must ensure that, while they do not 
tread on each other‟s toes, they understand that all of them perform governmental functions for the benefit of the 
people of the country as a whole. Sections 40 and 41 are designed in an effort to achieve this.‟ See also 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Irene Grootboom and others 2000(1) BCLR 1360 
(CC) paras 39-40 where Yacoob J observed that: „[A] co-ordinated State housing program must be a 
comprehensive one determined by all three spheres of government in consultation with each other. But the 
national sphere of government must ensure responsibility for ensuring that laws, policies, programs and 
strategies are adequate to meet the State‟s s 26 obligations‟. See also Steytler & De Visser (2011) chap 16, 3. 
19
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 16, 3. 
20
 [2014] eKLR para 67. With regard to South Africa, Woolman and Roux (2011) chap 14, 9 emphasise this 
noting that „[w]hile the different spheres of government have distinct responsibilities, they must work together 
in order for the South African government as a whole to fulfil its constitutional mandate‟. 
21
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 16 p 3. 
22
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 154. 
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3 Cooperative intergovernmental relationships 
As a consequence of the distinctness and the interdependence of the two orders of 
government, the Kenyan Constitution provides a normative framework for the conduct of 
intergovernmental relations. Article 6(2) prescribes that the two levels of government „shall 
conduct their mutual relations on the basis of consultation and cooperation‟. Article 189 then 
lays down detailed rules of operation to govern and give effect to the cooperative government 
and cooperative intergovernmental relations. Intergovernmental relations are defined as the 
processes of interactions between different governments and between organs of state from 
different governments in the course of the discharge of their functions.
23
 
3.1 Goals of cooperative government 
Cooperative government seeks to achieve four important goals. First, it seeks to ensure a 
well-coordinated and cohesive system of government, which provides services to the people 
as a whole.
24
 Effective and cost effective service delivery at the local level that is well co-
ordinated with national priorities is therefore at the core of cooperative government and 
intergovernmental relations envisaged by the Constitution.
25
 Secondly, it seeks to avoid 
competition among the governments and their working at „cross-purposes or in a mutually 
destructive way‟.26 The Task Force on Devolved Government reports that „[a] cohesive 
multi-sectoral perspective should be adopted with a view to avoiding wasteful competition, 
ineffective use of human resources and costly duplication‟.27 Thirdly, the system aims to 
avoid duplication of roles as this is wasteful. In International Legal Consultancy Group, the 
Court recommended the enactment of statutory provisions „to guide the Senate and County 
Assemblies on how they should co-operate in the oversight of national revenue allocated to 
the county,‟ in order „to avoid duplication of roles and consequent inefficiencies‟.28 Fourthly, 
                                                 
23
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 157. See also Langeberg Municipality para 20 where the South 
African Constitutional Court defined intergovernmental relations thus: „[t]he concept of intergovernmental 
relations here is inescapably a reference to relations between spheres of government and organs of state within 
those spheres‟. With reference to South Africa Steytler and De Visser (2011) ch 16, 4 recognise that the 
interactions may be both the hierarchical supervisory relations and the more equal cooperative relations.  
24
 Woolman & Roux (2011) ch 14, 14. 
25
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 157. 
26
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 16, 7. 
27
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 157. 
28
 International Legal Consultancy Group para 63. 
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the system seeks „to promote harmonious co-existence‟29 among the governments and their 
institutions. It is designed to facilitate political compromises and solutions to conflict and 
problems between the two levels of government, avoiding conflict and adversarial 
relationships.
30
 The Court in International Legal Consultancy Group observed that „pertinent 
political questions between the two levels of government should be resolved in a manner that 
does not result in acrimony and hostility‟.31 
In areas of concurrent law-making, cooperation is desirable in order to avoid conflicting 
legislative provisions, and thus reduce conflict of laws requiring the application of Article 
191. Furthermore, it is necessary in order to determine which national laws or parts of them 
should be implemented by county governments, and to ensure that adequate provision is 
made in the budgets of the different governments for the implementation of these laws. 
3.2 Cooperative government obligations 
As set out by Articles 6(2) and 189, the concept of cooperative government imposes certain 
obligations upon the two levels of government.
32
 These are the obligation (a) to respect the 
constitutional status of the institutions of the other level of government, (b) to respect the 
functional and institutional integrity of the other level, (c) to consult, (d) to cooperate, (e) to 
support and assist, and (f) to avoid judicial settlement of disputes. 
These principles of cooperative government are not themselves easily and always dispositive 
of a matter in court. However, they serve as policy directives and interpretive tools that can 
be used to give effect to other provisions of the Constitution. They can, however, be 
dispositive when raised as preliminary issues regarding whether or not the matter is ripe for 
determination by the courts.
33
 Their open-ended nature and flexibility avail courts a 
                                                 
29
 International Legal Consultancy Group para 68. 
30
 Woolman & Roux (2011) ch 14, 8. 
31
 International Legal Consultancy Group para 70. 
32
 See Woolman & Roux (2011) 8 footnote 2 where they refer to Ex parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa in re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) para 40 where the Court said that 
Chapter 3 „introduces a new philosophy to the Constitution, namely that of co-operative government and its 
attendant obligations. In terms of that philosophy, all spheres of government are obliged in terms of [FC] s 40(2) 
to observe and adhere to the principles of co-operative government set out in chap 3 of the Constitution.‟ Also 
see Currie & De Waal (2001) 123. 
33
 See Woolman & Roux (2011) chap 14, 9. 
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significant amount of latitude in deciding whether an intrinsically political matter is 
sufficiently ripe for judicial intervention.
34
 Thus, each of these obligations is examined to 
establish the extent to which it is justiciable and dispositive of a matter. 
3.2.1 Respect for functional and institutional integrity 
Article 189(1)(a) requires the governments to perform their functions and exercise powers in 
a manner that respects the functional and institutional integrity of each other, and the 
constitutional status and institutions of each other. 
3.2.1.1 The governments and their institutions 
Respect for the integrity and constitutional status of the government and institutions of each 
level of government emphasises the relative autonomy and distinctive nature of each level of 
government. The institutions of the county government include the county governor, the 
county executive, and the county assembly which must be treated with respect. Thus, 
although national government has limited supervision and intervention powers, it cannot 
exercise them in a manner that disrespects and undermines the integrity and constitutional 
status of the county governments and their institutions. It is argued that it was in pursuit of 
respect for the institutions of the other level of government that the Court in International 
Legal Consultancy Group urged for restraint whenever the Senate issues summons against 
members of the county government in exercise of its oversight powers.
35
 Though national 
government has powers to legislate for the Republic, it cannot do so in a manner that 
denigrates and demeans the integrity and constitutional status of the county governments and 
their institutions. This is to guide the manner in which the governments conduct themselves 
towards each other. Respect and disrespect to the other government or its institutions may be 
exhibited by mere attitude which may hinder cooperation or consultation. It could also be 
exhibited through the exercise of powers and functions. For example, the national 
government in exercise of its legislative powers may pass legislation meant to demean and 
disrespect the county governments and their institutions. The Order of Precedence Act of 
2014 is a debatable case in point. The Act provides for an order of precedence, which it 
defines as „a list of officers arranged in their order of seniority or hierarchy in the Republic of 
                                                 
34
 See Woolman & Roux (2011) ch 14, 9. 
35
 International legal consultancy group para 67. 
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Kenya‟,36 and in which the county governor is ranked among largely national government 
public officers.
37
 It also determines who can use a flag on their motor vehicle
38
 and who may 
be addressed by which title.
39
 These matters appear mundane and may very well require 
regulation, but by introducing hierarchy in this manner, may affect the relative autonomy of 
county governments, at least in their areas of final decision-making. The Act clarifies that it 
does not in any way or form „affect the status of the arms or branches of government under 
the Constitution‟,40 but is silent on whether or not it affects the status of county governments 
and their institutions. However, the memorandum and objects and reasons of the Act 
emphasise that the Act is „aimed at providing a yardstick for providing the proper position of 
all officers, their seniority and hierarchy for the purpose of state functions‟. 
3.2.1.2 The functions and powers of the governments 
The obligation to respect the integrity of the functions and powers of each level embodies a 
number of basic principles. First, one level of government or one organ of state may not use 
its powers in such a way as to undermine the effective functioning of another level or organ 
of state.
41
 This obligation concerns itself with the manner in which power is exercised, not 
whether or not a power exists.
42
 This limits the manner in which each of the levels of 
government performs its constitutionally assigned distinctive functions and exercises its 
powers. This is done by focusing on and restricting the manner in which the powers are 
exercised.
43
 As Steytler and De Visser have noted with respect to South Africa, „co-operative 
government thus serves as a constraining principle on all the three spheres of government 
when they exercise their distinctive powers and functions‟.44 The principle proceeds on the 
basis that the government is operating within its constitutional functional areas and powers, 
but doing so in a manner that is unacceptable as it undermines the effective functioning of the 
                                                 
36
 S 2 Order of Precedence Act, 2014 (OPA).  
37
 S 4(1) OPA. 
38
 S 5(1) OPA. 
39
 S 6(1) OPA. 
40
 S 4(3) OPA. 
41
 See Woolman & Roux (2011) ch 14, 8. 
42
 Premier of the Western Cape para 57. 
43
 Currie & De Waal (2001) 123. 
44
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) chap 22, 127 while discussing the position of South African spheres of 
government. 
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other. From this perspective, the Court in International Legal Consultancy Group commented 
about the exercise of the Senate‟s oversight powers thus: „The Senate should endeavour to 
improve accountability at the county level and not cripple the County Governments.‟45 This 
principle becomes relevant once it is established that the government has acted in its areas of 
competence. Only then does the question as to whether the government is performing its 
functions and exercising its powers in a „manner that respects the functional and institutional 
integrity of government at the other level‟ arise.46 If the government has acted outside its area 
of competence, the dispute must be dealt with on the basis that the government acted both 
unlawfully and unconstitutionally.
47
 The purpose of this obligation is to prevent one level of 
government from using its powers in a manner that undermines the other level of 
government, and prevents it from functioning effectively.
48
 
Secondly, this is a no-encroachment obligation requiring the governments not to encroach on 
the domain of the other.
49
 This obligation recognises the significance of the fundamental 
principle of allocation of powers to national and county governments, and the need to protect 
the powers.
50
 The Constitution imposes limits on the powers and functions of each level of 
government which must be observed.
51
 It underpins the division and protection of powers 
between the Kenyan national and county governments and their performance and exercise 
which may ultimately spill over and encroach upon the functions and powers of the other 
government. It thus seeks to confine the levels of government within their enumerated 
functional areas and powers and guards against abuse of power. Thus, one level of 
government must not assume any power or function of the other.
52
 National government, for 
                                                 
45
 International legal consultancy group (judgment) para 68. 
46
 See Woolman & Roux (2011) ch 14, 16. 
47
 See Woolman & Roux (2011) ch 14, 16. 
48
 Premier of the Western Cape para 58. 
49
 In the First Certification judgment para 289 the South African Constitutional Court made it clear that „[t]hese 
principles, which are appropriate to cooperative government, include an express provision that all spheres of 
government must exercise their powers and functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, 
functional or institutional integrity of the government in another sphere‟. 
50
 See Executive Council of the Province of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development and another 1999 (12) BCLR 1360 paras 79 and 80 (Executive Council of the 
Province of the Western Cape).  
51
 See Executive Council of the Province of the Western Cape paras 80 and 81.  
52
 See Liquor Bill case para 41. 
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instance, cannot through the exercise of its legislative powers take over the functions of 
county governments.
53
 For example, the County Government (Amendment) Act No 13 of 
2014, which establishes County Development Boards chaired by the respective county 
Senators,
54
 confers on the Boards powers that are unconstitutional as they encroach on those 
of the county governments. Although the Boards are disguised as intergovernmental relations 
forums, their powers go beyond cooperative consultation.
55
 The Boards encroach on the 
county government development functions and powers as they must „consider and give input 
on any county development plans before they are tabled in the county assembly for 
consideration‟.56 They also encroach on the county budgetary powers and functions since the 
Boards must „consider and give input on county annual budgets before they are tabled in the 
county assembly for consideration‟.57 They must also consider and advise on any issues of 
concern that may arise within the county‟.58 By requiring the operational expenses of the 
Boards to be provided for in the annual estimates of the respective county governments, the 
Act creates unfunded mandates for county governments.
59
 This Act encroaches on not only 
the powers of the county executive to develop development plans and annual budgets, but 
also the county assemblies‟ powers to approve and legislate the proposed plans and budgets 
into county laws. To subject the two county government arms to the approval of these Boards 
is a very serious intrusion into the relative county autonomy. This exercise of power also 
interferes with the county governments‟ effective performance of its functions and exercise of 
its powers. The legislation undermines the democratic accountability mechanisms. The 
people elect county governors and their governments with mandate to make development 
decisions without interference, for which they may hold them accountable at the next 
elections at the end of the five-year term. They can also recall them mid-stream. 
                                                 
53
 See Premier of the Western Cape para 60 where the South African Constitutional Court stated that „[t]his 
power given to the national legislature is one which needs to be exercised carefully in the context of section 
41(1)(g) to ensure that in exercising its powers, the national legislature does not encroach on the ability of the 
provinces to carry out the functions entrusted to them by the Constitution‟. 
54
 S 91A(1)(a) of CGAA. 
55
 S 91A(2)(a) CGAA. 
56
 S 91A(2)(b) CGAA. 
57
 S 91A(2)(c) CGAA. 
58
 S 91A(2)(d) CGAA. 
59
 S 91B(2)(b) CGAA. 
 
 
 
 
359 
 
Chapter 9: Cooperative government and intergovernmental relations 
Thirdly, the actual integrity of each sphere of government and organ of state must be 
understood in light of the powers and purpose of that entity.
60
 In determining whether or not a 
government has breached this obligation, the overall functional distribution, the purposes 
meant to be achieved by such distribution, and the relations among the two levels of 
government must be examined. This will involve looking at the functions and powers of the 
levels of government, not in isolation but in relation to each other and the overall objectives 
of devolution. 
3.2.2 The obligation to consult 
Cooperative government entails intergovernmental dialogue which requires that the 
governments liaise and work with each other when conceiving, developing and implementing 
policies and legislation. As noted, Article 6(2) requires the mutual relations of the 
governments to be based on „consultation and co-operation‟. Article 189(1)(b) also requires 
the governments to consult. In financial matters, Article 220(2)(c) requires national 
legislation to provide for the form and manner of consultation between national and county 
governments when preparing the plans and budgets. 
3.2.2.1 The meaning of consultation 
Consultation entails the duty to make conscious and deliberate efforts to seek out the views of 
the other party, and to consider them before arriving at a decision. It ensures that the exercise 
of the autonomous and distinct powers is informed not merely by the narrow interests of the 
government exercising its powers, but also the wider interests of the other level of 
government and all other concerned persons.
61
 It serves as a means for improving decision-
making for the benefit of all concerned.
62
 In The Commission for the Implementation of the 
Constitution v Attorney General and another,
63
 the High Court adopted the legal definition 
the South African courts have given to the term consultation: 
It seems that „consultation‟ in its normal sense without reference to the 
context in which it is used, denotes a deliberate getting together of more than 
one person or party ... in a situation of conferring with each other where 
                                                 
60
 Woolman & Roux (2011) ch 14, 8. 
61
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 16, 13. 
62
 Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 16, 13. 
63
 [2013] eKLR para 39. 
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minds are applied to weigh and consider together the pros and cons of a 
matter by discussion or debate. The word consultation in itself does not 
presuppose or suggest a particular forum, procedure or duration for such 
discussion or debate. Nor does it imply that any particular formalities should 
be complied with. Nor does it draw any distinction between communications 
conveyed orally or in writing. What it does suggest is a communication of 
ideas on a reciprocal basis.
64
 
In light of this broad definition, consultation in the context of the Kenyan cooperative 
government must be understood as encompassing three key elements. 
3.2.2.1.1 Invitation to present views 
There must be an invitation to the other government to present its views on a matter under 
consideration.
65
 In Robertson and Another v City of Cape Town, the South African High 
Court defined consultation thus: „[t]he essence of consultation is the communication of a 
genuine invitation, extended with a receptive mind, to give advice‟.66 The invitation could be 
passive, extended to the public in general with a closing date within which the consulted 
party may choose whether to respond or not. But it can also be more active by purposely 
soliciting the views of specific parties. This entails an active effort to obtain the views of 
those supposed to be consulted.
67
 
3.1.2.1.2 Afford reasonable opportunity to present views 
The second element is that the consulted government must be afforded a reasonable and 
adequate opportunity to present its considered views.
68
 The South African High Court in 
Hayes and Another v Minister for Housing, Planning and Administration, Western Cape and 
other explained that „as long as the lines of communication are open and the parties are 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to put their cases or points of view to one another, the 
                                                 
64
 Maqoma v Sebe and Another 1987 (1) SA 483 (Ck) 491E. 
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 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 16, 13. 
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 2004 (9) 950 (C) (Robertson HC) para 108. See also the South African Intergovernmental Relations 
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form of such consultation will usually not be of great import‟.69 For example, an invitation to 
present views the following day on a matter that requires time for consideration or to an 
institution that requires time to consult its members will not afford the invited party a 
reasonable and adequate opportunity to present its considered views. Some matters may even 
require research before forming an informed opinion. An invitation to the county 
governments to give a collective opinion on a matter must thus be allowed adequate time to 
enable them to come together for discussion before forming the collective opinion. 
In the South African case of Robertson and Another v City of Cape Town; Truman-Baker v 
City of Cape of Town the court emphasised that consultation was a „bi-lateral process‟ 
requiring active engagement with the party whose views or advice is sought. In this case the 
Court held that both the Minister for local government and Parliament had failed to invite the 
Fiscal and Financial Commission for consultation.
70
 In their assessment, Steytler and De 
Visser regard the decision in this case as supporting the proposition that when there is a duty 
to consult with a particular body, there must be conscious effort to invite and consult that 
party. While the decision of the consulting government cannot unreasonably be delayed by 
dilatory conduct of the consulted government, active consultation is more than a mere 
invitation to submit views.
71
 
3.2.2.1.3 The views must be considered in good faith 
Consultation implies an obligation to consider the views of the other government in good 
faith before making the decision.
72
 Consultation is not an end in itself. It is meant to ensure 
that better decisions are arrived at after considering the views of both governments. The other 
government must thus not be consulted as a mere formality, but with commitment to consider 
and take into account the views shared, if they add value that improves the decision being 
made. This can be secured through the requirement that the consulting government gives 
reasons why the views of the consulted party were not accepted. For example, Article 
218(2)(c) requires that the Division of Revenue Bill and the Allocation of Revenue Bill must 
be introduced in Parliament together with a summary of any significant deviation from the 
recommendations of the CRA, and an explanation for each of such deviations. 
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3.1.2.2 The consequences of failure to consult 
One major consequence of failure to consult may be the invalidation of the decision taken 
even if it is legislation on grounds that the process for decision-making was tainted with 
unconstitutionality. The principle of constitutional supremacy requires compliance with both 
the substantive and procedural prescriptions of the Constitution. Thus, where it is proved that 
the Constitution requires consultation before a decision is made, the absence of such 
consultation must lead to the invalidation of the resulting decision.
73
 
3.1.3 The obligation to cooperate 
The third obligation of the governments is to cooperate with each other which emanates from 
the provisions of Article 6(2) requiring that the governments „shall conduct their mutual 
relations on the basis of consultation and co-operation‟. This is elaborated by Article 189(2) 
which prescribes that „[g]overnment at each level, and different governments at the county 
level, shall co-operate in the performance of functions and exercise of powers and, for that 
purpose, may set up joint committees and authorities‟. The essence of cooperation is the need 
to work together and, as already mentioned, this need is necessitated by among other things, 
concurrency in the functional assignment to the two levels of government. As used together 
with the term „mutual‟, cooperation contemplates more friendly and collegial relations as 
opposed to „conflictual or antagonistic‟ adversarial relations.74 
The South African Constitutional Court recognised the need to cooperate in the context of the 
Interim Constitution even before the Final Constitution had made express provision for co-
operative government. In Re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions 
of the National Education Policy Bill 83 of 1995, the Court said the following about a 
National Education Policy Bill that called for the executive cooperation between the 
provinces and the national government: „Where two legislatures have concurrent powers to 
make laws in respect of the same functional areas, the only reasonable way in which these 
powers can be implemented is through co-operation.‟75 And in the First Certification 
                                                 
73
 Steytler & De Visser ((2011) ch 16, 16) they observe that „[m]aking consultation mandatory means that it is a 
validity requirement for the legislation‟. See also Robertson HC para 93. Amendments to the Structures 
Amendment Act of 2002 were invalidated for having been enacted without consultation with the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission. The decision was later set aside by the Constitutional Court but for different reasons. 
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judgment, the Court held that „[i]ntergovernmental co-operation is implicit in any system 
where powers have been allocated concurrently to different levels of government and is 
consistent with the requirement of [the Constitutional Principle] XX that national unity be 
recognised and promoted. The mere fact that [the New Text] has made explicit what would 
otherwise have been implicit cannot in itself be said to constitute a failure to promote or 
recognize the need for legitimate provincial autonomy.‟76 This obligation is, however, very 
difficult to enforce since the governments cannot be compelled by a court order to work 
together. 
3.1.4 The obligation to assist and support 
The fourth obligation is to assist and support each other. Article 189(1)(b) and (c) require the 
national and county governments to assist and support each other, and where appropriate 
implement the legislation of each other. As was mentioned in Chapter Eight, a distinction 
must be drawn between support in the context of cooperative government, and support in the 
context of supervision and intervention.
77
 While supervision and intervention support is 
hierarchical flowing from national government to county government, cooperative support is 
not hierarchical. It can flow from any government to another both vertically and horizontally. 
This provision may be constitutional anchorage for a claim for support from one county to a 
neighbouring county, and even from a county to the national government.
78
 Cooperative 
assistance and support must be done within the context of mutual respect for the functional 
and institutional integrity of each other and therefore requires the cooperation and consent of 
the governments involved. The active participation of both governments is required, with the 
recipient having the discretion whether or not to accept the assistance or support. This serves 
to enhance the objective of devolution of enabling communities to manage their own affairs. 
3.2 Application of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations 
The application of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations has three major 
dimensions: the vertical, horizontal and fiscal. 
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3.2.1 Vertical intergovernmental relations 
Reference to „[t]he governments‟ at the national and county levels in Article 6(2) and to 
„[g]overnment at either level‟ in Article 189(1), means that the principles and obligations of 
cooperative government and intergovernmental relations apply, first, vertically between 
national and county governments. This relate to interactions between the national 
government, on the one hand, and the 47 counties or any one of them, on the other hand. 
These interactions are done through the branches of these governments, especially the 
executive arm to enable them to coordinate their policies and programmes, and the organs of 
state within these governments. 
Pursuant to these constitutional provisions, the Intergovernmental Relations Act was enacted 
to provide some of the institutions through which such relations could be conducted.
79
 
Section 7 of this Act establishes a National and County Government Co-ordinating Summit 
whose members are the President, or in his absence, the Deputy President and the governors 
of the 47 counties. Section 13 provides for the establishment of sectoral working groups and 
committees which bring together officials of ministries at the national and county levels of 
government. The Summit is, however, a consultative body and cannot make decisions that 
bind national and county governments. 
3.2.2 Horizontal intergovernmental relations 
At the horizontal level, the constitutional provisions envisage cooperation and 
intergovernmental relations among two or more of the 47 counties.
80
 The principles and 
obligations of cooperative government accordingly also apply to relations between one 
county and another county or counties. The Constitution even envisages that two or more 
counties „may set up joint committees and joint authorities‟ for the purpose of discharging 
some of their functions that may relate to shared services.
81
 It envisages that county 
governments can form an „organisation of county governments‟ through which they can be 
consulted by the Senate when it is determining the five-year formula for sharing revenue 
among the counties.
82
 
                                                 
79
 Intergovernmental Relations Act 2 of 2012.  
80
 Art 189(1) and (2). 
81
 Art 189(2). 
82
 Art 217(2)(c). 
 
 
 
 
365 
 
Chapter 9: Cooperative government and intergovernmental relations 
It is in pursuit of cooperative government that the Intergovernmental Relations Act has 
provided for the establishment of the Council of County Governors.
83
 The Council serves as a 
forum for consultation among the county governments, sharing information with a view to 
learning from each other, considering matters of common interest, resolution of disputes 
between counties, facilitation of capacity building, for monitoring of implementation of inter-
county agreements on inter-county projects, and consideration of reports of other 
intergovernmental forums such as the vertical ones.
84
 
Although this Act does not make any express provision for horizontal cooperation and 
intergovernmental relations between the legislative arms of the county governments, the 
constitutional provisions do not preclude cooperation between the county assembly speakers 
of different counties. Neither do they preclude cooperation among the members of the county 
assemblies of different counties. 
3.2.3 Fiscal intergovernmental relations 
In many multilevel systems of government, control over and distribution of financial 
resources and the amounts allocated to different orders of government are contentious issues. 
The Kenyan devolution was necessitated by concerns about the extreme disparities
85
 arising 
out of the previous system that was largely centrally controlled and was based more on 
political patronage rather than objective criteria.
86
 As a result, the Constitution adopts a 
financial system that seeks to subject these matters to intergovernmental processes that create 
checks and balances and are based on objective criteria. Rawal DCJ in Speaker of the Senate 
captures this spirit of checks and balances and accountability as follows: 
It is well to remember that the revenue collected is from and for the people, 
for whose benefit the three arms of the government have been entrusted with 
power and authority, under the Constitution. Further, the wisdom of our 
Constitution is its categorical rejection of exclusionary claims to powers of 
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governance: its letter and spirit is suffused with the call for accountability, 
co-operation responsiveness and openness.
87
 
Mutunga CJ concluded his advisory opinion by also underscoring the spirit of checks and 
balances and cooperative approaches to the sharing of resources. He asserted that „[b]oth 
Houses of Parliament represent the same people, and the resources at the core of this dispute, 
are owned by the people of Kenya. In the equitable distribution of resources owned by the 
people of Kenya, the principles of checks and balances, mediation, dialogue, collaboration, 
consultation, and interdependence are not necessarily conflictual, granted that they are all 
invoked in the interests of the people of Kenya‟.88 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 220(2)(c) requiring national legislation to provide for 
„the form and manner of consultation between the national government and county 
governments in the process of preparing plans and budgets‟, the Public Finance Management 
Act
89
 has provided for the establishment of an Intergovernmental Budget and Economic 
Council. The Council comprises the Deputy President, a representative of the Parliamentary 
Service Commission, a representative of the Judicial Service Commission, the Chairman of 
the CRA, the Chairperson of the Council of County Governors, every County Executive 
Committee member for finance, and the Cabinet Secretary responsible for intergovernmental 
relations.
90
 The Council provides a forum for intergovernmental relations and consultation on 
various matters relating to finances.
91
 
4 Intergovernmental disputes and their resolution 
Although cooperative government and consultation were designed as mechanisms of 
avoiding intergovernmental disputes, the nature of multilevel governance is such that there 
are occasions when avoidance fails, and disputes over functions, powers and resources 
arise.
92
 In such an event, the Constitution provides for how the disputes must be resolved in 
an amicable manner before resorting to adversarial litigation. Articles 189(3) and (4) impose 
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a fifth obligation which relates to settlement of intergovernmental disputes: „In any dispute 
between governments, the governments shall make every reasonable effort to settle the 
dispute, including by means of procedures provided under national legislation‟. The 
provisions establish an obligation to avoid adversarial litigation and make every reasonable 
effort to settle disputes through other means. 
4.1 The rationale of the obligation 
Three major reasons why governments must avoid adversarial litigation when dealing with 
intergovernmental disputes are identified. First, a major aim is to encourage a culture of 
solving society‟s problems by building political compromises at the political level. In the 
First Certification judgment, the South African Constitutional Court explained the reason for 
this requirement in the South African Constitution
93
 as being the need to resolve disputes at a 
political level.
94
 This requirement compels governments at the two levels to work out 
differences and disputes among themselves in the political arena, which affirms the process 
of cooperative devolved government.
95
 A similar sentiment is reflected in Article 6(2) which 
calls for „mutual relations‟ based on consultation and cooperation as opposed to adversarial 
approaches that may strain relations. The High Court in Okiya Omtatah Okoiti reasoned „that 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms should be sought in the first instance so as not to 
strain the relationship between the national government and the county governments and in 
the case of counties, among themselves‟.96 This should contribute to much needed national 
integration and cohesion. 
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Secondly, the nature of some intergovernmental disputes is such that they are suited for 
resolution politically through non-judicial mechanisms, since they involve „policy choices 
and administrative judgments‟.97 Disputes relating to the duty to support and assist as well as 
supervision and intervention powers will be well suited for politically negotiated or mediated 
settlement.
98
 Furthermore, given the open-textured nature of the constitutional provisions on 
a number of issues, non-judicial mechanisms will easily render more pragmatic solutions to 
disputes than legal answers will. For example, disputes regarding the performance and 
exercise of concurrent functions and powers could easily be resolved through political 
compromises, without having to resort to litigation in terms of Article 191. Likewise, issues 
relating to funding of additionally assigned and transferred functions will find easier answers 
in politically negotiated compromises than in judicial intervention. A good example is the 
provision that national government may require county government to implement within the 
county such national legislation or parts of it.
99
 
Thirdly, while adversarial adjudication often focuses on past acts and facts and finds in 
favour of one of the parties to the dispute, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms focus on 
and address the present and future interests of both parties.
100
 This addresses how they relate 
to each other and how their relationships could be structured in the future,
101
 a matter that is 
critical for cooperative intergovernmental relations. Thus, the governments are obliged to 
respect and arrange their activities in a manner that advances intergovernmental relations and 
bolsters co-operative governance.
102
 In the context of cooperative government, avoiding 
confrontational adversarial litigation may not only prevent damaging relationships, but may 
in fact enhance the relationships as the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms serve to 
educate the parties. The parties come to understand fully and better the interests and concerns 
of each other.
103
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Fourthly, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are more cost-effective and efficient 
methods of resolving disputes.
104
 Litigation is often very costly and time-consuming as 
decisions can be delayed for long, subjecting the implementation of policies and decisions to 
unnecessary delays.
105
 This will make it difficult for both national and county governments to 
move with speed and provide the urgently needed development and services.
106
 The public 
purse from which all derive their funding must therefore be protected from unnecessary 
expense arising out of litigation in matters that could easily be settled through other less 
expensive means.
107
 
This obligation gives rise to six important issues: (a) What constitutes an intergovernmental 
dispute?; (b) Who are the parties to an intergovernmental dispute?; (c) What is the nature and 
extent of the obligation to avoid adversarial litigation?; (d) What is the nature and extent of 
the obligation to settle disputes by other means?; (e) What are the non-judicial alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms?; (f) The role of the courts. 
4.1.1 What constitutes an intergovernmental dispute 
The obligation to avoid adversarial litigation applies only when there is an intergovernmental 
dispute. Two terms require examination: „dispute‟ and „intergovernmental‟. A dispute is 
defined as a specific disagreement over a matter of fact, law or policy in which one party 
makes a claim or assertion, while the other party refutes or counter-claims, resulting into a 
specific impasse over which the parties cannot agree as opposed to a broad and general 
disagreement about a problem.
108
 Since one aspect of the obligation is to avoid litigation in 
the courts, the dispute must be one that has legal aspects that can be resolved through court 
processes. This means that differences between levels of government that are merely political 
with no legal dimension that can be dealt with in the courts are not disputes for the purposes 
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of these provisions.
109
 „Intergovernmental‟ refers to the parties to the disputes, that is, 
between governments. 
4.1.2 The parties to an intergovernmental dispute 
Article 189(3) is concerned with „in any dispute between governments‟ which refers to the 
two levels of government and any state organs of government and entities within these levels 
of government; this includes counties and organs within counties.
110
 Section 30(2) of the 
Intergovernmental Disputes Act provides that the Act applies to „resolution of disputes 
arising (a) between the national government and a county government; or (b) amongst county 
governments‟.111 Not all organs of state should, however, be included. Given that alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms are justified because of the need to enter into political 
compromises and settlement, the parties to an intergovernmental dispute must be entities that 
have the power and are capable of entering into political compromises. These include the 
Chapter Fifteen commissions and independent offices, which are excluded because they 
should not enter into political compromises.
112
 The obligation, as per the definition, does not 
also include disputes that involve private citizens. In Republic v Transitional Authority and 
another Ex parte Medical Practitioners, Pharmacists and Dentists Union (KMPDU) and 2 
others,
113
 the High Court examined this issue and held that „[c]learly, that Part does not 
expressly apply to disputes by ordinary citizens arising from the exercise of powers by and 
obligations placed upon the Authority. To interpret the said provisions to include disputes by 
individuals who are aggrieved by actions or omissions of the authority would be 
overstretching the said provisions yet there is no ambiguity arising therefrom‟.114 But not 
every dispute involving the levels of government or organs of state within them qualifies as 
an intergovernmental dispute. 
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4.1.3 Dispute must involve exercise of state authority 
The purpose of the constitutional provisions on cooperative government and 
intergovernmental relations is to regulate relations of governments when they perform and 
exercise their constitutional governance functions and powers. Intergovernmental disputes 
can only arise when the governments act in the public law domain in exercise of their public 
power and state governance authority.
115
 This excludes relations created by private law from 
the category of intergovernmental disputes.
116
 While the broad authority of governments 
includes the power to enter into contracts of sale, „the enforcement of such [contracts] is the 
subject of private law and is not subject‟ to the principles and obligations of cooperative 
government and intergovernmental relations.
117
 
4.2 The obligation to avoid adversarial litigation 
The Constitution imposes an obligation on governments involved in an intergovernmental 
dispute to avoid adversarial litigation in preference for alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms as a first option. They must „make every reasonable effort‟ to settle the disputes 
by other means and procedures,
118
 
4.2.1 The nature of the obligation 
Article 189(3) requires the governments to „make every reasonable effort to settle the 
dispute‟ by means other than judicial intervention. These provisions are borrowed from the 
South African Constitution which requires all the three spheres of government to „make every 
reasonable effort‟ to settle disputes by means other than adversarial litigation.119 However, 
unlike the Kenyan provision, the South African Constitution goes further than this and 
prescribes that it „must exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the 
dispute‟.120 This South African text has been interpreted as incorporating only one and not 
two obligations. The Constitutional Court asserted in National Gambling Board v Premier of 
Kwa Zulu Natal and others that the governments are required to „comply with their obligation 
to try and resolve their disputes amicably‟ before approaching any court for adversarial 
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litigation.
121
 In the assessment of the Court, this obligation forms „an important aspect of 
cooperative government‟.122 
Despite this textual difference, „every reasonable effort‟ in the Kenyan provision should be 
interpreted to include the need to exhaust other remedies. In the circumstances, the manner in 
which the South African courts and scholars have interpreted their provisions should provide 
instructive lessons for Kenya when determining the nature and extent of the obligation 
created. In International Legal Consultancy Group, the Kenyan High Court observed that 
„before resulting to summons, the Senate should have sought consultations or mediation with 
the respective County Governors with regard to the concerns raised by the Controller of 
Budget‟s report‟.123 
The use of the phrase „every reasonable effort‟ implies an onerous obligation on the part of 
the governments which must make these efforts in good faith and with a commitment to 
resolving the dispute.
124
 Going through motions of alternative dispute resolution without any 
commitment and desire to reach a compromise would not suffice as „every reasonable effort‟, 
and a court to which the dispute is brought may refer it back to the governments to make 
every reasonable effort.
125
 This entails much more than an effort to settle a pending court 
case. The governments must not pay lip-service to this obligation as they are required to re-
evaluate their positions fundamentally.
126
 
The reasonableness of the effort must be determined taking into account both the disputed 
issues and the mechanisms of alternative dispute settlement that have been used. As will be 
discussed later, different mechanisms are more suitable for different types of disputes and a 
choice of a more suitable mechanism contributes to the reasonableness of the effort. 
Moreover, a choice of mechanisms that are illegal would be manifestly unreasonable.
127
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4.2.3 Enforcement of the obligation 
The obligation is binding on the governments and the courts must be astute to hold the 
governments to account for the steps they have actually taken to honour their cooperative 
governance obligations. In enforcing this obligation, the court must read Article 189(3) 
together with Article 159(2)(c) which requires it to promote „alternative forms of dispute 
resolution‟. The obligation to avoid litigation can be enforced by the courts, which have 
discretion to fashion appropriate remedies. Where a court is not satisfied that a government 
has made every reasonable effort, it may refer the dispute back to the governments in dispute 
on grounds that it is not yet ripe for litigation.
128
 By such referral, so that the governments 
explore other means and procedures, the Court would be encouraging cooperative 
government. In Ex parte Medical Practitioners, the High Court observed that „the Court is 
entitled to either stay the proceedings until such a time as the alternative remedy has been 
pursued or bring an end to the proceedings before the Court and leave the parties to pursue 
the alternative remedy‟.129 The South African Constitutional Court has asserted that the 
„courts must ensure that the duty is duly performed‟.130 Likewise, in National Gambling 
Board the Court declined to grant the parties direct access noting that „[t]he parties‟ failure to 
comply with the obligations of chapter 3 is sufficient ground for refusing direct access‟.131 
As the guardian of the Constitution, the Court must devise and formulate other remedies that 
can be used to give effect to the constitutional provisions. For example, in cases of 
intransigence which can be attributed to a state officer that is obviously abusing his or her 
office, an order of costs against the officer and not the government or institution would be an 
appropriate mechanism to enforce cooperative government obligations.
132
 
4.3 The non-judicial alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
Article 189(4) requires national legislation to be enacted to „provide for procedures for 
settling intergovernmental disputes by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including 
                                                 
128
 See Steytler (2001) 203. 
129
 Ex parte Medical Practitioners para 61. 
130
 Uthukela District Municipality and others v President of the Republic of South Africa and others 2002 (11) 
BCLR 1220 (CC) para 13.  
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 National Gambling Board para 37.  
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 See s 31 of the South African Division of Revenue Act 5 of 2002. 
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negotiation, mediation and arbitration.‟ The nature of the dispute must determine the choice 
of the dispute settlement mechanism. According to Steytler: 
A commission of inquiry is preferable where there is a dispute of fact. 
Conciliation is concerned with the future rather than with the unraveling of 
the past and is therefore appropriate for accommodating differences in 
policy. Arbitration and adjudication are again more suitable for disputes 
involving legal questions.
133
 
Some disputes may involve a combination of questions of fact, policy and the law, and may 
require a combination of mechanisms or one mechanism serving more functions.
134
 For 
example, negotiation could be combined with mediation which is then followed by 
arbitration.
135
 
4.3.1 Negotiation 
Negotiation is one of the processes of private decision-making by the parties themselves in 
which the parties control the process and the outcome. It involves bargaining by and between 
the parties to a dispute who seek to resolve the conflict between them through the exchange 
of resources or structuring of relationships.
136
 The process does not follow formal structured 
procedures as the parties who are in control can follow any method that is likely to yield 
results. 
4.3.2 Mediation 
Mediation introduces into the process of negotiation the services of an outsider called a 
mediator who facilitates the negotiations. The mediator must be an acceptable, impartial and 
neutral third party, whose main roles are to ease the tensions among the parties, create a 
conducive atmosphere for negotiation, and help the parties reach an agreement.
137
 Since the 
mediator is not an independent authority whose decisions are binding on the negotiating 
parties, he or she can only make proposals for a possible solution, which the parties who still 
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control the process may or may not accept. The mediator improves the negotiation process by 
introducing a measure of formality and structure.
138
 
4.3.3 Arbitration 
Arbitration involves the parties in dispute agreeing to appoint a neutral third party known as 
an arbitrator and giving him the authority to make a decision on their behalf.
139
 The arbitrator 
must be an impartial and neutral third party who makes a decision on the basis of the 
evidence and submissions adduced by the parties in dispute.
140
 The proceedings must follow 
procedures determined by the parties. As contrasted with a mediator whose decision is not 
binding on the parties, an arbitrator‟s decision is usually binding.141 
4.3.4 Other methods 
Article 189(4) uses the term „including‟, which means that the legislation is not limited to 
providing for negotiation, mediation and arbitration – it could identify other like methods and 
provide for them. For example, the legislation may provide for appointment of an 
independent commission of inquiry by the governments in dispute to establish the facts in 
dispute and make formal recommendations.
142
 The legislation could also provide for 
conciliation, which is a variant of mediation in which the mediator plays a more 
interventionist role by investigating the dispute independently and making formal 
recommendations regarding the terms of settlement of the dispute.
143
 The facilitator assists 
the parties to establish a positive and compromising relationship which corrects perceptions, 
reduces fears and improves communication.
144
 It must however be appreciated that there is a 
very fine line between mediation and conciliation.
145
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4.4 The role of the judiciary in intergovernmental relations 
Although the Constitution provides for and emphasises the need to settle intergovernmental 
disputes by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, it does not oust the jurisdiction of the 
courts from intergovernmental relations and disputes. Article 189(3) only requires the 
governments to „make every reasonable effort‟ to settle the disputes by alternative methods to 
be provided for by national legislation without completely precluding adversarial litigation. 
The South African courts have interpreted similar provisions as embodying discretion for the 
court to determine whether or not to hear a matter even where such other means have not 
been used or exhausted. In City of Cape Town v Premier of the Western Cape, the High Court 
of South Africa observed that: 
To disregard the provisions of section 40(4) of the Constitution, which vests 
in a court a discretion to hear a matter, even if not satisfied that the parties 
have made every reasonable effort to settle the dispute, would run counter to 
the provisions of section 34 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right of 
the individual to have any dispute resolved by the application of law, decided 
in a fair public hearing before a court.
146
 
Similarly, the Constitutional Court in the First Certification judgment noted that the 
requirement to use other means does not oust the jurisdiction of the courts or deprive any 
organ of government of the powers vested in it under the Constitution.
147
 
The Courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are the guardians of the Constitution and must 
have a final say in any dispute between the governments established under the Constitution. 
Requirement of alternative dispute resolution does not exclude the courts‟ jurisdiction but 
only prescribes what should happen before turning to the courts. Exceptional circumstances 
may exist which make alternative dispute resolution unnecessary and justify adjudication by 
the courts without first using other means or exhausting them. 
First, given that some of the disputes among the governments may be in respect of the 
different interpretations of constitutional provisions they may have, the courts become the 
correct avenue to render a determinative interpretation. Article 163(6) expressly provides that 
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 2008 (6) SA 345 (c) para 17. 
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 First Certification judgment para 291. See also Minister of Police and others v Premier of the Western Cape 
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„[t]he Supreme Court may give an advisory opinion at the request of the national government, 
any State organ, or any county government with respect to any matter concerning county 
government‟. The High Court and the Court of Appeal have jurisdiction in various 
constitutional interpretation matters that involve intergovernmental relations disputes.
148
 
These provisions must have been informed by the recognition of the fact that questions of 
interpretation are better suited for judicial intervention than alternative dispute resolution. 
A matter concerning county government may involve the constitutional status of county 
government as a government, the functions and powers of the county government or even the 
resources that county governments are entitled to. In effect, these are matters of 
intergovernmental relations. It may even involve the composition of the two houses of 
Parliament, as was the case in the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the 
National Assembly and the Senate
149
 in which the Supreme Court was called upon to give an 
Advisory Opinion about whether the not-more-than-two-thirds gender representation rule in 
either of the houses was to be implemented immediately or progressively. The Court found 
that „[t]he gender composition of both the National Assembly and the Senate, if it could touch 
on the constitutionality of these organs is an issue bearing impact on county government‟ and 
is therefore a matter concerning counties.
150
 Given the novel and far-reaching nature of the 
innovations of Kenya‟s devolved system, the Supreme Court emphasised the important role 
of the judiciary in the intergovernmental relations by giving its advice on matters relating to 
the new system. It stated: 
The Court recognizes, however, that its Advisory Opinion is an important 
avenue for settling matters of great public importance which may not be 
suitable for conventional mechanisms of justiciability. Such novel situations 
have clear evidence under the new Constitution, which has come with far-
reaching innovations, such as those reflected in the institutions of county 
government. The realization of such a devolved governance scheme raises a 
variety of structural, management and operational challenges unbeknown to 
traditional dispute settlement. This is the typical situation in which the 
Supreme Court‟s Advisory-Opinion jurisdiction will be most propitious; and 
                                                 
148
 Arts 165(3) and (6), and 164(3).  
149
 [2012] eKLR (Gender Representation).  
150
 Gender Representation para 20.  
 
 
 
 
378 
 
Chapter 9: Cooperative government and intergovernmental relations 
where such is the case, an obligation rests on the Court to render an opinion 
in accordance with the Constitution.
151
 
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, the judiciary will have an opportunity to police and 
enforce the devolution bargain and balance of power between the two levels of government. 
The Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate has endorsed this view, noting that the „Courts 
must patrol Kenya‟s constitutional boundaries with vigor, and affirm new institutions, as they 
exercise their constitutional mandates, being conscious that their very infancy exposes them 
not only to the vagaries and fragilities inherent in all transitions, but also to the proclivities of 
the old order‟.152 
Secondly, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms cannot be used to negotiate 
unconstitutional positions.
153
 The governments cannot negotiate and contract themselves out 
of the basic principle of constitutional supremacy as this would be unconstitutional and 
invalid. Indeed, any third party who is not bound by the cooperative government obligations 
can challenge any unconstitutional or illegal attempt to reach a political compromise or 
settlement.
154
 Settlement of disputes by other means must be done constitutionally and in the 
interest of the people. Thus, although private citizens are not parties to intergovernmental 
disputes and are not bound by the cooperative government obligations, they have stakes in 
the manner in which political compromises are arrived at. They have an interest in ensuring 
that the governments operate constitutionally and can therefore challenge any political 
compromise that is unconstitutional. 
Thirdly, there will be no need to refer the dispute back to the parties, as it would serve no 
value where parties have already taken firm positions. While one party may genuinely want 
to negotiate, the other may be intransigent or use negotiation as merely a delaying tactic.
155
 If 
a party to a dispute becomes intransigent, pays lip-service to the efforts to settle the matter by 
other means, or deliberately creates a dispute by acting in a manner it knows is wrong, or on 
the basis of ulterior motives, the Court must be free to adjudicate in the matter without 
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insisting on every reasonable effort first being made. It is for this reason that the Supreme 
Court in Speaker of the Senate decried the refusal by the Speaker of the National Assembly to 
resort to mediation in resolving the disagreement with the Senate. The Court asserted that 
„[s]uch course of action is precisely what Archibald Cox had in mind: “If one arm of 
government cannot or will not solve an insistent problem, the pressure falls upon another”. 
The pressure now falls on the Supreme Court.‟156 
Fourthly, even where the Constitution makes provision for specific alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms, the judiciary as the final arbiter of the Constitution, retains 
supervisory powers which it can use to review the non-judicial processes.
157
 For example, for 
cases of intervention in terms of Article 190 and suspension of county government in terms 
of Article 192, non-judicial mechanisms are envisaged. The Senate is even empowered to 
terminate the intervention or suspension. It is submitted that a county government dissatisfied 
with the manner in which the non-judicial mechanisms have been used can approach the 
Courts for review. Likewise, a county dissatisfied with the manner in which the non-judicial 
mechanisms have been used in stoppage of transfer of funds under Article 225 can also seek 
judicial intervention. 
5 Conclusion 
A purposive interpretation reveals that there is sufficient provision in the Constitution about 
how to manage intergovernmental relations and dispute resolution among the levels of 
government established under the Kenyan devolved system. First, the constitutional choice of 
a cooperative as opposed to a competitive devolved system of government was a deliberate 
one aimed at providing intergovernmental relations that urge cooperation and avoidance of 
disputes. Cooperative government imposes obligations upon the governments to cooperate, 
consult and respect each other. Secondly, even when disputes cannot be avoided, and 
therefore arise, the Constitution provides for resolution of such disputes through mechanisms 
and procedures that avoid litigation in the first instance. The governments must make every 
reasonable effort to resolve the disputes by means other than judicial intervention. This 
requirement does not, however, oust the jurisdiction of the judiciary, which is assigned a 
critical role in not only intergovernmental relations but also in the settlement of disputes. 
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Since the concept of cooperative government borrowed from the South African Constitution, 
South African jurisprudence and scholarship have provided very useful lessons in the 
interpretation of the Kenyan provisions. These have been relevant in respect of the notions of 
distinct and interdependent governments, and the obligations to respect, consult and to avoid 
resolution of disputes through litigation. They have also been relevant in respect of the role of 
the courts in intergovernmental relations including when they can decline to deal with a 
dispute and refer it back to the parties, and the circumstances under which they can adjudicate 
before other means have been used. The overall conclusion is that effective cooperative 
government is critical to the realisation of a fully devolved system of government. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
The Senate as an institution of shared rule 
1 Introduction 
As part of the institutional framework for cooperative intergovernmental relations discussed 
in Chapter Nine, the national legislature is conceptualised and designed as a bicameral body, 
comprising the National Assembly and the Senate.
1
 The Senate is the chamber through which 
counties are represented and participate in policy-making on county matters at the national 
level of government, as part of the institutional framework for „shared-rule.‟2 The Senate is 
thus one of the important structural pillars that support and protect the devolved system of 
government.
3
 This chapter examines the constitutional provisions on the nature of the Senate, 
its nexus with devolution, its composition and election, its legislative and other functions, its 
decision-making processes, and its relations with counties and county governments. 
2 The Senate as an integral part of devolution 
The design of the Constitution places it on the list of constitutional systems in which a 
bicameral parliament
4
 is an integral part of devolution.
5
 While the National Assembly‟s role 
is to represent „the people of the constituencies and special interests,‟6 the Senate „represents 
the counties, and serves to protect the interests of the counties and their governments‟.7 The 
Senate provides a forum for the representation and protection of the counties and their 
governments as well as their interests in the decision-making processes at the national level, 
and the participation of the counties and indirectly their governments in such processes. In 
effect the Senate represents both the people organised along the lines of the counties and the 
county governments, creating an arrangement in which the two houses represent different 
                                                 
1
 Article 93. 
2
 See Art 96. 
3
 See Chaps 7 and 8. 
4
 For a history of second chambers see Preece AA „Bicameralism at the end of the second millennium‟ (2000) 
21 University of Queensland Law Journal 67-84  
5
 See Dinan J „United States of America‟ in Le Roy K & Saunders C (eds) Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
Governance in Federal Countries (2006) 318, where he examines how the American bicameral legislature was 
conceived as part and parcel of the federal arrangement. 
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interests of the people.
8
 This creates a nexus between devolution and the Senate which 
provides a forum through which the counties and their governments engage in decision-
making at the national level.
9
 This nexus is reflected in the composition and election of the 
Senate, its decision-making processes, and its mandate, powers and functions. 
In Re: the Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission,
10
 the Supreme Court 
recognised the nexus between bicameralism and devolution, and viewed Parliament as a 
shared institution: 
Many offices established by the Constitution are shared by the two levels of 
government, as is clear from the terms of the Fourth Schedule which makes a 
„distribution of functions between the national government and county 
governments‟…We have taken note too that the Senate (which brings 
together County interests at the national level) and the National Assembly (a 
typical organ of national government) deal expressly with matters affecting 
county government; and that certain crucial governance functions at both the 
national and county level – such as finance, budget and planning, public 
service, land ownership and management, elections, administration of justice 
– dovetail into each other and operate in unity.11 
In Speaker of the Senate and another v Attorney General and others, the Supreme Court after 
emphasising that the people have established a system of governance defined by particular 
                                                 
8
 Speaker of the Senate and another v Attorney General and others [2013] eKLR (Speaker of the Senate) (para 
197) the Supreme Court noted that „[b]oth Houses of Parliament represent the same people‟.  
9
 Saunders C „Legislative, executive, and judicial institutions: A synthesis‟ in Le Roy K & Saunders C (eds) 
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries (2006) 344, 356 where she states thus: 
„Bicameralism has become accepted as the most obvious mechanism by which the constituent units can play a 
role in national institutions and thus be a key component of the arrangements for shared rule.‟ See also Watts 
RL Federal Second Chambers Compared, a Paper Presented at a Conference on „Federalizing Process in Italy: 
Comparative Perspectives.‟ An International Conference Organised by the Department for Institutional 
Reforms, Italy, and the Forum of Federations, Rome, February 17-19, 2010, 2 where he refers to Amellier who 
is among those who argue that bicameral federal legislatures are by definition a characteristic feature of a 
federal system. Note, however, that Watts states that there are federal countries without second chambers of 
parliament. 
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concepts and values such as devolution, observed that „[a] fundamental element in the 
scaffolding structure for the said constitutional principles and values is the institutional 
scheme of bicameralism in the legislative arrangements; and this is the dual-chamber set up 
in the institutions of law-making‟.12 This conceptualisation and design of the national 
legislature as an integral part of devolution
13
 is consistent with comparative experience in 
other countries with multi-level systems of government.
14
 
3 The composition and election of the Senate 
The composition and election of the Kenyan Senate are governed by Article 98(1) which 
provides for different categories of membership and modes of election. There are 47 
members directly elected by each county, 16 women members, two members representing the 
youth, two members representing persons with disabilities, and the Speaker. These can be 
divided into three broad categories: the county Senators; the special interest Senators; and the 
Speaker. 
3.1 The county Senators 
Article 98(1)(a) provides for one Senator for every county who represents and protects both 
the county and its people, and the government of the county. The representation of each 
county by one member reflects the principle of equality of representation of all the counties 
regardless of differences in demography and geographical size. This is the case in a number 
of federal systems with bicameral legislatures.
15
 
                                                 
12
 Speaker of the Senate paras 136 and 139 (emphasis in the original).  
13
 Task Force on Devolved Government Final Report on Devolved Government in Kenya: Developmental 
Devolved Government for Effective and Sustainable Counties (2011) 17. 
14
 Patterson S & Mughan A Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World (1999) 2; Norton P „Adding 
value? The role of second chambers‟ (2007) 15:1 Asia Pacific Law Review 7; and Swenden W „Subnational 
participation in national decisions: The role of second chambers‟ in Enderlin H, Walti S and Zurn M (eds) 
Handbook on Multilevel Governance (2010) 103-23. 
15
 See Watts RL Federal Second Chambers Compared (2010) 7 where he observes that out of 18 federations 9 – 
namely, United States of America, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia and South 
Africa – have equal representation of the constituent units, but the rest do not, although they make efforts to 
weight representation in favour of smaller regional units or significant minorities.  
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3.2 The special interests Senators 
Article 98(1) provides for three categories of special interest senators: women senators; 
senators representing the youth; and senators representing persons with disabilities. These 
three categories of Senators should be understood as special interest groups that were 
previously marginalised and whom the Constitution offers an opportunity for representation, 
protection and participation. Persons who themselves belong to these categories must be 
nominated to represent them. In Commissioner for the Implementation of the Constitution v 
Attorney-General and others,
16
 the Court of Appeal declared section 34(9) of the Election 
Act, which provided for the inclusion of Presidential and Deputy Presidential candidates 
among persons eligible for nomination to the Senate under these special interest groups, 
unconstitutional. The Court viewed these groups as having been previously marginalised and 
denied a chance to participate in governance institutions. It therefore understood the rationale 
of the special seats as being „to open up political space for entry and participation of persons, 
groups and categories of people who, due to various disadvantages and vulnerabilities, have 
historically been unable or incapable of generally and effectively finding their way through a 
strictly competitive methodology and have thus been relegated to the peripheries of the 
political playground‟.17 
Although the members of these special interest groups are elected to the Senate through party 
lists on the basis of proportional representation,
18
 this is not the orthodox method in which the 
number of seats due to a political party is determined by the total votes the party received. 
Rather, it is based on the total number of seats the party wins out of the 47 county Senators 
who are directly elected by the registered voters in the counties.
19
 The persons must however 
first meet all the qualifications set out for members of Parliament.
20
 These include attainment 
of the age of 18 years required for registration as a voter. These special interest senators are 
included in the Senate as recognition of the Constitution‟s commitment to inclusivity and 
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 [2013] eKLR (Commissioner for the Implementation of the Constitution). 
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 Commissioner for the Implementation of the Constitution para 55.  
18
 Arts 98(2) and 90.  
19
 Art 90(3).  
20
 Art 99. 
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protection of previously marginalised groups and communities without detracting from and 
undermining the role of the Senate as representative of the counties in the devolved system.
21
 
3.2.1 Women Senators 
Article 98(1)(b) provides for 16 women members who are elected through nomination by 
political parties according to their proportion of members of the county Senators. These 
members are elected in accordance with Article 90(2) which, in part, requires each political 
party participating in the general elections to nominate and submit in advance of the elections 
a list of 16 women members who would stand elected if the party were to be entitled to all the 
16 seats.
22
 After the general election, each party is then allocated women members in 
proportion to the total of its elected county Senators,
23
 picked from the submitted party list. 
The responsibility for the election of these women members is shared between the political 
parties and the Electoral and Boundaries Commission. The political parties are responsible 
for the preparation and submission to the IEBC, long before the election date, of lists of the 
women nominees.
24
 They must ensure that the party lists reflect the regional and ethnic 
diversity of the people of Kenya,
25
 and that the nominated women meet the qualifications for 
election as Senators. The IEBC, on the other hand, has the responsibility to receive, scrutinise 
and confirm that the lists comply with the requirements of the Constitution and other laws, 
failing which the IEBC must reject such a list. In Lydia Mathia v Naisula Lesuuda and 
Another the High Court held that „the IEBC should have rejected the list and asked the TNA 
[The National Alliance Party] to resubmit another list in compliance with the requirements 
that IEBC had sought from TNA. Article 90(2)(c) bestows upon IEBC the responsibility of 
ensuring that the party lists met certain criteria set out in the Constitution and legislation.‟26 
After the election of the county Senators, the IEBC is responsible for determining the 
                                                 
21
 Art 10 of the Constitution includes inclusiveness and protection of marginalised groups among the values of 
governance.  
22
 Art 90(2) (a). 
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 Art 90(3).  
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 Art 90(2)(c). 
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proportion of each political party, and allocating to it women members from its submitted 
party list.
27
 
Article 90(2)(b) expressly excludes the women lists from order of priority thus: „[E]xcept in 
the case of the seats provided for under Article 98(1)(b), each party list comprises the 
appropriate number of qualified candidates and alternates between male and female 
candidates in the priority in which they are listed.‟ The parties, however, have the discretion 
to arrange the list in their own order of priority. The lists must, however, reflect the regional 
and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya. In Lydia Mathia, the High Court, after quoting 
Article 90(2)(b), held that in designating the 16 women from the party lists, the IEBC can 
depart from the order of priority to ensure regional and ethnic diversity. It stated: „The plain 
meaning of this sub-article is that with the women nominated to the Senate IEBC had the 
mandate to designate, bearing in mind regional and ethnic diversity of the nominees and not 
necessarily looking at the order of priority in which nominees were listed.‟28 
It is argued that although Article 90 appears to empower the IEBC to designate which women 
from the party lists are duly elected for each political party, the provision does not empower 
the IEBC to pick and choose from the lists in total disregard of any priority set out by the 
parties. The correct interpretation is that where the list does not reflect the regional and ethnic 
diversity of the people of Kenya, the IEBC should reject the list and ask the concerned party 
to present a compliant list. This can be done at any stage before the final designation of the 
women duly elected. While the IEBC has the responsibility of ensuring that regional and 
ethnic diversity is reflected, it must be protected from being drawn into the politics of picking 
and choosing for the political parties. 
Even though the Constitution does not expressly state which interests the 16 women 
represent, they should be understood to represent women since the Constitution has sought to 
ensure inclusivity and gender equity in representative bodies. In practice, these women might 
end up representing the interests of the political parties that nominated them and not the 
women. This does not, however, imply a broad mandate to represent women on any matter, 
but is limited to matters in which the Senate is mandated to play a role. Even in such matters, 
                                                 
27
 See Art 90(3) and s 36(4) of the Election Act which provides that „[w]ithin thirty days after the declaration of 
the election results, the Commission shall designate, from each qualifying list, the party representatives on the 
basis of proportional representation‟.  
28
 Lydia Mathia 23. 
 
 
 
 
387 
 
Chapter 10: The Senate as an institution of shared rule 
the role of these 16 women in decision-making in the Senate is divided into two: decision-
making in matters affecting counties and decision-making in matters that do not affect 
counties. Article 123(2) and (4) prescribe that in matters affecting counties, the women 
senators do not have individual votes. They instead must consult and share their concerns 
with the county Senators who cast one vote each on the basis of equality among the counties. 
In matters that do not affect counties, all Senators, including these women Senators, have 
individual votes. However, given the very broad definition of matters affecting counties, 
other than constitutional amendments that do not affect counties, matters that fall into this 
category are very few.
29
 Firstly, the Senate‟s legislative mandate is limited to Bills 
concerning counties, which, it is submitted, are matters affecting counties in which the 16 
women have no individual vote. Secondly, in matters that are not Bills, Article 123(2) 
requires the Speaker to first rule on whether or not the matter affects counties, and where it 
does not, the 16 women members would have individual votes along with the other 
Senators.
30
 
3.2.2 Senators representing the youth 
Article 98(1)(c) provides for two members, one from each gender, representing the youth, 
who must be elected in accordance with Article 90 on the basis of political party lists 
presented before the election date.
31
 Since there are only two seats, the implication of Article 
90 is that even if all parties present lists, at best only two parties – the majority and the 
second largest party – stand a chance to share the positions. Each gets one member and if the 
first party gets a male member, the other must settle for a female member.
32
 
Although Article 98(1)(c) refers to members „representing the youth,‟ creating the impression 
that any person who is not a youth could be nominated to represent the youth, it is submitted 
that, as already noted, these members must themselves be youth.
33
 Article 260 of the 
Constitution defines youth as being the collectivity of all individuals in Kenya who have 
attained the age of 18 years but have not attained the age of 35 years. This definition is 
                                                 
29
 See Art 110 defining Bills concerning counties; and Interim Independent Electoral Commission para 39 where 
the Supreme Court defined concerning county government in very broad terms.  
30
 Art 123(3).  
31
 Arts 98(2) and 90(2). 
32
 Art 90(2)(b) and (c).  
33
 Commissioner for the Implementation of the Constitution para 55. 
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consistent with age 18 years which is identified as the age of adulthood at which a person 
qualifies to be registered as a voter and becomes eligible to vote, and stand for election to 
political office.
34
 Youth for purposes of Article 98(1)(c) must thus be persons between age 18 
and 34 years. 
Senate members under this category must be youth not only at the time of nomination but 
throughout the entire five-year term. If a person ceases to be a youth before the end of the 
term, he or she must cease to be a member of the Senate because the composition 
requirements provided for by Article 98(1) also act as qualifications. 
The senators do not have broad mandate to represent youth on all matters since, like the 16 
women, their mandate is limited to bringing on board the youth perspective on matters in 
which the Senate has a role. The role of these members is also subject to the decision-making 
limitations identified under Article 123. 
3.2.3 Senators representing persons with disabilities 
Article 98(1)(d) provides for two members, one from each gender, to represent persons with 
disabilities, who must be elected in accordance with Article 90 on the basis of political party 
lists presented before the election date.
35
 Once again, the best that can happen in this case is 
for two parties – the majority party and the second largest party – getting one member each. 
This reduces the role of the IEBC to allocating the two seats to the two parties. If the majority 
party gets a male member, then the other party must produce a female member. 
Although Article 98(1)(d) refers to members „representing persons with disabilities,‟ it is 
submitted that these members must themselves be persons with disabilities.
36
 Article 260 
defines disability as including „any physical, sensory, mental, psychological or other 
impairment, condition or illness that has, or is perceived by significant sectors of the 
community to have, a substantial or long-term effect on an individual‟s ability to carry out 
                                                 
34
 Art 83(1)(a) as read with the Registration of Persons Act. See also African Union The African Youth Charter 
(2006) which defines youth as young people falling between the ages of 15 and 35 years. See also Commission 
of the European Communities Youth, Investing and Empowering (2009) EU Youth Report 6 
http://ec.europa.eu/youth/documents/youth_report_final.pdf (accessed 13 October 2013); and Government of the 
Republic of South Africa The National Youth Policy (2009-2014), which however provides for the age of 14 to 
35 years. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/medislib/downloads/home/publications (accessed 13 October 2013).  
35
 Arts 98(2) and 90(2). 
36
 Commissioner for the Implementation of the Constitution para 55. 
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ordinary day-to-day activities‟. These two aspects – perception by sectors of the community 
and the effect on participation in day-to-day activities – incorporate elements of the social 
approach to the definition of disability envisioned by the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
37
 Article 98(1)(c) should therefore be understood in this 
context as providing an opportunity for persons with disabilities to be members of and 
participate in the Senate. Although the broadness of this definition implies a diversity of 
disability, which as a matter of practice should be considered in the preparation of the party 
lists, the IEBC cannot depart from the prioritisation of the party lists on the basis of this 
diversity of disability. In Ben Njoroge and another v Independent Electoral Boundaries 
Commission (I.E.B.C) and others,
38
 the High Court rejected an attempt by the IEBC to depart 
from the order of priority in the party lists on grounds of diversity of disability. Ougo J stated 
that: 
The wording of Article 98(2)(c) in my view is mandatory in that IEBC‟s 
mandate was to consider the party lists in order of priority in which the 
nominees were listed. To argue that they had to achieve the principle of 
diversity and ensure the two disabilities of physical and visual were 
represented and that they had to strike a balance in my view was wrong in 
light of Article 90(2)(b) of the Constitution.
39
 
Compared to the Lydia Mathia decision, this appears to be a correct interpretation as it does 
not draw the IEBC into the politics of political parties. 
                                                 
37
 The Convention recognises that disability is an evolving concept and „results from interaction between 
persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinder their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others‟. It therefore focuses more on the external, attitudinal and 
environmental barriers which hinder the persons with disabilities from participating fully in the activities of 
society and seeks to address them. It sees the external barriers as the problem and not the impairments 
themselves. See UNHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Monitoring the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Guidance for Human Rights Monitors (2010) Professional Training 
Services No 17. 
38
 [2013] eKLR (Ben Njoroge) 17. 
39
 Ben Njoroge 16. 
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3.2.4 The Speaker as an ex officio member 
Article 98(1)(e) provides for a Speaker of the Senate who must be an ex officio member of 
the Senate. The Speaker is elected by the members of the Senate from among persons 
qualified for election as members of Parliament but who are not such members.
40
 In practice 
the majority party candidate would easily win the seat. The Speaker‟s primary responsibility 
is to preside over the sittings and proceedings of the Senate,
41
 and generally manage its 
processes. Other provisions of the Constitution, however, set out other very important 
constitutional responsibilities of the office of Speaker which constitute it as an important 
constitutional office.
42
 In Judicial Service Commission v Speaker of the National Assembly 
and another,
43
 the High Court of Kenya emphasised the importance of the office of the 
Speaker of the National Assembly and identified a number of its important roles and 
functions. The Speaker determines the business of the House, restrains disorderly conduct, 
and controls debate. He or she determines „whether motions tabled by members of Parliament 
are admissible. If they are in violation of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, he may 
propose changes or rule that they are inadmissible.‟44 The Speaker „is the representative of 
the House in relation to other organs and authorities such as the Presidency and the Senate‟, 
and „his rulings are binding precedents‟ in the House.45 The Court then concluded that the 
Speaker is „the presiding and principal officer of the National Assembly on whose shoulders 
lie the responsibility for the proper constitutional conduct of proceedings and decisions in the 
National Assembly‟.46 Quoting from a Tanzanian High Court decision in Hon Augustine 
Lyatonga Mrema v Speaker of the National Assembly and another, the Court added that the 
Speaker is „the chief functionary and constitutional head‟ who is required „to discharge duties 
of a judicial or interpretative character, having finality attached to the same‟.47 These 
                                                 
40
 Art 106(1)(a). 
41
 Art 107(1). 
42
 See for example Art 110(3) which provides for determination by the Speakers of the question whether a Bill 
concerns counties or not, and if so, whether it is an ordinary or special Bill.  
43
 [2014] eKLR (Judicial Service Commission). 
44
 Judicial Service Commission para 85. 
45
 Judicial Service Commission para 86.  
46
 Judicial Service Commission para 87. 
47
 Judicial Service Commission para 87. 
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responsibilities detailed for the Speaker of the National Assembly are equally applicable to 
the Speaker of the Senate. 
The Speaker has no vote and where there is a tie, the question is lost,
48
 and is not even 
counted when determining the number of members of the Senate for purposes of voting.
49
 
The functions of the office must be discharged in an independent and impartial manner, and 
in good faith, especially given that this is a constitutional public office constituted by one 
person. The Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate underscored the importance of the office 
of Speaker, particularly its „role of the presiding officer‟, which it regarded as critical.50 After 
decrying the manner in which the Speaker of the National Assembly had conducted himself, 
the Court observed: 
[W]e categorically affirm that lawful public-agency conduct under Kenya‟s 
Constitution, requires every State agent to grapple, in good faith, with 
assigned obligations, and with a clear commitment to inter-agency harmony 
and co-operation. No State agency, especially where it is represented by one 
person, should overlook the historical trajectory of the Constitution, which is 
clearly marked by transition from narrow platforms of idiosyncrasy or sheer 
might, to a scheme of progressive, accountable institutional interplays.
51
 
In discharging the responsibilities of this office, the Speaker of the Senate must thus remain 
focused on the primary mandate of the Senate, which is to represent and protect the interests 
of the counties and their governments. 
3.2.5 Decision-making in the Senate 
Article 123 distinguishes between matters which affect counties and those which do not. 
Where the matter does not concern the counties the vote is cast by the individual Senators 
                                                 
48
 Art 122(2)(a) and (b). 
49
 Art 122(4). 
50
 Speaker of the Senate para 140. 
51
 Speaker of the Senate para 146. See also Lekota and Another v Speaker, National Assembly and Another 
[2012] ZAWCHC 385 para 12, where the Western Cape High Court stated that: „The trite principle is that the 
Speaker, although affiliated to a political party, is required to perform the functions of the office fairly and 
impartially in the interests of the National Assembly and Parliament.‟ 
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including the special interest Senators and the total votes possible in the Senate are 67.
52
 
Where, however, the matter concerns or affects counties, the special interest Senators have no 
individual vote.
53
 The votes belong to the 47 county Senators with each having only one vote 
which is cast by the county Senator, and the total votes possible in the Senate are 47.
54
 A 
simple „majority of all the delegations‟ determines the matter,55 and not merely a simple 
majority of the members present and voting. Article 122(1) prescribes that „[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided in this Constitution, any question proposed for decision in either House of 
Parliament shall be determined by a majority of the members in that House, present and 
voting‟. It is submitted that Article 123(4)(c) provides otherwise. Where, due to the special 
interest Senators, a county has more than one Senator, such Senators constitute a single 
delegation for the county and must consult with the other Senator on which way he or she 
should cast the vote for the county.
56
 The provision aims at achieving equality of the counties 
in decision-making in matters that affect the counties.
57
 A special interest senator is linked to 
a county by the place where he or she is registered as a voter.
58
 
3.3 The obligation to consult the county governments 
Article 96(1) provides that the „Senate represents the counties, and serves to protect the 
interests of the counties and their governments‟. This provision refers to representation and 
                                                 
52
 Art 123(3). 
53
 Art 123(4). 
54
 Art 123(4)(a). 
55
 Art 123(4)(c). 
56
 Art 123(1) and (4)(b). 
57
 This approach draws from both the German and the South African approaches. Section 60 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, for example, provides for representation of each province in the National 
Council of Provinces by a single delegation of ten members comprising six permanent delegates and four 
special delegates with the Premier of the province or a delegate designated by him heading the delegation. These 
provisions capture and give effect to the principle of equality of representation to the provinces. Section 65(1) 
provides that „each province has one vote, which is cast on behalf of the province by the head of its delegation‟. 
The Constitution draws a distinction between bills that can be passed by the National Council of Provinces on 
the basis of the nine votes belonging to provinces and cast following instructions or mandates from the 
provincial legislatures in terms of section 76, and bills that are passed on the basis of the individual members of 
the National Council of Provinces in terms of section 75. Where the votes belong to the provinces, the equality 
principle is adhered to; but not where they belong to individual members. See also Murray C & Simeon R „From 
paper to practice: the National Council of Provinces after its first year‟ (1999) 14 (1) SA Public Law 102.  
58
 Art 123(1).  
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protection of two distinct entities. First, the Senate represents and protects the counties and 
their people. This is the normal duty of representation which is similar to that of members of 
the National Assembly or members of Parliament in a unicameral legislature. Their 
representation and protection is based on their election mandate and continuous engagement 
with the voters as a whole. The question is thus: how can senators represent and protect the 
county governments, bodies that can articulate their own interest clearly? The only answer is 
that the Constitution implicitly imposes an obligation for formal communication between the 
Senate and the governments of the counties in matters that affect counties. It is submitted that 
there is an obligation to consult the governments of the counties on matters touching on the 
interests of the counties and those of their governments. Thus, the duty to consult may 
include direct invitation to county governments – both the county governor and his or her 
executive committee, and the county assemblies, to comment on any bill the Senate is 
considering. The Senate‟s duty to consult with the counties may impact on the validity of the 
decisions it ultimately makes not following an appropriate participatory process with the 
county governments. 
Although there should also be a duty on individual Senators to consult their county 
governments in order to effectively represent and protect them, a failure to do so cannot 
impact on the validity of the business conducted by the Senate as a whole. The obligation 
falls upon and is enforceable against the institution and not the individual members of 
Parliament. 
Consultation, as discussed in Chapter Nine, entails a duty on the Senate to make conscious 
and deliberate efforts to seek the views of the county governments. It is argued that before it 
takes a decision, the Senate should invite the county governments and afford them reasonable 
opportunity to make their views known and, where necessary, allow for public hearings. It 
should consider their views in good faith before making its decisions. 
4 The mandate, functions and powers of the Senate 
The Constitution provides for two sets of mandates for the Senate – a legislative and an 
oversight function. It sets out the role and functions of Parliament as the repository of 
legislative authority, which derives from the people of Kenya,
59
 and entails the functions and 
powers of both the National Assembly and the Senate. This Senate‟s legislative mandate is 
                                                 
59
 Art 94(1). 
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divided into two categories: namely, Constitution Amendment Bills and other Bills 
concerning counties. 
 4.1 Legislative mandate in Constitution Amendment Bills 
A fundamental pillar of the Kenyan devolved system is the creation and protection of the 
levels of government and the entire system by the Constitution. Under this scheme, no level 
of government is a creature of any other, nor can a level of government abrogate the other 
except by constitutional change.
60
 For this reason, one level of government cannot be allowed 
to amend the Constitution, without the involvement and approval of the other level.
61
 If this 
were to happen, the level of government which has such power would be superior to the other 
level and may use such power to either abolish the other level or adjust the functions or 
resources of the other level of government. 
Thus, the first legislative role through which the Senate represents and protects the interests 
of the counties and their governments is to participate in the enactment of any proposed 
amendments to the Constitution. The Constitution does not leave the participation of the 
Senate in constitutional amendments to be determined by whether or not each constitutional 
amendment Bill concerns counties. Instead, Article 94 expressly provides that Parliament, of 
which the Senate is a part, may consider and pass amendments to the Constitution.
62
 In 
addition, Articles 256 and 257, which provide for amendment of the Constitution, give a role 
to both the National Assembly and the Senate. There are three types of constitutional 
amendments: amendments initiated by Parliament under Article 256; amendments 
commenced by popular initiative under Article 257; and amendments of entrenched 
provisions under Article 255, which require a referendum in addition to other processes to 
enact them. In all the three cases, both the National Assembly and the Senate must pass the 
                                                 
60
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 15.  
61
 See Kincaid J „Editor‟s Introduction: Federalism as a mode of governance‟ in Kincaid J (ed) Federalism Vol. 
1 (2011) xxvi where he observes that: „In order to preserve the balance of power between the general and 
constituent governments, neither the general nor the constituent governments can amend the federal (or national) 
constitution unilaterally; instead, the concurrent consent of the general government and a supermajority of the 
constituent governments is usually required for amendment‟. See also Stauffer T & Topperwien N „Balancing 
Self-Rule and Shared Rule‟ in Fleiner LRB & Fleiner T (eds) Federalism and Multiethnic States: The Case of 
Switzerland (2000) 41, 51-2 where they emphasise the need for shared institutions that ensure that neither of the 
two levels of government can interfere with the status of the other. 
62
 Art 94(3). 
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amendment before it can take effect. Thus, the Senate is empowered to participate in all 
constitutional amendment Bills. These bills must, however, still be classified following the 
procedure of determining whether the Bill concerns counties or not. The purpose of such 
classification is not to determine whether the Senate will participate, but whether the Bill 
must be passed in the Senate by the 67 individual votes or the 47 county votes. Second, the 
classification must determine whether the Bill seeks to amend entrenched provisions listed by 
Article 255 or not, in which event it must also go to a referendum. Third, given that the basic 
structure of the Constitution is non-amendable, the process must also establish whether the 
proposed amendment touches on the basic structure of the Constitution.
63
 
4.1.1 Amendments initiated by Parliament 
Article 256(1)(a) expressly provides for the participation of the Senate in the consideration, 
debate and passage of constitutional amendments initiated by Parliament by stating that the 
amendment Bill „may be introduced in either House of Parliament‟. The Bill must be allowed 
a gestation period of ninety days after the first reading in each of the two houses before going 
to the second reading.
64
 This provision aims at allowing reasonable time for members to 
reflect on the provisions of the Bill and their implications before it is passed. It also provides 
an opportunity for both houses of Parliament to „facilitate public participation and 
involvement‟65 by publicising the Bill and facilitating public discussion about it before the 
Bill is passed.
66
 Since the Senate represents and protects the interests of the counties and their 
governments, these provisions read together should be understood as imposing an obligation 
on the Senate to consult the county governments, which should also be given an opportunity 
to discuss the Bill and make their input before it is passed. 
Article 256(1)(d) prescribes that the Bill shall be passed if each of the houses passes it in both 
its second and third readings, „by not less than two-thirds of all the members of that House‟. 
In the case of the Senate, „all members of that House‟ will be determined by whether the 
amendment Bill affects counties or not. If it is a Bill that does not affect counties within the 
meaning of Article 110(1), then „all the members‟ must refer to the 67 individual votes of the 
                                                 
63
 See section 2.3 of Chap 4. 
64
 Art 256(1)(c).  
65
 Art 118(1)(b). 
66
 Art 256(2). 
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Senators. But where the Bill affects counties, „all the members‟ must refer to the 47 county 
delegation votes. 
4.1.2 Popular initiative amendments 
Article 257 provides for constitutional amendments commenced by popular initiative. Such 
initiative may be „in the form of a general suggestion or a formulated draft Bill‟67 which must 
be „signed by at least one million registered voters‟.68 If the initiative is in the form of a 
general suggestion, its promoters must formulate it into a draft Bill before submitting it 
together with the supporting signatures to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission.
69
 Upon verifying the draft Bill and the signatures, the IEBC must submit the 
Bill to each county assembly for consideration within three months from the date of its 
submission to the IEBC.
70
 A county assembly may consider and approve the Bill within three 
months of receiving it and through its speaker deliver the same jointly to the Speakers of the 
two houses of Parliament, with a certificate that the county assembly has approved the Bill. 
If the draft Bill gets approved by a majority of the county assemblies, it is introduced in 
Parliament without delay to be considered and passed by each of the two houses.
71
 The Bill is 
passed if it is supported by a majority of the members of each house.
72
 Once again, „members 
of each house‟ in the case of the Senate will be either 67 or 47 depending on whether the Bill 
affects counties or not. Likewise, the Senate would be expected to consult the county 
governments. Where Parliament passes the Bill, it is submitted to the President for assent.
73
 
Where, however, either of the houses fails to pass the Bill, or where the Bill relates to 
entrenched provisions, the proposed amendment is submitted to the people in a referendum.
74
 
                                                 
67
 Art 257(2). 
68
 Art 257(1). 
69
 Art 257(3) and (4).  
70
 Art 257(4) and(5).  
71
 Art 257(6) and (7).  
72
 Art 257(8). 
73
 Art 257(9). 
74
 Art 257(10). 
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4.1.3 Amendments of entrenched provisions 
Constitution Amendment Bills passed under Articles 256 and 257 must go to a referendum if 
the proposed amendments relate to matters listed in Article 255.
75
 Among the amendments 
that require such referendum are those that relate to devolution matters. These include 
amendments relating to the supremacy of the Constitution,
76
 the territory of Kenya,
77
 the 
sovereignty of the people,
78
 the national values and principles of governance,
79
 the functions 
of Parliament,
80
 the objects, principles and structure of devolved government,
81
 the 
independence of the Judiciary and the Commissions and independent offices,
82
 and the 
provisions of the amendment chapter of the Constitution.
83
 Other amendments not directly 
relating to devolution are amendments to the Bill of Rights
84
 and the term of office of the 
President.
85
 
Under Article 188 the Senate also plays a role in the protection of the territorial boundaries of 
the counties. Any recommendation by a commission set up to alter the boundaries of a county 
must be passed not only by the National Assembly but also the Senate, with the support of at 
least two-thirds of the county delegations. As noted in Chapter Five, where the alteration of 
county boundaries affects the number of counties or their names, it must be done by way of 
an amendment to the Constitution.
86
 
                                                 
75
 According to Art 255(2)(a) and (b), the proposed amendment will be considered validly passed in the 
referendum if, first, „at least twenty per cent of the registered voters in each of at least half of the counties‟ vote 
in such referendum; and secondly, the proposed amendment secures a simple majority of the citizens who cast 
their votes. 
76
 Art 255(1)(a). 
77
 Art 255(1)(b). 
78
 Art 255(1)(c). 
79
 Art 255(1)(d). 
80
 Art 255(1)(h). 
81
 Art 255(1)(i).  
82
 Art 255(1)(g). 
83
 Art 255(1)(j). 
84
 Art 255(1)(e). 
85
 Art 255(1)(f). 
86
 See section 3.3 of Chap 5. 
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4.2 Legislative mandate in Bills concerning counties 
The Constitution provides in this respect that „the Senate participates in the law-making 
function of Parliament by considering, debating and approving Bills concerning counties, as 
provided in Articles 109 to 113‟.87 This limits the Senate‟s substantive legislative mandate to 
Bills concerning counties only. In all other Bills the only role of the Senate is to be involved, 
through its Speaker at the filtering stage, in the decision whether or not the Bill concerns 
counties. Article 110 identifies three categories of Bills concerning county governments: (a) a 
Bill containing provisions affecting the functions and powers of the county governments;
88
 
(b) a Bill relating to the election of members of a county assembly or a county executive;
89
 
(c) a Bill affecting the finances of county governments.
90
 Although a Bill must satisfy any 
one of these three elements for it to be classified as concerning counties, some Bills may 
contain more than one element. 
The three categories of Bills must be interpreted purposively and generously, in order to 
enable the Senate to play a role in the consideration, debate and passage of more laws so as to 
enable devolution, which is identified as one of the values of the Constitution, to take root.
91
 
This is because participation by the Senate is meant to represent the counties and protect their 
interests and those of their governments, and is envisaged by the Constitution as empowering 
the counties. Because of this constitutional commitment to protect devolution, the Supreme 
Court in Speaker of the Senate made it clear that „in interpreting the devolution provisions, 
where contestations regarding power and resources arise, the Supreme Court should take a 
generous approach‟.92 And regarding the role of the Senate in this „commitment to protect‟ 
mandate, the Court added that: 
Article 96 of the Constitution represents the raison d’etre of the Senate as 
“to protect” devolution. Therefore, when there is even a scintilla of a threat 
to devolution, and the Senate approaches the Court to exercise its advisory 
jurisdiction under Article 163(6) of the Constitution, the Court has a duty to 
                                                 
87
 Art 96(2). 
88
 Art 110(1)(a). 
89
 Art 110(1)(b). 
90
 Art 110(1)(c). 
91
 Art 10(2) (a). 
92
 Speaker of the Senate para 187.  
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ward off the threat. The Court‟s inclination would not be any different if 
some other State organ approached it. Thus, if the process of devolution is 
threatened, whether by Parliamentary or other institutional acts, a basis 
emerges for remedial action by the Courts in general, and by the Supreme 
Court in particular.
93
 
4.2.1 Bills containing provisions affecting functions and powers of counties 
In the first category, a Bill concerning county government is „a Bill containing provisions 
affecting the functions and powers of the county governments set out in the Fourth 
Schedule.
94
 Three important terms in this provision require examination – „provisions‟, 
„affecting‟ and „functions and powers‟. The reference to provisions means that the 
requirement is not for the whole Bill to affect the functions and powers of the county 
governments. A few provisions or even one provision is sufficient to lead to classification of 
a Bill as concerning counties, depending on its impact on the county government functions 
and powers. 
„Affecting‟, on the other hand, refers to the impact the provisions have on the functional areas 
of county government. The Bill need not be in the functional area of county government; 
what is important is the impact it has on the functional area. The Bill may be in respect of 
matters within the national government functional areas, and yet have provisions that 
indirectly impact on or affect the county functions and powers. Reference to functions and 
powers means, that effect on any one of the two suffices to classify it as concerning counties 
since the two are different things.
95
 
Thus, the test is not whether or not a Bill falls in a functional area of a county government; 
rather, it is the impact the provisions of the Bill have on the functions of the county 
government. First, in settling on this test, it must be appreciated that the purpose of the 
process is to determine whether or not the Senate should participate in the consideration, 
debate and approval of the Bill and not whether Parliament is legislating in a concurrent 
functional area. Second, it is to determine the procedure to be followed depending on whether 
it is a special or ordinary Bill concerning counties. The issue is not about which government 
                                                 
93
 Speaker of the Senate para 190 (emphasis in the original).  
94
 Art 110(1)(a). 
95
 See section 2 of Chap 6. 
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has competence to legislate in which functional area. It must be assumed that the competence 
of Parliament has been settled, whether concurrent or otherwise. It is about whether the 
Senate should participate in the Bill in issue. 
The South African Constitutional Court considered matters of a similar nature in Tongoane 
and others v Minister of Agriculture and Lands Affairs and other
96
 in which the question was 
whether Parliament had correctly classified a Bill requiring to be enacted following the 
procedure set out in section 75 or section 76. Section 76 Bills are enacted in a manner that 
grants the National Council of Provinces a more important role, in contrast to section 75 Bills 
in which it plays a less important role. Parliament‟s Joint Tagging Committee had tagged and 
Parliament processed the Bill in question as a section 75 Bill. In a challenge by the 
applicants, the Court observed that the tagging test is different from questions of legislative 
competence. It focuses on all the provisions of the Bill in order to determine the extent to 
which they substantially affect the functional areas of the provincial sphere of government 
and not whether any of its provisions are incidental to its substance.
97
 The Court further noted 
that the test for tagging Bills is informed by the purpose of tagging, which is not to determine 
the sphere of government that has the competence to legislate on a matter nor to prevent 
interference in the legislative competence of another sphere of government. Instead, tagging 
deals with how the Bill should be considered by the provinces and the National Council of 
Provinces. How a Bill must be considered by the provincial legislatures also depends on 
whether it affects the provinces.
98
 The Court concluded that: 
The subject matter of a Bill may lie in one area yet its provisions may have a 
substantial impact on the interests of the provinces. And different provisions 
of the legislation may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to the 
subject-matter of the legislation without regard to the impact of its provisions 
on functional areas in Schedule 4 may frustrate the very purpose of 
classification. Therefore the test for determining how a Bill is to be tagged 
must be broader than that for determining legislative competence.
99
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 (2010) BCLR 741 (Tongoane). 
97
 See Tongoane para 59. 
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 See Tongoane para 60. 
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 Tongoane para 59. 
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This approach is applicable in the Kenyan situation in which the purpose of determining 
whether the Bill concerns counties is whether the Senate should participate in its enactment, 
and if so, following which procedures. It is not to determine which level of government has 
competence to legislate. The application of this test requires the consideration of not just the 
objectives and purposes of the Bill, but also its provisions. The objective of the Bill may have 
nothing to do with the functions and powers of the county governments, yet if some of its 
provisions substantially affect the functions and powers of the counties, the Bill concerns 
counties.
100
 
The provision may deal with two different situations. First, it refers to Bills that directly 
involve both the exclusive and concurrent functional areas of the county governments under 
the Fourth Schedule. This indeed amounts to what must be regarded as the obvious meaning 
of the provision. Secondly, it refers to Bills that fall outside the functional areas of county 
governments but which indirectly affect them. Bills in the exclusive functional areas of the 
national government can therefore be characterised as Bills concerning counties for as long as 
they contain provisions affecting the functions and powers of the county governments.
101
 
It is submitted that it is indeed in matters falling outside the county functional areas in which 
the interests of the counties and those of their governments will require more protection 
through the Senate. In matters within their functional areas, the counties may be able to enact 
their own preferred legislation, which would enjoy precedence, subject only to the national 
government override powers provided for by Article 191(2) and (3). As the Court in 
Tongoane observed, „[y]et it is where matters substantially affect them outside their 
concurrent legislative competence that it is important for their views to be properly heard 
during the legislative process. The rationale behind section 76 is to protect provinces in 
legislations outside their functional areas.‟102 This approach is recommended for the Kenyan 
context, given the fact that the national government‟s expansive legislative powers may affect 
county governments even when it legislates in its own functional areas. In addition, the 
approach may be necessitated by the overlap and interdependence of functional areas. 
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4.2.2 Bills relating to election of county governments 
The second category is that of Bills „relating to the election of members of a county assembly 
or a county executive‟.103 „Relating‟ in this provision refers to having a connection with 
elections. Like „affecting‟ in the previous provision, „relating‟ to election must not be 
restricted to Bills that directly deal with elections. It includes Bills that are indirectly related 
to or have a connection with elections. This is a very broad provision that may embody a 
wide range of Bills. These include Bills dealing with regulation of political parties and how 
they nominate their candidates for participation in elections to the county assemblies and 
county executive committees, Bills on financing of elections, and even on the conduct of the 
elections. In the Interim Independent Electoral Commission the Supreme Court addressed this 
matter for the first time in the context of determining whether or not it had jurisdiction to give 
an Advisory Opinion in terms of Article 163(6), which grants it jurisdiction to render 
advisory opinions only „with respect to any matter concerning county government‟. It found 
that the determination of the election date was a matter concerning counties. The Court took a 
generous approach to the interpretation of what concerns county government, informed by 
the institutional arrangements under the Constitution, particularly the bicameral Parliament 
under which the Senate brings together and protects county interests at the national level. It 
also took into account the fact that „certain crucial governance functions at both the national 
and county level – such as finance, budget and planning, public service, land ownership and 
management, elections, administration of justice – dovetail into each other and operate in 
unity‟.104 It concluded that: 
There is, therefore, in reality, a close connectivity between the functioning of 
national government and county government: even though the amicus curiae 
Professor Ghai urged that the term „county government‟ is not defined in the 
Constitution; and that the expression “county government” should not be too 
broadly interpreted, we consider that the expression “matters touching on 
county government” should be so interpreted as to incorporate any national-
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level process bearing a significant impact on the conduct of county 
government.
105
 
Similarly, In the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the National Assembly 
and the Senate,
106
 the Supreme Court took the broad approach and ruled that it had 
jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion on the issue of gender representation in the Senate 
and the National Assembly since the composition of both the National Assembly and the 
Senate is a matter that concerns county government. 
4.2.3 Chapter Twelve Bills affecting finances of county governments 
The third category is of Bills which are „referred to in Chapter Twelve affecting the finances 
of county governments‟. Chapter Twelve deals with public finance, and makes provision for 
a number of matters in respect of which Bills may be brought for enactment into law, which 
may rightly be referred to as Bills concerning county governments. First, the chapter 
envisages laws providing for raising revenue by the two levels of government. For example, 
Article 209(2) envisages that an Act of Parliament may authorise the national government to 
impose other taxes not mentioned in the Constitution, so long as they are not taxes identified 
as county exclusive taxes.
107
 Secondly, the chapter contemplates the enactment of laws on 
loan guarantees by national government, which by their nature would involve Bills affecting 
the finances of the county governments.
108
 Thirdly, the chapter provides for enactment of 
legislation to prescribe the form, content and timing of the budgets of the county 
governments, which are matters concerning the finances of county governments.
109
 Fourthly, 
the chapter contemplates laws regulating the use of public funds. For example, laws 
regulating procurement of public goods and services by county governments would involve 
Bills affecting the finances of county governments.
110
 Fifthly, Article 225 requires national 
legislation to be enacted to provide for both the functions and responsibilities of the national 
treasury and the ensuring of expenditure controls by both governments. Sixthly, Article 226, 
on the other hand, requires national legislation to be enacted to provide for the keeping of 
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financial records and the auditing of accounts of all the governments. Furthermore, Article 
190 envisages national legislation that establishes financial requirements which county 
governments must comply with in the operation of their financial management system. All 
these are legislation emanating from Bills concerning counties, the consideration, debate and 
passage of which must be done by both the Senate and the National Assembly. 
More importantly, however, the chapter envisages Bills concerning sharing of revenue raised 
nationally, which, as discussed in the following sub-sections, are bills affecting the finances 
but also the functions and powers of the county governments. These are: the passage of the 
annual vertical Division of Revenue Bill; the determination of the five-year formula for 
horizontal allocation of revenue among counties; the annual horizontal Allocation of Revenue 
Bill; the sharing of the Equalisation Fund; the approval of the national government annual 
Appropriation Bill; and other matters affecting county government finances. 
4.2.3.1 The Division of Revenue Bill 
Article 218(1)(a) provides for the Division of Revenue Bill, which equitably divides the 
revenue raised nationally among the two levels of government. The Bill is required to be 
introduced in Parliament at least two months before the end of each financial year. The Bill 
must be introduced in Parliament and not just in one of the two houses of Parliament. This 
means that the Bill must be processed by each of the two Houses.
111
 Furthermore, since this is 
a Bill to be passed into an Act of Parliament, it must be read within the context of the 
provisions of Article 96(2) which require that Bills concerning counties be considered, 
debated and approved by the Senate. A Bill which deals with the equitable sharing of revenue 
vertically within the meaning of Articles 202 and 203 is a Bill concerning counties in whose 
consideration, debate and approval the Senate has a role to play.
112
 The Division of Revenue 
Bill should be classified as a Bill concerning counties because of two overlapping elements. 
First, it is a Bill referred to in Chapter Twelve affecting the finances of county 
governments,
113
 of which Article 218 forms a part. Secondly, the Bill contains provisions 
affecting the functions and powers of the county governments.
114
 In Speaker of the Senate, in 
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which the issue was whether the Senate has a role in the consideration of the Division of 
Revenue Bill, the Supreme Court held as follows: 
It is quite clear to us that the Division of Revenue Bill is a Bill bearing 
provisions that deal with the equitable sharing of revenue – which will 
certainly affect the functioning of county government. We have found no 
justification in the contention that the Division of Revenue Bill deals strictly 
with “national economic policy and planning” and so, on this account, it is a 
measure unrelated to county government. The Bill deals with equitable 
allocation of funds to the counties, and so any improper design in its scheme 
will certainly occasion inability on the part of the county-units to exercise 
their powers and to discharge their functions as contemplated under the 
Constitution. 
This is a critical test which will require that the Division of Revenue Bill be 
perceived as „a Bill concerning county government‟ and, therefore, a subject 
of the legislative competence of both the National Assembly and the 
Senate.
115
 
A general principle accepted in most non-centralised systems is that the allocation of funds 
must be informed by the functions each level has to perform.
116
 Article 203 sets out criteria 
for revenue sharing which emphasises the nexus between functional assignment and revenue 
allocation, with equity being among them. The vertical division of revenue among the 
national and county levels of government must be equitable and it is part of the business of 
the Senate to ensure this equity. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate 
concluded that: 
The Division of Revenue Bill, 2013 was an instrument essential to the due 
operation of county governments, as contemplated under the Constitution, 
and so was a matter requiring the Senate‟s legislative contribution. 
Consequently, the Speaker of the National Assembly was under duty to 
comply with the terms of Articles 110(3), 112 and 113 of the Constitution, 
                                                 
115
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and should have co-operated with the Speaker of the Senate, as necessary, to 
engage the mediation forum for resolution of the disagreement.
117
 
The second question is whether the Division of Revenue Bill is a special or ordinary Bill 
concerning counties. As will emerge later, this is obviously an ordinary Bill. 
4.2.3.2 The Allocation of Revenue Bill 
Article 218 also provides for the County Allocation of Revenue Bill, which is required to be 
introduced in Parliament at least two months before the end of each financial year. Bills 
which deal with the equitable horizontal sharing of revenue within the meaning of Articles 
202 and 203 are obviously Bills that affect the functions of county governments and therefore 
Bills concerning counties requiring the approval the Senate.
118
 Furthermore, the Allocation of 
Revenue Bill is a Bill which Article 110 includes among Bills referred to in Chapter Twelve 
affecting the finances of county governments, of which Article 218 forms apart.
119
 
4.2.3.3 The Equalisation Fund 
The Senate plays a role in matters relating to the equalisation fund established under Article 
204(1). The fund‟s purpose is to deal with a deficit of certain infrastructure in marginalised 
areas.
120
 The Constitution prescribes that the use of money out of the fund must be in 
accordance with an Appropriation Bill approved by Parliament.
121
 Approval of such 
Appropriation Bill by Parliament may only be undertaken after the Commission on Revenue 
Allocation has been consulted and its recommendations considered.
122
 It is instructive to note 
that the provision requires that the appropriation be approved by Parliament, of which the 
Senate is a part. 
Moreover, the Appropriation Bill providing for the expenditure of money in the equalisation 
fund is a Bill not only affecting the finances of the county governments but also concerning 
counties as envisaged in Article 110 of the Constitution, in which the Senate must play a role. 
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In addition, Article 204 establishes the equalisation fund to last for a period of twenty years. 
However, such a period could be extended by Parliament if it passes legislation to that 
effect.
123
 The Senate plays a role in the enactment of this legislation since the Constitution 
expressly requires that the legislation be supported by „more than half of all the county 
delegations in the Senate‟.124 
4.2.3.4 The national government Appropriation Bill 
The Budget estimates and annual Appropriation Bill of the national government as provided 
for by Article 221 raises serious issues regarding whether it requires consideration, debate 
and approval by the Senate. While a plain reading of this provision may lead to an initial 
conclusion that the Appropriation Bill is an exclusive function of the National Assembly, a 
closer scrutiny of the provisions yields a different result. First, the provision in part prescribes 
that the estimates for expenditure referred to in the provision „shall include estimates for 
expenditure from the Equalisation Fund.‟125 From the perspective discussed above in which 
Article 204 requires that expenditure of the money in the equalisation fund be in accordance 
with an Appropriation Bill approved by Parliament, the inclusion of expenditure from the 
equalisation fund in national government budget estimates and Appropriation calls for 
participation of the Senate. 
Secondly, the provision in part also prescribes that the appropriation estimates must be passed 
„together with the estimates submitted by the Parliamentary Service Commission and the 
Chief Registrar of the Judiciary‟. If the Senate does not get sufficient resources to discharge 
its functions, the functions of the county governments would be affected. 
Thirdly, as already noted, Bills relating to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission and political parties are bills concerning counties since they relate to the election 
of members of county assemblies and county executives. The IEBC is mandated to conduct 
„continuous registration of citizens as voters‟,126 and to conduct elections, including any by-
elections that may become necessary whenever any vacancy arises.
127
 For these purposes, 
annual allocations to the IEBC through the national government Appropriation Bill must be 
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made, which makes it a Bill concerning counties. Article 92 provides for „the establishment 
and management of a political parties fund‟;128 the rendering of „accounts and audit of 
political parties‟;129 and „restriction on the use of public resources to promote the interests of 
political parties‟.130 These provisions necessitate annual appropriations to political parties 
through the national Appropriation Bill, which makes it a Bill concerning counties. 
4.2.3.5 Determining the five-year formula 
The Senate has a controlling role in the allocation of the county share of revenue raised 
nationally among the 47 counties. The Constitution explicitly provides that the Senate 
„determines the allocation of national revenue among counties, as provided in article 217‟.131 
At first glance and read alone, this Article gives an impression that it is about the annual 
allocation of revenue among counties. However, when read with Article 217, it emerges that 
the provision deals with the role of the Senate in the determination of the five-year formula
132
 
for the allocation of revenue among counties.
133
 
Article 217 only deals with the determination of the five-year formula for the sharing of 
revenue among the counties for that period.
134
 It does not deal with annual division of 
revenue and annual allocation of revenue, but does not exclude the Senate from playing a role 
in the annual vertical division and horizontal allocation of revenue. Article 96(3) read with 
Article 217 therefore only confers controlling powers and functions on the Senate to 
determine the five-year and or three-year formula.
135
 This power of the Senate is provided for 
separately by Article 96(3) and not as a Bill concerning counties under Article 96(2). 
However, although the formula is passed as a resolution and not a Bill, Article 217 provides 
for the resolution in a manner that makes it look like a Bill and gives it binding effect as a 
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law. The matter is thus discussed among Bills concerning counties to avoid its being 
confused with the role of the Senate in the annual division and allocation of revenue.
136
 
4.3 Types of procedures for processing Bills concerning counties 
Once a Bill has been classified as concerning counties, it must also be determined whether it 
is a special or an ordinary bill concerning counties,
137
 as different procedures apply to the two 
categories. 
4.3.1 Ordinary Bills concerning counties 
Ordinary Bills concerning counties are negatively defined as all other Bills concerning 
counties which are not special Bills.
138
 These would include Bills containing provisions that 
affect the powers and functions of county governments but which do not in any way relate to 
the election of county assembly and executive members. They also do not include the 
Allocation of Revenue Bill. This means that all other Bills dealing with finances which 
concern counties are ordinary bills. 
Where one Chamber passes the Bill but the other rejects it, the Bill must be referred to a 
mediation committee appointed under Article 113.
139
 On the other hand, where either House 
passes the Bill but the other passes it in an amended form, the Bill must be referred to the 
originating House for reconsideration.
140
 In the event that such reconsideration results in the 
passage of the Bill as amended, the Speaker of that House is obligated, within seven days, to 
refer the Bill to the President for assent.
141
 However, where the reconsideration results in a 
rejection of the Bill as amended the Bill is referred to a mediation committee.
142
  
The mediation committee consisting of an equal number of members from each House is to 
be appointed by the Speakers of the two Houses.
143
 The mandate of the committee is to 
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negotiate and develop a version of the Bill acceptable to both Houses.
144
 Upon the mediation 
committee agreeing on a version of the Bill, each House votes to approve or reject it.
145
 
Where the two Houses approve the mediated version of the Bill the Speaker of the National 
Assembly is required to refer the Bill to the president within seven days for assent.
146
 Where, 
however, the committee fails to agree on a version of the Bill within thirty days, or where an 
agreed version is rejected by either House, the Bill is defeated.
147
 What emerges from these 
provisions is that in the case of ordinary Bills concerning counties, either House can override 
or veto the other without the requirement of a special majority vote. The Senate can override 
the National Assembly. This flows out of the provision that once a mediated Bill is rejected 
by either House, it is defeated.
148
 The Senate needs only a simple majority of the 47 
delegation votes to reject a mediated Bill. 
4.3.2 Special Bills concerning counties 
A special Bill concerning counties is a Bill which „relates to the election of members of a 
county assembly or a county executive,‟149 and an „annual County Allocation of Revenue Bill 
referred to in Article 218‟.150 The determination of what constitutes a Bill relating to the 
election to county assembly and county executive should be done in the same manner as 
determining Bills concerning counties. This entails looking at the provisions of the Bill, a 
process that must not be restricted to examining the object and purpose of the Bill only. For 
this purpose the national government budget, which votes money for the conduct of elections, 
should be regarded as a special Bill relating to the elections as envisaged by the provisions. 
Similarly, a Bill on political parties must be interpreted as a Bill relating to the election of the 
assembly members and members of the county executive. In addition, a Bill on the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission is a Bill concerning counties.  
The approval of a special Bill follows a combination of the procedure followed for passing 
ordinary Bills set out in Article 112, with additional special rules of procedure set out in 
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Article 111. The special rules serve to alter some of the rules used for ordinary Bills. While 
the National Assembly does not need a special majority to amend an ordinary Bill which in 
the first instance has been passed by the Senate, it requires at least two-thirds of the members 
of the assembly to amend or veto a special Bill that has been passed by the Senate.
151
 Where 
the National Assembly seeks to amend or veto a special Bill passed by the Senate but fails to 
secure the required majority, the Speaker of the National Assembly is obligated within seven 
days to refer the Bill in the form passed by the Senate to the President for assent.
152
 This 
means that the mediation procedure required for ordinary Bills would not be required in these 
circumstances. 
Where a special Bill concerning county governments is first introduced in the National 
Assembly and is passed, the Senate can reject or pass it either in the same form or with 
amendments by a simple majority of the delegation votes.
153
 If the Senate rejects the Bill then 
it is referred to the mediation committee.
154
 If the Senate amends the Bill it goes back to the 
National Assembly
155
 which can only change or reject it if it musters two-thirds majority 
among its members.
156
 Where a special Bill concerning county governments is first 
introduced in the Senate and passed by a simple majority of the delegation votes, the National 
Assembly can only amend or veto it by a two-thirds majority of its members. If the National 
Assembly musters the two-thirds majority and amends it, the Bill goes back to the Senate for 
reconsideration. If the Senate passes it as amended, it goes to the President for assent.
157
 
However, if the Senate rejects it, the Bill goes to the mediation committee.
158
 
The main difference between these two types of Bills is that while with ordinary Bills each 
House can veto the other with a simple majority, with special Bills, the National Assembly 
requires a two-thirds majority to veto the Senate. This puts the Senate in a very strong 
position where special Bills concerning counties are first introduced and passed in the Senate. 
Failure to muster such a majority would lead to the Bill as passed by the Senate to go to the 
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President for signing into law. In terms of Article 109(4) and (5), all Bills concerning county 
government may originate in any of the two Houses of Parliament, unless it is a money Bill 
as defined in Article 114(3), which can only be introduced in the National Assembly. 
4.4. Process of determining Bills concerning counties 
Article 110(3) provides for the process of determining whether a Bill concerns counties or not 
and, if so, whether it is an ordinary or special Bill, in the following manner: „Before either 
House considers a Bill, the Speakers of the National Assembly and the Senate shall jointly 
resolve any question as to whether it is a Bill concerning counties and, if it is, whether it is a 
special or an ordinary Bill‟. The provision caters for who determines, what is determined, and 
the timing of the determination. 
4.4.1 Who determines 
The two Speakers bear the responsibility for making these determinations jointly. This 
precludes unilateral exercise of this power by any of the Speakers as the exclusion of the 
other would „inevitably result in usurpations of jurisdiction, to the prejudice of the 
constitutional principle of the harmonious interplay of State institutions‟.159 Article 110 read 
as a whole imposes upon the two Speakers an obligation to consult, coordinate and work in 
harmony to arrive at a decision in these matters.
160
 The Supreme Court in Speaker of the 
Senate affirmed the process to be followed: 
As Mr. Nowrojee submitted, the requirement for a joint resolution of the 
question whether a Bill is one concerning counties, is a mandatory one; and 
the legislative path is well laid out: it starts with a determination of the 
question by either Speaker – depending on the origin of the Bill; such a 
determination is communicated to the other Speaker, with a view to 
obtaining concurrence; failing a concurrence, the two Speakers are to jointly 
resolve the question. Both sets of Standing Orders are crystal clear on this 
scenario, and both, on this point, as we find, faithfully reflect the terms of the 
Constitution itself.
161
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In what the Court described as the filtering role of the Senate, the Court emphasised that this 
process must be followed in respect of all the Bills coming before either Chamber of 
Parliament. It added that it is the constitutional task of the two Speakers to jointly determine 
the route the Bill must follow in the legislative process. Where the two Speakers determine 
that a Bill is not concerning county government, then in terms of Article 109(3), such Bill is 
rightly considered and passed exclusively by the National Assembly.
162
 Since in terms of 
Article 94(1) the legislative authority is vested in Parliament and not just in any one of the 
two Houses of Parliament, it is submitted that it is only in this manner that a Bill considered 
and passed exclusively by the National Assembly can be said to have been enacted by 
Parliament. The Court concluded thus: 
The emerging, broader principle is that both Chambers have been entrusted 
with the people‟s public task, and the Senate, even when it has not 
deliberated upon a Bill at all the relevant stages, has spoken through its 
Speaker at the beginning, and recorded its perception that a particular Bill 
rightly falls in one category, rather than the other. In such a case, the 
Senate‟s initial filtering role, in our opinion, falls well within the design and 
purpose of the Constitution, and expresses the sovereign intent of the people: 
this cannot be taken away by either Chamber or either Speaker thereof.
163
 
The essence of this is that the filtering process is a key mandatory element of the manner and 
former of enactment of all Bills that come to Parliament, without which a law would be 
invalidated. The test is whether the two Speakers considered the Bill and agreed on what type 
of Bill it is before the other legislative processes were undertaken. 
4.4.2 Timing and what is determined 
The provision prescribes that the process must be undertaken upfront before either House 
considers any Bill. As the Supreme Court noted, „the business of considering and passing of 
any Bill [can] not be embarked upon and concluded before the two Chambers, acting through 
their Speakers, address and find an answer for a certain particular question: What is the 
                                                 
162
 Speaker of the Senate para 131. 
163
 Speaker of the Senate para 131. 
 
 
 
 
414 
 
Chapter 10: The Senate as an institution of shared rule 
nature of the Bill in question?‟164 Any House that embarks on the consideration of any Bill 
before it goes through this process would be acting unconstitutionally and in futility. 
Article 110(3) identifies two things to be determined – whether or not a Bill concerns 
counties, and if the Bill concerns counties, whether or not it is a special or an ordinary Bill. 
As already discussed,
165
 the determination is done by examining all the provisions of the Bill 
as well as the objectives and purposes in order to establish whether they substantially impact 
upon or affect the functions and powers of the county governments. 
Despite the Court‟s view that the legislative path is well laid out, it is submitted that these 
provisions do not exhaustively provide for the manner in which the Speakers are to exercise 
this power and discharge the responsibility. A number of interpretation questions remain. 
Should the exercise of these powers be structured either by legislation or parliamentary rules 
of procedure? What if the two Speakers disagree on the classification of a Bill? What if the 
members of either of the two Houses disagree with the decision of the Speakers regarding the 
classification of the Bill? Is the exercise of these powers justiciable? If the Speakers disagree, 
either of them can approach the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion. If the Members of 
Parliament disagree with the decision of the two Speakers, they have no recourse since the 
Constitution explicitly vests the responsibility in the Speakers. The decision of the Speakers 
is however reviewable on the grounds of failure to observe the prescribed manner and form 
of the legislative process. 
4.4.3 The consequences of following the wrong procedure 
If the decision of the Speakers is wrong and Parliament follows the wrong procedure, then the 
lawfulness of the resultant Act can be challenged in Court as the manner and form of the 
legislative process were not followed. 
4.4.3.1 Manner and form required by the Constitution 
If Parliament operates outside or in disregard of the manner and form prescribed by the 
Constitution for legislating, it cannot be heard to say that the courts are interfering in the 
internal procedures and processes of the legislature. The Supreme Court in Speaker of the 
Senate held that Kenya‟s legislative bodies have an obligation to discharge their mandate in 
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accordance with the terms and procedures set out by the Constitution. It noted that „[w]here 
the Constitution decrees a specific procedure to be followed in the enactment of legislation, 
both Houses of Parliament are bound to follow that procedure. If Parliament violates the 
procedural requirements of the supreme law of the land, it is for the courts of law, not least 
the Supreme Court to assert the authority and supremacy of the Constitution.‟166 Non-
compliance with procedural requirements is therefore justiciable in the courts. 
It is not only the Supreme Court‟s jurisdiction which includes the power to resolve „questions 
touching on the mode of discharge of the legislative mandate‟, but even the other „Courts 
have competence to pronounce on the compliance of a legislative body, with the processes 
prescribed for the passing of legislation‟.167 In Okiya Omtatah Okoiti and others v Attorney-
General and others
168
 the High Court had occasion to also address this matter. It sought to 
uphold the principle of non-interference in the internal work of Parliament but only if 
Parliament acts within the confines of the Constitution. 
In passing the Constitution, Kenyans gave the responsibility of making laws 
to Parliament. The decision of the people must be respected, so that this 
Court can only interfere with the work of Parliament in situations where 
Parliament acts in a manner that defies logic and violates the Constitution. 
To agree with the National Assembly that this Court cannot interrogate its 
work will amount to saying that the National Assembly can fly beyond the 
reach of the radar of the Constitution. That is a proposition we do not agree 
with. Our view is that all organs created by the Constitution must live by the 
edict of the Constitution. Indeed, Parliament is commanded by Article 94(4) 
of the Constitution to protect the Constitution and promote democratic 
governance in the Republic of Kenya.
169
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Separation of powers does not therefore arise in cases of manner and form of the legislative 
process required by the Constitution. The Supreme Court arrived at this position after an 
extensive survey of comparative experiences in a number of countries such as Zimbabwe,
170
 
Canada
171
 and South Africa.
172
 
The South African Constitutional Court held that „legislation must conform to the 
Constitution in terms of both its content and the manner in which it was adopted. Failure to 
comply with manner and form requirements in enacting legislation renders the legislation 
invalid.‟173 In Tongoane the Court concluded that it has not only a right but also a duty to 
ensure compliance with the prescribed law-making procedures and can declare invalid any 
legislation enacted without observing such procedures.
174
 The Court explained this approach 
noting that it is „deeply rooted in the supremacy of [the] Constitution.‟175 It then concluded 
that „enacting legislation that affects provinces in accordance with the procedure prescribed 
... is a material part of the law-making process relating to legislation that substantially affects 
the provinces.‟176 
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The High Court of Kenya in Judicial Service Commission also emphatically concluded that 
„it is not a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers for the Court to issue orders 
restraining acts of the legislature that were alleged to be in violation of the Constitution‟.177 
Where the constitutional manner and form is supplemented by parliamentary rules of 
procedure such as the Standing Orders, such Standing Orders must be consistent with the 
Constitution. Parliament cannot through its Standing Orders abrogate or ignore the manner 
and form required by the Constitution. In terms of the supremacy clause, Standing Orders are 
„any law‟ that must be consistent with the Constitution.178 Parliament‟s Standing Orders must 
be limited to rules „for the orderly conduct of its proceedings‟179 and not be used to breach 
the constitutional rights or to ignore constitutional provisions and requirements.
180
 Neither 
can they be used to confer on Parliament or its committees powers which the Constitution 
does not confer on it or envisage.
181
 Finally, a failure to make the Standing Orders or making 
them in an incomplete manner that leaves a lacuna that frustrates the realisation of 
constitutional provisions and rights would be unconstitutional,
182
 since Article 124(1) is 
presented in peremptory terms that impose an obligation to make rules. 
4.4.3.2 Timing of challenges to manner and form 
Once it is established that Courts have jurisdiction to question the manner and form of the 
legislative process, the next issue concerns when a challenge can be mounted in respect of 
such issues. While citizens can challenge any law once it is enacted on grounds of its 
constitutionality, the general rule is that they cannot challenge the legislative process until it 
is completed.
183
 But there are exceptions where immediate intervention is called for in order 
to prevent the violation of the Constitution and the rule of law.
184
 The Supreme Court in 
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Speaker of the Senate acknowledged that the Court can be seized of the matter even before 
the legislative process is completed and noted that each case must be decided on the merits of 
its own facts. 
It makes practical sense that the scope for the Court‟s intervention in the 
course of a running legislative process, should be left to the discretion of the 
Court, exercised on the basis of the exigency of each case. The relevant 
considerations may be factors such as: the likelihood of the resulting statute 
being valid or invalid; the harm that may be occasioned by an invalid statute; 
the prospects of securing remedy, where invalidity is the outcome; [and] the 
risk that may attend a possible violation of the Constitution.
185
 
Similarly, in Judicial Service Commission the High Court held „that there are exceptional 
circumstances in which Courts may interfere with Parliament‟s exercise of its powers where 
the latter acts in breach of the Constitution‟.186 According to the Court, „[t]his would include, 
for instance, where Parliament enacts a law that is contrary to the Constitution‟.187 
Thus, the conclusion is that although the Courts would be reluctant to entertain a challenge 
before the legislative process is completed, in a few exceptional circumstances, they would 
intervene. Chief Justice Langa identified exceptional circumstances justifying intervention 
thus: „Intervention would only be appropriate if an applicant can show that there would be no 
effective remedy available to him or her once the legislative process is complete, as the 
unlawful conduct will have achieved its object in the course of the process. The applicant 
must show that the resultant harm will be material and irreversible.‟188 If excluded from 
participation in the legislative process, the Senate itself or members of public can take up the 
matter with the Courts. 
                                                 
185
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4.5 Obligation to facilitate public participation and involvement 
In the discharge of its legislative and other functions, the Senate is under a constitutional 
obligation to facilitate public participation and involvement. Article 118(1)(b) explicitly 
requires Parliament to „facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative and 
other business of Parliament and its committees‟. The rules discussed in respect of the 
obligation on the part of the county assemblies
189
 apply in a similar manner to the Senate. 
However, the Senate‟s obligation includes the duty to facilitate participation of the county 
governments. This is because in terms of Article 96(1), the Senate represents and serves to 
protect the county governments and their interests. Failure to fulfil this obligation will lead to 
the same consequences that arise in failure of manner and form of the legislative process, 
since facilitation of public participation and involvement is an important part of the 
legislative process. 
5 The oversight functions of the Senate 
The Constitution expressly and by implication mandates the Senate to exercise oversight and 
scrutiny over the national government and, to a limited extent, county governments. As a 
legislative body, the Senate like the National Assembly has parliamentary oversight powers. 
Corder et al defined oversight thus: 
Oversight refers to the crucial role of legislatures in monitoring and 
reviewing the actions of the executive organs of government. The term refers 
to a large number of activities carried out by legislatures in relation to the 
executive. In other words oversight traverses a far wider range of activity 
than does the concept of accountability.
190
 
In a constitutional context, Parliament‟s oversight function flows from the concept of 
separation of powers and responsible government. It is a corollary of law-making power and 
entails the monitoring of the implementation of such legislation by the executive.
191
 In 
Judicial Service Commission, the High Court referred to and adopted the above definition of 
oversight noting, however, that such „monitoring does not entail controlling, giving 
instructions or micro managing, but checking regularly the progress or development [of a 
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subject]‟.192 The Court emphasised that „[p]arliamentary oversight encompasses the review, 
monitoring and supervision of government and public agencies including the implementation 
of policy and legislation‟.193 
Although Article 96(3) and (4) refer to oversight by the Senate only in respect of „national 
revenue allocated to county governments‟, and „considering and determining any resolution 
to remove the President or Deputy President from office‟, it is submitted that various 
constitutional provisions imply oversight powers on the part of the Senate in various other 
circumstances.
194
 Two basic forms of the Senate‟s oversight can be identified: strong form 
oversight and weak form oversight. 
5.1 Strong form oversight 
This form of oversight involves intervention and oversight by the Senate in which it can 
make binding decisions. This form of oversight has two variants, namely: where the Senate 
can make binding removal decisions and where the Senate can merely review the decisions of 
national or county government. 
5.1.1 Removal oversight 
In this form of oversight, the Senate can make removal decisions that have finality. First, the 
Constitution confers upon the Senate a very important role in the process of determining 
impeachment proceedings against both the President and the Deputy President as part of its 
role in the oversight of state officers.
195
 It provides for impeachment of the President as a 
political process. The National Assembly votes to determine whether impeachment charges 
should be brought against the President or the Deputy President, while the Senate tries the 
case and votes to determine whether the charges have been proved. The impeachment can 
only be instituted and proved on one of three grounds: gross violation of a provision of the 
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Constitution or any other law; serious reasons to believe that the President has committed a 
crime under national or international law; or gross misconduct.
196
 
Consistent with the US Presidential system, Article 145(2) requires that after a motion for the 
removal of the President from office has been passed by the National Assembly, the matter is 
referred to the Senate for trial. In such circumstances, the Senate appoints a special 
committee of its members to investigate the matter and report back to the full house.
197
 If the 
special committee reports that the allegations against the President have been substantiated, 
the full house, after according the President an opportunity to be heard, takes a vote on the 
impeachment charges
198
 and may remove the President from office if it secures at least two-
thirds of all its members.
199
 The decision of the Senate is binding since Article 145(7) 
provides that in the event of such vote „the President shall cease to hold office‟. The Deputy 
President can also be impeached following the same procedures for the impeachment of the 
President.
200
 
Secondly, as discussed in Chapter Five, the Constitution read together with the County 
Governments Act confers upon the Senate a role in the removal of a county governor from 
office. It can receive from the county assembly, a recommendation for removal of a governor, 
consider it and make a binding removal decision.
201
 
Thirdly and related to removals is the role of the Senate in the approval of the appointment of 
the Inspector General of police. In terms of Article 245(2)(a), the Inspector-General of the 
National Police Service „is appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament‟.202 It 
is submitted that where the Constitution explicitly refers to Parliament, it means both the 
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National Assembly and the Senate. This provision should thus be understood as conferring 
approval functions on both the National Assembly and the Senate. 
5.1.2 Review of national government intervention 
This form of oversight arises in cases where one level of government intervenes in the affairs 
of the other in a manner that may affect its integrity.
203
 The Constitution confers on national 
government some limited supervision and intervention powers, which may be abused.
204
 
Aware of this risk the constitution-framers conferred upon the Senate oversight powers to 
check and countervail the national government in protection of the county governments. 
Whereas the Constitution envisages situations under which the national government may be 
required to intervene in the affairs of the county government,
205
 it also requires legislation to 
be made to provide for a process through which the Senate may terminate the intervention by 
the national government.
206
 Similarly, Article 192, which empowers the President to suspend 
a county government, also stipulates that such suspension cannot take effect unless the Senate 
has authorised it.
207
 And even when it is authorised and it has taken effect, the Senate may 
terminate the suspension at any time.
208
 Finally, in cases of stoppage of transfer of funds to 
counties, the decision to stop such transfer of funds may not be enforced immediately, unless 
approved by a resolution of Parliament passed by both Houses. If not approved within thirty 
days, the decision lapses retrospectively.
209
 
5.2 Weak form oversight 
This form of oversight only enables the Senate to engage in debate or dialogue with the 
national government or county government. The Senate does not have any coercive powers to 
enforce its decisions against non-compliant national and county government officials and 
administrators. Three types of weak form oversight can be identified: oversight over national 
government, intergovernmental relations oversight, and oversight over national revenue 
allocated to county governments. 
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5.2.1 Senate’s oversight over national government 
Legislative bodies have general oversight functions which entail „pro-active interaction 
initiated by a legislature with the executive and administration or other organs of state‟ aimed 
at encouraging compliance with constitutional obligations.
210
 Thus, implied in the legislative 
function of the Senate is the oversight power to monitor the implementation of that legislation 
and review any subordinate legislation made pursuant to it. 
This oversight is in respect of the national level of government and is limited to matters 
concerning county governments or matters which impact on county government.
211
 In 
exercising this limited oversight the Senate must respect the oversight roles of both the 
county assemblies and the National Assembly. While discussing similar matters in respect of 
South Africa‟s National Council of Provinces (NCOP), the equivalent of Kenya‟s Senate, 
Corder et al correctly observe that: 
Thus, the NCOP is not to oversee all of national government; it is to exercise 
oversight over the national aspects of provincial and local government. Its 
goal in doing this is to contribute to effective government by ensuring that 
provincial and local government concerns are recognised in national policy 
making, and that provincial, local, and national governments work 
effectively together. In this way the NCOP needs to respect the oversight 
roles of both the provincial legislatures and the National Assembly. A 
provincial legislature must conduct oversight of the provincial executive. 
This will include oversight of programmes contained in national legislation 
that the provincial executive is expected to implement and for which the 
province receives national funding. The National Assembly is primarily 
responsible for overseeing the national executive. However, neither 
provincial legislatures nor the National Assembly are in a position easily to 
identify and act upon problems with those national policies that are 
implemented by provincial executives. The NCOP is uniquely situated to 
fulfill this role.
212
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It is submitted that Kenya‟s Senate, which is obligated to consult with county governments, is 
uniquely situated to play this oversight role and where necessary initiate legislative 
amendments to such national legislation being implemented by county governments. 
Moreover, in a situation where several counties experience the same or similar problems with 
the implementation of national policy or legislation, it will not be possible for the relevant 
county assemblies exercising oversight and acting separately to resolve the problem.
213
 Such 
matters would best be dealt with by the Senate, which can consult all the counties, appreciate 
the magnitude of the problem and take realistic remedial measures. An appropriate solution 
that is compatible with the needs of all the counties can then be devised. The Senate can also 
provide a forum through which the counties can then engage the national executive on the 
issue. 
5.2.2 Intergovernmental relations oversight 
The constitutional role of the Senate to represent and protect counties and their governments 
as well as their interests and those of their governments makes it a critical institution for 
intergovernmental relations. The Senate provides a bridge between counties and the national 
government, thereby contributing to the realisation of the constitutional commitment to co-
operative government. Implied in this constitutional mandate is the Senate‟s oversight role in 
monitoring the effectiveness of the intergovernmental relations mechanisms in any field. It 
must exercise oversight over the general structure and procedures of intergovernmental 
relations. Corder et al rationalise this in the context of the South African National Council of 
Provinces, on grounds that „intergovernmental executive bodies should be subject to the 
oversight of the legislative body that reflects the multi-level governance‟ system.214 
5.2.3 Oversight over national revenue allocated to county governments 
Article 96(3) provides that the Senate „exercises oversight over national revenue allocated to 
county government‟. Although this provision confers oversight powers upon the Senate, the 
nature and extent of these powers seem unclear and elusive. Is „county government‟ limited 
to the county executive or does it include oversight over the county assembly? The notion of 
oversight is generally used in horizontal relations between the legislative and executive 
branches of government. In vertical relations, the terms often used are supervision and 
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intervention. Indeed, the Constitution has various provisions which empower national 
government to intervene in county government affairs. Thus, the Senate‟s oversight powers 
cannot encompass oversight over the county assembly. The county assembly is a legislative 
arm which should be allowed to exercise the legislative autonomy of the county government, 
subject only to the Constitution and national legislative norms and standards envisaged by the 
Constitution. This then limits the Senate to oversight over the county executive. Even then, 
the nature and extent can only be established if the provision is read in the context of other 
provisions, some of which confer similar powers on other organs of state. First, Article 
226(2), for instance, explicitly provides: „The accounting officer of a national public entity is 
accountable to the National Assembly for its financial management, and the accounting 
officer of a county public entity is accountable to the county assembly for its financial 
management.‟ 
This provision not only confers oversight powers in financial matters upon the county 
assembly, but also underscores the distinct nature of the two levels of government and the 
vertical separation of powers between them. Under this provision, the National Assembly can 
invite Cabinet Secretaries to account for poor performance of administrative organs or offices 
of the national government. Likewise, the county assembly can invite the governor or the 
county executive committee members to account for poor performance of the administrative 
organs or offices of the county government. Read together with Article 181, this provision 
forms the basis for the role of the county assembly in the process of the removal of the 
governor and the members of the county executive committee from office. 
The provision appears to conflict with the oversight powers of the Senate under Article 96(3), 
making them seem doubtful. In International Legal Consultancy Group v The Senate and 
another,
215
 the Senate‟s action of summoning nine County Governors and their County 
Executive Committee members responsible for finance to appear before it and produce 
various documents pertaining to the financial management within their respective counties, 
was challenged. Justice Mumbi Ngugi of the High Court, in an interlocutory ruling made ex 
parte after the Senate failed to appear even after being served, referred to the provisions of 
Article 226(2) and stated the following: 
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The Court appreciates that the Senate has an important role to play in the 
implementation of the Constitution, particularly so with regard to devolved 
government. However, just like all other state organs, it is bound by the 
Constitution, and it cannot arrogate to itself powers that it has not been given 
under the Constitution. On the material before me, and taking into account 
the provisions of Article 226(2), the Senate may have overstepped its 
mandate in purporting to summon the Governors and the County Finance 
Committees. While it does have power under Article 125 to summon anyone, 
that power cannot have been intended to be exercised arbitrarily and in 
isolation. Put differently, the provisions of Article 125 cannot be read in 
isolation, but must be read in conjunction with other provisions of the 
Constitution which allocate functions and powers to the various organs 
created by the Constitution.
216
 
In light of Article 96(3), it is doubtless that the Senate has some oversight role over county 
government, the nature and extent of which remain doubtful. 
Secondly, the Auditor-General who under Articles 226(3), and 229(4)(a) and (b) audits the 
accounts of both the national and county governments, is explicitly required to submit Audit 
Reports to „Parliament or the relevant county assembly‟.217 This means that reports in respect 
of the national government and its entities are submitted to Parliament, while those in respect 
of the county governments and their entities are submitted to the relevant county assembly. 
Article 229(8) then requires Parliament or the relevant county assembly to, within three 
months of receiving the report, „debate and consider the report and take appropriate action‟. 
Once again, these powers of the county assembly appear to conflict with the Senate‟s 
oversight powers under Article 96(3). The provisions create a possibility of both the Senate 
and the county assembly arriving at different decisions on the same matter, which raises the 
difficulty of whose decision should prevail. 
These provisions must therefore be harmonised in order to determine the nature and extent of 
the oversight powers of the Senate. The rules of interpretation of the Constitution as a whole 
and harmonisation of conflicting provisions require that no provision should be interpreted in 
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a manner that destroys the other. In International Legal Consultancy Group a bench of three 
High Court judges delivered judgement in which they endorsed this approach and held that in 
their view the Senate has oversight powers over the county governments in matters 
concerning national revenue allocated to them.
218
 Harmonisation should, however, recognise 
that while Article 226(2) confers on county assemblies broader oversight powers over all 
financial matters and other aspects of county government operations, Article 96(3) confers 
powers that are limited to revenue raised nationally allocated to county governments and do 
not extend to counties‟ own raised revenues. National revenue allocated to the county 
governments must be understood as referring to allocations from revenue raised nationally 
such as equitable shares and conditional and unconditional grants. The Court stated in this 
regard thus: 
Under Article 96(3), the Senate‟s oversight role is restricted to the National 
revenue allocated to the counties. It has no oversight over grants, loans and 
revenue generated locally by the counties. Under Article 226(2) of the 
Constitution the County Assembly has a wide berth to oversee all the 
financial resources of the county including revenues allocated by the 
National Government and the revenue generated locally by the respective 
county. The Senate cannot therefore overreach its oversight mandate under 
Article 96(3) to any other aspect of county Government operations and 
resources as that is the sole preserve of the County Assemblies.
219
 
The Court recognised an overlap in the Senate and county assembly oversight powers over 
national revenue allocated to county governments and held that in such circumstances both 
the Senate and the county assembly have a collective role.
220
 It added that there is no 
provision regarding how both the Senate and the county assemblies can exercise their 
oversight powers in a manner that avoids any jurisdictional overlaps. Thus, it recommended 
amendments to the Public Finance Management Act to provide for how the Senate and the 
county assemblies should cooperate in the discharge of this oversight function.
221
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However, even in these limited circumstances and with this recommendation, the Senate‟s 
oversight powers also appear to conflict with Article 96(1), which should be understood as 
establishing the most important role of the Senate as being to represent and protect the 
counties, their interests and those of their governments. This role is underscored in the 
Senate‟s review oversight role already discussed.222 For example, if the Senate oversees a 
county and clears it as operating a financial management system that complies with statutory 
requirements, but subsequently national government intervenes alleging non-compliance, the 
Senate would find itself in a situation of conflict of interest. It would be unable to exercise its 
county protection oversight under Article 190(5)(d) without being accused of lack of 
disinterested impartiality. Similarly, the Senate would find it difficult to approve stoppage of 
transfer of funds to county government beyond thirty days under Article 225(5) from a 
disinterested position of impartiality. The same will be the case when it plays a role in the 
renewal of the decision to stop transfer of funds to county governments. In both situations the 
county government may even argue that the non-compliance matters it is accused of were 
approved by the Senate. It may also argue that the national government intervention or 
stoppage of transfer of funds is instigated by the Senate for ulterior motives. However, it 
must be emphasised that the role of the Senate to represent and protect the counties, their 
governments and their interests is to objectively ensure that counties follow the Constitution 
and the law. Further, that national government does not unconstitutionally, unlawfully and 
arbitrarily interfere with counties. It cannot be an uncritical protection of counties against 
national government on all issues even where counties are wrong. 
Further harmonisation is therefore required. This calls for very delicate balancing between 
the important value of holding county governments accountable, and the need to maintain the 
trust of the county governments in the Senate as their honest protector against arbitrary action 
by national government. First, the Senate in exercise of its oversight powers must not only 
respect the oversight roles of the county assemblies
223
 but also the integrity and constitutional 
and institutional status of the county governments, and exercise restraint.
224
 The Court in 
International Legal Consultancy Group observed that „when these powers are exercised in 
reference to members of the County Government, there must be a measure of restraint by the 
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Senate … it must not do so arbitrarily and capriciously. It must exercise caution and refrain 
from acting in a manner that could be construed as micro-managing devolved units at the 
county level.‟225 The Senate must sustain the spirit of cooperative government enshrined in 
Articles 6(2) and 189.
226
 
Its oversight role under Article 96(3) should be harmonised with its protection role under 
Article 96(1) by narrowing the oversight role to supportive oversight in the same manner as 
supportive intervention envisaged by Article 190(1). The greater part of oversight in financial 
matters should be left to county assemblies which should be supported to develop their 
capacity and become more effective. The Senate‟s oversight should focus more on support to 
the county governors, county executives, and county assemblies to be more accountable. 
Such Senate oversight should be exercised in a cooperative manner. 
6 Conclusion 
A purposive interpretation in this chapter has demonstrated that a bicameral Parliament is an 
integral part of the devolved system of government which the Constitution establishes. The 
Senate plays a significant role of representing and protecting the counties and their 
governments. Although equality of membership among counties is interfered with by the 
special interest Senators, the decision-making in matters that affect counties allows for 
equality of the counties with each having only one vote. Similarly, although the Senate does 
not participate in the consideration, debate and approval of all the Bills, closer examination of 
what constitutes the Bills it participates in and other functions discloses that the Senate is the 
repository of fairly expansive powers. This is even further buttressed by its role as an 
institution for intergovernmental relations. Interpreted in this manner, the Senate becomes a 
critical institution in the realisation of devolution as the most transformative aspect of the 
Constitution. 
In discharging its duties the Senate, like any other legislative chamber, is bound to observe 
not only the substantive but also procedural requirements of the Constitution. The system 
reposes the responsibility of determining Bills concerning counties in which the Senate must 
participate in the Speakers of the two houses of Parliament. A purposive interpretation has 
established that if the Speakers and Parliament fail to comply with the constitutional 
                                                 
225
 International Legal Consultancy Group (judgment) para 67. 
226
 International Legal Consultancy Group (judgment) paras 67 and 68. 
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requirements on the procedures in this regard, the Courts must intervene to protect not only 
constitutional supremacy but also legality. 
South African jurisprudence and scholarship have provided instructive lessons in the 
purposive interpretation of the provisions relating to the Senate. First, the approach to the 
determination of Bills concerning counties, the consideration, debate and approval of which 
requires the participation of the Senate has benefited from this jurisprudence. Secondly, the 
jurisprudence has also been instructive in respect of the consequences of failure to follow the 
manner and form of the legislative process prescribed the Constitution as well as the Standing 
Orders. Finally, the jurisprudence has also been useful in respect of the Senate‟s obligation to 
facilitate public participation and involvement in its legislative processes. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Transition to devolved government 
1 Introduction 
Management of transition from an old to a new Constitution, which brings about fundamental 
change, is a difficult matter. Transition to Kenya‟s Constitution of 2010 is even more difficult 
since it aims to replace both the former Constitution and its highly centralised system, and 
introduce a devolved system of government.
1
 The World Bank has described the Kenyan 
transition process as being complex and ambitious,
2
 because the process must not only 
constitute the newly created county governments and transfer powers and functions from 
national government to them, but also wind up the former Local Authorities and collapse 
them and their powers and functions into the counties while ensuring that there is no 
disruption of services.
3
 Transition to devolved government entails the deconstruction of the 
centralised system with its legal order and some of its structures and institutions, and the 
construction of the devolved system of government with a new legal order and new structures 
and institutions. The new system must not be patched on top of the old system as this would 
fail to achieve the objectives of devolution. However, a major challenge lies in using the old 
order institutions to deconstruct the old order, and construct the new devolved order and its 
successor institutions, as some of them may have vested interests in the continuation of the 
centralised system. 
Chapter Eighteen and the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution provide for transitional and 
consequential matters with aspects of them focusing on transition to devolved government. 
This chapter examines aspects of these constitutional provisions relating to transition to 
devolved government. First is the gradual transition to devolved government. This section 
addresses the approach to interpreting transitional provisions; and the timing, period and 
phases of transition to devolved government. Second is the transition in the legislative area 
which involves the deconstruction of the old legal order through the enactment of enabling 
new order legislation, and the interpretation of the old order continued laws in a manner that 
makes them consistent with the new Constitution and facilitates transition to devolved 
                                                 
1
 World Bank Devolution without Disruption: Pathways to a Successful New Kenya (2012) 184.  
2
 World Bank (2012) v.  
3
 World Bank (2012) 184. 
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government. Third is the transfer of functions and resources, and the restructuring of the 
provincial administration. The chapter also examines the numerous key institutions which the 
Constitution establishes or envisages as being responsible for managing the transition 
process. 
2 The gradual transition to devolved government 
Article 263 provides for the birth of the new Constitution by its coming into force upon its 
promulgation by the President or on the expiry of a period of fourteen days from the date of 
the publication in the Gazette of the final result of the referendum ratifying it. However, 
Article 264 provides for the death of the former Constitution in a manner that signals a 
gradual transition to the new dispensation and devolved government. It repeals the former 
Constitution thus:  
Subject to the Sixth Schedule, for the avoidance of doubt, the Constitution in 
force immediately before the effective date shall stand repealed on the 
effective date.  
The Sixth Schedule to which Article 264 is subject provides details of, among other things, 
transition to devolved government and puts Parliament at the center of the institutional 
framework. This gradual nature of the transition process poses challenges and threats to the 
successful management of transition to devolved government. 
2.1 The approach to interpreting transitional provisions 
The transitional provisions are temporary in nature and cannot form a basis for permanent 
claims. They last for the period of transition only and cease to exist once their objective has 
been accomplished. While they last, they are part of the Constitution, and should be 
interpreted as such and be harmonised with the permanent provisions. Their main purpose is 
to facilitate the permanent provisions become operational and cannot be interpreted in a 
manner that obstructs or hinders the permanent provisions becoming operational.
4
 The Court 
of Appeal approved this approach in Center for Rights Education and Awareness and another 
v John Harun Mwau and other and made it clear that „[a]lthough the schedule is an integral 
                                                 
4
 Dennis Mogambi Mong’are v Attorney General and 3 others [2011] eKLR (Dennis Mogambi Mong’are) para 
54; John Harun Mwau & 3 others v Attorney General & 2 others [2012] eKLR (John Harun Mwau 1) para 123; 
Timothy Njoya & others v Attorney General & others [2013] eKLR (Njoya Two) 19.  
 
 
 
 
433 
 
Chapter 11: Transition to devolved government 
part of the Constitution, it should be understood for what it is – transitional in character … . 
[I]t was intended to be a bridge between the old Constitution and the new‟.5 The provisions 
serve the special purpose of facilitating the transformation brought about by the new 
constitutional order. Although these statements were made in another context, their 
authoritative value equally applies to transitional provisions relating to devolution. 
Transitional provisions thus provide for a structured process of transition and assign various 
responsibilities for managing transition to devolved government to some permanent 
institutions created by the permanent provisions of the Constitution, and other temporary 
institutions created by the transitional provisions. Being facilitative, transitional provisions 
cannot hinder permanent provisions from becoming operational. As argued later in this 
chapter, no provision of the Constitution can be hindered from coming into force simply 
because an institution created by the Constitution has failed to do what the Constitution 
requires it to do to facilitate the coming into operation of the constitutional provision.
6
 For 
this reason, when there is a conflict between the permanent provisions of the Constitution and 
the transitional provisions, the transitional provisions should not be interpreted in a manner 
that defeats the permanent provisions of the Constitution. They cannot be interpreted to 
hinder the new order becoming operational. Rather, they should be interpreted in a purposive 
manner that harmonises them with the substantive provisions of the Constitution and gives 
effect to the objective of bringing the new order into operation. The High Court in Dorothy N 
Muchungu v Speaker of the County Government of Embu and others, observed that the duty 
of the courts „is to interpret the Constitution in a manner that does not defeat its evident 
purpose, values and principles‟.7 Because of this, in Dennis Mogambi Mong’are, an attempt 
to use the permanent provisions to stop the vetting of judges and magistrates, which was 
provided for by the transitional provisions, was rejected. The Court held that the transitional 
provisions are part of the Constitution and cannot be questioned on the basis that they are 
unconstitutional.
8
 
                                                 
5
 [2012] eKLR (John Harun Mwau) para 43. 
6
 See section 3.2 of this chapter. 
7
 [2014] eKLR (Dorothy N Muchungu) para 47. 
8
 Dennis Mogambi Mong’are paras 42, 43 and 52. The court noted that the transitional provisions must be 
interpreted within the Kenyan historical context which indicated that the Kenyan people were desirous to make 
„a break with the past and bring in a new constitutional dispensation‟ with a judiciary in which people had 
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An attempt in Njoya Two to use the transitional provisions to delay the coming into force of 
the substantive provisions requiring members of Parliament to pay taxes on their salaries and 
allowances was rejected. Although in John Harun Mwau 1 it had been held that in the case of 
conflict, the transitional provisions prevail over the permanent ones, the Court in Njoya Two 
rejected this approach, noting that: 
[T]he correct position is as stated in the Executive Council of Western Cape 
Legislature … case – that the Constitution must be read as an integrated 
whole, and that where there is a conflict, then the substantive provisions of 
the Constitution would prevail. The role of the transitional clauses in the 
Constitution is to ensure a smooth shift from the old to the new order, while 
the role of the Constitution is to address and correct past injustices, and 
ensures that the citizens rights are protected in the future.
9 
The Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate and another v Attorney-General and others 
identified the constitutional provisions on devolution as key pillars in the process of the 
deconstruction of the previously centralised system.
10
 It noted that the Constitution of 2010 
was a bold and radical attempt „to restructure the Kenyan State‟ and revise „the terms of a 
social contract whose vitality had long expired‟ and become „dysfunctional, unresponsive, 
and unrepresentative of the people‟s future aspirations‟.11 But the Court correctly warned that 
the success of this initiative of fundamentally restructuring and reordering the Kenyan State 
is not guaranteed. „It must be nurtured, aided, assisted and supported by citizens and 
institutions‟.12 The Court therefore acknowledges that this is the reason the „Supreme Court 
Act imposes a transitional burden and duty‟ on it: 
The Supreme Court has a restorative role, in this respect, assisting the 
transition process through interpretive vigilance. The Courts must patrol 
                                                                                                                                                        
confidence. They intended all the provisions of the Constitution including the transitional provisions on vetting 
of the judges and magistrates, to have effect. 
9
 Njoya Two para 20. 
10
 [2013] eKLR (speaker of the Senate) para 173.  
11
 Speaker of the Senate para 160. 
12
 Speaker of the Senate para 160. See also Ojwang JB Ascendant Judiciary in East Africa: Reconfiguring the 
Balance of Power in a Democratizing Constitutional Order (2013) 39 where he observes that „[t]he new 
Constitution cannot propel itself‟ and identifies the judiciary as the key propeller.  
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Kenya‟s constitutional boundaries with vigor, and affirm new institutions, as 
they exercise their constitutional mandates, being conscious that their very 
infancy exposes them not only to the vagaries and fragilities inherent in all 
transitions, but also to the proclivities of the old order.
13
 
What emerges is that the purpose of transitional provisions, including those on transition to 
devolved government, is to facilitate the permanent provisions to become operational. They 
must thus be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to the permanent provisions, and when 
there is a conflict, the permanent provisions prevail. Consideration must be given to the 
disruptive potential of the transition process. Consequently, a generous interpretation that 
avoids such disruption and gives effect to the object of bringing devolved government into 
operation must be encouraged.
14
 
2.2 Phases of transition to devolved government 
The process of transition from the centralised to a devolved system of government is divided 
into two distinct periods: the period before the first elections after the coming into force of 
the new Constitution, and the period after the first elections under the new Constitution.
15
 
While certain aspects and activities of the transition process are to run from the effective date 
of the new Constitution through the first elections and beyond, other aspects are confined to 
the period before the first elections, and yet others can only begin and be undertaken after the 
first elections. 
2.2.1 Period before the first elections 
The first period of transition to devolved government begins from the promulgation of the 
new Constitution and runs up to immediately after the first elections under the new 
Constitution.
16
 Although section 2(2) of the Sixth Schedule suspends the provisions of the 
Constitution relating to devolved government, until the date of the first elections for county 
                                                 
13
 Speaker of the Senate paras 160 and 161. 
14
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 2, 31 discussing the approach of the Constitutional Court in MEC for 
Local Government and Planning for the Western Cape v Paarl Poultry Enterprises CC t/a Rosendal Poultry 
Farm 2002 (2) BCLR 133 (CC). They also refer to and discuss IMATU v Minister Pierre Uys (2001) JOL 8451 
(C) para 30.  
15
 See Task Force on Devolved Government Final Report on Devolved Government in Kenya: Developmental 
Devolved Government for Effective and Sustainable Counties (2011) 309-13.  
16
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 309. 
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assemblies and governors held under the new Constitution, section 2(3)(a) clarifies that 
elections for the county assemblies and governors must be governed by provisions of the new 
Constitution. Similarly, a number of preparatory activities such as the enactment of enabling 
laws required by the Sixth Schedule and Chapters Eleven and Twelve of the Constitution 
were not suspended and must be undertaken during this period.
17
 Section 2(3) of the Sixth 
Schedule explicitly recognises that certain laws critical to transition to devolved government 
must be enacted even before the first elections. A number of key preparatory laws relating to 
devolved government were enacted during this period. They include the Urban Areas and 
Cities Act of 2011,
18
 Transition to Devolved Government Act of 2012,
19
 County 
Governments Act of 2012,
20
 Public Finance Management Act of 2012,
21
 Transition County 
Allocation of Revenue Act of 2013,
22
 and Transition County Appropriation Act of 2013.
23
 
Section 2 of the Sixth Schedule provides for the suspension of certain provisions of the new 
Constitution, with implications for the management of transition to devolved government. 
First, although the Constitution establishes a bicameral Parliament in which the Senate is part 
and parcel of devolution and protects county interests, section 2(1)(a) and (b) suspend 
Chapters Seven and Eight which provide for representation of the people, and the legislature, 
until the first elections for Parliament under the new Constitution. The provisions of the 
chapters, however, apply to the first general elections under the new Constitution. Section 
3(2) of the Sixth Schedule extends the application of the provisions of the former 
Constitution relating to certain aspects of Parliament. Section 10 provides that „[t]he National 
Assembly existing immediately before the effective date shall continue as the National 
Assembly for the purposes of this Constitution for the unexpired term‟. Pending the election 
of the first Senate, section 11 provides, „the functions of the Senate shall be exercised by the 
National Assembly‟.24 It adds that „any function or power that required to be performed or 
                                                 
17
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 308.  
18
 Urban Areas and Cities Act No 13 of 2011. 
19
 Transition to Devolved Government Act No 1 of 2012.  
20
 County Governments Act No 17 of 2012. 
21
 Public Finance Management Act No 18 of 2012.  
22
 Transition County Allocation of Revenue Act No 6 of 2013. 
23
 Transition County Appropriation Act No 7 of 2013. 
24
 S 11(1) (a), Sixth Schedule. 
 
 
 
 
437 
 
Chapter 11: Transition to devolved government 
exercised by both Houses, acting jointly or one after the other, shall be performed or 
exercised by the National Assembly‟.25 
The suspension and extension provisions did not suspend bicameralism, what was suspended 
is the election of the National Assembly and the Senate. It is for this reason that section 10 
continues the National Assembly as it existed under the former Constitution not as the old 
order National Assembly, but „as the National Assembly for purposes‟ of the new 
Constitution. The old order National Assembly was by operation of law transformed into the 
new order National Assembly, and conferred with two distinct roles: that of the new order 
National Assembly; and that of the Senate. Thus, bicameralism became operative but the 
functions of the Senate were assigned to the transformed National Assembly to perform them 
on an agency basis. 
The implications of this are that in the discharge of its responsibilities in the management of 
transition to devolved government during the first period of transition, the transformed 
National Assembly is subject to the legislative „manner and form‟ prescribed by Articles 109, 
110, 111, 112, 113 and 123 which were therefore not suspended. Under these procedures, the 
National Assembly would have to first determine the nature of the Bill coming before it and 
if it requires the participation of the Senate, sit first as the National Assembly, and secondly 
as a Senate to deal with the matter following the decision-making processes of the Senate. 
One of the key devolution supporting pieces of legislation required for the deconstruction of 
both the old order unicameral Parliament and the old legal order, and construction of the new 
order bicameral Parliament and the new legal order, are the rules of procedure of the 
bicameral Parliament. Article 124(1) empowers each house of Parliament to „make Standing 
Orders for the orderly conduct of its proceedings‟ and those of its committees. The Kenyan 
bicameral Parliament requires three sets of rules of procedure: the rules of the National 
Assembly, the rules of the Senate, and the joint rules of the two houses when they are dealing 
with joint matters such as when the two Speakers determine whether a Bill concerns county 
governments or not, and whether it is a special or ordinary bill. 
Given the suspension and extension provisions, the transformed old order National Assembly 
should have enacted these rules in the early stages of the first period of transition. These were 
necessary to guide the proceedings of Parliament as it enacted other legislation. The National 
                                                 
25
 S 11(1) (b), Sixth Schedule.  
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Assembly adopted the National Assembly Standing Orders, in which provision is made 
regarding how the speakers of the two houses of Parliament must determine whether a Bill 
concerns counties or not, only on 9 January 2013. This was long after some of the laws 
mentioned above had been enacted. The Standing Orders do not have any transitional 
provisions covering how the transformed old order National Assembly was to discharge its 
dual roles of the new order National Assembly and the Senate. 
2.2.2 Period after the first elections 
The second period of transition to devolved government runs from the conclusion of the first 
elections which bring into being the first county governments.
26
 This is a three-year phase 
since section 15(1) of the Sixth Schedule requires the phased transfer of functions to county 
governments to run for three years from the date of the first elections. Although the Fifth 
Schedule sets out the periods within which required legislation must be enacted, the longest 
period provided for is five years from the effective date of the Constitution. Since the 
effective date was 27 August 2010, the five year period ends on 27 August 2015, six months 
before 4 March 2016 which is the date when the three-year phased transfer of functions must 
end. This is because the three-year period runs from 4 March 2013 when the first elections 
were held. 
3 Transition to a new legal order 
The constitutionally entrenched devolved system requires an enabling legal system founded 
upon laws that are consistent with the new Constitution. This must be accomplished through 
the enactment of new laws, the review, amendment, and or repeal of old laws, and the 
interpretation of the old order laws in a manner that makes them consistent with the new 
Constitution. 
3.1 Enactment of new order legislation 
The preparatory laws enacted in the first phase are just a few of those required to fully transit 
to a devolved system of government. Article 261(1) requires Parliament to enact any 
legislation required by the Constitution within the time-frames specified in the Fifth 
Schedule. Section 15 of the Sixth Schedule requires Parliament to enact legislation to provide 
for a well-managed and staggered transition from the centralised system to the devolved 
                                                 
26
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 311.  
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system of government. In addition, there are other legislation not specifically mentioned 
which will be necessary as part of the complementary and enabling legislation that form a 
legal system within the new constitutional dispensation. Furthermore, since the new 
Constitution is supreme, all the existing laws touching on devolution would need to be 
reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with the supreme Constitution. Some may have to 
be repealed altogether and replaced by new ones, while others may require amendments to 
make them consistent with the new Constitution.
27
 
3.1.1 Role of Parliament 
Through the deconstruction of the old legal order and construction of a new one that is 
devolution-friendly, Parliament bears a critical and onerous responsibility of managing 
transition to devolved government. While some of Parliament‟s responsibilities must be 
discharged by the full houses of Parliament, others have been vested in its committees. First, 
the Constitution establishes a transitional „Parliamentary Select Committee‟ known as the 
Constitutional Implementation Oversight Committee and charges it with the responsibility of 
overseeing the implementation of the Constitution.
28
 The committee must receive reports 
from the Commission on the Implementation of the Constitution,
29
 and „take appropriate 
action on the reports including addressing any problems in the implementation of [the] 
Constitution‟.30 Among the matters the reports should touch on are those concerning „the 
process of establishing the infrastructure necessary for the proper operation of each county 
including progress on locating offices and assemblies and establishment and transfers of 
staff‟.31 The committee must also receive and act on reports relating to „the devolution of 
powers and functions to the counties under the legislation contemplated in section 15‟ of the 
Sixth Schedule.
32
 
This committee must exist in both transition periods.
33
 Whereas in the first transition period 
the Committee can only comprise members of the National Assembly, it is submitted that in 
                                                 
27
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 310. 
28
 S 4 Sixth Schedule.  
29
 S 4(a) Sixth Schedule. 
30
 S 4(c) Sixth Schedule.  
31
 S 4(a)(iii) Sixth Schedule. 
32
 S 4(a)(iv) Sixth Schedule. 
33
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 313. 
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the second period of transition, it should be a joint committee of the National Assembly and 
the Senate. First, though section 4 of the Sixth Schedule refers to „a select committee of the 
National Assembly‟, the title of the section refers to a „Parliamentary Select Committee‟. 
Secondly, the functions of the committee are matters concerning county governments within 
the meaning of Article 110(1) of the Constitution. Thirdly, during the second period of 
transition the consequences of failure to enact the required legislation within the required 
time are to be visited upon Parliament comprising both houses. Parliament can be dissolved 
for failure to enact required legislation within the constitutionally required time-frame.
34
 Thus 
the Senate cannot suffer the consequences if it was not party to the failure. 
 
Secondly, section 4(b) requires the Parliamentary Select Committee on the implementation of 
the Constitution to coordinate with the Attorney-General, the Commission on the 
Implementation of the Constitution and the „relevant parliamentary committees‟ to ensure the 
timely introduction and passage of the legislation required by the Constitution. Parliamentary 
committees relevant to specific sectoral areas that have been devolved play a key role in 
ensuring the enactment of legislation necessary for transition to devolved government. Again, 
whereas in the first period of transition there would only be committees of the National 
Assembly, during the second period of transition, each house would have its own committees. 
3.1.2 Role of the national executive 
The national executive is a key role player in the enactment of legislation necessary for 
transition to devolved government. First, the mandate to prepare bills for tabling in 
Parliament to be enacted into enabling legislation is vested in the Attorney-General in 
consultation with the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution.
35
 In the first 
period of transition to devolved government the Attorney-General is a member of both the 
executive and the legislature. However, although it is not clear whether in the second period 
he is a member of the legislature, it is clear that he is a member of the national executive.
36
 
By implication, the Attorney-General as a member of the executive is expected to prepare 
these bills on the basis of policy instructions of the executive. The import of this is that the 
                                                 
34
 Art 261(7).  
35
 Art 261(4).  
36
 Art 152(1)(c).  
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national executive and its various ministries have responsibility to provide policy direction in 
the management of transition to devolved government. It was in appreciation of this 
responsibility that the executive through the Ministry of Local Government, in October 2010, 
established the Task Force on Devolved Government to provide a policy and legislative 
framework for the implementation of devolution.
37
 
Furthermore, the Constitution specifically assigns to the national government the function of 
„[c]apacity building and technical assistance to the counties‟.38 The discharge of this function 
requires both legislative action setting the legal framework for such capacity building and 
technical assistance, and executive action to implement such legislation. 
Once the laws have been enacted the responsibility of their implementation falls upon the 
executive arm of government. It is for this reason that the CIC is mandated to monitor, 
facilitate and oversee not only the development of legislation but also „administrative 
procedures‟ which often are undertaken by the executive.39 The implementation of the 
legislation referred to by section 15 to provide for phased transfer of functions to county 
government is central to the successful transition to devolved government. These provisions 
would involve the national executive and its ministries facilitating the devolution of power, 
assisting county governments in building capacity, and supporting them.
40
 
3.1.3 Role of the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution 
The transitional provisions establish a transitional institution called the Commission for the 
Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) as a critical role player in the management of 
transition to devolved government as well.
41
 Article 261(4) requires preparation of Bills by 
the „Attorney-General, in consultation with the Commission‟. This means that any legislation 
enacted without consultation with the Commission could be challenged because the 
prescribed legislative process was not followed. 
Transitional provisions explicitly require proposed legislation relating to devolved 
government to be enacted after the Commission has been established, consulted and its 
                                                 
37
 Task Force on Devolved Government (2011) 1-3. 
38
 Item 32 Fourth Schedule.  
39
 S 5(6)(a) Sixth Schedule.  
40
 S 15(2)(i), (ii) and (iii).  
41
 S 5(1), (2) and (3) Sixth Schedule. 
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recommendations considered by Parliament.
42
 The Commission must be given at least 30 
days to consider such legislation,
43
 which enables it to consult with the public and 
stakeholders and give it serious consideration, before making its recommendations. In The 
Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution v Attorney General and another, the 
High Court affirmed that „[i]t is not in contention that the law requires that the respondents 
consult CIC and that CIC is granted at least a thirty day period to consider legislation 
regarding devolved government before enactment of such legislation‟.44 On the facts of the 
case, however, the Court held that the Commission had been consulted as required.
45
 
Consultation of the Commission is thus part of the manner and form constitutionally 
prescribed for the enactment of laws during the transition period. 
The Commission must operate over the two periods of transition to devolved government. It 
must be constituted within 90 days after the effective date of the new Constitution, enabling it 
to begin its work in the early stages of the first transition period.
46
 Its five year lifespan spills 
into the second transition period and can be extended by Parliament.
47
 
3.2 Failure to enact enabling legislation 
The Constitution provides that where Parliament fails to enact required legislation within the 
specified time-frame, any person may petition the High Court on the matter,
48
 which may 
issue a declaratory order
49
 directing Parliament and the Attorney-General to ensure the 
enactment of the law within the time the Court specifies in the order.
50
 „Within the period 
specified in the order‟ means that the Court can extend the time-frame specified in the 
Constitution for the enactment of legislation. The order of the Court would also require 
Parliament and the Attorney-General to report the progress to the Chief Justice.
51
 Where even 
after the Court order, Parliament fails to enact the legislation it shall, on the advice of the 
                                                 
42
 S 14(1) Sixth Schedule.  
43
 S 14(2) Sixth Schedule.  
44
 [2013] eKLR (Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution) para 34.  
45
 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution para 38. 
46
 S 25(1) Sixth Schedule. 
47
 S 5(7) Sixth Schedule.  
48
 Art 261(5). 
49
 Art 261(6)(a). 
50
 Art 261(6)(b). 
51
 Art 261(6)(b). 
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Chief Justice, be dissolved by the President and fresh elections held.
52
 The newly elected 
Parliament must enact the legislation,
53
 failing which the same process applies to it.
54
 
The question, however, is what the county government and other aggrieved parties who may 
require such legislation to be able to operate or exercise their powers are supposed to do in 
the meantime. It is submitted that aggrieved parties, including county governments, can rely 
on any relevant old order legislation however incomplete it may be. The Supreme Court has 
justified this approach on grounds that: 
[T]here ought to be no vacuum occasioned by failure or delay on the part of 
the legislature. This is why existing laws were given the leeway to continue 
operating, on condition that they would be construed with necessary 
alterations, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions to bring them into 
conformity with the Constitution.
55
 
For example, if national government fails to enact legislation establishing a framework of 
uniform norms and standards within which county governments can establish their own 
administrations in terms of Article 235, the counties can proceed to establish offices and 
appoint officers to them relying on the old order legislation. 
Such incomplete existing legislation must be interpreted by the courts in a manner that gives 
effect to the constitutional provisions. In such limited circumstances, Ojwang holds the view 
that the judiciary as a constant element in the new constitutional system should provide the 
„forum of empirical law-making, as necessitated by the demands of contested questions‟.56 
He notes that the incomplete law must be interpreted to cater for the situation: 
It is well known that no judicial officer is allowed, as a matter of firmly-
established law, to decline to resolve a dispute falling within his or her 
jurisdiction on the ground that the issues are too difficult, or do not lend 
themselves to a correct answer. It follows from this principle that even where 
                                                 
52
 Art 261(7).  
53
 Art 261(8). 
54
 Art 261(9). 
55
 Communications Commission of Kenya and others v Royal Media Services and others [2014] eKLR 
(Communications Commission of Kenya) para 195.  
56
 See Ojwang (2013) 78. 
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Parliament has not made a law regulating a specific matter in detail, it does 
not follow that the relevant question, therefore lies outside the purview of the 
law; it is the mandatory obligation of the Court to interpret the incomplete 
law of Parliament, and declare a complete scenario of law on the question. 
This indeed, is the very essence of judicial law-making as it has evolved in 
the common law tradition.
57
 
Thus, the incomplete existing law must be used to give effect to the constitutional provisions 
to cover for the situation. The Supreme Court has, however, held that there are some existing 
laws which are not capable of being construed to bring them into conformity with the 
Constitution, or „conditioned through judicial intervention without usurping the role of 
Parliament.‟58 Such laws are invalid for all purposes. 
3.3 Continuation of existing laws 
Since the process of formulating and enacting new legislation as well as repealing or 
amending the old one would take a long time, section 7(1) of the Sixth Schedule which is 
titled „existing laws‟, provides for the continuation in force of all the laws:  
All law in force immediately before the effective date continues in force and 
shall be construed with the alterations, adaptations, qualifications and 
exceptions necessary to bring it into conformity with this Constitution.  
In the Kenyan context, „existing laws‟ or „law in force‟ refer to Acts of Parliament and by-
laws of the former local authorities since the devolved system aims to collapse these local 
authorities into the newly created county governments. They also refer to all laws already 
enacted even if their implementation had not yet started.
59
 
                                                 
57
 Ojwang (2013) 91. 
58
 Communications Commission of Kenya para 197 (emphasis in original).  
59
 In the South African case of Mashavha v President of the Republic of South Africa and others 2004 (12) 
BCLR 1243 (CC) para 25, the Constitutional Court stated that: „Therefore the phrase “in force” should not be 
interpreted in section 235(6) to draw any distinction between laws which were actually being implemented, 
executed, or administered at a particular time and laws which had been enacted but not yet come into operation, 
or which were not being implemented actively. It simply refers to laws which existed (on the statute book, if one 
wishes to put it that way) immediately before 27 April 1994, and which would continue to exist in terms of 
section 229.‟ 
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These laws continue in force only if they are (a) consistent with the new Constitution, (b) 
they were not expressly or implicitly repealed by the coming into force of the new 
Constitution, and (c) they have not been subsequently expressly or implicitly amended or 
repealed by a competent authority under the new Constitution.
60
 Given the fundamental 
change the Constitution introduces in the structure of governance and the status of a distinct 
level of government it confers upon the county governments, certain aspects of some old 
order laws are implicitly repealed by the coming into force of the new Constitution.
61
 The 
South African Supreme Court of Appeal set the basic test for the survival of an old order 
provision as being „whether it has been amended or impliedly repealed or is inconsistent with 
the Constitution, but only to the extent of such inconsistency‟.62 
3.4 Interpretation of existing laws 
Existing laws must be interpreted in a manner that brings them into conformity with the new 
Constitution.
63
 Interpretation must thus identify aspects that were implicitly repealed by the 
coming into force of the Constitution, aspects that have subsequently been amended or 
repealed by lawful authority under the new Constitution, and aspects that are inconsistent 
with the Constitution, and regard them as such. The High Court in Njoya, in which the 
executive had entered into an agreement with Parliament exempting the members of the 
National Assembly from payment of taxes on their salary and allowances despite the fact that 
Article 210(3) explicitly prohibits the enactment of any law exempting any person from 
payment of tax by reason of the office the person holds, affirmed this approach. The Court 
determined that the old order National Assembly Remuneration Act will continue to be in 
force with regard to the remuneration of the members of the National Assembly but „[must], 
by virtue of section 7 of the Sixth Schedule, be brought into conformity with the Constitution. 
                                                 
60
 See Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 1, 30. 
61
 Such repealed laws or aspects are therefore not part of the laws in force that survived. In the South African 
case of CDA Boerdery (Edms) Bpk and another v The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 
2007 (4) SA 276 (SCA) para 32 Cameroon JA stated that „[t]the old-order subordination of the local authority‟s 
power to levy rates of more than 2 cents in the Rand to the Administrator‟s [Premiers] approval was implicitly 
repealed when the Constitution took effect. It did not survive the transition‟. 
62
 Majomatic 115 (Pty) Ltd v Kouga Municipality and others [2010] 3 All SA 415 (SCA) (Majomatic) para 6. 
Old order by-laws of the former local authorities that are found to be valid only apply in the territorial areas 
previously covered by the former local authorities to which they belonged.  
63
 S 7(1), Sixth Schedule.  
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As a result, any legislation made by parliament or any agreement that is made in violation of 
the provisions of the Constitution is void.‟64 Through such interpretation, courts should where 
new legislation has not been enacted, interpret existing laws in a manner that amends them to 
bring them into conformity with the Constitution and the devolved system of government. 
The constitutional requirement that these laws be „construed with the alterations, adaptations, 
qualifications and exceptions‟ necessary to bring them into conformity with the Constitution 
by implication adopts the interpretation remedy of severance and reading in of a statute, 
which was discussed in Chapter Two.
65
 This technique involves excising or severing from a 
statute the unconstitutional aspects and leaving the constitutional part intact.
66
 On the 
contrary, „reading in‟ involves reading into the statute words that do not exist as if they 
actually exist in the statute to make it consistent with the Constitution. Sometimes both 
severance and reading in are done simultaneously, excising certain words from the provision 
while reading in other words that are not in the provision.
67
 
4 Transfer of functions and resources, and restructuring provincial 
administration 
In order to ensure that delivery of services to the citizens is not disrupted, the old order local 
government structures and institutions were continued, since the establishment of the county 
institutions was suspended until the first elections.
68
 In the meantime preparatory legislation 
for the establishment and structuring of some of the county structures and institutions had to 
go on. In furtherance of decentralisation of functions and provision of services by county 
governments in terms of Articles 176(2) and 184, both the County Governments Act of 
2012
69
 and the Urban Areas and Cities Act of 2011
70
 were enacted. 
                                                 
64
 Njoya p 22.  
65
 Section 6.3 of Chap 2.  
66
 Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Matiso and others v Commanding Officer Port 
Elizabeth Prison and others (referred to as Coetzee and Matiso) 1995 (10) BCLR 1382. 
67
 See Rotich Samuel Kimutai v Ezekiel Lenyongopeta and 2 others [2005] eKLR page 6. 
68
 S 18, Sixth Schedule. 
69
 See ss 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54 of the CGA.  
70
 See ss 11-30 and 54-60 of the UACA. 
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4.1 Phased transfer of functions 
An important aspect of transition to devolved government is the transfer of functions to 
county governments. Section 15 of the Sixth Schedule requires an Act of Parliament to be 
enacted to provide for „the phased transfer, over a period of not more than three years from 
the date of the first election of county assemblies, from the national government to county 
governments of the functions assigned to them under Article 185‟. Purposively interpreted, 
these provisions envisage the following broad transition issues that are pertinent to the 
transfer of powers and functions to county governments: a phased transfer of functions; 
national government facilitation, support and assistance; and transfer of the fiscal and 
financial powers and functions. 
The functions of the former local authorities, which were assigned to county governments, 
were excluded from transfer over a period of three years since the provision refers to „from 
the national government to county governments‟. These were to be transferred on day one 
immediately after elections to avoid disruption of services given that the local authorities 
were to cease to exist upon such elections. Indeed, section 23(1) of the Transition to 
Devolved Government Act requires the Transition Authority to, „by notice in the Gazette at 
least thirty days before the first elections under the Constitution, identify functions which 
may be transferred to county governments immediately after the first elections‟. This was 
accomplished through Legal Notice No 16 of 2013. After this initial transfer of functions, 
section 23(2) of the Act provides that county governments must individually request for 
transfer of other functions as and when they are ready to assume them. Only functions from 
the national government to county governments were subject to staggered transfer over a 
three year period. However, although the provision appears restricted to legislative county 
functions assigned under Article 185, a contextual reading of this provision with the other 
sub-articles reveals that transfer of even the county executive functions was envisaged. 
Before any function is transferred, a process of analysis and unbundling of the functions must 
be undertaken to ensure that only functions assigned by the Constitution to county 
governments are transferred, and that the national government does not wrongly hold on to 
other functions which the Constitution has assigned to county governments. Section 7(2)(a) 
of the TDGA recognised this when it identified one of the functions of the Transition 
Authority to be to „facilitate the analysis and the phased transfer of the functions provided 
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under the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution to the national and county governments‟. In 
Okiya Omtatah Okoiti and another v Attorney General and 6 others
71
 the applicant 
unsuccessfully tried to have the Court reverse the transfer of the health functions to county 
governments on grounds that those were national government functions which had been 
wrongly transferred to counties. He urged the Court to interpret and define „national referral 
health facilities‟ in a manner that would include what are obviously „county health 
facilities‟.72 The Court declined to interpret these phrases on grounds that these are matters of 
policy falling within the preserve of national government.
73
 It is argued that the Court was 
wrong as these are constitutional matters appropriate for judicial interpretation. The 
Constitution has assigned powers and functions to the two levels of government. The effect 
of what the Court held is to reverse this assignment and empower the national government to 
determine what the counties can and cannot do. 
The Constitution recognises an asymmetrical process of transfer of functions to various 
counties. The essence of this is that not all the counties would have the same functions 
transferred to them at the same time. This is necessitated by the differences in the capacities 
of the counties to assume the functions. Section 15(2)(c) is explicit that the required 
legislation must „permit the asymmetrical devolution of powers to ensure that functions are 
devolved promptly to counties that have the capacity to perform them but that no county is 
given functions it cannot perform‟. In Republic v Transitional Authority and another Ex parte 
Medical Practitioners, Pharmacists and Dentists Union (KMPDU) and 2 others the 
applicants sought to have the transfer of the health functions to county governments annulled 
on grounds, among others, that the county governments did not have the capacity to assume 
them.
74
 The case was, however, dismissed on grounds that the applicants had not established 
that the counties did not have capacity to handle the functions. While the Court noted that 
there are shortages of personnel and other health facilities, it noted that this was a problem 
facing even the national government and could not be used to delay the transfer of the health 
functions to the county governments. It concluded that „[d]evolution in this country is a new 
system of governance and in its implementation, there are bound to be disagreements in the 
                                                 
71
 [2014] eKLR (Okiya Omtatah Okoiti).  
72
 Okiya Omtatah Okoiti para 3. 
73
 Okiya Omtatah Okoiti paras 85, 90 and 91.  
74
 [2013] eKLR (Ex parte Medical Practitioners) paras 12 and 13. 
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manner in which it is being done. That, however, ought not to be a ground for derailing the 
process unless it is shown that there are no mechanisms through which contentious matters 
can be resolved.‟75 
The Constitution prescribes that the Act of Parliament must „establish criteria that must be 
met before particular functions are devolved to county governments to ensure that those 
governments are not given functions which they cannot perform‟.76 This provision does a 
number of things: One, it recognises that not all the functional areas need be transferred to a 
county government at the same time. Two, even in a given functional area, not all the 
functions need be transferred at the same time. Some aspects of a functional area may be 
transferred ahead of other aspects. Three, not all the county governments need to have the 
same functions transferred to them at the same time. Some counties may be ready to 
discharge certain functions ahead of other counties, which in turn may be ready for other 
functions. 
4.2 National government must facilitate, assist and support county governments 
Section 15(2) of the Sixth Schedule imposes upon national government three intertwined 
responsibilities of managing the process of transfer of functions – the obligations to facilitate 
devolution of powers, assist, and support the county governments. An Act of Parliament must 
provide for the manner in which the „national government shall facilitate the devolution of 
power‟.77 To facilitate is to make easier or less difficult for something to happen, and to assist 
the progress of an entity or a process. This obligation is justiciable. If, for instance, a county 
government has satisfied the prescribed criteria for the transfer of certain functions but the 
national government fails to transfer them, the county government may approach a court for 
relief. 
Section 15(2)(a)(ii) requires the legislation to provide for how the national government must 
„assist county governments in building their capacity to govern effectively and provide the 
services for which they are responsible‟. Building capacity is not limited to human capacity 
relating to personnel matters only, but includes other non-personnel-related infrastructure 
necessary for the delivery of county services. Malherbe observes that administrative capacity 
                                                 
75
 Ex parte Medical Practitioners para 90. 
76
 S 15(2)(b) of the Sixth Schedule.  
77
 S 15(2) (a) (i) Sixth Schedule.  
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„is obviously a comprehensive term that includes administrative resources and structures, 
human resources in terms of sufficient, qualified and skilled staff, as well as financial 
resources‟.78 This includes a justiciable obligation to provide funds to enable the county 
governments make their first budgets and finance their activities. 
Furthermore, an Act of Parliament must also provide for how national government must 
„support county governments‟. Once the county governments have been elected and start 
running their own affairs, the national government is still under an obligation to support 
them. Read together, the obligations these three provisions impose on national government 
can be divided into two aspects: One, the establishment of basic infrastructure the counties 
would require to start functioning and be able to immediately upon elections take over the 
functions that were previously performed by the former local authorities. Two, the assistance 
and support of counties once they have been elected in building their own capacity to be able 
to receive other functions and discharge them effectively. 
4.3 Transition in financial matters 
Critical to transition in the functional areas is the issue of resources required for the discharge 
of the responsibilities or functions. Thus, a purposive interpretation of section 15 of the Sixth 
Schedule also discloses that the Constitution envisages transition to devolved government in 
the resources area, including preparedness and capacity building in fiscal and financial 
matters, human resources, assets and liabilities, and the closure and transfer of public 
records.
79
 
The transitional provisions envisage the audit, protection and preservation of the assets and 
resources of the former local authorities, for handing over to either county governments once 
they are elected, or to the national government. It also envisages determination of how the 
                                                 
78
 Malherbe R „The constitutional distribution of powers‟ in De Villiers B (ed) Review of Provinces and Local 
Governments in South Africa: Constitutional Foundation and Practice (2008) 49. 
79
 In terms of section 3(d), (e) and (f), of the TDGA, the Act is to provide for policy and operational 
mechanisms for the audit, verification and transfer to county and national governments – assets and liabilities; 
human resources; pensions and other staff benefits of employees of the local authorities; the closure and transfer 
of government records; mechanisms for capacity building. 
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liabilities are to be dealt with. Since the county governments took over from the former local 
authorities, it follows that they must take over their liabilities.
80
 
4.4 Restructuring provincial administration 
Within the context of transition to devolved government, one of the old order structures and 
institutions that must be addressed through restructuring is the system of provincial 
administration, whose powers are anchored in the Chiefs‟ Act.81 Since colonial days, this was 
the institutional engine of the centralised system of government which was used for exerting 
centralised control right down to the local level. The system comprised the following 
hierarchy of administrative officers: provincial commissioners (PC), district commissioners 
(DC), divisional officers (DO), location officers (chief), and sub-location officers (assistant 
chief). Instructions and orders from the President‟s office would flow down through the chain 
of command to the chiefs who would then issue orders to be obeyed in terms of the Chiefs‟ 
Act. Section 17 of the Sixth Schedule provides for the restructuring of provincial 
administration in the following manner: „Within five years after the effective date the 
national government shall restructure the system of administration commonly known as the 
provincial administration to accord with and respect the system of devolved government 
established under this Constitution.‟82 
First, this provision imposes a mandatory obligation on national government to restructure 
the system of provincial administration, which is evidenced by the use of the term „shall‟. 
„Restructure‟ is to organise something differently.83 It is „to change, alter, or restore the 
structure of something‟, „to effect a fundamental change in an organization or system‟; or „to 
organize a system, business or society in a different way‟.84 Secondly, the restructuring must 
be done to „accord with‟ the system of devolved government. „Accord‟ is to be in agreement 
or consistent with, to concur, conform or be compatible or in harmony with the system of 
                                                 
80
 In Republic v Town Clerk of Webuye County Council and another [2014] eKLR para 15, the High Court held 
that a judgment liability against a former local authority must be executed against the successor county 
government. 
81
 Chiefs‟ Act Revised Edition of 2012. 
82
 S 17 Sixth Schedule.  
83
 Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and Word Power Guide (2001) 1103. 
84
 Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/restructure (accessed 5 April 2014). 
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devolved government.
85
 For restructuring of provincial administration to accord with 
devolved government, it must be compatible with the constitutionally distinct nature of the 
county governments and recognise their relative autonomy in terms of their powers and 
functions.
86
 Thirdly, it must be done to „respect‟ the system of devolved government. Respect 
is „to hold in esteem or honor; to show regard or consideration for; to refrain from intruding 
upon or interfering with; to pay proper attention to; not to violate; or to treat courteously or 
kindly‟.87 
Although national government has been granted power to restructure provincial 
administration, the power must be exercised within the limits of the Constitution, since where 
such limits exist, they constrain the power of the national government. The restructuring of 
provincial administration must accord with and respect the system of devolved government 
from two distinct perspectives. First, the process of restructuring must itself accord with and 
respect devolved government. Secondly, the resultant restructured provincial administration 
must both in its structure and operations accord with and respect the system of devolved 
government. Understood within its context of being part of Part 4 of the Sixth Schedule 
which is titled „devolved government‟, the purpose of the section is to facilitate transition to 
devolved government and not to retain the centralised system of government. The system can 
only be restructured to the extent that it can harmoniously co-exist with devolved 
government. This conclusion should be understood in the context of the observation already 
made that although provisions of schedules to the Constitution are part of the Constitution, 
those such as section 17, which are anchored upon transitional provisions of the Constitution, 
do not establish permanent rights and claims. Only schedules anchored upon permanent 
provisions of the Constitution are permanent in nature and can form a basis for permanent 
claims and rights. To restructure provincial administration to accord with and respect the 
system of devolved government must take into account Articles 6(2) and 189(1)(a) and 
requires three elements, discussed in the following sections. 
4.4.1 Respect the constitutional status and institutions of counties 
The process and the resultant administration must accord with and respect the constitutional 
status and institutions of county governments. By providing for county governments that are 
                                                 
85
 See Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and Word Power Guide (2001) 10. 
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 Art 6(2). 
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 Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and Word Power Guide (2001) 1103.  
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distinct from and interdependent with national government, Article 6(2) envisages county 
governments that are, by and large, autonomous in nature and status. Article 189(1)(a) thus 
calls for respect for the county governments‟ „constitutional status and institutions‟. Some of 
the key institutions of the county government that must be respected are the governor, the 
county executive committee, the county assembly and the county administration. 
4.4.2 Respect the functions and powers of counties 
The resultant restructured provincial administration must accord with and respect the system 
of devolved government in the sense that it performs its functions and exercises its powers 
within the functional areas of national government. The distinctiveness and the autonomy of 
county governments recognised by Article 6(2) envisage county governments that have 
clearly allocated and protected functions and powers. As such, Article 189(1)(a) provides for 
respect for „the functional and institutional integrity‟ of the county governments. Thus, the 
restructured administration cannot encroach upon the functions and powers of county 
governments, which must be respected. If the system goes beyond these functional and power 
boundaries, its actions would be declared unconstitutional and invalid. 
Any legislation or executive action that confers upon the restructured provincial 
administration the constitutional powers and functions of county governments would be 
unconstitutional. The National Government Co-ordination Act (NGCA) empowers the 
President to establish committees of Principal Secretaries and other mechanisms of co-
ordination of the national government functions.
88
 The President may decentralise such 
committees and other mechanisms.
89
 The NGCA then recreates the former provincial 
administration and requires the Public Service Commission to appoint the former provincial 
administration administrative officers to the renamed offices, „to co-ordinate national 
government functions and to perform such other functions as may be assigned to them under 
this Act or any other law‟.90 The “any other law” includes the Chiefs‟ Act (CA), which is one 
of the old order continued laws but was revised in 2012 after the enactment of the 
Constitution. Yet the CA confers on provincial administration a wide range of powers and 
functions, many of which are unconstitutional for encroaching on county functional areas. 
The Act confers the power on chiefs to issue orders that must be obeyed by people residing 
                                                 
88
 See s 13(1) of the National Government Co-ordination Act No 1 of 2013. 
89
 See s 13(2) NGCA. 
90
 See s 13(1) and (2) NGCA. 
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within the local limits of their jurisdiction.
91
 Disobedience of these orders attracts penal 
consequences.
92
 First, the chiefs can prohibit or restrict the consumption or possession of 
intoxicating liquor by, and supply of such liquor to young persons,
93
 and the holding of 
drinking bouts.
94
 These are county functional areas of „[c]ultural activities, public 
entertainment and public amenities, including liquor licensing‟.95 Secondly, the chiefs can 
order for the prevention of the „spread of disease, whether of human beings or animals‟,96 
order for the destroying of locusts in any stage of development, and order for the suppression 
or control of animal or insect pests or plant pests, noxious weeds or diseases.
97
 They can also 
order the restriction or prohibition of the „use of grazing by any form of stock in any area 
which has been set apart for the purpose of reconditioning or which has been planted with 
any fodder-producing plants or grass‟.98 Again, these are county government agriculture 
functions which include crop and animal husbandry,
99
 and plant and animal disease 
control.
100
 Thirdly, the chiefs can require the proper burial of deceased persons in 
cemeteries,
101
 and forbid the deliberate exposure of persons supposed to be dying.
102
 Yet 
these are part of the county health functions which include cemeteries, funeral parlours and 
crematoria;
103
 and the function of control of air pollution and other public nuisances.
104
 
Fourthly, the chiefs can issue orders to regulate the cutting of timber and prohibit the wasteful 
destruction of trees,
105
 yet the implementation of specific national government policies on 
natural resources and environmental conservation including soil and water conservation and 
                                                 
91
 S 10 CA. 
92
 S 18 CA. 
93
 S 10(a) CA. 
94
 S 10(b) CA. 
95
 Item 4 Part 2, Fourth Schedule.  
96
 S 10(h) CA. 
97
 S 11(d) CA. 
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 S 11(j) CA. 
99
 Item 1(a) Part 2, Fourth Schedule. 
100
 Item 1(d) Part 2, Fourth Schedule. 
101
 S 11(h) CA. 
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104
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forestry are county functions.
106
 They can also issue orders to control grass fires,
107
 yet 
firefighting and disaster management is a county function.
108
 These are clearly cases of 
usurpation of county functions which must be held unconstitutional. 
4.4.3 Not perform or exercise national government functions and powers in a 
manner that interferes with county functions and powers 
The issue here focuses on the manner in which national government exercises its 
constitutional functions. The essence of this is that where the restructured provincial 
administration is exercising the constitutional powers and functions of national government, 
it must do so in a manner that does not encroach on the powers of county government. The 
restructured administration must do so in a manner that respects and does not interfere with 
the functions and powers of county governments. It must not impede the county governments 
from performing their own functions and exercising their own powers effectively. The South 
African Constitutional Court cautioned that the powers of municipalities must be respected 
by the national and provincial governments which may not use their powers to „compromise 
or impede a municipality‟s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions‟.109 
Thus, national government‟s power to restructure provincial administration must be exercised 
carefully within the context of recognition for the system of two levels of government with 
constitutionally divided, limited and protected powers and functions. Any encroachment even 
by the mere manner of the performance or exercise of the national government‟s functions 
and powers, by the restructured administration, will be unconstitutional and invalid, and must 
be declared as such.
110
 
4.4.4 Progressive restructuring 
Section 17 of the Sixth Schedule requires the national government to restructure provincial 
administration „within five years of the effective date‟ of the Constitution, which was 27 
August 2010, the date the Constitution was promulgated. Given the requirement to restructure 
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 Item 10 Part 2, Fourth Schedule. 
107
 S 10(n) CA. 
108
 Item 12 Part 2, Fourth Schedule. 
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 Executive Council of the Province of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional 
Development and another 1999 (12) BCLR 1360 (CC) para 29. 
110
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„to accord with and respect‟, devolved government, restructuring is not an event but a 
process. Preparatory restructuring could begin in the first period of transition and must form 
part of the national government‟s responsibility and obligation to facilitate, assist and support 
„devolution of power‟ and „county governments in building their capacity‟.111 The process 
must however continue in the second period of transition after county governments have been 
elected and have established their own administrative structures which the restructuring must 
accord with and respect. This will ensure that the resultant restructured administration is not 
duplicative and wasteful, since the Constitution prescribes that public funds be used in a 
prudent and responsible manner.
112
 In Law Society of Kenya v Transition Authority and 2 
others, in which the High Court was invited to declare certain provisions of the National 
Government Co-ordination Act as unconstitutional, the Court declined on grounds that the 
matters raised required to be dealt with through consultation in terms of section 19 of the 
Act.
113
 The Court stated: 
The national government has five years from 22
nd
 August 2010 (sic) to 
restructure the provincial administration. This is not a one off event; it is a 
process that involves public and stakeholder participation. Parliament has 
had a say in the process by enacting various statutes to govern devolution. 
The provisions of these statutes will always be subject to amendment as and 
when circumstances require within the process of „restructuring‟. The 
National and County Governments are both recognized by the Constitution 
and must be given effect in the manner contemplated by the Constitution.  
The County Governments have only just come into existence after the 4
th
 
March 2013 election. They must be incubated and supported and this Court 
is an integral part of that process. Article 189 requires that the National and 
County Governments respect each other, assist and support each other and 
co-ordinate their functions. Granting the declarations sought in the petition 
will undermine this objective and process of implementation of the 
                                                 
111
 See s 15(2)(a) of the Sixth Schedule.  
112
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113
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Constitution, devolution and the restructuring of the provincial 
administration.
114 
Similarly, in Minister for Internal Security and Provincial Administration v Centre for Rights 
Education Awareness (Creaw) and 8 others
115
 the Court of Appeal recognised that the 
restructuring of provincial administration „is required to be achieved progressively within 5 
years‟.116 
4.4.5 Harmonisation of restructuring with other transitional provisions 
Restructuring provincial administration in terms of section 17 must be harmonised with other 
transitional provisions. First, during the first period of transition, provincial administration 
performed and exercised functions and powers that included some assigned to county 
governments. Secondly, during the second period and especially after transfer of functions to 
county governments, provincial administration, whether fully restructured or not, cannot 
perform the functions and exercise the powers of county governments. Any performance and 
exercise of county functions and powers would be inconsistent with the Constitution and thus 
null and void. Provincial administration can only perform and exercise the functions and 
powers assigned to national government. Thirdly, through agreements between the national 
and county governments envisaged by Article 187, the county governments can nonetheless 
allow provincial administration to perform and exercise county functions and powers on 
behalf of the counties. The same applies to any other national government personnel. 
Fourthly, given that provincial administration has vast numbers of staff that can perform 
county functions, as part of facilitation, assistance and support, some of these staff must be 
shifted to county governments. 
5 Conclusion 
Transition provisions of the Constitution are, by their very nature, temporary and aim to 
facilitate transition to devolved government. As such, they must be interpreted in a manner 
that facilitates rather than hinders the coming into operation of devolved government. 
Through the suspension of some of the provisions of the new Constitution, and the extension 
of those of the former Constitution, the transition provisions provide for a gradual transition 
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to devolved government. This process is spread across two distinct transition phases. These 
are the period before the first elections, and that after the first elections under the new 
Constitution, during which a number of identified transition activities must take place. 
The transition to devolved government must involve the deconstruction of the centralised 
system and the construction of the devolved system. This must be secured through: (a) 
enactment of devolution compliant laws; (b) interpretation of old order continued laws in a 
manner that makes them consistent with the new Constitution and facilitates transition to 
devolved government; (c) transfer of functions and resources, and the restructuring of 
provincial administration. 
The Kenyan transition to devolved government is a complex and difficult process. It 
envisages a massive deconstruction and reconstruction of the state. The process cannot propel 
itself but must be carefully and delicately managed, facilitated, assisted and supported. 
Consequently, it involves a multiplicity of institutions playing varying roles. The Supreme 
Court in Speaker of the Senate correctly viewed this large number of institutions as evidence 
of the Constitution‟s „commitment to protect‟ devolution as the „core promise of the new 
Constitution‟.117 It noted that „[t]he large panoply of institutions that play a role in 
devolution-matters, evidences the central place of devolution in the deconstruction-
reconstruction of the Kenyan state‟.118 One of the major challenges of transitioning to 
devolved government is the fact that some of the old order institutions have to play a role in 
the deconstruction of the old order and construction of the new order. The risk of vested 
interests trying to transition to devolved government in their own image of centralised 
government is obvious. 
Once again, South African jurisprudence has proved beneficial in the purposive interpretation 
of the constitutional provisions on transition to devolved government. 
                                                 
117
 Speaker of the Senate paras 186, 187 and 183. 
118
 Speaker of the Senate para 183 (emphasis in original).  
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
Conclusion 
1 Outline of the major argument 
At the beginning of this study it was asserted that devolution was adopted as the centrepiece 
and most transformative aspect of the Constitution. It was intended to address the many 
governance, economic and development problems of the country, which arose from the long 
history of a highly centralised, undemocratic and inequitable system. The main problem 
identified, however, was that this may not easily be realised since devolution is a novel 
concept that constitutes the most complex aspect of the Constitution. It also has a 
controversial history and may be resisted by those who have vested interests in the centralised 
system, given that it has the potential for introducing radical change with far-reaching 
implications for many aspects of governance. Thus, the main purpose of the study was to 
provide a comprehensive and consistent interpretation of the devolution provisions of the 
Constitution in order to give effect to the purposeful realisation of devolution as a radical 
break with the past. The study posed two major questions: One, whether a purposive 
interpretation could be used to provide a comprehensive, coherent and consistent 
interpretation of the constitutional provisions on devolution to give effect to devolution‟s 
transformative intent; and two, whether foreign jurisprudence, and especially South African 
jurisprudence, could be useful in this process. 
2 Interpretation approach 
The devolution provisions must be interpreted through a purposive approach, which the 
Constitution itself has provided for, and which recognises that constitutional interpretation is 
a process of the practical realisation and application of the constitutional provisions by giving 
them content, shape and direction.
1
 Thus, a purposive approach focuses on identifying the 
values, purposes and objects the provisions aimed to achieve, and giving effect to them. This 
is achieved through interpreting the Constitution as a whole, taking into account both intra-
textual and extra-textual context. From this perspective the social, economic, political and 
cultural context of the country in its historical and contemporary dimensions was identified as 
                                                 
1
 Du Plessis L „Interpretation‟ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2011) ch 32, 
19. 
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playing a critical role in the identification and shaping of the values, objects and purposes of 
devolution. These context and the values, objects and purposes of devolution have thus been 
significant points of reference in the purposive interpretation of the devolution provisions of 
the Constitution. „Sharing and devolution of power‟ has itself been identified as an important 
value of governance, which is elevated to the fundamental status of being part of the basic 
structure of the Constitution.
2
 The centrality of devolution in the Kenyan Constitution has 
been demonstrated by an interpretation that puts the principle of devolution beyond the 
Constitution amendment power, even with a referendum. The constitution-making history has 
disclosed that devolution was identified as a major solution to the problems of the centralised 
past, long before the Constitution was adopted. The Constitution-framers were thus required 
by the legislation guiding the constitution-making process to deliver a Constitution that 
incorporates devolution. 
The historical and contemporary context has revealed that the main objects and purposes for 
adopting devolution were: to promote and advance democracy and accountability; 
development and service delivery; equity and inclusiveness; and limitation of centralisation 
and its centralizing tendency. It has been argued that in order to give full effect to these 
values and objects of devolution, the devolution and county-empowering provisions must be 
interpreted liberally, broadly and generously in favour of the counties and devolution. On the 
other hand, the national government intervention and devolution-limiting provisions must be 
interpreted narrowly and strictly against the national government. The study has 
demonstrated that through a purposive interpretation the Kenyan courts must, while informed 
and guided by the identified values and objects of the Constitution and devolution, play the 
critical role of developing and shaping devolution. The Supreme Court has already asserted 
that the courts must resolve the „constitution-making contradictions, clarify draftsmanship-
gaps, and settle constitutional disputes‟ that may have arisen from the compromises of the 
constitution-making process.
3
 Purposive interpretation continues the „constitution-making 
                                                 
2
 Art 10(2)(a). 
3
 Speaker of the Senate and another v Attorney General and others [2013] eKLR (Speaker of the Senate) para 
156. See also Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board and others v The Centre for Human Rights and Democracy 
and others (Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board) Supreme Court Petitions Nos 13A, 14 and 15 of 2013 para 
212. See also Du Plessis L (2011) ch 32, 39 where he states that: „Modern free theorists contend that 
determining the intention of the legislature necessarily entails the filling in of gaps in the enactment, making 
sense of an open-ended provision. A “wait and see” attitude with regard to legislative reform is deemed 
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process which does not end with promulgation. The courts must „illuminate legal 
penumbras‟4 that may have been created by the constitution-making process. 
3 Lessons from South African jurisprudence 
The second question asked whether lessons could be drawn from the jurisprudence developed 
by the South African courts, given that Kenya‟s devolution heavily borrowed from the South 
African Constitution. The study has demonstrated that while South African jurisprudence is 
useful in defining the devolution terms, concepts and the intergovernmental relations, and 
giving meaning and content to the provisions, it must be used with circumspection, taking 
into account the contextual differences between South Africa and Kenya. 
First is the fact that devolution occupies a central place in the Kenyan constitutional design, 
as compared to its place in the South African Constitution. While the main focus of the South 
African Constitution was to establish one sovereign, democratic state founded on a number of 
liberal democratic values, which do not include devolution,
5
 the focus of the Kenyan 
Constitution is to establish a state in which the people are proud of their ethnic, cultural and 
religious diversity, and are determined to live in peace and unity as one indivisible sovereign 
nation.
6
 This Kenyan state is founded on values among which „sharing and devolution of 
power‟ occupy a central place.7 The Constitution thus identifies one of the objects of 
devolution as being the need „to foster national unity by recognizing diversity‟.8 Sharing and 
devolution of power are thus elevated to founding values and are major devices through 
which the Constitution seeks to secure national unity in diversity. Moreover, the principle of 
the Kenyan devolution is anchored in Article 1, which provides for the sovereignty of the 
people and the sharing out of the power to exercise such sovereignty as one of the essential 
organisational features of the governance system. The county governments do not exercise 
                                                                                                                                                        
inappropriate. The judiciary, with the help of the common law, must intervene in order to remedy defects in 
statute law, since legislative processes are not sufficiently expeditious and streamlined to cope with deficiencies 
that show up in day-to-day practice.‟ 
4
 Speaker of the Senate para 156. See also De Villiers B „Introduction‟ in De Villiers B (ed) Review of Provinces 
and Local Governments in South Africa: Constitutional Foundations and Practice (2008) 10 commenting in 
respect of the South African Constitution. 
5
 See s 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  
6
 Paragraph 3 of the Preamble. 
7
 Art 10(2)(a).  
8
 Art 174(b). 
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decentralised power delegated to them by national government. Instead, they share with the 
national government the exercise of the sovereign power of the people assigned to them 
directly by the people of Kenya. This power, even if limited in subject matter, is not derived 
from the national government but the people.
9
 Further, since devolution cannot propel itself, 
the Constitution establishes and envisages a multiplicity of institutions to facilitate, assist, 
support and protect devolution. The Supreme Court in Speaker of the Senate viewed this 
large number of institutions as evidence of the Constitution‟s „commitment to protect‟ 
devolution as the „core promise of the new Constitution‟.10 It noted that „[t]he large panoply 
of institutions that play a role in devolution-matters, evidences the central place of devolution 
in the deconstruction-reconstruction of the Kenyan state‟.11 For these reasons a more 
generous interpretation of the Kenyan provisions in most instances is justified as the correct 
and advisable approach in order to protect devolution than has been done in South Africa. 
Secondly, while the South African Constitution establishes a multilevel system of 
government comprising three spheres of government; namely, national, provincial and local, 
the Kenyan devolution has only two levels of government – the national and county. 
Evidence from South African jurisprudence indicates that the Constitutional Court has 
interpreted the powers and functions of the provincial sphere of government strictly and 
narrowly,
12
 while it has interpreted those of local government liberally, broadly and 
generously.
13
 This approach has been criticised and explained by some scholars as arising out 
of a number of factors. First, apartheid history, which had attempted to divide the country 
through the creation of black Bantustans, makes for fertile ground to fear strong provinces 
and seek strong central government in order to redistribute and deal with the racial 
segregation and deprivation of the past. Secondly, the centralist ideological leanings of the 
monolithic African National Congress party, which was nurtured with the support of 
                                                 
9
 See the German Southwest State Case (1951) 1 BVerFGE 14 para 4, in Kommers DP The Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (1989) 72.  
10
 Speaker of the Senate paras 186, 187 and 183. 
11
 Speaker of the Senate para 183 (emphasis in original).  
12
 See Premier: Limpopo Province v Speaker: Limpopo Provincial Legislature and others 2011 (11) BCLR 
1181 (Limpopo 1) paras 22 and 24, and Premier: Limpopo Province v Speaker: Limpopo Provincial Legislature 
and others [2012] ZACC 3 (Limpopo 2). 
13
 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 (2) BCLR 157 
(SCA) (DFA) para 49. 
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centralist communist parties during the Cold War days and which controls government at 
both national and provincial spheres.
14
 Thirdly, national government officials have 
interpreted concurrent functions in a manner that pre-empts provinces from the legislative 
arena and relegates them to the sole role of implementation of national government 
legislation.
15
 
However, it is evident that the Court has also been generous and protective of the provincial 
sphere, especially regarding its participation in decision-making at the national level. In a 
number of cases, legislation has been invalidated on grounds that the manner and form 
followed did not accord the provinces or the NCOP its due role in the process.
16
 In the 
circumstances, it is submitted that the Kenyan Courts should be inclined towards the 
jurisprudence that takes the liberal, broad and generous interpretation so as to give effect to 
devolution given its central position in the Kenyan constitutional design. Given that the 
Kenyan counties combine and aim to achieve the roles of both regional and local government 
levels,
17
 the interpretation of the powers and functions as well as their intergovernmental 
rights of participation should be generous in the same manner that the South African 
Constitutional Court has treated both provincial and local government. This generous 
approach must be sustained whether one is dealing with powers and functions, finances, 
intergovernmental relations or the right of participation through the Senate in national 
government decision-making. 
Thirdly, the text of some of the Kenyan devolution provisions differs from the equivalent 
South African provisions. In some cases these differences should be interpreted as having 
been deliberate. The Kenyan constitution-framers were aware of the South African provisions 
but deliberately chose to phrase the Kenyan provisions differently. For example, while the 
South African Constitution expressly provides for both provincial
18
 and national
19
 legislative 
                                                 
14
 See Malherbe R „The future of provinces: Constitutional and structural aspects‟ in De Villiers B Review of 
Provinces and Local Governments in South Africa: Constitutional Foundations and Practice (2008) 46 and 48. 
See also De Villiers (2008) 6. 
15
 See Malherbe (2008) 47. 
16
 Matatiele Municipality and others v President of the Republic of South Africa and others 2007 (1) BCLR 47 
(CC) (18 August 2006) para 55. 
17
 Bosire CM Devolution for development, conflict resolution, and limiting central power: An analysis of the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010 (Unpublished Phd thesis, University of Western Cape, 2013) 408-9. 
18
 S 104(4) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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incidental powers, the Kenyan Constitution provides for county legislative incidental 
powers
20
 but not for national government legislative incidental powers. This has been 
interpreted as a deliberate omission intended to protect the county legislative domain from 
invasion by national government. Article 185(2) read together with this deliberate omission 
imply an intention to protect and empower county governments to be able to effectively 
perform their functions and exercise their powers. The constitution-framers intended to 
protect devolution, given its centrality in the constitutional scheme. 
4 Evaluation of the whole system 
4.1 The role of the values, objects and principles in the system 
Using the purposive interpretation, the study has disclosed a Kenyan history of a highly 
centralised political and economic system that was not at all accountable to the people. This 
system led to economic underdevelopment, poor service delivery, skewed development and 
service delivery, feelings of regional and ethnic disparities and marginalisation of 
communities, inequity in the distribution of resources, development and other opportunities, 
and exclusion of people and communities from decisions that affect their lives. Devolution 
was therefore adopted as a response to these problems and shortcomings, which it was meant 
to redress. This is reflected in the objects and principles of devolution which focus on 
developmental devolved government, the recognition of participation of the people and 
communities in their own development, equitable sharing of resources and opportunities, the 
protection of minorities and marginalised groups and communities, and democratic and 
accountable systems that limit centralised power. 
A purposive interpretation has demonstrated that these values and objects of devolution are 
not only aids for the interpretation of other provisions of the Constitution, but are also 
themselves operative provisions which demarcate the limits of powers of the two levels of 
government. First, the powers are limited in the sense that they can only be used as a means 
of achieving these objects. The values and objects are specific goals and purposes meant to 
direct and guide action towards certain ends. They identify the ultimate ends in pursuit of 
which all power assigned within the devolved system of government should be deployed. 
Secondly, devolution as a value forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
19
 S 44(3) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
20
 Art 185(2). 
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imposes limitations even on the constitution amendment power – making certain provisions 
of the Constitution non-amendable. Thirdly, the values and objects, like the Bill of Rights, 
serve to transform some of the powers and functions of the levels of government into binding 
obligations. The powers and functions lose their discretionary nature and become obligations 
which the governments must discharge and which can be enforced by one government 
against the other or by citizens against any one of the governments. 
A purposive interpretation in this respect has drawn some useful lessons from comparative 
jurisprudence. The German
21
 and Indian cases in particular have been useful in establishing 
the doctrine of the basic structure of the Constitution, of which it has been argued that the 
Kenyan devolution forms a part.
22
 Likewise, South African cases have been useful in 
indicating that objects and values can transform discretionary powers and functions into 
binding obligations.
23
 
4.2 The nature and structure of the system 
As already noted, in contrast to the South African system, the Kenyan Constitution 
establishes only two levels of government: national and county. However, the provisions 
empowering county governments to decentralise their functions and provision of their 
services have been purposively interpreted as envisaging a statutory local government level 
as a competence of county government. The study has demonstrated that in nature the county 
governments are relatively autonomous. Their territorial autonomy, including their 
boundaries, names and the numbers have constitutional protection. A purposive interpretation 
has established that while county boundary alterations that do not involve change of county 
names or number of counties can be effected by a parliamentary resolution, alterations that 
lead to the change of the names or total number of counties must go through constitutional 
amendments. Those that change the total number of counties must go through a referendum 
as well. 
                                                 
21
 Southwest State Case (1951) 1 BVerFGE 14 para 2, in Kommers (1989) 71-2. See also Kesavananda Bharati 
v State of Kerala (1973) AIR SC 1461. Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, in which Chandrachud (1975) AIR 
SC 2461. See Minerva Mills Ltd v India (1980) AIR SC 1789, 1824.  
22
 Golak Nath v State of Punjab (1967) AIR SC 1643. 
23
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another 2005 (2) BCLR 150 (CC) para 38. See 
also Joseph and others v City of Johannesburg and others 2010 (3) BCLR 212. 
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To a lesser extent, comparative jurisprudence has been useful. While the South African cases 
have been useful in the interpretation of the county assemblies‟ duty to facilitate public 
participation and involvement in their businesses,
24
 Nigerian
25
 and the United States of 
America
26
 cases assisted in the interpretation of provisions on removal of the governor from 
office. 
4.3 Powers and functions 
Although the assignment of powers and functions appears the most complex aspect of the 
Kenyan devolution, this study has demonstrated that through a purposive interpretation, it is 
possible to decipher clear functions of the two levels of government. The Constitution is open 
to interpretation that recognises exclusive, concurrent and residual powers of the two levels 
of government. Contrary to the impression created by Article 186(4), county governments 
have some very clear exclusive powers. The study has drawn lessons from the „bottom-up‟ 
approach to interpretation developed by the South African courts and scholarship, to 
determine the exclusive powers and functions of both levels of government. This approach is 
essentially purposive and requires that county government powers and functions be 
determined first before the remainder is regarded as national government powers and 
functions. In this manner, one avoids subsuming county government exclusive powers and 
functions under those of the national government. Even though the approach was strictly 
developed to address the problem of overlaps in the exclusive powers and functions of the 
levels of government, the same approach has been useful in isolating exclusive powers and 
functions from concurrent ones in the first place. It has also been demonstrated that a 
purposive interpretation which in essence seeks to effectuate and give full effect to the 
purposes and objects of devolution may at times be realised by interpreting certain aspects of 
the devolution provisions narrowly and restrictively. 
The study has interpreted the legislative powers of Parliament under Article 186(4) narrowly 
in order to protect the county legislative space. It, however, demonstrated that Article 186(4) 
plays a limited but very important role of assigning to Parliament legislative powers in 
respect of unclear aspects of what otherwise are areas of county government exclusive 
powers. Although the functional lists do not specify the concurrent powers and functions, 
                                                 
24
 See Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly (2006) BCLR 1399. 
25
 Hon Muyiwa Inakoju and others v Hon Abraham Adeolu Adeleke Supreme Court of Nigeria S.C 272 of 2006. 
26
 Walter L Nixon v United States 506 US 224 (1993). 
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there are significant areas of concurrency. These are determined by examining both the 
functional lists and other provisions of the Constitution to identify specific functions which 
both national and county governments can perform. In a number of cases, both the national 
and county governments can legislate on the same matter. When conflict of national and 
county laws arises in these areas of concurrency, the justification requirements under Article 
191 must be interpreted strictly against national government, in order to resolve such 
conflicts in a manner that does not unduly interfere with the county legislative domain. In this 
manner, county governments‟ powers and functions, which initially appeared very limited, 
have turned out to be substantial. 
4.4 Financial powers 
In the financial area, it has been demonstrated that while county governments must be 
encouraged to raise their own revenue, they in reality have been assigned very limited 
revenue raising powers, comprising property and entertainment taxes as well as any other 
taxes authorised by national legislation. Nonetheless, property rates and entertainment taxes 
have purposively been interpreted as being original revenue raising powers deriving from the 
Constitution and not legislative powers donated by national government. 
The abovementioned sources cannot yield adequate revenue for the county governments to 
enable them to discharge their constitutional obligations and responsibilities. Consequently, 
counties are entitled to a share of the revenue raised nationally, either as equitable shares or 
conditional grants. Thus, revenue raised nationally has been purposively interpreted as 
accruing not exclusively to national government but jointly to national and county 
governments, which must share it equitably in an objective manner in terms of the criteria 
spelt out by Article 203. This interpretation approach has also indicated that the shareable 
revenue raised nationally is more than the revenue raised by the national government in terms 
of Article 209. From this perspective, it has been concluded that even revenue excluded from 
the Consolidated Fund because it has been dedicated to specific purposes, is not excluded 
from the shareable „revenue raised nationally‟, but must be included in the Division of 
Revenue Act and reflected as part of the share of national government, since it is dedicated to 
functions constitutionally assigned to national government. The fifteen per cent rule has also 
been interpreted narrowly as not playing a role in the definition of revenue raised nationally 
and the determination of the vertical division of revenue. It only plays a limited role in the 
resolution of disputes which should rarely arise if the system of vertical division of revenue 
guided by the functions and the criteria in Article 203 is well understood and applied. 
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Interpreted in this manner, it is concluded that the financial constitutional design ensures that 
county governments have reliable sources of revenue to enable them to discharge their 
governance and service delivery responsibilities. 
The financial provisions bear striking similarities to those of the South African Constitution. 
Thus, South African jurisprudence and scholarship have provided lessons in the purposive 
interpretation of certain aspects of the Kenyan financial provisions. In particular, the concept 
of „original‟ revenue raising powers drew from South African cases.27 The principle that 
county equitable shares are entitlements and not largesse from national government was 
informed by the decision in a South African case.
28
 
4.5 Cooperative government and intergovernmental relations 
The system of devolution which the Constitution has adopted is cooperative and not 
competitive. This is because, compared to local government under the repealed Constitution, 
county governments under the new Constitution are fully-fledged governments with status to 
engage in intergovernmental relations with the national government or each other at the 
county level.
29
 The national and county governments are described as distinct and 
interdependent, and are required to relate to each other in a cooperative and consultative 
manner. The notion of cooperative intergovernmental relations has been interpreted as 
imposing upon the two levels of government the obligations to respect the constitutional 
status and institutions and also the functions and powers of each other. When this principle is 
strictly interpreted against national government, county governments‟ autonomy and space is 
protected. The governments must consult, cooperate, support and assist each other. It has 
been demonstrated that effective performance of certain functions and exercise of some of the 
powers in order to achieve the objects of devolution, require cooperation, consultation, 
                                                 
27
 See City of Cape Town and another v Robertson and another 2005 (3) BCLR 199 (CC) in which the South 
African Constitutional Court held that the power of local government to impose rates is an original one. See also 
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and others 
1998 (12) BCLR 1458 para 39. See also Steytler & De Visser (2011) ch 13, 7 who have observed that one 
„consequence of being an original power is that a municipality‟s power to levy rates is not dependent on 
enabling national legislation‟. 
28
 Uthekela District Municipality and others v President of the Republic of South Africa and others (2002) (5) 
BCLR 479 (N). 
29
 See Malherbe R „The constitutional distribution of powers‟ in De Villiers B (ed) Review of Provinces and 
Local Governments in South Africa: Constitutional Foundations and Practice (2008) 25. 
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assistance and support among the two levels of government. It has been demonstrated that in 
areas of functional interdependence, cooperative government ensures that the autonomy of 
county governments and the exclusivity of functions and powers of the levels of government 
is respected and maintained without compromising the effective performance of the inter-
dependent functions by the two levels of government. Although the main objective of co-
operative devolved government is to avoid conflict among and within the two levels of 
government, occasions arise when avoidance is not possible. In such circumstances, the two 
levels of government also have an obligation to avoid judicial settlement of disputes, and 
pursue alternative dispute resolution mechanisms before resorting to litigation. 
Given that there are similarities in the Kenyan constitutional provisions in this respect to the 
South African provisions, the purposive interpretation has drawn instructive lessons from 
South African jurisprudence. The notion of distinct and interdependent levels of 
government
30
 draws from the South African Constitution,
31
 and its interpretation has drawn 
on South African decisions.
32
 The concept of cooperative as opposed to competitive devolved 
government requiring cooperation and consultative relationships between the levels of 
government
33
 also draws from the South African Constitution,
34
 and their interpretation has 
consequently relied on South African jurisprudence.
35
 The interpretation of the obligation to 
avoid adversarial litigation has also drawn lessons from South African decisions.
36
 
4.6 The Senate as an institution of shared governance 
A key element of the system is the combination of the notion of „self-rule‟ at the county level 
and „shared rule‟ at the national level. Shared rule requires recognition of participation rights 
                                                 
30
 Art 6(2). 
31
 S 40(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
32
 Fedsure para 126. See also Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg (2001) 9 BCLR 883 (Langeberg) 
paras 39-40. 
33
 See Arts 6(2) and 189. 
34
 See s 41 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
35
 Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (First 
Certification judgment) para 287. See also Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa in re 
Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) para 40. See also Executive Council of the Province 
of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development and another 1999 (12) 
BCLR (CC) 1360 paras 79 and 80. 
36
 See First Certification judgment para 291. See also Langeberg Municipality para 20. 
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of county governments in decision-making at the national level, which the Senate has been 
interpreted as providing infrastructure for. The Senate represents the counties and protects 
their interests and those of their governments. It thus participates in legislation-making at the 
national level in Bills concerning counties. Because of these and the need to protect 
devolution, Bills concerning counties have been interpreted broadly, liberally and generously 
in favour of the Senate to create room for it to play a role in Bills affecting counties. In this 
regard, the Supreme Court has correctly asserted that it would be willing whenever 
approached to ward off any threat to devolution.
37
 Purposive interpretation demonstrates that 
failure to involve the Senate in the enactment of a Bill concerning counties is justiciable as 
part of the manner and form of the legislative process. Furthermore, the Senate‟s oversight 
powers to review national government intervention in county affairs are interpreted as 
forming part of its strong oversight powers. It can even veto the President on the issue of 
suspension of a county government. In contrast, its oversight powers over national 
government revenue allocated to county governments have been interpreted narrowly as 
forming part of its weak oversight powers, which it must exercise bearing in mind the co-
operative government obligations to respect the constitutional status and institutions of 
county governments as well as the oversight functions of the county assembly. But it has 
been emphasised that this does not mean blind protection even when county governments are 
wrong and require corrective measures. 
The concept of Bills concerning counties in which the Senate has a role to play
38
 draws from 
the South African Constitution which provides for the participation of provinces in the 
national legislative process through the National Council of Provinces,
39
 the equivalent of the 
Senate. As such the interpretation of how to determine a Bill concerning counties has drawn 
lessons from South African cases.
40
 Likewise, this South African jurisprudence has been 
useful in the interpretation of the justiciability of the failure to involve the Senate in the 
legislative process dealing with Bills that concern counties.
41
 
                                                 
37
 Speaker of the Senate para 190. 
38
 Arts 96(2) and 110. 
39
 See ss 42(4), 75 and 76 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
40
 Tongoane and others v Minister of Agriculture and Lands Affairs and other (2010) BCLR 741  
41
 See Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly and others (2006) 12 BCLR 1399 
(CC) para 208. See also Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa & others 2009 (2) BCLR 136 
 
 
 
 
471 
 
Chapter 12: Conclusion 
4.7 Supervision 
Despite this relative autonomy of the county governments and the cooperative form of 
devolution adopted, a measure of supervision entailing regulation, monitoring and 
intervention by national government is envisaged. Regulation has been interpreted narrowly 
to restrict it to framework legislation avoiding details that may cover the whole field and pre-
empt county governments from their legislative domain.
42
 Because of the risk of abuse of 
such supervision and intervention powers, the Constitution explicitly provides for very 
constrained and circumscribed intervention, suspension and stoppage of transfer of funds 
powers. It has been demonstrated that in order to achieve the objects of devolution, these 
powers must be interpreted narrowly and strictly against the national government. For 
example, it has been argued that appropriate steps and measures must be interpreted 
restrictively, limiting them to only those measures that address the functions that the county 
government has been unable to perform. Assumption of responsibility has also been 
interpreted narrowly to ensure that national government only takes this measure when it is 
absolutely necessary to do so. Similarly, in cases of suspension, „exceptional circumstances‟ 
has been interpreted narrowly and strictly against national government to ensure that no 
inroads are made into the autonomy of the county governments, without good reason. As 
well, „material breach‟ and „persistent material breaches‟ for purposes of stoppage of transfer 
of funds to county governments have been interpreted narrowly and strictly against national 
government to ensure that stoppage of transfer becomes necessary only in a few instances. 
The overall conclusion is that while supervision is necessary to ensure that the objects of 
devolution are achieved, it is balanced against the need to protect the autonomy and the space 
of the county government. The study demonstrates that both objectives can be secured 
through a purposive interpretation and application of the constitutional provisions in this 
respect. In interpreting these aspects of supervision in this manner, the South African cases 
have been useful in some respects.
43
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(CC) para 43; Lindiwe Mazibuko v Speaker of the National assembly and another 2013 (11) BCLR 1297 (CC) 
paras 47, 60 and 66. 
42
 See Malherbe (2008) 21-3.  
43
 See Mnquma Local Municipality and Another v Premier of the Eastern Cape and others (2009) ZAECBHC 
14. See South African Defence and Aid Fund and Another v Minister of Justice (1969) 1 SA 31 (A) 34A-35D. 
See also First Certification judgment para 124; Premier of Western Cape & others v Overberg District 
Municipality & others 2011 (4) SA 441(SCA). 
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4.8 The challenges of transition 
The study has revealed that a major challenge to the system is the management of the gradual 
transition from the centralised system to the devolved system. The constitutional transition 
provisions have been interpreted narrowly as being aimed at facilitating and bringing into 
operation the substantive provisions and the devolution provisions, in particular. Their role is 
limited both in time and purpose. In respect of enactment of legislation required to bring 
devolution into operation, it has been argued that a purposive interpretation must be used to 
adjust the old order laws to ensure that they give effect to the constitutional provisions and 
bring them into operation even before enabling legislation has been enacted. The courts must 
take a liberal approach when interpreting these old order laws even where they are 
incomplete to ensure that they give operational meaning to constitutional provisions in 
specific and suitable cases. Since the reality of devolution is that it will take a long time to 
enact the required devolution-compliant laws and to review and amend or repeal the old order 
laws, these old order laws are continued in existence. The study has demonstrated that the 
requirement that such laws be interpreted with alterations and modifications to bring them 
into conformity with the devolved system, adopts severance and reading in as an 
interpretation strategy as well as a remedy to legislative inconsistency with the Constitution. 
As part of transition to devolved government, the power of national government to restructure 
provincial administration to accord with and respect the system of devolved government has 
been interpreted strictly against national government to ensure that, first, the constitutional 
status and institutions of county government are respected. Secondly, the functions and 
powers which the restructured provincial administration performs and exercises must be 
limited in the national government functional areas and powers, and not include county 
functional areas and powers. Thirdly, even when performing national government functions 
and exercising national government powers, the restructured provincial administration must 
do so in a manner that does not interfere with or encroach on county functions and powers. 
5 Conclusion 
The lessons learnt are that it is one thing to adopt a devolved system and yet another to 
interpret it in a manner that delivers its objects and purposes. The approach to interpretation 
can either develop a system to its desired goals or be used to undermine its objectives and 
purposes. The constitutional provisions can provide for an effective non-centralised system, 
but if it is not developed through a purposive interpretation, it may not deliver this objective. 
The overall assessment is that the Kenyan Constitution establishes a non-centralised system 
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with constitutional provisions on all the essential elements of such a system, but if it is not 
clearly understood, applied and realised in the manner presented in this study, it may not 
deliver the desires of the Kenyan people. This therefore puts an obligation on the courts to 
develop devolution through a purposive interpretation. All other institutions involved in 
interpretation also bear responsibility to take a purposive approach, while developing policies 
and legislation necessary for the operation of the devolved system. A purposive interpretation 
can achieve the objective of realising devolution as the central and most transformative 
aspect of the Constitution. It has, however, been demonstrated that comparative jurisprudence 
is useful in taking this approach. 
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